

Ramon Llull's gradualist solution to the hypothetical question: «Utrum Deus fuisset incarnatus, si non fuisset originale peccatum?»*¹

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Introduction

I should first like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that in order to give a full view of Ramon Llull's—or, for that matter, of any (medieval) writer's—Christology demands, at the very least:

I) an examination of that author's doctrine of God (both «theological» and «economical») and of whether this is logically prior to his or her consideration

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¹ *Ars ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones (Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae Generalis)* = *LATG, MOG V*, v, 313 (671). This question is also asked within the relevant medieval tradition under the form: «Utrum si homo/Adam non peccasset, Deus fuisset incarnatus?» See nn. 81-2 of the present article for bibliographical details concerning the hypothetical question and the solutions historically offered thereto, as well as concerning the «absurdity» of its «hypothetical» formulation.

of the Incarnation,² as well as of his or her pneumatology,³ angelology,⁴ Mariology,⁵ anthropology,⁶ sacramentology and ecclesiology,⁷ not to mention ethics and erotology, as well as his or her conception of the hypostatic union itself.⁸ By definition, therefore, this article can provide no more than a very partial and preliminary account of any or each of these theological and economical aspects onto which Christian teachings on the Incarnation open out. We might even say, along with authors from the medieval Franciscan tradition⁹ (as well as those of

² In Ramon Llull's case, this would involve an examination of the manner in which both the Trinity and the Incarnation are articulated, in his mature thought at least, in and through the correlatives. The former task has already been very amply performed in Gayà (1979); cf. also Gayà (2008, 461-515). As Anthony Bonner has demonstrated, however, the correlative terminology makes its first appearance—in the opening lines of the *LFAD* (1285-1287 (?)), *MOG* III, iv, 1 (205)—not in an elemental context, but rather with reference specifically to God who, as Father, is *Deificativus* and *Deificans*, as Son, is *Deificativus* and *Deificabilis*, and as Holy Spirit, is *Deificatus* and *Deificabilis*, and thus in the context of the expression of Trinitarian dynamism, see Bonner (2007, 107-10, here 108-9). Likewise, as my own article, Hughes (2001, 111-5, here 113), has shown, the correlativisation of the deification/hominification dyad occurs in Llull at least as early as the *Compendium seu Commentum Artis Demonstrativae* (1288-89).

³ As its title shows, Kamar (1957) studies the Holy Spirit in relation to the schism between Western and Eastern Christianity. Beyond the many scholarly articles examining Llull's relation to Eastern Christianity and the aforementioned schism by Sebastián Garcías Palou, practically nothing, however, seems to have been written on the topic of Llull's pneumatology per se or on that of the grace acquired by man through the Holy Spirit in the resurrected Christ.

⁴ Llinàs (2000).

⁵ Llull's Mariology has recently been treated in Perarnau (2005) and Perarnau (2006, 193-228). See also Sari (2009).

⁶ See Jaulent (2004) and Romano and de la Cruz (2008, 363-459).

⁷ See Gayà (2009, 51-69). Speaking of Thomas Aquinas' sacramentology, as expressed in his *Summa theologiae*, III, Q. 60, A. 3, Gayà points to a «reorientació cristocèntrica» or «recurs cristològic» on Thomas's part which «serveix per esquivar alguns dels problemes més greus plantejats per la consideració de la causalitat instrumental dels sagraments», Gayà (2009, 54-5 and nn. 9-11). The author again highlights the centrality of Christ to sacramentology and ecclesiology when he states: «Podem anticipar que Ramon Llull afirma amb contundència el lligam que hi ha entre Jesucrist, l'Església i els sagraments», citing the following text from Llull's *Liber clericorum*, III, *ROL* XXII, p. 334: «Septem sacramenta ecclesiae uolumus fundare in domino Iesu Christo, et de ipso iudicare, cum ipse sit fundamentum totius ecclesiae», Gayà (2009, 60, n. 35).

⁸ For a comparison between the erotology of Proclus and that of the Pseudo-Dionysius, see Riordan (2008, 93-94); see also *ibid.*, 92-7 and 198-209; for an analysis of Proclus' notion of *erōs pronoētikos* or «providential loving desire» as well as the role of *erōs* within the Procline cycle of procession and return, see Chlup (2012, 242-4).

⁹ In this connection, Longpré seems convinced that Llull would have been familiar with the evolution of Franciscan Christological positions—see Longpré (1969, 24)—and, in particular, with the thesis of the Primacy of Christ, prior to and independently from John Duns Scotus, *id.*, 31; cf. also *id.*, 25-6 for evidence of a lack of unanimity among Franciscan authors concerning the primary purpose of the Incarnation. On the latter grounds, one can probably interpret Giovanni Iammarrone's study of Franciscan Christology, Iammarrone (1997), as an attempt to provide a synthetic overview, largely characterised—

more recent date), that reality, both natural and supernatural, can be considered to be centered upon Christ Himself, though were we to do so we would have to ascertain whether an author and the text he has written are concerned more with *logocentricity* (i.e. a consideration of Christ specifically under the aspect of His divine Personhood, His being the Son—or *Logos*—of God, as is the case with St Bonaventure, particularly in his *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, Book III) than with a true *Christocentricity* (i.e. a consideration of reality as focused upon Christ's humanity).¹⁰ An examination of these two latter issues, therefore, would necessarily entail reference to and engagement with the widespread medieval Franciscan (though not exclusively Franciscan) tradition of affective spirituality, in which the suffering and passible nature of Christ's *humanity* in His life, Passion and death were used, often

with the exception of the extensive excursus on St Bonaventure—by the desire to present a more unified and homogeneous *esprit de corps* among participants in the tradition. For the way the sheer variety of perspectives and approaches among Franciscan authors made it hard to reduce their teachings to a unity of themes and methods in comparison with the Dominicans as regards the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, see Buzzi (1999, 379).

¹⁰ As Iammarrone notes, St Bonaventure's preference for the «negative response» to the hypothetical question leaves him exposed to (present-day) criticisms that he tends to «far entrare nel rapporto Creatore-creatura umana la materialità e la corporeità (e quindi anche la realtà del Verbo fatto carne) in modo piuttosto "accidentale", diremmo quasi "occasionale" [...]», thereby viewing both the *exitus a Deo* and—although to a lesser extent—the corresponding *reditus ad Deum* from a theological perspective that is *Logocentric* rather than *Christocentric*, Iammarrone (1997, 168); cf. also *ibid.*, 196-7. On p. 191 of the same work, Iammarrone gives a definition of Christocentrism which, in his view, attends to its «root meaning» («prendere il termine nella radicalità del significato»), a definition worth quoting in full: An authentic Christocentric vision is present «solo se si afferma che Gesù Cristo in quanto Verbo *incarnato* nella sua concretezza storica ed escatologica è stato voluto da Dio Padre predestinatore e creatore, che perciò è e resta sempre inizio e metà di ogni agire salvifico e quindi anche dell'evento Gesù Cristo, come *prima realtà "extradivina"*, *motivo e causa* di tutto il creato, nel senso che ne possa e debba essere considerato causa esemplare, finale ed efficiente (personale-strumentale) sia nell'ordine "naturale" (esistenza creaturale) che "sopranaturale" (condizione di esistenza "sopracreaturale" del tutto gratuita) o "cristico"»; cf. also *ibid.*, 191, n. 157 for the sources of this definition. There are three criteria identified by J.-F. Bonnefoy as being representative of the thesis of the primacy of Christ, subscription to any one of which qualifies an author as being an adherent of this position: Christ as (secondary) final cause, as (secondary) exemplary cause, and as (secondary) efficient cause; see Bonnefoy (1957, 123-235, esp. 128-31). See also Unger (1942, 428-75, esp. 430, 441-61). The glory of God, the primary purpose of the Incarnation as defined by Unger, is identified with the manifestation of His goodness *ad extra*, *ibid.*, 432. Carol (1986, 475-6) distinguishes between the «ultimate» and the «proximate» ends of or reasons for the Incarnation, the former being God's intrinsic goodness, the latter being, primarily, the supreme love and worship which only Christ can render to the Father and, secondarily, the personal glorification of Christ and Mary; the deification of rational creatures; and the redemption of the world. See also *ibid.*, 469-70, for Carol's delimitation of positions consistent with the Primacy of Christ (or, as it was later called, the Scotist) thesis.

ekphrastically, as themes, pretexts, catalysts, as well as images for contemplation, in order to inspire devotion in the subject.¹¹ (Any move away from—or change of emphasis towards—such a focus on Christ’s human nature, therefore, might be taken to represent a move away from an affective stance towards the Incarnation.)

Hugh of St Victor, for instance, in his *Commentariorum in Hierarchiam Coelestem S Dionysii Areopagitae*, states that «dilectio supereminet scientiae, et major est intelligentia. Plus enim diligitur quam intelligitur [here referring to the beloved from the *Song of Songs*], et intrat dilectio et appropinquat, ubi scientia foris est»,¹² and thus, according to Paul Rorem, «opened the way for [an] influential turn of the Dionysian apophatic towards the Franciscan affective».¹³ This quotation from Hugh of St Victor, clearly puts one in mind of Llull’s aphorism 19 from the *Llibre d’amic e amat* (1276-1283), though to opposite effect: «Demaná l’amich al enteniment e a la volentat qual era pus prop a son amat. E corregren ambdós, e fo ans l’enteniment a son amat que la volentat».¹⁴ Richard of St Victor and Thomas Gallus (two more Victorines), Hugh of Balma (a Carthusian), and St Bonaventure played a considerable role in the affective interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysius, which roles in the latter three cases have been examined by Boyd Taylor Coolman.¹⁵ This affective reading of the Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings was only one of several medieval attempts to resolve the contradiction between «the (Augustinian) assumption that God is fully known and loved in a beatific *visio Dei*, which is the goal of human existence, and the (Dionysian) insistence that God is radically and transcendently unknowable».¹⁶ Any comprehensive treatment of Llull’s Christology, therefore, would have to

¹¹ *Llibre de contemplació*, Book II, Chapter 54, § 24, *ORL* II, 280-81: «neguna pena que vos sofferíssets en est mon, no la soferís poc ni molt en quant érets Deu; enans tots los treballs e totes les ontas e tota la pena e tota la mort, tota caec e venc en vostra humana natura, e tota se sostenc en aquella; on, beneita sia ella, e vos, sènyer d ella.» Cf. also *ibid.*, Book III, Chapter 123, § 2, *ORL* IV, 131, wherein the Cross stands as an image recalling Christ’s suffering for mankind: «On, beneytes sien, Sènyer, totes les crous, car en totes se significa e s representa so que vos per reembre l umanal lynatge sostengués e soferís. Mas per lo nostre peccat, pocs son los homens qui en la crou sapien apercebre ni conèxer la pobrea ni les ontas ni les desonors ni les penes que vos soferís en est mon, per amor de nosaltres peccadors.» Many later examples (i.e during and after Llull’s «transitional period») could be cited in which Christ appears as the supreme manifestation of God’s attributes and the supreme created being or signifier; however, the majority of these operate in a much more cerebral and speculative manner, and at a generally higher level of abstraction. For an analysis of the Franciscan affective tradition, see Curbet (2013, 16-22).

¹² *PL* 175:1038D.

¹³ Rorem (2009, 80-81).

¹⁴ *NEORL* VIII, 433; for an English translation, cf. Bonner and Bonner (1985/1993, 192, but see n. 10).

¹⁵ Taylor Coolman (2009, 85-102, esp. 87-97).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

examine his relation to the affective tradition, any changes therein, and the way in which he negotiates the aforementioned contradiction.

II) that when reviewing an author's Christology, and particularly that of medieval authors where the level of abstraction can be high,¹⁷ one should give an assessment of the relative degree to which that author gives emphasis: a) to all; or b) to each particular mystery of Christ's Incarnation, Passion, Death, Resurrection and Ascension, as well as the extent to which reference is made to the biblical narrative.¹⁸ As Leonardo Boff has stated, in a passage which has particular resonance for the rich conceptuality of Ramon Llull's Christology, «[s]olo a partire dalla resurrezione possiamo in qualche modo raffigurarci che cosa significhi realmente ominizzazione di Dio [Gesù immagine di Dio—Iammarrone] e divinizzazione dell'uomo [Gesù verità, modello dell'uomo—Iammarrone], in una unità inconfondibile e indivisibile».¹⁹ It is also important in this respect to examine in depth the extent to which efficient, as well as exemplary and final causality is attributed to the humanity of Christ²⁰ in order for an author to qualify as an adherent of the Primacy of Christ thesis,²¹ a task which, particularly in

¹⁷ Iammarrone (1997, 122). Referring to the pre-Bonaventurian Parisian Masters, authors of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, Iammarrone, again, describes how, even within the theological orientation «prevalentemente ontologico e concettuale» of the period, theirs remained «collegata al concreto», Iammarrone (2004, 66).

¹⁸ Iammarrone points out that there is a gap within St Bonaventure's Christology as regards the Resurrection, a gap «che, d'altra parte, si colloca nella linea della cristologia medievale influenzata fortemente da sant'Agostino e da sant'Anselmo, nelle cristologie dei quali la dimensione salvifica della risurrezione non è sufficientemente valorizzata», Iammarrone (1997, 182).

¹⁹ Boff (1990, 195-6; cf. also 244-7), cited in Iammarrone (1989, 58, n. 140 [quotation corrected]); a Spanish-language edition of the former is available as Boff (2000), which states «Sólo a partir de la resurrección podemos imaginarnos de alguna forma lo que realmente significa la hominización de Dios y la divinización del hombre, en una unidad inconfundible e indivisible», *ibid.*, pp. 211-2; cf. also *id.*, pp. 264-7.

²⁰ In the very late work *Liber de compendiosa contemplatione* (May 1313), Llull shows that the glorified (and thus, resurrected) Christ, «*summa creatura a Deo summe intelligibilis, amabilis, et memorabilis [...qui] est in divina gloria*», is, on account of that glory (and alongside the divine intellect, will and memory), the «*causa efficiens et finalis in creando [...]*» ORL XVIII, (1935), p. 449; ROL I (1959), p. 86 (emphasis added); cf. also Longpré (1969, 15, n. 63), where the author quotes the entire passage; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 22, where the author notes Llull's evolution from a view of the Incarnation as being primarily redemptive to one in which Christ is seen as «le terme premier et direct des décrets divins et la raison d'être finale et exemplaire de l'univers».

²¹ The expression «Primacy of Christ» favoured by the Franciscan tradition derives from Col 1:15, and expresses the notion that Christ, in the words of the Vulgate, «est imago Dei invisibilis primogenitus omnis creaturae», thereby describing the predestination of Christ. Christ, therefore, in this context, is the cosmic Christ. See in this respect Delio (2003, 7 and n. 8).

Llull's case, requires a thorough survey of Pseudo-Dionysian influence and its Procline roots, as has been undertaken in brief by J. M. Ruiz Simon with respect to the period of transitional works dating from well before Llull's first stay in Paris (1287-1289), as identified by this author.²² It should be noted, however, that Llull himself makes an unequivocal statement of the thesis of the (absolute and universal) Primacy of Christ *ante litteram* in his *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione* (September 1305), in Distinction II, Part IV: *De primo fine creato in duratio*, § 4, Response. Although Llull speaks of the created end with the supreme priority in duration, here that priority is said not to be temporal; it is, instead, a priority of nobility and virtue: «Respondeo: Verum dicis respectu temporis; de prioritare autem temporis non intendo dicere, sed de prioritare nobilitatis et uirtutis. Nam sicut intentio habitationis domus est prior ipsa domo uel habitatione domus in nobilitate et uirtute, sic prioritas nobilitatis et uirtutis prior est nobilitate temporis»;²³ as well as in Distinction II, Part VI: *De ente primo, intelligente et amante creatum*, § 5, Response:

Respondeo et dico, quod respectu temporis uerum dicis, non autem respectu finis ordinationis et nobilitatis. Nam sicut in arbore instinctus et appetitus naturae se habent primo ad fructum, et deinde ad florem et ad subsequencia, sic Deus primo se habuit ad illam creaturam, quam primo assumpsit, deinde ad alias creaturas. Et sicut in pomerio branchae, rami, folia et flores sunt, ut sit pomum, sic et multo melius omnia creata sunt, ut sit homo Christus, uerus Deus et uerus homo.²⁴

By such statements as those noted, Llull expresses definitively the Primacy of Christ in the order of God's wishes or intentions.

III) that we ask ourselves: What is wrong with—or problematic about—the following statement? «During the Patristic period, authors such as St Irenaeus of Lyon, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, St Athanasius, St Gregory Nazianzen, St Gregory of Nyssa, the Pseudo-Dionysius, and St Maximus the Confessor, among others, and during the scholastic period, further authors, such as Rabanus Maurus, Rupert of Deutz, Honorius Augustodunensis, St Bernard of

²² Ruiz Simon (2005, 167-196; esp. 174-193). For Christ's exemplarity in contemporary Franciscan thought, see Iammarrone (1989, 76-80); for Christ's exemplarity in the *Opuscula* of St Francis of Assisi, see Iammarrone (2004, 43ff.); for the same exemplarity in the works of St Bonaventure, see Iammarrone (1997, 166); cf. also Iammarrone (2004, 67-93).

²³ *ROL* XII, 119.

²⁴ *ROL* XII, 121.

Clairvaux, Peter Lombard,²⁵ Peter Comestor, Robert Grosseteste,²⁶ John Peckham,²⁷ Matthew of Aquasparta, as well as others, are known to have contributed to the development and definition of the doctrines of deification and/or the Primacy of Christ».²⁸

The danger here lies in the fact that, while presenting a list which suggests a causal relationship over time between the various authors, one might fail properly to pay heed to the historically specific problematic each of the aforementioned authors has faced given his or her reception of a concept (or set of concepts), which may itself (or themselves) have become detached from the textual if not extratextual context in which it was (or they were) produced and transmitted, and risks being insufficiently precise about the nature and manner of any such causal relationship. There are also the added dangers that any list such as this may conceivably be accused of a certain arbitrariness as regards the authors it includes or chooses to ignore, and that, in compiling such a list, one may be prone to the kind of teleological tendency found in «Whig history».

We should bear in mind, therefore, that the concept of deification takes on a considerably different cast when used by Patristic authors than it does when used by Ramon Llull, for instance, an author for whom, beyond its purely soteriological connotations, strong though these are, it operates as a shorthand dyad, alongside hominification, to denote and embody the inherent dynamism of the hypostatic union in Christ, himself the point at which these bi-directional, vectorial forces converge.

IV) that we consider whether the author in question is writing a Christology «from above» or a Christology «from below». St Bonaventure, for instance, in

²⁵ Peter Lombard is notable for his *not* having attended to the hypothetical question in his *Libri Quatuor Sententiarum*, Book III; see Bonnefoy (1954, 333).

²⁶ Dales and King (1986). Cf. also Goering (1995, 17–51, esp. pp. 35–43) for evidence in support of the possibility that Grosseteste received theological training at the University of Paris during some part of the 1220s. For a very recent English translation of *De cessatione legalium*, see Hildebrand (2012); cf. *ibid.*, 4–9, for the question of Grosseteste's presence or otherwise in Paris.

²⁷ See Iammarrone (1997, 219–21).

²⁸ For a catalogue and analysis of the various Christian writers who have contributed to this tendency, see Carol (1986, esp. 170–203; 255–89; St Irenaeus of Lyon, 172–4; Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian and Origen, 174–5; St Athanasius, 177–9; St Gregory Nazianzen, St Gregory of Nyssa, 179–80; St Maximus the Confessor, 192–4; Rabanus Maurus, 256; Rupert of Deutz, 258–60; Honorius Augustodunensis, 261–2; St Bernard of Clairvaux, 262–4; Peter Lombard, 265; and Peter Comestor, 266). For deification/divinization in the Pseudo-Dionysius, see Riordan, (2008, *passim*, esp. Chs 3 and 4); for a monographic, though—to this reader—somewhat confused, presentation of the Pseudo-Dionysius' thought with respect to deification, see Kharlamov (2009); as well as Ivanoviè (2011, 43–55).

his Christology, is often viewed as proceeding «from above», following an Augustinian and Bernadine model, and as setting out from the already given datum of God and of his Word or Son to only then move on to the mystery of the Incarnation. The opposite procedure would involve setting out from the concrete, historical data of Jesus' life and to rise therefrom to a consideration of the Word or Son of God. Whether the above is an accurate description of Bonaventure's method is not of importance here; what is of concern is whether such a depiction helps one orientate oneself with regard to the evolution of Lull's Christology. And, seen in the most general terms, a very definite evolution can be detected in Lull's Christology, from his earliest writings, through the transitional phase of 1283-1289, up to the mature Christology of his Ternary Phase. That in which this evolution consists can be summarised as follows:

- a) An initial stage manifesting a kenotic Christology, in which there is emphasis on Christ's suffering, Passion and death on the Cross, which serve as (affective) motifs for *contemplation* by means of which the reader is drawn upwards *anagogically*, the most obvious example being the *Llibre de contemplació*.²⁹ In this phase man's first intention is given emphasis;

²⁹ For Lull's emphasis upon Christ (and Mary's) poverty and upon Christ's suffering, for instance, see *Llibre de contemplació*, Book II, Chapter 54, § 16, *ORL* II, 279: «Loat Senyor e ennobleyt sobre totes nobles! Vos volgués esser encarnat e nat de fembra pobre, per tal que coneguessen los pobles que vos no vengués en est mon per esser ric dels bens temporal; enans ic vingués *per esser pobre e per esser menyspreat e aontat e escarnit e turmentat e mort*» (emphasis added). A particularly fine instance of this emphasis is also seen in Chapter 107, § 4 of the «Art de contemplació» from the *Romanç d'Evast e Blaquerua*, where the kenotic descent of Christ (and of the presumed contemplative) is configured in terms drawn straight from the Franciscan affective tradition: «E per açó Blaquerua devallá sa memoria a rememrar la viltat e la miseria d'aquest mon e los peccats que y son; ni con fo gran la malvestat que nostre pare Adam feu contra sa creador con li fo disobedient; ni con fo gran *la misericordia, larguea, humilitat, pasciencia* de Deu con li plac pendre carn humana, ni con volch aquella carn donar a *pobretat, menyspreament, turments, treballs e angoxosa e vil mort*, sens que no havia colpa ni tort dels nostres faliments», *Romanç d'Evast e Blaquerua*, NEORL VIII, 546 (emphasis added), this downward movement, however, immediately being followed by a contemplative ascent focused upon the Dignities themselves, an ascent which produces a marked emotional response—psychological, physical, and devotional—in the contemplative: «Dementre que-l remembrament de Blaquerua era çajús en remembrança d'aquestes coses, puyá l'enteniment a entendre e seguí-lo lo remembrament, e contemplaren en les altes virtuts divines, ço es a saber, bonea, infinitat, eternitat e *caetera*. E per açó la volentat hac tanta de devoció enfre les noblees de les virtuts e la passió e mort de la natura de Jesucrist, e *doná al cor suspirs, contricció, e lo cor doná als hulls lagremes e plors e a la bocha confessió e laors de Deu*», id. (emphasis added). It is worth remembering, with reference to the closing words of this passage, that in 1294 Lull would write an entire opuscle on *affatus*, «lo sisèn seny». It is perhaps also worth mentioning here the presence of an «act of contrition» on the part of the penitent during the sacrament of penance to be performed at least once a year following the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, see Poschmann (1963, 156).

- b) During the «transitional period» Llull developed a new cosmology in which, through the theme of the semblances of the divine Dignities and the deepening of his consideration of God as cause, he begins to conceive of the world as the product of God's *influentia* or as a deified reality. This has consequences for Llull's Christology, which is henceforth articulated in the densely correlativised terminology pertaining to deification/hominification. During this period, Llull's Christology features as a central element of the structural relation between this deepening consideration of God as cause and the new formulation of the Art;
- c) A mature phase in which God is considered as creator and we see both a Christology «from above' and «below», insofar as in Christ God's Dignities and the descending order of their *influentia* find their repose (i.e. their «multiplication' comes to an end), while man's intellective soul, in its *refluentia*, also finds its repose in and through Christ via the fulfilment of its first intention towards God.³⁰

1. The background to the «hypothetical question»

It may first help the reader to consider the fact that, strictly speaking, there are four possibilities regarding Christ's Incarnation and it's relation to Adam's fall, only the first two of which may be expressed as suppositions or hypotheses (and, in this, scholastic theologians, used the question form: *Utrum?*), the second, in effect, collapsing into the first, while the third and fourth relate to the actual order of creation, and therefore do not form the subject of this article nor specifically the object of inquiry, to a greater or lesser extent, for scholastic theologians concerned with the hypothetical question. (Here, loosely speaking, the following phrases «in the absence/presence of' denote «independently from/dependently upon», respectively. The reader should also understand that neither of the pairs of possibilities (i) and (iv) nor (ii) and (iii) is tautologous.)

³⁰ I am indebted to J. M. Ruiz Simon for many of these insights; personal communication, March 2002. For the reciprocal specularity of Trinity and Incarnation in Ramon Llull, see Hughes (2005-6, 3-37; esp. 25-30). The reader should note, however, the comments of Franco Buzzi with respect to Llull's *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione* (September 1305), to the effect that Llull «parte indubbiamente dall'evento dell'incarnazione, dall fatto storico que si è realizzato in Gesù Cristo, [e] non avrebbe senso intendere le sue riflessioni come se si trattasse di una costruzione a priori del caso nuncio dell'incarnazione», Buzzi (1999, 394). As I am suggesting here, in Llull there is always an active tension and, progressively, a cyclical motion between downward and upward vectors, involving, as it were, both «analytic» and «synthetic» tendencies, as manifested in the complementary characteristics of a Christology both «from above» and «from below».

- (i) Christ is/would have been incarnated in the absence of original sin (i.e. the affirmative response to the hypothetical question; this position is often qualified by saying that, in such circumstances, Christ would have been incarnated in an impassible, immortal flesh);
- (ii) Christ is not/would not have been incarnated in the absence of original sin (i.e. the negative response to the hypothetical question);
- (iii) Christ is/would have been incarnated in the presence of original sin (this corresponds to the actual order of creation);
- (iv) Christ is not/would not have been incarnated in the presence of original sin (a possibility which would contradict the actual order).

Despite this range of possibilities, however, the hypothetical question cannot be classed as a genuine logical problem, apart from in the rather trivial sense of its expressing oppositions between positives and negatives. If we were to use the symbols «I»/«not I» for Christ's being incarnated/not incarnated, though, and «S»/«not S» for the presence/absence of Original Sin, together with «&» for the logical «and», the four propositions outlined above could be rewritten as follows:

- (i) I & not S;
- (ii) not I & not S;
- (iii) I & S;
- (iv) not I & S,

which, in fact, taken together, does form a certain kind of «square of opposition», although admittedly *not* the familiar Aristotelian-Boethian one based upon quantification.³¹

Although thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theologians may not have explicitly articulated the problematic surrounding the hypothetical question in the manner described above, they were nonetheless just as keen to examine, defend and be apologists for their faith by means of rational thought and reasoned argument as they were to support Christian doctrines by means of their religion's own authorities. Ramon Llull, as we know, was keener than most to lay emphasis upon rational demonstration, while, out of consideration for his Muslim and Jewish interlocutors or disputants, to abandon recourse to scriptural and patristic authorities which those interlocutors and disputants would fail to

³¹ It would seem, therefore, that this range of possibilities cannot, in fact, be rendered in terms of the symbols of formal logic, as has been carried out by Anthony Bonner with respect to the universals and particulars of Llull's Art in the specific case of the *LATG* (the very work in which Llull gives his most formal expression to the hypothetical question and its solution; cf. *infra*) in Bonner (2007, 271-2). Whatever the case, one can safely assert that, in Llull's writings, the processes of deification and hominification—immediate and perfect in Christ—operate as a form of «calculus» (or approximation to zero) of the contrariety between the human and the divine.

acknowledge in any case. Nevertheless, the range of possibilities—(i) to (iv)—outlined above provide the co-ordinates within which any discussion of this Christian article of faith, thus linked to the biblical doctrine of Adam's fall, might be held to have taken place during the High Middle Ages. It should be noted, however, that neither of these—article of faith or doctrine—was acceptable to Muslims or Jews, a fact from which we can glean one of the most potent reasons, in Ramon Llull's case, for making the former independent from the latter.

Before we can even begin to approach the topics outlined in the Introduction, however, it is necessary to indicate some of the sources for medieval debate on the nature and function of the Incarnation. If we look back to the Patristic period, it becomes evident that the Primacy of Christ thesis has its earliest origins in the Greek Fathers' writings on Christology and on the doctrine of grace, writings which disposed them towards a view of Christ's supremacy. Thus the Primacy of Christ thesis took root from the «physical theory» of the Incarnation, in which the contact between Christ's divine and human natures is held to be sufficient to divinise or deify human nature itself, conceived in a realist manner.³² Pancheri states that «these basic principles [the physical theory of the Incarnation and the divinisation of man], which have in St Irenaeus, St Athanasius, and St Gregory of Nyssa, their most authoritative defenders, paved the way to an open statement of the theology of Christ's primacy.»³³

In the Latin West, however, the articulation of this primacy emerged in the context of a different set of preoccupations, namely those regarding original sin and redemption. Such an hamartiocentric focus found its expression in the hypothetical question of whether there would have been an Incarnation in the absence of original sin. St Anselm, the earliest and foremost representative of such a position, gave the answer clearly already implicit in this question, namely that there would have been no Incarnation if Adam had not sinned, given that he establishes the «necessity» of the Incarnation and of Christ's expiatory death on the Cross. As Pancheri states, «hamartiocentrism cannot but arrive at the conclusion, that God would not have become incarnate if Adam's offence had

³² See Gross (1938, esp. 339-51). This work has recently been published in an English version as Jules Gross, *The Divinization of the Christian according to the Greek Fathers* (Anaheim: A & C Press, 2002); see also Pancheri (1984, 13; originally published as Francesco Saviero Pancheri, «Il Primato universale di Cristo», in *Problemi e figure della Scuola Scotistica del Santo*, Pubblicazioni della Provincia Patavina dei Frati Minori Conventuali 5 (Padua: Edizioni Messaggero / Basilica del Santo, 1966), 183-414.

³³ Pancheri (1984, 13.)

not intervened, since its point of departure is the presupposition that the dominating motive or end of Christ's coming is precisely our redemption from sin.³⁴

The difference between these two perspectives is clear: the latter makes Christ's primacy a minor adjunct to the doctrine of redemption while the former presents divinisation as both terminus and centre of the salvation mystery.³⁵ This marked difference of inflection permits the later elucidation of a position in which sin and redemption are subordinated to a higher end, namely the deification of man via the Primacy of Christ.

St Anselm's contribution, in *Cur Deus Homo*, to the debate on the reasons for the Incarnation is fundamental to the scholastic period and far beyond. Anselm's Germanic, juridical doctrine of the necessity of an infinite satisfaction required for a quasi-infinite offence against God's honour, the offence being measured against the status of the person offended rather than by that of the offending person, was a determining factor in the development of hamartiocentric responses to the hypothetical question later typified by the Thomist school. The notion of God's «lost honour» resulting from original sin thus guided Anselm's views on the need for either infinite satisfaction or proportionate punishment. The latter option, however, was not a possibility since the condemnation of mankind to perpetuity in Hell would completely subvert God's design with respect to man's salvation. Satisfaction, though, can only be rendered by a being which is at once infinite and finite, namely by a God-man: God, so that He *can* offer satisfaction; man, so that he *should* do so.³⁶ Nevertheless, for Anselm, the necessity of the Incarnation is not determined by man; rather by God's desire that man achieve salvation.³⁷

³⁴ Ibid., 14. Llull's insistence upon redemption as the primary purpose of the Incarnation can be seen in many works of the Quaternary Phase up until the «transitional period», e.g. *Llibre de contemplació*, Dist. XI, Book II, Chapter 54: «Com fo ordenada la encarnacio de nostre Senyor Jesu Christ», §§ 2-3, *ORL* II, 277; § 9, § 12, *ibid.*, 278; and Dist. XII, Book II, Chs 60-62 («Com pertany a nostre Senyor Deu segons la sua bonea que sia recreador», «Com per encarnacio divina fo delit peccat original», «Com lumà llynatge fo recreat per la sancta passio de Jesu Christ», respectively), *ORL* III, 7-23, and so on. Indeed, as Ephrem Longpré has stated, «Raymond Lulle fut d'abord le théologien contemplative de la Passion», Longpré (1969, 5-35, here 8). The issues underlying the hypothetical question were first mooted by St Augustine. Commenting on Lk 19:10: «Venit Filius hominis quaerere et salvum facere quod perierat», he stated that «Si homo non perisset, Filius hominis non venisset», *PL* 38:940. For the latter information, see Buzzi (1999, 357-413; here 391-2, n. 111).

³⁵ Gross (1938, 394), states that «la divinisation est fondamentale pour la plupart des Pères grecs. Elle forme comme le centre de leur sotériologie: tout l'oeuvre rédemptrice du Christ, de l'incarnation à la resurrection, ainsi que l'action du Saint-Esprit et de l'Église qui continue cette oeuvre, convergent vers la déification, comme le terme de notre salut.»

³⁶ Schmitt (1940, 101-2).

³⁷ Pancheri (1984, 15-16).

For Anselm, Christ can only offer adequate satisfaction by His voluntary Passion and death, a death to which otherwise He would not be subject, being untainted by sin and, thus, mortality. Ultimately, therefore, it is God's justice which demands an adequate satisfaction for sin, and such satisfaction is the cause of the Incarnation. Pancheri states, therefore, that «the gravest defect of the Anselmian perspective is the total neglect of the value of the Incarnation as a mystery of universal divinisation.»³⁸ The debate which surfaced among the emerging alternative positions was one centred, therefore, on the extent to which importance was attached to the role of either God's justice or to that of His goodness and love, in the decree of the Incarnation.

It was authors such as Rupert of Deutz (†1135) and Honorius Augustodunensis (†1150) who properly reintroduced the Patristic legacy with regard to the Incarnation into the Latin West, though they may, in fact, have been preceded in this by Scotus Eriugena, a possible medium for the transmission of the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius to Latin Christians. The two former authors, however, introduced the dimension of God's love and goodness as manifested by the Incarnation, emphasising that God created the world for the love and glory of Christ, and that the Incarnation was decreed prior to and independently from original sin, a position also adopted by Alexander of Hales (ca. 1185-1245) or, at least, the authors of the *Summa Halensis* or *Summa Fratris Alexandri*.³⁹

Rupert of Deutz, it should be noted, was initially a supporter of the thesis which proposed a primarily redemptive function for the Incarnation.⁴⁰ However, in his *De Gloria et honore Filii hominis super Matthaem* he poses the hypothetical question (according to Ephrem Longpré, he was the first theologian ever to do so),⁴¹ stating:

Hic primum illud quaerere libet utrum iste Filius Dei, de quo hic sermo est, etiam si peccatum, propter quod omnes morimur, non intercessisset, homo fieret, a non.⁴²

³⁸ Ibid., 16.

³⁹ Ibid., 17. Although, as Walter H. Principe points out, «however great the influence of Alexander on the composition of this *Summa*, his own authentic teaching must be sought in the *Glossa* and in his *Quaestiones* rather than in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*», in Principe (1967, 15, and n. 6). For Rupert of Deutz's position, see Rupertus Tuitensis, *De Gloria et honore Filii hominis super Matthaem*, *PL* 168:1624-29.

⁴⁰ Longpré (1969, 24, and n. 97).

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 33.

⁴² *PL* 168:1628 B.

Prior to reaching this point, however, he has already stated categorically that Christ is the hidden or secret sacrament («sacramentum absconditum») and the very reason why God had created everything.⁴³ Rupert's answer is decisive yet subtle, indicating that only Christ's passibility and mortality is dependent on Original Sin, and that all the saints and the elect would have been born in the absence of that sin and that, furthermore, Christ's Headship and Kingship is likewise necessary to the human race irrespective of sin.⁴⁴

In his *Libellus octo quaestionum de angelis et homine*, Honorius Augustodunensis has the *magister* who is in dialogue with his *discipulus* state: «Peccatum primi hominis non fuit causa Christi incarnationis, sed potius fuit causa mortis et damnationis. Causa autem Christi incarnationis fuit praedestinatio humanae deificationis: ab aeterno quippe a Deo erat praedestinatum, ut homo deificaretur [...]»,⁴⁵ reiterating his affirmative response with the words «auctoritas sacrae scripturae et manifesta ratio declarat, Deum hominem assumpsisse, etiamsi homo nunquam peccasset».⁴⁶ Prior to this, although in the same chapter

⁴³ «Quid ergo intelligi vult nomine "sacramenti absconditi a saeculis", subjungendo "in Deo qui omnia creavit?" An forte causam ipsam secretam, propter quam Deus omnia creavit? Non enim frustra vel otiose, talem praesenti loco relationem fecit, dicens "in Deo qui omnia creavit", et quae causa est, propter quam Deus omnia creavit, nisi iste Filius hominis? Religiose dicendum, reverenter est audiendum, quis propter istum Filium hominis, gloria et honore coronandum, Deus omnia creavit «, *ibid.*, *PL* 168:1624 A, and quoting the authority of both the Pauline Epistle to the Hebrews [Heb 2:10] and the Gospel of John, he concludes: «Nunc autem duo haec dixit, prius, propter quem omnia; deinde, et per quem omnia», (i.e. he asserts that Christ is both the final and the efficient cause of creation), *ibid.*, *PL* 168:1624 B; for important comments on Lull's use of this Pauline text in his *Contemplatio Raimundi*, and the potential use of Rupert's text as a source for this borrowing, see Longpré (1969, 31-33). Bonnefoy states that Rupert's response here is based on St Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, Book 14, Ch. 23, § 1, *PL* 41:430; see Bonnefoy (1954, 332, and n. 7).

⁴⁴ «Nam de eo quod mortalis homo non fieret, quod mortale corpus non assumeret, nisi peccatum accidisset, propter quod et nos omnes facti sumus mortales, nulli dubium est, nulli nisi infideli incognitum est. Illud quaerimus utrum hoc futurum, et humano generi aliquo modo necessarium erat, ut Deus homo fieret caput et rex omnium, ut nunc est, et quid de hoc respondebitur? Nimirum de omnibus sanctis et electis certum est, quia nati fuissent omnes, et soli, si non accidisset illud peccatum primae praevaricationis», *PL* 168:1628 C.

⁴⁵ *PL* 172:1187. It should be noted, however, that, according to Longpré, the text given in Migne is severely flawed; cf. Longpré (1969, 26, n. 113). We should note here that Honorius' work makes frequent use of the vocabulary of deification, both substantively and verbally, and that were Lull to have become familiar with this text at around the same time he was investigating the *Corpus Dionysiacum* in Paris between 1287-1289, another set of texts which are replete with the same terminology, both these sources might have provided him with a very strong stimulus towards the formation of a differently focused Christology.

⁴⁶ *PL* 172:1187-88. Cf. also Gayà (1989, 19-24), in which the author examines the extent to which Honorius represented an influence on Ramon Llull, above and beyond that of Bonaventure, particularly with respect to Honorius' work *Clavis physicae*, a more likely source of ideas for Ramon Llull, in this

in which this statement occurs (Chapter 2: «Utrum Christus incarnaretur, si homo in paradiso perstitisset?»), it is the *discipulus* himself who poses the hypothetical question using this very formula, only to conclude negatively that «putatur nunquam in carne venisse [Christus], si homo non peccasset quem redimeret: et sic videtur peccatum hominis causa fuisse Christi incarnationis. Quod si ita est, tunc illud peccatum non fuit malum, imo magnum bonum» to which the *magister* responds: «Peccatum hominis non bonum, sed maximum malum fuisse [...]».⁴⁷

Robert Grosseteste's (ca. 1175-1253) *De cessatione legalium*, a work originating in an academic context and one aimed at proving that, given the new Covenant initiated by Christ, «the continued observance of the ceremonial precepts of the Jewish law [was] heretical»,⁴⁸ is notable for its iterations of the hypothetical question and its apparent leaning towards the affirmative solution, although one should note that the author expresses a certain hesitancy in its regard and is reluctant explicitly to commit himself thereto, a hesitancy and reluctance expressed *only after* he has set out thirty *rationes* in support thereof in the *Particula tertia*. These *rationes*—in contrast to the *auctoritates scripturae* detailed at length in the preceding part of the work (i.e. *Particula secunda*), which appear to confirm the opposing view (namely, that «hominis lapsi restaurationem oportuit fieri per Dei hominis passionem»),⁴⁹ yet which Grosseteste states «possunt [...] etiam ostendi ratione»⁵⁰—seem prompted, in part, by the uncertainty still left in the author's mind as to whether Christ would have been incarnated in the absence of Original Sin («Veruntamen, an Deus esset homo etiam si non esset lapsus homo *non determinant aliqui de sacris expositoribus*

author's view, than John Scotus Eriugena's *Periphyseon*. For a forthright denial that Eriugena was an influence on Llull, see, with caution, Egea i Ger (1999, 533-46).

⁴⁷ PL 172:1187.

⁴⁸ Dales and King (1986, xii). The editors point out that there was «extensive debate on the Mosaic law [...] in the schools of late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Europe», and that the time was one of «Christian heresies, of Judaizing Christians, of superficially converted Jews and of Muslims and Jews who would not convert», *ibid.*, xii-xiii. They go on to say that «all of these [things] led Christians to question the tenet that theirs was the only true religion and gave impetus to doubt, disbelief and apostasy», *ibid.*, p. xiii. It would be interesting to examine the extent to which the potential addressees of Ramon Llull's works might be included among such groups and to what extent he singled out Christians who were subject to «doubt, disbelief and apostasy» as being ripe for his particular message. According to Hildebrand, following Richard Schenk, «Grosseteste, in fact,] seems to be writing for Christians who [...] are too sympathetic [to] Jewish practices», Hildebrand (2012, 15, and nn. 43-4). Hildebrand dates this work as probably between 1230-1235, see *ibid.*, 16.

⁴⁹ Dales and King (1986, 119).

⁵⁰ *Id.*

in libris suis quos ego adhuc inspexerim, nisi fallat me memoria mea).⁵¹ Rather than examine the *rationes* by means of which these biblical commentators (i.e. *sacri expositores*) prove the fittingness of God's being made man in order to make atonement for («ut restauret»)⁵² fallen mankind, however, Grosseteste moves straight to the question of whether «Deus esset homo si non fuisset lapsus homo».⁵³ Some of his more cogent *rationes* concern our status as God's adoptive sons («nos sumus filii Dei adoptione, et etiam homines, ut videtur, fuissent filii Dei adoptivi et per gratiam, licet numquam homo peccasset»);⁵⁴ Adam's prophecy *ante lapsum* of the marriage between Christ and his Church as a knowing and believing prophecy uttered without foreknowledge of his imminent fall;⁵⁵ the fact that God's assumption of human form guarantees the beatification of the *whole* man (body and soul), quoting St Augustine (in fact, Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima*, 9: *Sensus hominis duplex*)⁵⁶ to the effect that

Non enim esset totus homo beatificatus in anima, videlicet per contemplacionem deitatis, et in carne per visum carnis assumpte humanitatis, nisi Deus esset homo. Plena igitur beatitudo hominis exigit Deum esse hominem; posito igitur quod homo non peccasset, Deus nichilominus homo esset, aut homo numquam beatus esset.⁵⁷

Not surprisingly, given his fondness for the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius, some of Grosseteste's most impressive arguments have a strong Neoplatonic flavour, and seem to be of particular relevance to the position later adopted by Ramon Llull. This is particularly true of his argument concerning the activity and extension of the good «in omnium [...] utilitatem», insofar as, somewhat maximatically, «summa [...] bonitas tantum bonum influit universitati quanti boni ipsa est capax», this great good being the God-man himself, whose presence in the world (i.e. in the actual order of creation) is confirmation enough of that world's capacity to possess this very good now («universitas [...] habet autem nunc istud bonum»). This line of argument is saved from circularity, I believe, by the interplay of two separate, though—here, at least, in Christ—ultimately convergent, orders of reality: that of the superlative order of the diffusion

⁵¹ Id., (emphasis added). Grosseteste's arguments favouring the affirmative response to the hypothetical question extend from Parts 3.1.1-3.2.4 of *De cessatione legalium*.

⁵² Id.

⁵³ Id., 120.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 125 (*Particula tertia* I, 16 = 3.1.16); cf. also *ibid.*, 126 (3.1.17).

⁵⁵ E.g. *ibid.*, 127 (3.1.20).

⁵⁶ *PL* 40:779-832; here 784-5. See Principe (1967, 84, n. 52). For the affinities between Grosseteste's text and the *Quaestiones Disputatae «Antequam Esse Frater»* by Alexander of Hales, and on the possibility of an influence deriving from one upon the other or from a common source, see *ibid.*, 86, n. 57.

⁵⁷ Dales and King (1986, 128; 3.1.22).

or procession of the good («inluit») and that of the actual order of created reality («habet autem nunc istud bonum»), capable as it is to a lesser degree of receiving all that is imparted to it. (In Lullian terms, this might be expressed as the coincidence in Christ of the superlative uncreated and the superlative created orders.) On this basis, therefore, is Grosseteste able to argue that «huius igitur boni [universitas] capax est, nec facta est capabilis huius boni per lapsum hominis», leading him to conclude that «Igitur, licet homo non esset lapsus, hoc tanto bono non careret universitas»,⁵⁸ or, in other words, Christ would have been incarnated in the absence of original sin.⁵⁹

Grosseteste's concluding comments on all these *rationes* (in *Particula tertia* II, 1-2),⁶⁰ *rationes* so enthusiastically expounded after the multiple biblical *auctoritates* used to support the primarily redemptive function of the Incarnation in the *Particula secunda*, are, at the very least, however, cautious if not evasive, and are worth quoting *in extenso*:

II, 1. Hiis et huiusmodi ratiocinationibus videtur posse astrui Deum esse hominem licet numquam peccasset homo. Quod tamen an verum sit me ignorare scio, et meam in hac parte ignorantiam non mediocriter doleo. Nichil enim, ut supradiximus, a nostris auctoribus super hoc determinatum me vidisse recolo. Nec sine expressa auctoritate aliquid in tam ardua questione asserere volo vel audeo, quia parvitatem ingenii mei et scientie mee cito potest fallere verisimilis ratiocinatio. Si hoc tamen verum esset quod Deus scilicet fuisset homo licet non esset lapsus homo, congruenter omnis creatura intenderet illum hominem, qui est capud ecclesie.⁶¹

⁵⁸ All the quotations in this paragraph are taken from *ibid.*, 120 (3.1.4).

⁵⁹ In addition to the argument from goodness, Grosseteste goes on to use arguments from perfection and from unity, and, as we have already seen, from our adoption in Christ (*viz.* deification).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 133-34 (3.2.1-2). It is worth noting here that Grosseteste's *rationes* are not exempt from the presence of both biblical and patristic authorities.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 133. It is interesting to note that Roger Marston († ca. 1303), a pupil of John Peckham, and a Franciscan like Grosseteste, although, unlike him, a tentative supporter of the negative response to the hypothetical question, quotes the latter's uncertain conclusion almost verbatim in his *Quodlibet II*, Q. 5[.5a] [«Utrum Filius Dei incarnatus fuisset, si homo non peccasset»: «Huiusmodi rationibus innituntur opinantes Deum incarnandum licet non peccasset homo. "Quod tamen an verum sit, ignorari me scio nihilque super hoc a nostris auctoribus determinatum recolo me vidisse, nec sine expressa auctoritate aliquid in tam ardua questione asserendum puto, quia parvitatem ingenii et scientie cito posset fallere ratio verisimilis." Tamen omnes auctoritates Sanctorum videntur asserere quod Incarnationis Christi ratio praecipua fuit humani generis reparatio» (note here also the use of the Bonaventurian term «ratio praecipua»), Etkorn and Brady (1968, 157-8); cited—and here corrected—in Longpré (1969, 27, n. 117) from MS Florence, Bibl. Laur., conv. Sopp. 123, f. 133d-135a. Roger concludes on the matter in the vein of St Bonaventure, as follows: «Communiis tamen tenent moderni doctores Filium Dei ideo praecipue carnem assumpsisse, ut hominem perditum repararet. Et opinionem hanc aestimo magis piam», Etkorn and Brady (1968, 158). The near verbatim reproduction of Grosseteste's text here has also been noticed by Bonnefoy; see Bonnefoy (1954, 352).

The following section describes how Christ has Headship of the Church, making reference not only to the classic biblical locus for Christ's primacy (i.e. Col. 1:15), but also to the principle of (final) causality, and culminates in a conceit of an organic nature, in certain ways redolent of Lull's subsequent use of arboreal imagery and structures:

2. Nulli dubium enim quin omnia sint facta propter hominem et propter hominem secundum optimum statum hominis. Quapropter finis omnium factorum in hoc mundo sensibili est ecclesia triumphans, et maxime finis omnium esset illius ecclesiae capud unicum. Quapropter et omnis creatura expectarent et suo modo suspirarent ad hominum-Deum capud ecclesie,⁶² quo adveniente, cum ipse esset finis omnium precipuus, esset plenitudo temporis. Vera enim cuiusque plenitudo est finis propter quem est adepticio, et secundum hunc modum ipse homo-Deus est primogenitus omnis creature [Col 1:15], quia finis prior est in intentione quam sint illa quae sunt ad finem.⁶³ Et per hunc modum, sicut ille Adam qui fuit primus tempore factus fuit in animam viventem, sic novissimus Adam factus esset in spiritum vivificantem. Et quemadmodum per primum Adam, qui fuit radix arbores generacionis humane, omnes generarentur in vitam naturalem; sic per novissimum Adam, qui fuisset, sicut et nunc est, fructus illius arboris, omnes regerarentur in vitam vivificatam per gratiam. Et quemadmodum videmus in arbore naturali quod tota arbor est propter fructum, in fructu autem est semen—semen autem, ne sit ociose, semen iterum germinat et generat; sic in arbores generacionis humane fuisset homo-Deus fructus et semen, regenerans in vitam iusticie et glorie generatos ex radice prima in vitam nature.⁶⁴

Grosseteste's hesitancy on this matter allows him only to conclude that, *in the actual order of creation* (rather than the hypothetical order), «quomodocumque se habeat veritas de incarnatione Verbi si non fuisset lapsus homo, certissimi sumus nunc, homine lapsu, quod Deus est homo».⁶⁵

⁶² It is worth remembering in this context St Bonaventure's celebrated dictum to the effect that «non enim Christus ad nos finaliter ordinatur, sed nos finaliter ordinamur ad ipsum, quia non caput propter membra, sed membra propter caput», *III Sent.*, p. 706; D. 32, A. 1, Q. 5: «Utrum Deus magis dilexerit genus humanum quam Christum», *Conclusio*, 3), which would leave such an indelible impression on so much of Franciscan spirituality, not to mention, perhaps, even Lull himself. Cf. Longpré (1969, 23-4).

⁶³ The phrase «Finis est prior in intentione, intentio sumitur pro actu mentis, qui est intendere» occurs in St Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de veritate*, Q. 21, A. 3, ad 5, Busa (1980b, 124). Bonnefoy notes that, with respect to the phrase «et secundum hunc modum ipse homo-Deus est *primogenitus omnis creature*, quia finis prior est in intentione quam sint illa quae sunt ad finem», «autant [Grosseteste] est hésitant pour répondre à l'insoluble question, autant il est catégorique pour affirmer les thèses connexes avec celle de la primauté du Christ, notamment sa finalité universelle et sa priorité dans l'ordre des intentions divines», Bonnefoy (1954, 334).

⁶⁴ Dales and King (1986, 133-4).

⁶⁵ For an interesting account of how Grosseteste's thinking on the Incarnation (and thought in general on the Incarnation) helped shape modern Western notions of scientific enquiry, and of how his vision of

Later on, St Bonaventure (†1274) meditated upon the *ratio praecipua* (or primary purpose) of the Incarnation⁶⁶ and observed that there were, indeed, two opinions on this issue. The first distinguished between the substance and the passible modality of the Incarnation:

Quidam enim dicere voluerint, quod de incarnatione est loqui dupliciter. Est enim incarnatio carnis assumptio: aut quantum ad substantiam; aut quantum ad defectum passibilitatis. Si fiat sermo de ipso quantum ad defectum passibilitatis et mortalitatis dicunt, quod incarnationis praecipua ratio fuit humani generis redemptio. Nisi enim homo peccasset et lapsus et redimendus esset, Christus carnem mortalem non assumsisset.⁶⁷

From this position emerged the statement that the perfection of man and, thus, of the universe is the *ratio praecipua* of the substance of the Incarnation, independently from original sin

Incarnatio enim facit ad perfectionem hominis—et per consequens ad perfectionem totius universi—in hoc quod complet et completionem dat humano generi, secundum illud quod respicit naturam, et secundum illud quod respicit gratiam, et secundum illud quod respicit gloriam.⁶⁸

It is only Christ's passibility, whose end is man's redemption, which follows from prevision of sin.

The second opinion stated that the primary purpose is the reparation of Adam's sin, whereby there would have been no Incarnation in the absence of such sin:

the hypostatic union in Christ served to unify the material and spiritual realms of the universe and to represent the unifying principle of the macrocosm, see Ranft (2013, 203-205). The author, however, incorrectly states that «Scholars have long noted that Grosseteste was the first scholastic thinker to ask and answer a particular question about the incarnation, [namely,] why it occurred», *ibid.*, 203. Cf. also Bonnefoy (1954, 334-5).

⁶⁶ St Bonaventure does so, however, without explicitly posing the hypothetical *question*, although when answering the question of the Incarnation's *ratio praecipua*, he does in fact give a conditional *answer* to the form the hypothetical question would have taken had he asked it, namely, «igitur si homo stetit, incarnatio facta non fuisset; ideo incarnationis ratio praecipua videtur esse hominis reparatio», *III Sent.*, p. 22; D. 1, A. 2, Q. 2.2. Cf. also Delio (2003, 10-11, and n. 31).

⁶⁷ Pancheri (1984, 21). Cf. also *III Sent.*, p. 23; D. 1, A. 2, Q. 2 (i.e. «Quae fuerit incarnationis ratio praecipua?»).

⁶⁸ *Id.*

praecipua ratio incarnationis est reparatio humani generis [...] Ista [ratio] est praecipua respectu omnium, quia, nisi genus humanum fuisset lapsum, Verbum Dei non fuisset incarnatum.⁶⁹

For Bonaventure—albeit that, like Grosseteste, he is expressing a degree of circumspection and hesitancy regarding the primary purpose of the Incarnation—the true reason for the Incarnation can only be known by He who is incarnated on our behalf, though he opted himself for the second opinion as being more consonant with the piety of faith, stating that, nevertheless, the former opinion has greater conformity with reason.⁷⁰

Prior to Bonaventure, however, the Parisian Masters responsible for the *Summa Halensis* or *Summa Fratris Alexandri*⁷¹—a work resulting not only from the contributions of Alexander of Hales but also from those of Franciscan theologians working alongside him (such as Jean de la Rochelle, Odo Rigaud, William of Middleton, and so on)⁷²—had answered the question concerning the fittingness (*convenientia*) of the Incarnation, in the words of Iammarrone, «ponendosi la domanda se questa [i.e. l'incarnazione] avrebbe avuto un senso per Dio e per l'uomo anche nel caso in cui non vi fosse stata la caduta dell'umanità nel peccato e quindi l'esigenza della redenzione.»⁷³ In comparison with other—earlier or later—efforts to answer this (hypothetical) question, Iammarrone feels that the formulation of the Parisian Masters is «più felice perché è più generale e pone in termini espliciti il senso dell'incarnazione per l'esistenza del-

⁶⁹ *III Sent.*, p. 24; D. 1, A. 2, Q. 2 (i.e. «Quae fuerit incarnationis ratio praecipua?»).

⁷⁰ «Quis autem horum modorum dicendi verior sit, novit ille qui pro nobis incarnari dignatus est. Quis etiam horum alteri praeponeendus sit, difficile est videre, pro eo quod uterque modo catholicus est et a viris catholicis sustinetur. Uterque etiam modus excitat animam ad devotionem secundum diversas considerationes. Videtur autem primus modus magis consonare iudicio rationis; secundus tamen, ut apparet, plus consonant pietate fidei», in *III Sent.*, pp. 21-8, here p. 24. The reference to this work in Iammarrone (1997, 161, n. 57) is incorrect as regards Distinction and Article, though correct as to pagination. Cf. also Pancheri (1984, 22-5). For a full treatment of St Bonaventure's Christology, see Iammarrone (1997, Chapter 4, 143-214). On pp. 197-98, esp. n. 185, the author notes other places in St Bonaventure's works where he discusses the question of the *ratio praecipua* of the Incarnation. Delio, however, notes an evolution in Bonaventure's Christology, from an initial adherence to an Anselmian position in his *Breviloquium* (1255) to the statement of Christ as the «noble perfection of the universe» and the Incarnation as the perfection of the created order and an act of cosmic completion» in and after his *De reductio artium ad theologiam* (1257), citing in this latter case Bonaventure's *Sermo II in nativitate Domini* (IX, 107), an evolution which bears witness, in the author's view, to a «twofold emphasis on completion and redemption» in St Bonaventure's doctrine on the Incarnation. See Delio (2003, 10).

⁷¹ Alexander of Hales (1948, 1-310). Iammarrone calls these masters the first professional theologians of a Franciscan persuasion, Iammarrone (1997, 120); Iammarrone (2004, 65).

⁷² Iammarrone (1997, 120).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 127.

l'uomo (e del suo mondo) in quanto tale.⁷⁴ Two of the affirmative reasons adduced in favour of an Incarnation in the absence of Original Sin are: first, the Pseudo-Dionysian principle of *Bonum est diffusivum sui*;⁷⁵ and, second, the *beatifiability* of man's entire being—this being brought about *in toto* by Christ's recapitulation of all reality (corporeal, sensory and intellectual).⁷⁶ Beatification, in the case of Latin Christianity, is of course one of the cognates of the Eastern theological concept of deification/divinisation (or *the?sis*), as are filiation and adoption in Christ, and man's participation in Christ's divine Sonship. The passive capacity of man's *beatifiability* as expressed by these Franciscan authors in their *Summa*, however, though unlikely to be anticipatory in any positive sense of Llull's own dynamic formulation of the correlatives of *Deificativus / Deificabilis / Deificare*, related as these latter are to the substantives of *Deificativitas* and *Deificabilitas*, nevertheless sets the tone for Llull's later innovations and is uncannily echoed thereby. As Iammarrone states, in relation to the Parisian Masters' affirmation of Christ's efficient causality and of an Incarnation in and through which all humanity is called by grace to participation in divine filiation: «Tutto il discorso è impostato senza che si faccia menzione alcuna del peccato [...]», the result being that Christ's predestination «è vista *anche* nell'ottica della liberazione dal peccato, *ma non è legata ad essa* [...]».⁷⁷

Unlike Bonaventure, St Thomas Aquinas always had recourse to the hypothetical question in his consideration of the actual fact of the Incarnation and its relationship to redemption, thus revealing close links with the Anselmian formulation. Aquinas generally reached the same conclusions as Bonaventure did

⁷⁴ Id.

⁷⁵ Alexander of Hales (1960, 208; *Quaestio* 15.47), as cited in Principe (1967, 84). Alexander concludes that «ergo *conveniebat* incarnationem fieri etiam si non esset passio [i.e. si non esset *peccatum*]», id. (emphasis added).

⁷⁶ Iammarrone (1997, 128-29); Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones Disputatae* «*Antequam Esse Frater*», id., as cited in Principe (1967, 84). As Principe points out, «similar arguments are found in Grosseteste», id., n. 51. Cf. *supra*. Alexander again concludes that an Incarnation would be possible in the absence of and independently from Original Sin in *Quaestio* 57.28, where he states that «Haec enim unio divinitatis cum humanitate potuit esse etsi *non peccasset homo*; sed tunc non esset cum ea prout est passibilis, id est habens necessitate ad patiendum assumptam», Alexander of Hales (1960, 1106), as cited in Principe (1967, 86).

⁷⁷ Iammarrone (1997, 131). Cf. also *ibid.*, 198, n. 187, where the author states that St Bonaventure was aware that of the two possible positions on the Incarnation, the Parisian Masters had inclined towards the latter, i.e. the affirmative solution to the hypothetical question. This somewhat cautious conclusion is endorsed by Principe—in specific relation to Alexander of Hales himself rather than to the authors of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*—who comments that «[a]lthough [Alexander of Hales] does not state explicitly that God would have become incarnate even if man had not sinned, the tendency of all his arguments is towards such a conclusion», Principe (1967, 86).

before him, though with a lesser degree of certainty.⁷⁸ Aquinas, in fact, in his *Summa theologiae* III, Q. 1, A. 3-co, blending certainty with agnosticism, gives epistemological primacy to the textual witness of the Bible, believing man ultimately to be incapable of fathoming such matters, stating that «ea enim quae ex sola Dei voluntate proveniunt, supra omne debitum creaturae, nobis innotescere non possunt nisi quatenus in sacra scriptura traduntur, per quam divina voluntas innotescit».⁷⁹ Aquinas asserts in this same passage only the greater fittingness (*convenientius dicitur*) of the view which holds the primarily redemptive function of the Incarnation. However, it was a characteristic of later Thomists that, disregarding Aquinas' hesitancy, they stated that redemption is the *sole* reason for God's Incarnation.⁸⁰ Thus they made an unjustifiable leap from an affirmative statement («Christ was incarnated to redeem man») to an exclusive statement («Christ was incarnated solely to redeem man»).

2. Ramon Llull's gradualist construal of the «hypothetical question»

As we have already seen, much debate over the centuries has focused on the «hypothetical question» of whether Christ would have been incarnated in the absence of original sin.⁸¹ The question is nowadays considered, at least by some

⁷⁸ Aquinas, however, did not give an affirmative response to the hypothetical question, as had—with certain qualifications—his teacher Albert the Great; see Borgnet (1893-94, 361 b; Book III, D. 20, A. 4): «Dicendum, quod in hac quaestione solutio incerta est. Sed quantum possum opinari, credo quod Filius Dei factus fuisset homo, etiamsi numquam fuisset peccatum: [...] tamen nihil de hoc asserendo dico: sed credo hoc quod dixi, magis concordare pietati fidei.» Also cited in Bonnefoy (1954, 338). For Aquinas' caution with respect to the «solution» to this question and for the different interpretation given of his response by later Thomists, see *ibid.*, 339-42.

⁷⁹ Busa, 1980a, 769.

⁸⁰ Pancheri (1984, 25-30). See also Carol (1986, Pt I, Chs 1-3; Pt II, Chs 1, 3, 6) for the development of Thomist and Scotist positions on the Incarnation. For St Thomas' subtle and circumspect opinion, see Busa 1980a, 769: «ita quod, peccato non existente, incarnatio non fuisset. *Quamvis potentia Dei ad hoc non limitetur: potuisset enim, etiam peccato non existente, Deus incarnari*» (emphasis added).

⁸¹ For a discussion of this question in the 13th century and in its contemporary perspective, see Longpré (1930, 365-71); Bissen (1932, 314-36); Unger (1942, 428-75); Durand (1947, 475-86); Caldentey (1949, 363-81); Bonnefoy (1954, 327-68); *id.* (1957, 123-235); Martelet (1965, 35-80). See also Carol (1986, esp. Part II, Chs 1 and 6). The latter author states, *ibid.*, 267-8, that, during the period of high scholasticism, «owing to the influence of Rupert of Deutz and Honorius Augustodunensis, the thesis [i.e. of the Primacy of Christ] is discussed for the most part (and unfortunately) under a hypothetical formulation.» However, for the affirmative response to a more general formulation of the hypothetical question by the pre-Bonaventurian Parisian Masters (authors of the *Summa Halensis*) see Iammarrone (1997, 127-9); see also text above at nn. 71-74 in the present article.

authors, to be insoluble.⁸² However insoluble it may be, in the Middle Ages it evinced two «solutions»: the negative response, the so-called Thomist or «exclusively redemptive» thesis, which viewed the Incarnation as being dependent upon original sin and, therefore, saw its final cause or purpose as being redemption (associated more with the followers of Aquinas, and the Dominicans in general, than with Aquinas himself who was most careful in his appraisal of and respect for both responses, though ultimately, if marginally, favouring the negative response);⁸³ and the affirmative response, the so-called Scotist thesis, according to which the Incarnation is independent from and prior to original sin, and its purpose is the perfection of the universe through the predestined deification of man. Again, this second position is that of the followers of John Duns Scotus rather than that of Scotus himself.⁸⁴ Yet this hypothetical question along with the second or affirmative response, reflecting a world without sin which is not that of the actual order of creation, entered the medieval world, as has been noted, with the writings of Rupert of Deutz and Honorius Augustodunensis. However, Scotus himself studiously avoided the hypothetical question on the grounds that man cannot know - since it is not given in revelation - what God would have done in the absence of original sin, namely in an hypothetical order; all we know is what has been revealed about the actual order (of nature, grace, and glory) in its relation to Christ's Incarnation. The question should be, according to Bonnefoy, not «Would Christ have been incarnated if Adam had not sinned?» but «Is the Incarnation dependent on Adam's sin or

⁸² Bonnefoy (1954, 327-68). See also Martelet (1965, *passim*) for an attempt to resolve this question. Cf. also Unger (1942, 434-5) for a denial that the thesis of the absolute Primacy of Christ even involves hypothetical considerations.

⁸³ For a discussion of St Thomas' position on the hypothetical question, see Potvin (1973, 212-6) and Pancheri (1984, 25-30).

⁸⁴ For Scotus' avoidance of the hypothetical question, see Pancheri (1984, 31ff). On p. 31 the author states that «[i]t is not through the limited perspective of "Si homo no peccasset..." that Scotus introduces the great theme [of Christ's absolute primacy]; he presents it in itself, directly [...] The discussion of Christ's primacy no longer appears as "a theological question," but rather as *the* essential and all-encompassing theological datum.» See also for this issue, Iammarrone (1997, 315), where the author states that Scotus replaces the hypothetical question with a concrete reformulation of the issue in terms of whether Christ was predestined as the Son of God. Cf. also, *ibid.*, 204-5 and n. 203, where Iammarrone indicates the grounds on which St Bonaventure rejects the affirmative response in *III Sent.*, p. 25; D. 1, A. 2., Q. 2. Consulting the text, we find that Bonaventure states that his preferred view «magis consonat pietati fidei, quia Deum magis honorificat quam praecedens. Nam praecedens dicit, quod Deum conveniebat incarnari ad perfectionem universitatis; et ideo Deum quodam modo intra perfectionem universi concludit et quondam necessitate incarnationis ponit ei, cum dicit, opera eius aliter ad perfectionem non perducit.» See also Bonnefoy (1954, 359-60, and n. 68), on Scotus' reluctance to speculate upon a hypothetical order and thus to even pose the hypothetical question itself.

not?’⁸⁵ Duns Scotus, moreover, went further than merely asserting the purpose of the Incarnation to be the perfection of the universe for he also affirmed the absolute primacy of Christ in the order of God’s wishes and thus the (non-temporal) priority of Christ’s predestination over all other divine decrees, a predestination which, therefore, precedes foresight of the Fall on God’s part and is held already to be known by Adam in his state of innocence.

It is useful, however, to make a distinction between the thesis of the perfection of the universe and that of the primacy of Christ since the former can be a response to the hypothetical question and (just like the negative response) is generally anthropocentric, while the latter is a response with respect to the actual order of creation and is Christocentric, insofar as Christ is, for Llull at least as much as Scotus, the «opus summum Dei».⁸⁶ As Bonnefoy makes clear, the affirmative (or «Scotist») and negative (or «Thomist») responses to the hypothetical question constitute two theses, supported, respectively, by two arguments, namely, the perfection of the universe and the redemption of fallen humanity. The former, however, in his view, is not synonymous with the thesis of the Primacy of Christ.⁸⁷ Is it, nevertheless, possible to say, in any meaningful sense, then, that Llull was able to override this distinction in the form of a genuinely Christocentric perfection of the universe? It must here be stressed that while Llull avoided all recourse to revelation in his discussion of the actual order - which coincides with that of God’s wishes (for, if God wishes something, He must already know it and, if he both knows and wishes it, then it must be) - he does, however, pose and answer the hypothetical question - in the affirmative - on at least one occasion.⁸⁸

Llull’s answer—or «solution’—to the question: «Utrum Deus fuisset incarnatus, si non fuisset originale peccatum?», which he gives in the *Ars ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones (Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae Generalis)* = *LATG*, Distinction III, Part ii: «De Mille minutis Quaestionibus», «De Deo et incarnatio», Quaestio XXII, is not the customary scholastic «Dico quod sic» or «Dico quod non». Although certainly both laconic and lapidary, his solution nevertheless manages to incorporate the theological (and metaphysical) concept of the maximity of the Dignities’ manifestation in and through Christ’s human

⁸⁵ That is to say, the question should not be considered from the perspective of a hypothetical (and therefore unknowable) order but from that of the actual order of God’s decrees in the present economy of salvation.

⁸⁶ Cf. Bonnefoy (1954, *passim*).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 342.

⁸⁸ *LATG, MOG V*, v, 313 (671).

nature, while stressing both the latter's inclusion within created reality and superiority over all beings within that created realm. It also manages to squeeze in a reference to the methodological principle of first and second intentions, the means by which Llull ensures that his argument is genuinely dialectical, if not more than dialectical, insofar as it takes account of the two opposing positions available as possible responses or solutions to this question,⁸⁹ yet goes further than would be strictly necessary as regards dialectic, by endorsing both positions within a hierarchy of relative preference.

This reasoning leads to a conclusion only obliquely related to the question posed (and to the tradition surrounding this question), but which to readers familiar with the Lullian doctrine of intentions, make his answer or «solution» perfectly intelligible and perfectly clear: «Solutio: Humanitas Christi, quae est pars universi create, habet majorem magnitudinem bonitatis, quam omne reliquum creatum: et ideo est per primam intentionem, et universum creatum est per secundam.»⁹⁰ In effect, though Llull is leaving his reader to «fill in the gaps», he is expressing a preference for the «affirmative response» to the hypothetical question, while at the same time accommodating its contradictory, the «negative response», in a position of subordinacy, thereby making the point that these two positions are not mutually exclusive, and thus overriding—or «violating», in the words of Parisoli (2005, *passim*)—the principle of (non-)contradiction. It is in this sense that I have called Llull's approach to the matter «gradualist», insofar as he admits to the existence of degrees of truth attaching to potentially or actually conflicting positions, degrees which vary according to how greatly those positions achieve concordance with the Principles and methods of his Art (i.e. the extent to which they manifest «goodness», «greatness», etc., and are in accord with their own—and man's—first intention).

Interestingly enough, Llull doesn't say that the former response is true *simpliciter*, and the latter *secundum quid*. We might even say that Llull «solves» the hypothetical question in the way he does here, because for him it is less a matter

⁸⁹ See Ruiz Simon (1999, 194). For a more recent and nuanced account of Llull's treatment of *quaestiones* in the context of dialectic and the shifts in demonstrative techniques used by Llull from the Quaternary to the Ternary and the Post-Art Phases, as well as in respect of the formalisation of the Ten Questions and Rules from the *Taula general* (1293-1294) onwards, see Bonner (2007, 77-90, for Llull's questions during the Quaternary Phase; 137-42, for the Questions and Rules during the Ternary Phase; 155-60, for the mixing of the Principles and Rules; for Rule B: *Utrum?*, see esp. 138-9, 174-6, 184-6; see also *ibid.*, 16-18 and 256-9 for dialectic, and 129 and 185 for the «relegation» of the black triangle (doubt-affirmation-negation) of Figure T from the Quaternary Phase to *Utrum?* or the rule of «Possibility», the first of the Questions or Rules in the Ternary Phase).

⁹⁰ *LATG, MOG V*, v, 313 (671).

of deciding upon contradictories than of selecting a *ratio praeferenda*. We should note, however, that in his solution Lull alludes only to Christ's humanity and fails to refer to his divinity, but in doing so clearly grounds this solution in the very fact of Christ's human existence. As we have just suggested, and perhaps even more importantly, from a methodological point of view at least, we should note further that this solution is specifically articulated in terms drawn directly from Lull's (now ternary) Arts.⁹¹

What is also more than apparent here is that—unlike the lengthy *pro et contra* weighing of Scripture against *rationes* which precedes the final hesitancy (and reliance on the determinations of biblical commentators) of Grosseteste's response to the question, or the subtle deliberations of St Bonaventure and Aquinas, both of whom are keen to see merit in the arguments they choose to reject, and all three of whom we see being pulled in different directions at the same time by the nature of the question—Lull's own solution is marked by a swiftness, simplicity, succinctness, and decisiveness, not to say obviousness, which almost belie the delicate accommodation he must have had to make. The difference, therefore, between Lull's conduct and that of other authors who have adjudicated—or not—on the hypothetical question is that, while some have come down firmly on one side or the other, others have decided that the matter can only be known by God, and still others, after due consideration of the arguments on both sides of the question, have reluctantly opted for the more traditional, «negative» response (none of which positions are mutually exclusive), is that he has not chosen to reject or dismiss either one of the options, but to embrace both, even if unequally so. Where some have chosen one alternative over another or shown a marked degree of ambivalence, Lull has chosen, to a degree, *not* to decide, but rather actively to embrace the ambivalence revealed by many other writers on the subject.

Lull, in fact, makes a further invocation of—or indirect reference to—the hypothetical question, as far as its bearing upon Mary as the Mother of God is concerned, in the final section of the «Tree of Examples» («De l'Arbre exemplifical»), VII «Del fruyt de l'Arbre exemplifical», § 12 «Del exempli del fruyt maternal» from the *Arbre de ciència* (1295-96), when he states that «aquels qui dien que yo no fora Mare de Deu si no fos peccat, dien que lo fruyt de ma

⁹¹ In Distinction III, Part i, Question 2: «De Incarnatione», Prima Quaestio B «Utrum Deus sit incarnatus», Solutio BCtG, of the *LATG, MOG V*, v, 152 (510), Lull uses the schema «p ? u; not-p ? not-u; u; conclusion: p» (where «p» indicates a «particular» and «u» a «universal») to resolve this question affirmatively. See Ruiz Simon (1999, 229). For an examination of Lull's understanding of the terms «particular» and «universal» in their relation to the Art and, in particular, to this specific text, see Bonner (2007, 270-72).

maternitat no es mon fill Jesu Christ, enans ho es peccat.⁹² We can see, therefore, that in Llull's eyes the predestination of Christ and of Mary are inseparably linked, and that that predestination is viewed as being independent from, as well as prior to (in the order of God's decrees), any prevision of sin. Llull makes a much earlier and, again, oblique reference to the hypothetical question in the *Llibre de contemplació* (1273-74 (?)) Book 3, Chapter 183, §§ 7-8, when establishing the generality of Adam's sin, which is general because thereby God has reason to grant salvation only to those who deserve it («que l peccat d Adam es general per so que vos ajats ocasió que no donets salvacio a negú sino a aquells qui n son reemuts»).⁹³ It is in the form of a *demonstratio per negationem* that Llull articulates the hypothetical question, though broadens, at the same time as subordinating, the nature of the question through the added dimension of its generality or universality, in §8: «Si l peccat d Adam no fos general, Sènyer, no agrets ocasió que us encarnassets ne fossets home, e si vos no fossets home, los homens no pogren en gloria tam bé gloriejar corporalment com farán per so car vos sots home.»⁹⁴ By this reasoning, therefore, God's assumption of human nature is part of His very righteousness and results specifically from the generality of Original Sin: «On, per tal que vos aguessets ocasió de esser home per esser dreturer a home, es significat que l peccat d Adam es general.»⁹⁵

As has been pointed out by Batalla and Fidora in the introduction to their bilingual edition of the *Disputa entre la fe i l'enteniment*, Llull makes a (possi-

⁹² *ORL* XII, p. 443; the Latin text here reads: «Et illi qui dicunt, quod ego mater Dei non essem si non esset peccatum, dicunt, quod fructus maternitatis non est meus filius Iesus Christus, sed peccatum», *ROL* XXV, p. 821. See also Question XXIX: «Utrum in Incarnatione DEI fuerit principalis Divina Ostensio & Dilectio, vel nostra Redemptio?», § 3, Solution by «contrariety», in *Quaestiones per Artem Demonstrativam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, iii, 50 (66), where Llull considers indirectly the hypothetical question in the context of the two competing theses of redemption and divine manifestation and love, preferring the latter.

⁹³ *ORL* V, p. 134.

⁹⁴ Id. Cf. also Longpré (1969, 10-11). Anthony Bonner has pointed out in a personal communication [probably between 2001-2002] that «if you start with the supposition that God did not create the world [or in this particular case, that Adam's sin is not general] and show that this leads to a contradiction [and, again, here that this contradiction leads to a further contradiction], then God must have created the world [or, in this case, Adam's sin must be general]. It's the negative version of *modus tollens*:

~A -> B

~ B

~~A

A

which is the *demonstratio per negationem*, *reductio ad impossibile* and *demonstratio per hypothesim* all rolled into one.'

⁹⁵ *ORL* V, p. 134.

bly final) reference to the hypothetical question in the *Liber de iustitia Dei* (1314),⁹⁶ where he categorically and definitively dismisses the negative response on the grounds of its incorrectness («non dicunt bene illi, quod asserunt, quod principalis finis incarnationis est redimere humanum genus»)⁹⁷ and of the impossibility of its consequences («quia sequeretur, quod, si peccatum originale non fuisset, Deus incarnatus non esset, et quod *peccatum fuisset causa incarnationis*» (emphasis added)).⁹⁸

Over time, however, Llull seems to venture much further than either his predecessors or contemporaries in stressing the deification of man (and hence the perfection of the universe), along with the hominification of God, as being prior to and independent from original sin (i.e. he seems to abhor any construal that assigns a causal role to original sin with respect to the Incarnation), as well as the priority of Christ in both the order of God's wishes and the actual order of creation.⁹⁹ He insists after his earlier works, at least, that the world exists for Christ and not vice versa (which would be the case if the Incarnation *were* dependent upon original sin), and in this is reminiscent of St Bonaventure's dictum: «non enim Christus ad nos finaliter ordinatur, sed nos finaliter ordinamur ad ipsum, quia non caput propter membra, sed membra propter caput.»¹⁰⁰

In very general terms, it is possible to say, therefore, that only if Christ is considered with respect both to his divinity and his humanity in fully correlativised form can he be adequately incorporated into—and codified within—Llull's overall system of thought. In other words, God is best revealed, and therefore known and loved, and the entire creation may make its superlative return to God, if and only if Christ is seen not simply as a concrete, historical figure from whose life, death and resurrection we receive expiation from sin and full redemption, but also, and primarily, as a rather more abstract conception within and through which occurs the transformative cycle of the correlativised hominification of God (i.e. His «procession» into creation) and man and creation's «return» to God in and through the correlativised deification of Christ's

⁹⁶ *ROL* II, p. 52, as cited in Batalla and Fidora (2011, 48); pp. 46-50 of the same introduction provide a good summary of some of the issues treated in the present article.

⁹⁷ *Id.*

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ It is interesting to note in this respect Alexander of Hales distinction between the name «Jesus» and that of «Christ», a further source perhaps of Llull's deification/hominification terminology, despite the obvious differences: «Unde "Iesus" dicit *Verbum humanatum*, sed "Christus" dicit *hominem deificatum*», in Alexander of Hales (1951-7; *Glossa* III, 18. 9c (A), 194), as cited in Principe (1967, 194, and n. 28; emphasis added).

¹⁰⁰ *III Sent.*, p. 706; D. 32, A. 1, Q. 5, Conc. 3, as already cited in n. 62 of the present article.

humanity. The fact that deification and hominification are correlativised indicates and reflects in the strongest possible way the presence of Trinitarian dynamism *ad extra*. It is this gradual, though qualified, move from a more concrete to a more abstract conception of Christ—or, expressed differently, from a more visceral and emotional to a more detached response to the figure of Christ—that we witness in the evolution of Llull's Christology.

Conclusion

Taken together, certain texts by Rupert of Deutz and Honorius Augustodunensis along with the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, if not also Robert Grosseteste's *De cessatione legalium* (a work assimilated by Alexander of Hales via the Franciscan tradition), represent a strong precedent for an author such as Ramon Llull as regards Western authorial backing for a view of the Incarnation and the divine purpose underlying it that is predicated upon the independence of the event itself and of its finality from Original Sin. Iammarrone sees the contributions of the Parisian Masters as preparing the way, within a Franciscan context, for a truly *Christocentric* and *Christovertical* or *-apical*—in the sense of positioning Christ at the vertex/apex or summit of Creation—Christology and anthropology.¹⁰¹ Whether Llull specifically took cues from these authors is open to debate (and has already constituted the topic of considerable research),¹⁰² although it would certainly seem that Llull's Christology is formulated and increasingly develops along these lines, culminating in what to this author seems like a gradual transformation from «mere» Anselmian maximity (as applied to Christ) in Llull's earlier works (i.e. before the onset of his «transitional phase») to Pseudo-Dionysian superlativity (increasingly so after his first visit to Paris, and, again, as applied to the presence of the divine attributes or Dignities in Christ's human nature), starting with the *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis* (1287-89)¹⁰³ and drawing to a close, perhaps, with his statements in the *Liber de quaestione valde alta et profunda* (August 1311) regarding the Incarnation as the supreme sign of the superlativity of divine nature («signum maximatis et plenissimatis naturae divinae», «signum plenissimum plenissimati et eternalissimati, quia sine signo signatum non esset cognitum»)¹⁰⁴. All this is accompanied

¹⁰¹ Iammarrone (1997, 131).

¹⁰² As already cited in Robert Hughes (2001, 111-115, n. 1.); and also in Llinàs (2008, 41-68). Further bibliography is given in Buzzi (1999, 391, n. 109).

¹⁰³ MOG IV, vi (377-429).

¹⁰⁴ *ROL* VIII, pp. 166-7; as already noted, in a slightly different context, in Hughes (2005-6), p. 19.

by a progressive de-emphasis on Llull's part of a rhetorically potent affective response to Christ's passible, mortal nature in his Passion and Crucifixion, a de-emphasis which leads to a more detached and, generally speaking, cerebral view of Christ's divinity and humanity, here considered in their union without confusion as the primary vectorial factors accomplishing a procession and return of creation within a Christic cosmos.

The question remains, however, as to why Llull would have waited until 1294-95 to articulate the hypothetical question in the first place, given that his writings from the mid-1280s onwards already bear witness to his knowledge of the issues at stake. I would suggest as an answer that he did not pose the question until he was completely certain that he had arrived at a fairly definitive conception of God as cause and of Christ as the centre and apex of creation; until, that is, the hypothetical question and his solution thereto could be articulated—to the extent that they are—in full accord with the principles and structures of his newly-forged Ternary Arts. Additionally, I would suggest, a formal treatment of the hypothetical question within an interpretation or *Lectura* of the Art had first to await the formalisation of the «Questions» or «Rules» themselves, of which «*Utrum...?*» is the first, within a series of works Llull wrote between 1293-1294.¹⁰⁵

Further research on this topic might consider the way in which Ramon Llull's posing of and nuanced solution to the hypothetical question engage with the medieval discourse surrounding the necessity or contingency of the Incarnation, and how the solution outlined in this article together with his increasingly abstract conception of Christ enable him to posit a gradualist necessity of the Incarnation whereby the Incarnation itself might, on one level, at least, become a necessary subject of science (i.e. of theology, under the Art).¹⁰⁶

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¹⁰⁵ The Questions and Rules were first introduced by Llull in three works from 1293-1294: *Tabula generalis*, ROL XXVII, *Arbor philosophiae desideratae*, ROL XXXIV, pp. 1-149, and the *LATG*, *MOG* V, v, 2-9 (360-7). See n. 89 of the present article for details regarding the treatment in Bonner (2007) of the Questions and Rules.

¹⁰⁶ See Ginther (2004, 39-40, 49 n. 24, 59, and 128-37), also with reference to the Franciscan tradition of expressing commitment to the «whole Christ» (*Christus integer*) as the subject matter of theology.

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Key Words

Christology, the «Hypothetical Question», the Primacy of Christ, Deification/hominification, the Franciscan tradition, affective spirituality, necessity of the Incarnation.

Paraules clau

Cristologia, la «Qüestió hipotètica», la primacia de Crist, deïficació/hominificació, la tradició franciscana, espiritualitat afectiva, necessitat de l'Encarnació.

Abstract

This article attempts first to outline certain methodological considerations essential to a full understanding of Llull's Christology, a subject vast enough to require monographic treatment by possibly more than one contributor. It then proceeds to concentrate upon the tradition that grew up, particularly after the early twelfth century, around the so-called hypothetical question of whether God would have been incarnated in the absence of Original Sin, focusing in particular upon the Franciscan responses thereto, with which it is likely that Llull was familiar. It then examines in detail the occasions on which Llull discussed either directly or indirectly the hypothetical question itself and the solutions he offered thereto.

Resum

Aquest article es proposa en primer lloc d'esbossar algunes consideracions metodològiques essencials per a entendre plenament la cristologia lul·liana, una matèria prou extensa com per a requerir un tractament monogràfic, preferiblement per part de més d'un estudiós. Seguidament es concentra en la tradició que va madurar, sobretot a partir de començament del segle XII, a l'entorn de l'anomenada qüestió hipotètica –si, sense el pecat original, Déu s'hauria encarnat o no–, amb una atenció especial a les respostes dels teòlegs franciscans, que són les que versemblantment resultaven més familiars per a Llull. Finalment examina en detall les ocasions en què Llull va discutir de forma directa o indirecta la qüestió hipotètica i les solucions que va proposar.