

Speculum, Similitude, and Signification: the Incarnation as Exemplary and Proportionate Sign in the Arts of Ramon Llull¹

Introduction

In this article I should like to examine certain aspects of Ramon Llull's use of the language of resemblance ("imatge," "figura," "semblança"), specularity ("mirall") and signification with respect to the Incarnation, in order to demonstrate the pivotal role Christ plays in his thought. I should like to do this with particular reference to the minimisation of difference and contrariety, and the maximisation of similitude and concordance, between God and man achieved by the Incarnation, although bearing in mind that Llull maintains at all times the distinctness of Persons in the Trinity as of natures in Christ and of the uncreated and the created (difference, concordance and contrariety making up the green triangle of Figure T during the Quaternary Phase and featuring strongly in Figure T of the Ternary Phase, in which latter the nine principles of this figure attain full status as principles).²

¹ I should like to thank Josep Maria Ruiz Simon for reading earlier drafts of this article and for his valuable comments, contributions, and criticisms thereon. I should also like to thank Alexander Fidora for his astute comments upon the text and for provision of bibliographical material and information, and Yanis Dambergs for drawing a number of Llull's writings to my attention, which I would have otherwise overlooked. By "Arts", I mean here as much those works in which the principles of the Arts find their application as the Arts proper.

² In *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, *MOG* I, vii, 32 (464), Llull discusses the reasons why all three Persons of the Trinity were not incarnated, concluding that the difference in the Persons of God is better signified if only one of these assumed flesh, and that by greater difference is signified greater concordance between these three Persons. This equation between the majority of difference and the majority of concordance (between the Persons of the Trinity) cannot be applied in the same manner, however, to the duality of natures in Christ; Llull is less concerned to equate difference and concordance between the divine and the human but rather to show how the supreme concordance and similitude of these in Him can effect the perfection of man and the universe consequent upon the elimination of all contrariety between God and creation.

Within the Judaeo-Christian tradition, of course, human nature is held to bear a fundamental similarity to that of God, being created in His image and after His likeness. Original Sin, therefore, the result of Adam's act of disobedience towards God, alienates man from his creator to such an extent that, for Christians at least, man's restitution can only be achieved through the willing self-sacrifice of God's only son. And it is the nature of this very restitution which preoccupies Llull so greatly from his first to his final works. Whether he conceives of this in terms of man's atonement or in terms of man's recovery of the glory promised him at creation or further still in Christo- and theocentric terms as the finality of creation and as God's purpose, the issue of the degree of man's likeness to God and the proportion established in Christ between the human and the divine is always present. Nevertheless, Original Sin, that point of rupture, remains for Llull the occasion for that great, though accidental, difference and contrariety which has arisen between man and God, a difference and contrariety both of which are perpetuated by a theory of the Incarnation which makes this latter dependent upon that sin.³

The earlier part of Llull's writing career was spent, as we might expect from a writer who recently had undergone a profound religious conversion, in considerations regarding his personal atonement for past, actual sins, considerations regarding the universality of Original Sin, and considerations regarding Christ's personal and potentially universal atonement for the offence committed by Adam, the guilt for which was passed on to all his descendents in the form of a stain which brought with it passibility, corruptibility, mortality and death.⁴ It

³ The functions of concordance and contrariety within Figure T are to provide the Artist with a general or a particular answer, respectively, to any question. This might suggest that Llull's preference for concordance over contrariety in this respect—dating from *Liber de XIV articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae fidei* (1283-5?), in which Llull asserts (Distinction IV, part 2, § 6) that recreation stems from sin, although sin is not its cause, and that it signifies the maximal contrariety existing between the Dignities and sin, after which point he begins to emphasise the positive concordance between God and man as established in and through Christ, *MOG* II, vi, 156 (576)—corresponds to a desire further to universalise the figure of Christ in the context of his broader aims of rendering his Arts more general. For a good general analysis of the nature and function of "recreation" in some of Llull's earlier works, see Perarnau i Espelt 2005, 10-14, 31-35.

⁴ See *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* (1274-83), *NEORL* II, 117, ll. 53-6. The manner in which Llull construes Christ in his early works, namely, as that most general being capable of saving man from general mortality and of removing the general guilt contracted as a result of generalised Original Sin, through the recreation effected by His Passion and Crucifixion, persists until after the turn of the century. However, the notion of Christ as a figure possessing at least as great a degree of generality as Original Sin, whereby He can fulfil His role as Recreator, undergoes a degree of change, to the extent that, taken in Himself, Christ comes to feature, in Llull's eyes, as the most general creature on a *purely ontological* level, that is to say, in relative independence from a sustained consideration of His role in man's redemption. On the generality of Original Sin, see *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1273-4?), 183:1-30; 248:2, 10-16, 25-6; *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (1274?), *MOG* I, vii, 13 (445); *Liber de XIV articulis*

should be noted, in this respect, that Original Sin was viewed by the Latin tradition—in contrast to the Byzantine—following Saints Augustine and Anselm, in quasi-juridical terms as a nigh-on infinite offence against God transmitted in a quasi-biological manner as inherited guilt.⁵

The language of Llull's early-period Christological discourse, therefore, bears the inflection of Christ's humility and patience as revealed by (His Incarnation in human form and) His Passion, as well as of God's essential goodness and mercy towards man, as these are manifested externally in and through the Incarnation; all of which qualities feature among the structuring principles of the Arts of Llull's Quaternary Phase. The basis for such inflection is Llull's acute awareness of his own, and man's, estrangement from God, that is to say, man's accidental difference from and contrariety to God resulting from the Fall. Christ thus figures in this scheme as someone who might make, indeed *has* made, reparation for the sin committed by Adam, and yet who, also, through his obedience to God and love for man, manifested in the acute suffering of his Passion, presents mankind with a supreme example, by which man might avoid actual sin, and find reconciliation with his maker.⁶

sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae fidei (1283-5?), *MOG* II, vi, 155-6 (575-6); on the fact that Christ's Incarnation and Passion do not recreate man's sensual or intellectual natures in this world but only on the Day of Judgement, when they will be recreated in all who have faith in Christ's Incarnation, see *Llibre de contemplació* (1273-4?), 248:28-29; on how the death suffered by Christ's body removes generalised guilt in the sensitive and vegetative powers, while the Passion of his soul removes guilt from the powers of memory, intellect and will, through the conjunction of his power with that of the Son of God, see *Liber de XIV articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae fidei* (1283-5?), *MOG* II, vi, 182 (602); on the general mortality which is a consequence of generalised Original Sin, see *Arbre de sciència* (1295-6), *ORL* XII, 96; *ROL* XXV, 474, ll. 1849-1857; on the generality of Original Sin and the satisfaction made by the most general created being, God and man, who, as Recreator has to be at least as general as Original Sin, see *Llibre dels articles de la fe* (1296), *NEORL* III, 51, ll. 95-100; on the role played by the generality of Christ's human nature in recreating the world, see *Proverbis de Ramon* (1296?), *ORL* XIV, 43; on why God was incarnated rather than angelified (namely, so that He could participate in all creatures through human flesh—"in homine factam generaliter"), see *Contemplatio Raymundi* (August 1297), *ORL* XVIII, 403; on the generality of the restoration effected by Christ's Passion, see *Llibre que deu hom creure de Déu* (January 1302), *NEORL* III, 101, ll. 111-14; *ROL* XXX, 169, ll. 121-25; on the generality of the Resurrection, see *NEORL* III, 101, ll. 115-20; *ROL* XXX, 169, ll. 126-32; *Liber ad probandum aliquos articulos fidei catholicae per syllogisticas rationes* or *Liber de syllogismis* (February 1304), *ROL* XX, Part VI, *passim*; and, most importantly, on Christ as that being with the greatest commonality, see *Llibre que deu hom creure de Déu* (January 1302), *NEORL* III, 99, ll. 50-58.

⁵ For the Byzantine tradition, see Meyendorff 1974/1979, 145, 160-1; and Congar 1935, 94-7. See also Ricoeur 1974/2004, 265-82, especially 273-5 and 280-1. For Llull's position with regard to these two traditions, see Hughes 2005, 281-96.

⁶ It is also interesting to note how Llull's repeated references, particularly at this stage of his writing career, to Christ's humility, patience, obedience and suffering, constitute a forceful appeal to the reader's feelings of admiration and compassion. See also Ramon Llull, *Proverbis de Ramon* (1296?), *ORL* XIV, 85, Part I, Chapter 83, "De Exempli," sections 7 and 8, on "humilitat" and "paciencia," respectively. Although these latter instances are a relatively late case of his recourse to such appeals, this work demon-

Parallel to this, however, we also find in Lull's early writings, the emergence of an increasingly potent discourse—along the theophanic lines so common among medieval Platonists—upon the manifestation of God's essential attributes in creation, a discourse which indicates to Lull himself that, not only does Christ have this negative role to play in the cosmos as its Recreator or Redeemer, but that also He might, in a positive sense, reinstitute the likeness or similitude between man and God which was offered to man at creation but which was deferred by Adam's sin. This likeness is essentially the offer of a progressive deification initiated at baptism, continued throughout life in the practice of the sacraments and the exercise of the virtues, and culminating in beatitude in glory, though in a beatitude which can only ever approximate divine infinitude.⁷ This parallel discourse, possibly under an Anselmian influence regarding notions of maximity, as well as under the direction of Neoplatonic ideas regarding the degrees of perfection of being in creation, a creation pro-

strates how, even a considerable time after Lull's endorsement of those positions consistent with a belief in the primacy of Christ and, so, after he had begun to emphasise Christ's role as locus of an intersection between the two vectors of deification and hominification, along with those of *influentia* and *refluentia*, he still adhered to a strong belief in the redemptive function of the Incarnation: "Ab incarnació e passió procurà Deus nostra redempció," *ibid.*, 97. See also *Contemplatio Raymundi* (August 1297), *ORL* XVIII, 404-5, in which there is an intense focus on the sufferings and humiliation undergone by Christ for the sake of man's salvation. *Influentia* and *refluentia* are both defined among the Hundred Forms of *Lògica nova* (May 1303) as follows: "[i]nfluentia es abundancia de son primer, per so que aquell primer puscha aver agencia," and "[r]efluentia es abstracció de son primer, car en lo subyet en que fo enfluxa a indigencia," *NEORL* IV, 74; *ROL* XXIII, 92, ll. 339-40 and 341-2. Until at least the late 1280s, Lull's answer to the question of why actual evil should exist in a world which has already been restored through the Incarnation, takes the form, beyond a more general response explaining man's tendency towards non-being, of a lament over the fact that men have not followed Christ's example (particularly that of the Passion) to a greater degree.

⁷ In *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* (March 1305), *ROL* IX, 157, such beatitude involves, though not exclusively, the greatest of rewards granted to man's body in paradise, namely, that he might see the body of Christ in glory. A proof of God's Incarnation is, thus, constructed on the basis of the maximity of the reward that God could grant to man's body, given the hypothesis of the Incarnation. In other words, God could not grant this greatest of awards in the absence of an Incarnation. See also *Liber praedicationis contra judaeos* (August 1305), *ROL* XII, 61. For further discussion of the role of beatitude in Lull's thought, as this developed, see Ruiz Simon 2005, 174-8, where the author notes the influence of Proclean notions of causality upon Lull's understanding of those similitudes which characterise the beatific vision in glory. For the existence of "a highly developed doctrine of deification" in the Latin West (in Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*) even in the medieval period, see Williams 1997, 1. Williams also confirms the unity of sanctification in this life and consummation in the next implicit in my account, *ibid.*, 2. Williams also points out that the concept of deification (in Aquinas) is articulated in the close relations existing between the doctrine of God (as a transcendent, independent Trinitarian being who nonetheless wishes His creatures to participate by grace and, ultimately, glory in His life) and theological anthropology (the presence of *vestigia* of the Trinity in man and all creation; the doctrine of the *imago Dei*), *ibid.*, 1, 4-7, 14-19, linked by a concept of love that brings "unity-in-distinction", *ibid.*, n. 8 and text. The idea of an 'assimilation to God' or divinisation is already present in Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176b, and was quoted by Plotinus.

pelled by the desire to return to its origins in the ultimate perfection of the primary category of Being, articulates Llull's—and man's—own aspiration to attain a maximum, that is to say, a maximum of perfection or being. Christ, viewed in such positive terms, is that maximum, the very embodiment of divine perfections and of being in its purest created form: in his Deity he is hominified God; in his humanity, deified man.

These latter features of Llull's thought, however, are the result of a deepening awareness of the degree to which God's causality bears fruit in creation, particularly in the form of His incarnated, only-begotten Son. This increased focus upon the manifestation of God's attributes in creation, which reaches a mature expression in the early 1280s, and is later conceived to be the product of God's descending influence, is, however, completed by the notion of creation's own ascending refluent, through its signification of the Deity towards whom it is in the process of returning. It is also worth noting here the close links between Llull's thought in this respect and Franciscan notions of creation as God's self-manifestation, in which Christ features as the plenary point of such manifestation.

We must also take into account the fact that Llull conceived of the ends of the Incarnation—whether the deification/hominification pair, Christ's perfection of the universe, his conjunction of the infinite and the finite, the recreation of man, Christ's suffering and death, descent into Hell, bodily resurrection (or all combined)—as a form of signification (to the human intellect), indeed its exemplary form. And, in this, the human intellect—most completely and perfectly in Christ—operates as the privileged conduit through which signification might circulate fully, Christ being that sign required by God so that His *influentia* and man's *refluentia* might properly be signified. Llull's own definitions of signification show that he intended this term to denote the revelation of secrets and the rendering explicit of what was only implicit.⁸ It would seem that signification, therefore, bears a very close relationship to the Incarnation, particularly to its finality or finalities, since what Llull progressively effects through his discourse upon the final causes of the Incarnation, is the revelation of its ultimate secrets,

⁸ Following a suggestion of Johnston's, Johnston 1987, 163, it would seem that this movement from the implicit to the explicit bears parallels to the formal cause of the Great Arts, namely the descent from the universal to the particular; that is, from the principles and their conditions to the questions posed and the answers given, as well as to the movement from cause to effect and from the exemplar to the example which participates in it. Johnston describes Llull's understanding of signification as being "the immediate perception of the universal in the particular or vice versa and [...] a necessary relational or causal connection, received in the mind as a first intention [i.e. a concept] of the natures of things," *ibid.*, 173. For Johnston's account of Llull's ideas upon signification, see *ibid.*, 162-75. For an earlier account of Llull's theory of signification and its relation to medieval speculative grammar, see Platzcek 1953-4, 35-49. For more recent accounts, focusing upon Llull's realist and materialist semantic theories, see Vidal i Roca 1990, 323-334, and Trias Mercant 1993, Chapter 8, especially 99-107.

the rendering explicit of its implicit truths, with respect both to creation and to God Himself. Thus Llull makes explicit the truths of deification and hominification there implicit,⁹ and he reveals the secrets of the relationship between the Incarnation, God's greatest external operation, and the Trinity, God's greatest internal operation, that is to say, their reciprocal specularity. The secrets revealed and the truths made explicit by signification are secrets and truths signified to the human intellectual soul, so that man might fulfil his first intention, and God His.¹⁰ I will consider later in this article, therefore, how Llull conceptualises the relationship of the Incarnation both to the Trinity, via his theory of signification, and to the issue of the perfect reciprocal love existing between God and man in Christ.

For Llull, as a Christian Neoplatonist, created beings fulfil their purpose and are granted their consummation upon being united with the Good, thereby finding repose in the perfection of their kind. Through his application of such ideas, Llull shows that, in and through Jesus Christ, God influences, perfects or deifies creation to the maximal degree, such that His Dignities find repose in creation. Furthermore, human nature is so ennobled as a result, that, through Christ's example, man can "majorify," in turn, his positive response (or "refluence") towards the creator's beneficence and love, thus achieving repose in God's Dignities for himself and for the entirety of creation. Llull, however, does not fail to make clear that, though initially, at least, one may apprehend Christ to be the supreme nexus between God's potentially infinite *influentia* and man's finite *refluentia*, the maximal sign of God's perfection (as well as of man's aspiration towards God), ultimately we should understand him as the conduit through which love flows in both directions, and as occupying first place in the order of God's wishes.¹¹

⁹ Hughes 2001, 111-115. It has been noted by Ruiz Simon 2005, 174-8, that Llull's understanding of the beatific vision in glory (in other words, the ultimate deification of man) may have been developed during the period of his "transitional works" of 1287-89 as a result of his reading of the *corpus dionysiacum* during his first stay in Paris (also 1287-89).

¹⁰ Llull gives a number of definitions of "significació," the majority of them emphasising that signification reveals the secret or secrets bestowed upon and residing in a subject. It is defined in *Lògica nova* (May 1303), *NEORL* IV, 75; *ROL* XXIII, 93, ll. 399-401, as follows: "Significació es ens per lo qual secret es revelat, per so car significació ateyn aquelles coses que entren al subject e yxen del subject." Johnston states that the final clause of this definition refers to accidents of things, accidents by means of which the subject is known, Johnston 1987, 163. Although Llull states in the *Liber de significatione* (February 1304) that "significatio est ens, cui proprie pertinet significare," *ROL* X, 14, he also states that the aim of the Art of signification is "reducere significationes implicatas ad explicatas," *ibid.*, 20. See also Bonner and Ripoll 2002, 271. Among the Hundred Forms included in *Lògica nova*, "secret" is defined as "ombra de ignorancia del enteniment, qui no pot esser pratich ab ignorancia. E la rahó es quar enteniment no pot aver alcuna participació ab ignorancia," *NEORL* IV, 78; *ROL* XXIII, 95, ll. 477-9.

¹¹ God's influence upon creation is only *potentially* infinite as created beings do not have the capacity to receive infinitude.

Christ, for Llull, therefore, is the *sine qua non* in the absence of whose Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection and Ascension, neither God nor man would be capable of fulfilling their respective first intentions or final causes and, thus, of achieving repose.¹² And if the divine end of the Incarnation were not superior to its human end, God's *influentia* as cause upon creation would be less than man's *refluentia* as effect and His first intention would be less perfectly signified in creation than man's. As a starting point for such considerations, I shall turn now to Llull's treatment of Christ's role as exemplary sign of the divine perfections, namely the unparalleled resemblance his human nature bears to the divinity of God, and the superlative (moral) example offered by Christ to mankind, in particular, by means of his Passion (the suffering of Christ's humanity during the Passion being a favoured theme among Franciscan writers).¹³

¹² Although Llull denies that in God there is any division into first and second intentions in *Llibre d'intenció* (1274-83) (see Carreras y Artau 1939, I, 611. The passage in question states that "[e]n la entenció de Deu no ha divisió de primera e segona intenció on sia menoritat, quor tota sa intenció es infinida e eternal; e per assò, fill no'y pot caber segona intenció," *Llibre d'intenció*, ORL XVIII, 8-9. Emphasis added.), Ruiz Simon has pointed out, in personal communications, that Llull explicitly attributes a first intention to God in both *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis* (1288-89) and *Disputació de cinc savis* (1294). In the former work, Llull states that "...ergo iste Homo, qui est Creatura summe perfecta ratione deitatis est ultima Finis et Summa Perfectio omnium creaturarum, ergo ad eum sunt creata omnia, tanquam ad suum ultimum Finem," *MOG* IV, vi, 26 (402). Ruiz Simon comments that, although Llull does not, in fact, use the terms "first" and "second intentions" here, he is calling upon the definition of these terms as given in *Art demonstrativa*: "La primera intenció és la causa final, e la segona és ço qui s'ha a la fi," *Art demonstrativa*, OS I, 375; in the *Disputació de cinc savis*, Llull also states that "La fi per què és encarnatió és per so que Déus sia home e aquesta és la primera entenció e la pus principal per què Déus és encarnat. E la segona entenció és per so que home sia Déu e aquesta segona entenció és primera segons comparatió de la redemptió del human gendre, la qual redemptió és per la segona entenció." *Disputació de cinc savis*, ATCA 5, 75. Ruiz Simon has made the further suggestion that, prior to Llull's change to a ternary system, Christ is viewed by Llull as the final cause of creation in the context of man's first intention; and, as a result of the transitional period before 1289 and their contribution to the reformulation of the Art, He is viewed subsequently as the final cause of creation in the context of God's first intention, the order of His *influentia* and of His deification of reality. Thus Llull would be found to progress from an earlier focus upon creation's repose in God to a later focus upon God's repose in creation.

¹³ As is shown in *Proverbis de Ramon* (1296?), for example,—though, in this case, without reference to the Passion—where Llull states that "[e]n la humanitat de Jhesu Crist ha major exemplar de les divines raons, que en neguna altra creatura," and, further, that "[s]ol Jhesu Crist està centre de complit exempli," ORL XIV, 84-85. In the same chapter, Llull also claims that Christ's supreme moral example is manifested to man through His goodness and love, neither of which can be rivalled in the created realm. Llull offers Christ (and his Passion) as a moral example and subject of devotion to what must be, exclusively, a Christian readership, until around 1289. However, as the first quotation illustrates, he expresses very definite ideas not only regarding man's corporeal and spiritual ascent as driven by Christ's moral example, but also regarding the manner in which Christ's human nature signifies the very descent of the "divines raons" into creation, a conception carrying a more broadly ecumenical appeal.

1. Christ as Sign, Similitude, and Exemplar; Christ's Example of Martyrdom in the Passion¹⁴

It is widely recognised that ideas of image and likeness, specifically the image and likeness of God in which, according to the Old Testament, man was created, were central to Judaeo-Christian conceptions of the relationship between divinity and humanity and were "perhaps the single most important element of patristic anthropology".¹⁵ It is perhaps less well known, however, that certain Church Fathers insisted upon a qualitative distinction between the image and the likeness of God as granted to and embodied by man.¹⁶ M. J. Edwards defines this distinction as follows: "The former, which is held to be indefeasible, is the power of rational choice that makes us persons and enables calloused sinners to cooperate with God in their salvation. The likeness or similitude, on the other hand, though promised at the outset, was not vouchsafed to Adam at the moment of creation, or at least not in such measure as to barricade his soul against temptation."¹⁷ The author goes on to state, this time with implicit refer-

¹⁴ Johnston suggests that Llull understands the term "sign" in a way which places "any logical, metaphysical, or physical relationship" (emphasis added) within the semiotic order, Johnston 1987, 54. Discussing Llull's use of the Aristotelian Categories in his early works and the contribution of the former to "the long-standing medieval difficulty regarding the conception of Logic as an *ars sermocinalis* or an *ars realis*," *ibid.*, 63,—that is to say, regarding the question of whether the Categories have a real or merely verbal value—, Johnston describes Llull's "natural Logic," *ibid.*, 64, as providing the "hermeneutic analysis" which is signification, *ibid.*

¹⁵ Citation from Williams 1997, 15. Genesis I: 26, "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness...' " or "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram". Llull cites this *auctoritas* in the context of his development of rational and necessary proofs of scriptural quotations in his *Liber de praedicatione* (1304), *ROL* III, 402-3; also cited in Bonner 2005, 63. These ideas were also instrumental in the development of Renaissance ideas pertaining to the dignity of Man, see Trinkaus 1973-4, *passim*. Trinkaus points to the Neoplatonic and Patristic origins of the idea that "[m]an's dignity lay in his creation in the image and likeness of God, which could be interpreted as meaning [...] that it was man's destiny to transcend the limitations of the image-likeness and to ascend to eventual deification by a progress toward perfect assimilation of image and model, [...]", *ibid.*, 144. For an indication of authors from the «School of Chartres» expressing such ideas as well as of writers outside the more strict Neoplatonic circles, see *ibid.*, 139-40.

¹⁶ Lossky 1957, 114-27; also Williams 1997, 15.

¹⁷ Edwards 2002, 102. Trinkaus 1973-4, 137, comments that, for the early Greek Fathers, such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, man's "similitude" or likeness to God (*homoiosis* in the words of the Septuagint) "connoted the dynamic process of becoming like God, or Platonic 'assimilation' " while his being created in God's "image" indicated his pre-lapsarian state of perfection. However, for the view prevalent among both Patristic and Latin (medieval) authors, with the notable exceptions of Augustine and Aquinas, that man's recreated state—after its *reformatio in meliore*—was superior to the state in which his nature was first created, see Thunberg 1985, 60; Hughes 2005, 289. Aquinas, in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 33, a. 3, speaks of three kinds (or degrees) of similitude: of image, of grace, and of glory, cited in Williams 1997, 8. We should note that Llull progressively states, from a very early stage, that: a) the union of natures in Christ has returned the entire human race to its prelapsarian

ence to the deification of man and the deification of Christ's humanity, that "[o]nce sin has entered the citadel of reason, the assimilation of man to God through virtue was impossible without a manifestation of the likeness [viz. man's likeness to God] through the infallible humanity of Christ."¹⁸ According to Origen (AD 185-254), possibly the first expositor of St. Irenaeus of Lyons (*fl.* 180) with whom the distinction is generally held to originate, the verses from the Old Testament, namely Genesis I: 26-8, connote that "whereas man has obtained the image in the dignity of our first condition, the perfection of the likeness is laid up for him only at the consummation."¹⁹ Though the image may not have been forfeited as a result of Adam's Fall, it appears that man's likeness to God, a property of both body and soul, has been lost or deferred, at the very least; it is only through the Incarnation of Christ that this likeness or similitude can be restored, in part through his Incarnation, Passion, and Resurrection, and in part through mankind's imitation of the exemplary God-man.²⁰

As has been pertinently noted, however, in the case of Thomas Aquinas, this doctrine of the *imago Dei* is not necessarily used by Latin authors in the same manner as by their Patristic forebears. Aquinas is said to consider not the theological bearing of this doctrine upon this life or upon human nature as it had been intended prior to the Fall, but rather upon how mankind is ordered towards his end. Williams states that, instead of indicating the price paid for Adam's sin or the degree of man's forfeiture, "[t]he *imago Dei* theology tells us primarily what we will be, not what we are".²¹

state of purity (*Llibre de contemplació* (1273-4?), 85:15); and b) the work of recreation exceeds that of creation on God's part; but that c) the manifestation of God's attributes is itself superior to the hypothesis of recreation (*Llibre de demostracions* (1274-6), *ORL* XV, 582). Points b) and c) would seem to be associated, therefore, with the restoration of God's image in man but also the initiation of a positive and progressive reinstitution of man's similitude to God. See Hughes 2005, 289-90.

¹⁸ Edwards 2002, 102.

¹⁹ Origen, *First Principles* 3.6.1; P. Koetschau, *Origenes Werke. De Principiis*, Leipzig: GCS 22, 1913, V, 280, cited in and translated by Edwards 2002, 102. See also Ruiz Simon's discussion of the role of Genesis I: 26-8 in Lluïl's efforts to relate the essential constitution of the human soul (on the basis of likenesses or similitudes) with man's creation in the image and after the likeness of God, in Ruiz Simon 2005, 173, n. 10 and text.

²⁰ Gayà links the concept of *imago* with the spiritual nature of man while associating that of *vestigium* (lit. footprint) with a range of views articulated by Aquinas and Bonaventure among others. Generally speaking, Gayà views man's *vestigium* as the means by which he might attain partial (demonstrative) knowledge of God, the highest form of which is knowledge *per contemplationem*, namely the contemplation of creation which, being like unto God, offers significations and demonstrations of Him. Gayà 1995, 481-3. Trinkaus 1973-4, 138, states that for Augustine, at least, "the Fall was interpreted as seriously and severely corrupting the 'image' of God in man but not entirely obliterating it, whereas man's similitude, which lay in his capacity to perform virtues, was entirely lost until restored by the divine grace of the Atonement". As a result of his interpretation of Genesis I: 26, Augustine saw *vestigia* of the triune God in creation, man possessing this image in the triadic structure of the intellectual soul.

²¹ Williams 1997, 15.

Not surprisingly, Ramon Llull frequently has recourse to such terms as “imatge i figura,” “mirall,” and “semblança,” in his characterisation of Jesus Christ, the ultimate reflection of the immanence and agency of God in creation, the ultimate point of reference for God’s influence upon creation’s chief representative (mankind), the principal locus of created perfection and the foremost source and embodiment of the world’s return to its superabundant divine cause. Llull’s use of these terms, however, carries a distinct flavour and is employed within the context of a broadly Neoplatonic project. Gayà has already shown that signification is the mediating relationship between a “figure” and reality, and that it is frequently expressed by Llull in terms of the example of the mirror (“mirall”).²² Gayà informs us that Llull relates the function of the mirror to the manner in which sensory things signify and demonstrate to man their intellectual counterparts.²³ Bonner and Ripoll have also recently gathered together Llull’s own definitions of many of these terms.²⁴ Similarly, Ruiz Simon has provided a detailed analysis of the role played by divine likenesses or similitudes in the replacement of the essences of the four elements as the fundamental principles of the sublunary world.²⁵

Gayà explains, at the end of his article, that man’s initial knowledge of reality comes to him through certain “figures” presented by his sensory perceptions. Man perceives in these figures, properties and qualities that signify real objects which must be analysed in terms of logic and metaphysics in order to enable an ascent from the sensory to the intellectual realm. Demonstration constitutes, on the one hand, an explanation of these properties and qualities insofar as they define the perceived object, and, on the other, a confirmation of the existence of other realities outside the range of sensory perception, but asserted as articles of faith. Gayà thus makes a sustained attempt to illustrate the importance of the comprehension of faith for the Illuminated Doctor. According to Gayà’s reading, therefore, to consider Christ as “imatge i figura” would be to consider him with respect to the sensitive and intellective (or spiritual) orders exclusively;

²² Gayà 1995, 483-90. The etymology of the word *speculum* combines the senses of reflection and contemplation, and it is in both these senses that the human intellective soul is said by Llull to be or to act as a mirror: a means by which the intellect might have indirect access to the divine truths (the Trinity) and might contemplate these, while existing as their image and reflection. For Gregory of Nyssa’s view of the soul as a mirror by means of which man can see and know God in himself and ultimately achieve deification, see Trinkaus 1973-4, 137.

²³ Gayà 1995, 490. It is clearly in this sense that the incarnated Christ functions, even at the level of his corporeality, as a mirror with respect to the Trinity, although, as we will see, the Trinity, itself the highest category of Being, also functions reciprocally as a reflection of Christ.

²⁴ Bonner and Ripoll 2002, s.v. “Demonstratio”, “Figura”, “Mirall | Speculum”, “Semblansa, semblança | Similitudo”, and “Significació | Significatio”. For “figura”, “imaginar and imatge” (or “ymaginar” and “ymatge”), and “semblança”, see also Colom Mateu 1983-5, s.v.

²⁵ Ruiz Simon 2005, 167-71.

similitudes, on the other hand, have greater extension, being structural features of Llull's later Arts and cosmology, and so, operate at every ontological and epistemological level, of which Christ is only the foremost representative.

Gayà has been describing a process of contemplative ascent, via sensory "figures," to the intellectual order; a process which, when applied to the person of Christ, involves a preliminary contemplation of Christ's body, accessible as this is not only to the senses but also to the intellect, and subsequent logical and metaphysical analyses of Christ's (physical and intellectual) properties and qualities. Such analyses, employing the intermediary "figure" of Christ's corporeality, would result in an ultimately intellectual appreciation of Christ's human nature—which conjoins soul with body—and an intellectual appreciation of his divine nature, and the form in which these two natures are conjoined in one person, that person being the second member of the Trinity. For Llull, therefore, the figure of Christ (and Christ-as-figure), presents man with the opportunity to attain a sensory appreciation of Christ's sensory properties and qualities, a sensory appreciation of his intellectual properties and qualities, an intellectual appreciation of his intellectual properties and qualities and, finally, an intellectual appreciation of his sensory properties and qualities.²⁶

On the ontological rather than epistemological level, however, Llull's frequent use of the term "figure" to describe Christ can also be seen to indicate the manner in which the Incarnation provides the opportunity for the senses (and the sensory order) to fulfil their aspiration towards the deity (God being "finis omnium corporalium") as well as the very means by which the deity might participate in creation in a way which is maximally evident to the human perceptual faculties.²⁷ Physical reality which is either elementative, vegetative, sensitive

²⁶ Not to mention the mystical or supra-intellectual dimension of man's apprehension of Christ's divinity, available through the ascent from the positive through the comparative to the superlative degree. For Llull's taxonomy of knowledge, see Lohr 2000, 159-70, where the author describes Llull's belief that the affirmation of the possibility of a doctrine was a necessary precondition for its demonstration. He illustrates how the existence of possible (or intellectual) beings formed a cornerstone of Llull's epistemology, as exemplified by Llull's taxonomy of knowledge (the four degrees of: sensory-sensory; sensory-intellectual; intellectual-intellectual; intellectual-sensory), the third degree of which permitted the enquirer to attain intellectual knowledge of intellectual or possible things. Llull's insistence upon the possibility of demonstrating the articles of faith through this third degree of knowledge is, for Lohr, what sets Llull apart from his contemporaries (particularly the Dominicans). [The text in this footnote is taken from my review of Lohr's article in *SL* 42 (2002), 119-21.]

²⁷ *Disputatio eremitae et Raymundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, *MOG* IV, iv, 82 (306); see also *Liber de XIV articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae fidei* (1283-5?): "Deus Filius est finis totius finis creaturae, & convenit, illum, cum quo ipse est eadem Persona, esse finem omnium hominum," *MOG* II, vi, 169-70 (589-90). See also Johnston's discussion of the polysemic nature of the term "figure" as used by Llull in Chapter 362 of *Llibre de contemplació*, in Johnston 1987, 79-80.

or imaginative, is not capable of the acts pertaining to the powers of the human soul (viz. remembering, understanding and loving); it does have the capacity, however, to attain its end and, thus, find repose, in Christ's own body. As Llull explains in *Disputatio eremitae et Raymundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi* (August 1298), God is the ultimate end of all physical things on account of His union with human nature, for the reason that the Son of God, existing as the body of Christ—which is God—participates in the natures of all other corporeal beings and, therefore, by reason of this participation of his body in all that is corporeal, all corporeal creation is elevated and exalted (“exaltata & sublimata”).²⁸

However, the uncreated, incorporeal divinity remains in all cases imperceptible; even in the light of the reality of the Incarnation, there is no (direct) access of the senses to an experience of God. Nevertheless, in this latter case, the senses, at least, are no longer destined to exist in a condition of unprofitability or frustration with regard to their ultimate finality, their return to God, since they may participate in Christ's (physical) humanity. For, as Llull explains in *Contemplatio Raymundi* (1297), access to Christ in his deity is not without a medium, that medium being the manner in which Christ's humanity participates in all corporeal creation; indeed, though Christ, as God man, is the end of all corporeal creatures, his divinity cannot be attained through corporeality itself, as he (in his divine nature) is “insensibilis, immobilis, non illuminabilis, inelementabilis, non vegetabilis nec ymaginabilis”;²⁹ but, because of the conjunction of divinity and humanity (and of body and soul) in Christ, God is rendered perceptible in His humanity, that is to say, as man. Christ's divinity is thus, for Llull, one of those “other realities outside the range of sensory perception, but asserted as articles of faith.”³⁰

We should note, however, that, at times, the dual nature of Christ, in both its aspects, is fully implicated (and its role even emphasized) in the repose of phys-

²⁸ *Disputatio eremitae et Raymundi*, *MOG* IV, iv, 82 (306).

²⁹ *Contemplatio Raymundi*, *ORL* XVIII, 401-2. Christ's soul, in its spiritual nature, constitutes the link between His human corporeality and His divinity. See also *Disputatio eremitae et Raymundi* (1298), *MOG* IV, iv, 81-2 (305-6). Since God is not susceptible of being moved, nor is He available to the senses or the imagination, and He cannot be produced either from the four elements or from vegetation, it falls to the powers of the human soul (memory, understanding and will) to direct their acts towards Him.

³⁰ Cf. *supra*. It should be noted that, though the above arguments may appear to conflate (the larger set of) the sensory order (including animals, of which the human animal is the highest representative) and (the subset of) the order of man's perceptual powers (in which the former order finds itself resumed), man-as-microcosm figures in the sensory order as its perfection precisely because his physical nature is conjoined with a spiritual nature (which can be equated with the intellectual order), this also being the reason why his senses are more noble than those of animals. Jesus Christ figures in this scheme as the fullest perfection of creation, the means by which the entire field of creation is recapitulated and returned to its creator.

ical creation; for, in what represents an interesting variation upon his earlier statements, Llull affirms the following year, in Chapter 11 of *De quadratura et triangulatura circuli* (June 1299) (concerning the nature of the hypostatic union in Christ and its function of recapitulating creation and bringing it to fullness and completion), that all created ends are contained in the end of the human and the divine natures of Jesus Christ, finding there their repose, fulfilment, and perfection.³¹ It is, in fact, the very conjunction of divinity with humanity in Christ which exalts and elevates not only Christ's human nature itself but, with it, the entire created universe.³²

Created beings, in this respect, exist primarily as varying degrees of reflection or signification of their creator, according to the position they occupy on a vertical scale between being and non-being. Christ's existence as God-man—as conjunction of uncreated and created, of infinite and finite—is the paradigm case of such signification, particularly in Llull's writings from the mid-1280s onward, Christ being not only the most perfect created sign of God's internal (and uncreated) Trinitarian dynamic but also an index of the completion or perfection of created being. For Llull, signification, manifestation and demonstration, are cognates of the "metaphysics of participation"—participation being itself a cognate of deification—in which each element of creation plays its part through the transmission of a resemblance (an image or reflection) of its creator.³³

However, while signification is essentially an ascending movement,³⁴ and the bestowal of degrees of being upon creation can only be a descent, participation and reflection operate in both directions (though, in the latter case, with one of

³¹ Armand Llinarès, "Version française de la première partie de la "Quadrature et triangulation du cercle"", *EL* 30 (1990), pp. 240-5 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Dr. Yanis Damberg for bringing the presence of these passages in this work to my attention.

³² *Ibid.* Here—Chapter 11—Llull affirms that the value of Christ's human nature is increased by its conjunction with divinity. See also *Liber praedicationis contra judaeos*, *ROL* XII, 51-2, where Llull states that as a consequence of the hypostatic union, the created universe is thus elevated on account of the participation of Christ's human nature in the five parts of which the universe consists (the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, and the rational). For further discussion of Christ's role as medium between God and creation, though, on this occasion, couched in terms of the proportion the finite, created world bears to Christ's human nature and the proportion this latter bears, in turn, to infinite, uncreated divine nature, see this article, text after note 69.

³³ Johnston expresses dissatisfaction with the "diffusion of Llull's *Principia*," stating that "the fundamental indistinction of any metaphysics of participation through resemblance [is that] resemblance describes the participation that explains it," Johnston 1987, 51. See also Bonner's introduction in *OS* I, 63 (note 38 and text), for comments regarding the synonymy of signification, manifestation and demonstration.

³⁴ Although we must note the reciprocal signification of the Incarnation and the Trinity, which are conceived only in Llull's final works in explicit terms of ascent and descent. On the unique possibility of descent for being, according to Platzcek, see Badia's introduction to Pring-Mill 1991, 15-16.

its terms as the exemplar or object and the other as its image). Thus, although for contemplative purposes, the mind can ascend the chain of being and, on an ontological level, beings can participate in both higher and lower levels of being, Being itself is exclusively the gift of the Supreme Being, as cause of the created realms. Nevertheless the intellect is also capable of tracing this descent through creation as we see in one of Lull's later works, *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus* (1305). In the figure of Christ, however, all movements are present: the ascending and descending contemplative (i.e. epistemological) movements; the ascending and descending ontological movements of (maximal) participation in the divinity—and hence, signification's ascent in the semantic order—and of the divinity's reciprocal participation in creation; yet also, uniquely and maximally in the case of created beings, the descending ontological movement consisting of Christ's bestowal of being upon creation, in his role as efficient and exemplary cause. Further, in Christ there is a maximal resemblance or bi-directional specularity (see section iii of this article) between God's maximal external operation and His internal operation or Trinity, a maximal resemblance, that is, between object and image, a resemblance or similitude in which Christ is equally exemplar or object, image, and medium of reflection.

There are three important ways in which Lull considers signification, similitude and example, in relation to the figure of Christ. The first is epistemological: that is to say, he considers Christ's role in signifying the perfect divine attributes to the human intellect; the second is ontological: that is to say, he considers Christ in terms of his supreme likeness to God; and the third is moral: that is to say, he views Christ's example as an example of how to remember, understand, love and serve God. Already in *Llibre de contemplació* (1273-4?), while discussing the Incarnation in the context of recreation, Lull views the Incarnation as a privileged sign of the perfect Qualities of God. He states that just as God's Virtues signify that the world was created in order that the nobility and perfection of the creator be known, so too do they signify that He assumed flesh, suffered, and died for us sinners in order that these Virtues (or Qualities) might be signified to us. For the more the creator does for His creation, the more His Qualities (mercy, love, humility, generosity, power, perfection) are signified to His creatures.³⁵ We note here how, although Lull is considering a redemptive Incarnation, its redemptive quality is, in effect, subordinated to the formal properties of its supreme signifying power, that is to say, to its role in the more general manifestation of God's Virtues or Qualities,³⁶ for recreation is conceived to be the maximum that God can do for His creation only insofar as it is the very

³⁵ *Llibre de contemplació*, 248:24. Here Lull uses the terms Virtues and Qualities interchangeably.

³⁶ Even at this early stage then, we find a degree of equivocalness in Lull's view of the purpose of the Incarnation, although, clearly, he exalts one of the terms over the other.

means whereby His Qualities are most nobly signified to creation.³⁷ Later in Lull's writings, the notions of the perfection of the universe through Christ's reinstatement of the fundamental similitude between man and God, will replace recreation *tout court* as the maximum in this formula.³⁸

By the time of *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae* (1288-9) and *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles* (1289?) Lull has come to speak of the Incarnation as the *supreme* likeness to God, the end of all things created, and of Christ as the greatest reflection of the divine attributes, the exemplary image manifesting these latter to the human intellect.³⁹ Elucidating upon this point, Lull states, also in *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, that the Incarnation establishes the greatest resemblance between the intrinsic and extrinsic operation of the divine attributes.⁴⁰ Seven years later, in *Llibre dels articles de la fe* (1296), while discussing the greatness of the similitudes of the divine Reasons in the Incarnation, Lull explains that each Reason has greater concordance in its created manifestation ("les rahons del mon") with greatness by reason of majority than by reason of minority.⁴¹ On account of this, Lull argues that it is necessarily true that the Dignities or Reasons of God require the majority of their similitude in this world in order that they achieve full activity and find repose, while also ensuring the concordance of the greatest uncreated and created reasons. The entire passage between lines 32-56 constitutes a veritable encomium to the humanity of Christ whose human reasons are deified and sustained in the man God.⁴² It is interesting to note

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 248:22.

³⁸ See *Liber praedicationis contra judaeos*, *ROL* XII, 58: "Et sic sequitur, quod Incarnatio Filii Dei sit, ut perficiat subiectum imperfectum de subiecto simpliciter perfecto."

³⁹ *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, vi, 77 (369); *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, iii, 47-8 (63-4)

⁴⁰ *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, vi, 77 (369).

⁴¹ *Llibre dels articles de la fe*, *NEORL* III, 50, ll. 32-35.

⁴² *Ibid.*, ll. 51-2. Also, however, we note the force of the distinction between God's uncreated "reasons" or attributes ("Deus [...] ab ses rahons propres et essencials", "les divines rahons") and created similitudes or "reasons" ("les rahons del mon"), the latter of which are displacements from (or lesser participations in) the essential attributes of God themselves, though Lull insists upon the imperative for the maximality of the resemblance between the two, particularly in Christ's "ssupposit de dues natures, divina e humana", *ibid.* ll. 34-40 and 47-8. Nevertheless in a transitional work of 1288-9, at least, and in the context of the deification of Christ's humanity, Lull does speak of 'internal' and 'external likenesses' or similitudes of God, the former being God Himself, the latter being man, *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, vi, 77-8 (369-70). There does seem to be some overlap, at least, if not an incipient distinction (and, therefore, displacement), in Lull's use of the terms "similitudes" and "reasons", created or uncreated, see *Contemplatio Raymundi*, *ORL* XVIII, 401. Lull uses a variety of terms to designate God's essential attributes: progressively and variously calling them "Virtues," "Qualities," "Dignities" and "Reasons." Trinkaus 1973-4, 138, points out that due to the Patristic tendency to see creation in emanationist terms, "in a sense [for the Greek Fathers, at least] the presence of the divine image in man was an estrangement of the divine nature".

again, however, that in the midst of this wealth of concepts with its protean terminology, Llull is able, at different periods of his production, to reconcile his criterion that the Dignities must manifest themselves maximally in creation not only with the thesis of a redemptive Incarnation but also with the thesis of Christ's renewal of the relationship of similitude between God and man (i.e. the deification of man through the deification of Christ's humanity) *and even* with both theses together held in asymmetrical synthesis.⁴³

This maximal manifestation or signification of similitude to the divine attributes, is also treated in terms of influence, the mode of the Incarnation being sustained in the mode of the divine Reasons "sicut modus qui est inter causam et effectum." The cause influences its effect with its similitudes and reasons, so that cause can be effect and effect cause.⁴⁴ Llull mentions this influence in the context of his proof that the purpose of the world is so exalted in goodness, greatness etc., because the divine Reasons are permitted to find their repose in the Incarnation.⁴⁵ Llull's God, therefore, though ultimately transcendent, is no *Deus absconditus*,⁴⁶ He openly manifests His Reasons in creation, exerting an influence as cause on effect, as we see in *Liber ad probandum aliquos articulos fidei catholicae per syllogisticas rationes* or *Liber de syllogismis* (February 1304), where Llull refers to Christ as the created mirror of the uncreated Virtues and their influence in creation.⁴⁷ These sections all refer to the role of the Incarnation in revealing the likenesses ("similitudines") of God and His influence in creation. This focus on the notion of (a two-way) influence ("influentia et refluentia") is already present, however, in *Compendium seu commentum Artis*

⁴³ *Llibre de contemplació*, 248:22, 24; *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, MOG III, vi, 77-8 (369-70).

⁴⁴ *Contemplatio Raymundi*, ORL XVIII, 401.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 400-1.

⁴⁶ Indeed, in *Liber praedicationis contra judaeos* (August 1305), ROL XII, 22, Llull, in the Sixth Sermon, commenting on the Biblical injunction: "Non habeas Deum alienum" (Ex. 34, 14), even describes God as "Deu[s] vicinu[s]" on account of His conjunction with human nature. He goes on to explain, in the same passage, that "...est ergo Deus incarnatus, ut non sit nobis Deus alienus, ut sit medium inter ipsum et nos per participationem altam et sublimem," *ibid.* Some ten or so years earlier, in *Compendium artis demonstrativae* (1288-9), MOG III, vi, 77-8 (369-70), Llull expressed, in the densest correlative terminology—which distinguishes here between a proximate and a remote passive correlative of "Deitas"—, the proximity established between God and man, through the conjunction of natures in Christ: he states that God created man in greater resemblance to Him than all other creatures, but that He created one man above all men in His image, "quem tanquam Deificabile remotum Deificat in Deificabile propinquo, induens illum hominem totum Deum in Deificabile propinquo, qui Deificabilis propinquis est eadem natura divina cum suomet Deificativo," such that just as the sensory ("sensatum") and the rational soul together make a man, so an homificate ("homificatum") and God are one substance or person ("suppositum") that we call Christ.

⁴⁷ *Liber ad probandum aliquos articulos fidei catholicae per syllogisticas rationes* or *Liber de syllogismis*, ROL XX, 471-2.

demonstrativae,⁴⁸ where Llull indicates that the second Person of the Trinity is the infinite and eternal similitude of the Father, and man, the greatest external similitude to God, is deified by that Person. Similarly, the union of God and man is a union of internal and external similitudes of God, and Christ, in his supreme similitude to God, is the end of all creation.

At the very end of the Ternary Phase and beyond, this theme of Christ as supreme likeness is taken up again. In *Ars compendiosa Dei* (May 1308) he recommences his superlativisation of Christ, stating that Christ's human mercy is the supreme and perfect sign of God's mercy; that Christ's humanity is the first principle by which God as creative first principle is reflected, known, and loved ("speculatum, cognitum et dilectum"); that the Incarnation (as the ultimate finality of the world) is the supreme sign of God's perfection; and, finally, that Christ's function is to signify by his supreme created filiation the supreme uncreated filiation.⁴⁹ We notice here that Christ does not simply signify the perfect divine attributes, as in *Llibre de contemplació*, but he signifies these *perfectly and supremely*, a theme also reiterated in *Supplicatio Raymundi venerabilibus et sublimis sacratissimae theologiae professoribus ac baccalariis studii Parisiensis* (June 1310), where Llull refers to Christ as the supreme sign of the supreme signified.⁵⁰ Similarly, in *Liber de quaestione valde alta et profunda* (August 1311), Llull refers to the Incarnation as the supreme sign of the superlativity of divine nature ("signum maximitatis et plenissimatis naturae divinae," "signum plenissimum plenissimati et eternalissimati, quia sine signo signatum non esset cognitum").⁵¹ This entire focus on Christ as a sign arises from Llull's belief that although God requires nothing external to Himself by reason of a lack, He does require a (supreme) sign whereby He might be signified and so, known and loved. Following certain suggestions of Ruiz Simon, it might be possible here to read Llull's emphasis, from the time of the *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae* (1289) onwards, upon the supreme similitude of the Incarnation to God and the superlativity of Christ as signifier as echoes of the language of the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus.⁵²

While Llull's early preoccupation with Christ's atonement of Original Sin gradually diminishes, the need for Christ as an example of the way to honour and serve God nevertheless persists until at least 1288-9, at which time there is an intensification of his focus upon Christ not only as sign of the perfect quali-

⁴⁸ *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, MOG III, vi, 77-8 (369-70).

⁴⁹ *Ars compendiosa Dei*, ROL XIII, 151, 154, 208-9, 228.

⁵⁰ *Supplicatio Raymundi*, ROL VI, 248.

⁵¹ *Liber de quaestione valde alta et profunda*, ROL VIII, 166-7.

⁵² Ruiz Simon 2005, 178-82.

ties of God,⁵³ but also variously as supreme likeness to God,⁵⁴ as supreme sign of God's perfection,⁵⁵ and as supreme sign of the supreme signified.⁵⁶ Here there is a progressive superlativisation of Christ's humanity and of his external similitude to (and signification of) God's internal attributes. Nevertheless, before this development, Llull often insists upon the need for Christ's Passion as an example of martyrdom (i.e. as the extreme and ultimate means to love, honour and serve God),⁵⁷ and as a sign of his love for man, to be emulated by suffering and dying a martyr's death in an effort to return that love.⁵⁸ In *Llibre de contemplació*, Llull extolled the image of Christ on the cross as the most beautiful image, sign, and exemplar possible,⁵⁹ and went on to lament that such an image did not inspire people more to follow its meaning unto death.⁶⁰ In fact, in *Fèlix* or *Llibre de meravelles* (1288-9), Llull has Blaquerna recount an *exemplum* illustrating that the world is not in error on account of any failing on the part of Christ's Passion, but rather it is so on account of man's reluctance to follow the customs embodied by Christ's example and those of his apostles, martyrs and other holy men.⁶¹

Such expressions of missionary zeal and desire for a martyr's death may disappear from Llull's writing after this point, but this does little to diminish his fervour and respect for Christ's example in his own missionary practice and apologetic aims. Llull probably starts to de-emphasise this active endorsement of Christ's Passion-as-exemplar (to Christians) in favour of a more broadly Apostolic model around the time of writing *Fèlix* (1288-9). This change might be attributed to the development of his ideas on the primacy of Christ and related theories contributing to the superlativisation of Christ's person and purpose, as well as to certain of the preparations involved in his shift from a quaternary to a ternary system. Another possible—and, in this instance, extrinsic—reason for Llull's change of heart, may lie in a more marked focus upon apologetics, that is to say, a greater consideration of his Muslim and Jewish audiences, both of whose faiths accepted that atonement was possible without an Incarnation.⁶² Though many of Llull's earlier writings seek to demonstrate the generality of Original Sin and the necessity of an Incarnation in the name of atonement, it

⁵³ *Llibre de contemplació*, 248:24.

⁵⁴ *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, vi, 77 (369).

⁵⁵ *Ars compendiosa Dei*, *ROL* XIII, 208-9.

⁵⁶ *Supplicatio Raymundi*, *ROL* VI, 248.

⁵⁷ *Llibre de contemplació*, 55:9-10.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapters 87, 90, 91.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 123:19-20.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 123:24.

⁶¹ *Fèlix* or *Llibre de meravelles*, *OS* II, 57.

⁶² Davies and Leftow (eds) 2004, 283.

may have begun to seem to him to be more expedient, more urgent even, to seek further, more potent reasons, reasons which might be more readily acceptable to those of the Islamic and Judaic faiths. It is in such a light that we should view Lull's introduction of Neoplatonic concepts of repose, influence and reflucence, and the processes of deification and hominification, which begin to appear during Lull's transition period between the composition of the *Art demonstrativa* (c. 1283) and that of the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (1290).

Perhaps the most significant reason for Lull's change of approach, is his decision to forge a theodicy which gives precedence to the consummation of humankind, initiated by the reinstitution of man's forfeited likeness to God and, by some accounts, the separate resumption of man's divinisation (both effected by the resurrected and glorified Christ), over his earlier predominant concentration upon Christ's passible nature and the determining role of Original Sin (with its correlatives of the crucified Christ and man's atonement) in the economy of salvation. In this way, Lull can focus his thought—and man's efforts—upon the likeness to divinity held up to man at his future consummation, given a life of Christian faith, understanding, virtue and sacramental observance, rather than upon the forfeiture of that likeness and its inheritance as an ineradicable blemish by succeeding generations of men.⁶³ So, despite Lull's continuing recognition of the role of Christ's Passion in the redemptive function of the Incarnation consequent upon Original Sin, a marked preference develops for a thesis which underlines the dignity of man as opposed to the "misery of the human condition".⁶⁴ Notwithstanding this, however, Lull's decision seems to be based upon the adoption of an *imago Dei* theology which, unlike that of Aquinas, also bears witness to the Patristic distinction between image and likeness. Thus, while Lull progressively, through his contemplation of the role of Christ and the associated mysteries, points to the end to which man is ordered, namely his deification, rather than to what he is, or has forfeited (the likeness) or had corrupted (the image) as a result of the Fall, he nonetheless at all times gives voice to the lack at the heart of man's current condition, a lack which can only be rectified and completed by the resurrected Christ.

⁶³ For certain similarities and differences between Lull's own and Eastern-Christian views of deification and its relation to Original Sin, see Hughes 2005, 287-90; see also Meyendorff 1974/1979, 160-161, for the distinction between sin's corruption of man's likeness to God and its interruption of man's divinisation or deification in Byzantine Christianity.

⁶⁴ These two latter themes, deriving from the traditions initiated by the two fourth-century writers Lactantius and Arnobius, were recognised literary genres by the late-twelfth century, Trinkaus 1973-4, 140.

2. Christ as the most adequate external sign of God's internal activity

In *Excusatio Raymundi* (December 1308-February 1309),—one of the first few works of the Post-Art Phase following the composition of *Ars brevis* (January 1308) and *Ars compendiosa Dei* (May 1308)—Llull makes use of the Twentieth Fallacy, or fallacy of apparent contradiction.⁶⁵ His proofs of God's infinite internal agency (*bonificare*, *magnificare* etc.) thus serve as proofs of the Trinity. Llull distinguishes between God's internal agency, which must be infinite in order to be equivalent to His (infinite) existence, and His external agency, which cannot be infinite (as creation cannot receive infinitude).⁶⁶

A slightly different procedure is used, however, for proofs of the Incarnation. Llull still focuses on the fact of God's internal agency but now considered from the viewpoint of whether the best, greatest etc. being requires an external sign of this internal agency, that sign being Christ. Christ is the external sign by which God's internal agency is known. If God is the being who is the "ens magis agens bonum, magnum," etc., He requires an external sign of this (so that He is known as the "ens magis agens bonum," etc.). Llull makes wide use of (negative) hypotheses ("facta hypothesis, quod Deus non sit ens magis agens bonum etc., sequitur quod non requirat signum magis bonum etc.").⁶⁷ But Llull has already demonstrated in his proofs of the Trinity that God *is* the "ens magis agens bonum etc.," therefore.... The proofs of the Trinity focus on God's infinitude as an internally active being; his proofs of the Incarnation focus on God's need for an external sign of this agency.

What seems implicit in all this is that if God is internally and infinitely active, then He requires the most adequate sign of this in the created world, precisely because He is not infinitely active in creation, that is to say, externally. For, as Llull tells us, if God were not a Trinity (i.e. actively the best, greatest etc. being) He would not require a sign, which is here, by definition, external and so, created. Llull, however, does not really go into detail as to how the incarnated Christ might signify the Trinity, God's "*summa intensa agentia extensiva*."⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Bonner situates Llull's use of this fallacy in the context of his rare citation of authorities in this text and of his efforts to demonstrate the capacities of his system of thought as an alternative to scholasticism rather than simply to correct the errors of his contemporaries and predecessors, Bonner 2005, 51. For a discussion of Llull's use of apparent contradictions, see Ruiz Simon 1999, 168-82, where the author identifies this "Twentieth Fallacy" or *fallacia nova* as a development of the Aristotelian fallacy known as *de ignorantia elenchi*, with the difference that in Llull's new fallacy (apparent) formal contradiction (in both quantity and quality) occurs not only in the conclusion, but in the premises as well. Llull's use of this fallacy is designed to protect the unity of Christian knowledge (faith and reason) against (Averroist) attempts to profess the Christian faith while defending philosophical theses which contradict that faith.

⁶⁶ *Excusatio Raymundi*, ROL XI (1983), 337-47.

⁶⁷ In fact, here Llull combines *demonstratio per negationem* and *demonstratio per hypothesim*.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

In Distinction II of *Liber de majori agentia Dei* (March 1309), written only a month later, Llull again states his intention to prove the Incarnation, this time via the principles adapted from his Artistic period (unity, goodness, greatness, eternity, power, intellect, will, virtue, truth, glory, nature, perfection), and by means of the majority of external agency in God, which is a sign of the majority of His internal agency. In §§ 13, 16-18, Llull asserts that the Incarnation is the supreme created sign of God's internal agency, without which there would be a lack of proportion between the supreme signified and its proportionate sign ("careret proportio inter signatum summum et signum proportionatum").⁶⁹

The *Dictat de Ramon* and *Coment del Dictat* (both December 1299) are significant works also in relation to this latter theme, on account of their assertions regarding the proportion established between the infinite and finite through the Incarnation and their mutual accommodation and union.⁷⁰ Here, as in *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (1294-5), Llull links the reciprocal participation of God and creation through Christ to the theme of the proportion between infinite and finite established through God's assumption of human flesh, this participation being an index of God's great love for man.⁷¹ Thus, in his commentary on lines 183-4 of *Dictat de Ramon* ("Infinit ha proporció / ab nos per encarnació"), Llull affirms that it is fitting that there be proportion between infinite and finite, by which the finite can have its end and perfection in the infinite and participate in its nature, having already established God's participation in creation in the previous section. Llull here makes clear that the proportion between infinite God and finite man exists in the Incarnation inasmuch as God has finitude insofar as He is made man, yet not with respect to Himself.

⁶⁹ *Liber de majori agentia Dei* (1309), *Estudios Franciscanos* 46 (1934), 316. In *Liber de perversione entis removenda* (December 1309), *ROL* V, 502-3, we also find a further reference to the Incarnation as the supreme sign of divine operation conditional upon the union of divine and human natures in Christ. For Llull's definitions of "Proporció / Proportio," see Bonner and Ripoll 2002, 253-4. His definitions of this term do not resemble our modern mathematical notions of proportion, as when he states in *Taula d'esta Art* (September 1293-January 1294), *ORL* XVII, 395 that "Proporció es orde de graus a una cosa, axí com a regiment, cavaller, comte o rey, o axí com a hom sentir e ymaginar e entendre." "Proporció" is later defined in *Lògica nova* (May 1303), *NEORL* IV, 77, as "...abit de actu de justicia o de equalitat, e constituit de disposició. E la rahó es car proporció demostra justicia e concordansa." "disposició" and the "potencia-objec-actus" triad are also defined in the same work, *ibid.*, 75; in the Latin text, "dispositio", *ROL* XXIII, 92, ll. 374-6; "proportio", *ibid.*, 94, ll. 438-40; "potentia-obiectum-actus", *ibid.*, 93, ll. 386-91.

⁷⁰ *Dictat de Ramon*, *ORL* XIX, 270; *Coment del Dictat*, *ORL* XIX, 305; *Dictati commentum*, *ROL* XIX, 389-390, ll. 143-158. Domínguez notes that the Catalan text of the *Coment* in the *ORL* series comes from a single, relatively modern manuscript with many lacunae, errors and misreadings, adding that, although, individually, each text is deficient, the Catalan text of the *Coment*, the 15th-century Spanish version transcribed by Domínguez himself, and the Latin text published in *ROL* XIX, "ofrecen conjuntamente un texto suficientemente seguro," Domínguez 1996, 57.

⁷¹ *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, v, 153 (511).

Without the Incarnation, no such proportion would exist and man would not attain his end or purpose, which end itself is said to be infinite. But Lull is also careful to note that in such union between the infinite and the finite, there is no debasement of God's nature for, insofar as He assumes any human defects, He does so as man, not God; nor is there any composition, since infinite and finite cannot form a composite, for composition can only exist with respect to finite parts, time, and quantity, which do not pertain to the divine nature.⁷² Thus Lull maintains the possibility of a union between the infinite and the finite which the evil demon ("lo mal Esprit") in *Medicina de peccat* (July 1300) would have us believe was impossible on the grounds that they are so different as to be incompatible and unable to form a union.⁷³

In *Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo* (December 1300), Lull states that this proportion which exists between God and creation, is achieved in the Incarnation through the proportion the world bears to Christ's human nature, which itself bears proportion to divine nature.⁷⁴ Creation on its own could not attain such proportion, but can only do so as a result of the humanity of Jesus, the end towards which the whole world is ordered and created. Thus without God's assumption of human flesh, this would not be possible.⁷⁵ In *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione* (September 1305), however, he concedes that a creature cannot have an infinite end, though maintains that the will can desire an end which is greater than that of all other creatures ("magis magnus omnibus creaturis") and the intellect understand it. If there were no such greatest being, however, there would indeed be infinite multiplication (of God's Dignities in creation) and there could be no repose for God in creation or vice versa.⁷⁶ In a following response to a further objection, Lull also maintains that, in fact, there can be proportion between uncreated and created greatness in the Incarnation.⁷⁷ This proportion between a supremely infinite and supremely finite being exists primarily on account of their very conjunction, and this proportion is maximal, because it is the effect of the supreme cause.⁷⁸

⁷² *Coment del Dictat*, ORL XIX, 314-5; *Dictati commentum*, ROL XIX, 385-6.

⁷³ *Medicina de peccat*, ORL XX, 98.

⁷⁴ A point also made a few years earlier in *Proverbis de Ramon* (1296?): "Tot lo món es creat e proporcionat a Jhesu Crist," ORL XIV, 42.

⁷⁵ *Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo*, ROL XXI, 382.

⁷⁶ *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione*, ROL XII, 117.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Emphasising the very dependence of creation upon God's logically prior decree of the Incarnation and, thus, explicitly affirming the primacy of Christ thesis, Lull states, in *Disputatio Raymundi christiani et Hamar Saraceni* (April 1307), ROL XXII, 197-8, that without the Incarnation, God would not be disposed to create the world—which is finite and new—because there exists no proportion between the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the new: the reason for this is, because the ultimate end cannot be the middle between them, unless it be by means of the conjunction of divine and human natures achieved by

In a later work, *Ars mystica theologiae et philosophiae* (November 1309), Llull makes clear that it is the effect of the Incarnation to exalt the universe to the highest possible degree as a result of the conjunction of divine and human natures. If this were not the case, however, there would be an immense difference, an unbridgeable gap, existing between the optimal goodness of God (existing in the superlative degree) and the goodness of the world. Christ is thus the link between positive and superlative degrees, between finite and infinite, and through the Incarnation proportion is achieved between the superlative cause and its superlative effect.⁷⁹

We have seen Llull progress from a notion of Christ as (privileged) sign of the divine attributes to that of Christ as supreme sign of these, via a distinction between created and uncreated similitudes. He moves towards a consideration of the duality and conjunction of human and divine natures in Christ in terms of external and internal similitudes of the dynamic divine attributes via a meditation upon the proportion established between God and man in and through Christ, the perfection of whose deified humanity is the closest approximation possible to divinity in the created realm. Underlying such movement is Llull's continuing preoccupation with the nature of the relationship between the Incarnation and the Trinity, with a particular focus upon the manner in which the former signifies the latter.

3. The Trinity and the Incarnation

During the period between *Llibre de demostracions* (1274-6) and *Liber de divina voluntate infinita et ordinata* (January 1314), Llull embarks upon a sustained delineation of the relations existing between the Trinity and the Incarnation. In *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (c. 1274), he had already stipulated the reasons why the three Persons of the Trinity did not become incarnate;

the Incarnation. As an indication of just how the primacy of Christ thesis exists side by side with a conception of a redemptive Incarnation—even in some of Llull's later works—the reader should compare the above passage with that found in *ibid.*, 238 (Ad 4).

⁷⁹ *Ars mystica theologiae et philosophiae*, *ROL* V, 340. Johnston states, however, that "Llull explicitly recognizes that there is no proportion of Creator to creature," Johnston 1987, 18 (emphasis added), citing only *Liber de inventione maiore* (September 1315), *ROL* II, 302, in support of this claim. The relevant passage from Dist. III, De questionibus, 9, actually states that "[u]nitas divina melius potest agnosci cum una creatura maiori, quam cum minori; quia inter maius et minus nulla est similitudo," *ibid.*, the verb "agnoscere" meaning "to perceive or recognise." What this article illustrates however, is that, despite Llull's statement in *Dictati commentum*, *ROL* XIX, 390, ll. 157-8, that "inter infinitum et finitum non sit aliqua proportio", proportion *does* exist between creator and creature, and maximally in the case of Jesus Christ, that most noble created being through whose Incarnation such proportion is established.

he expressed these reasons in terms of the basic investigative components of Figure S and other principles, namely [F G T] [Majority Difference Concordance] [E A]. (Broadly speaking, Llull's conclusion is that the difference in the Persons of God is better signified if only one of these assumed flesh, and by greater difference is signified greater concordance between these three Persons).⁸⁰ Some twenty years later, in *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (1294-5) (Dist. III, Part i, Q. 2, Tertia Quaestio D: "De quo est Incarnatio Dei?"), § 2, Solutio: D E T D), he explains why it is fitting that the Son of God should be incarnated, giving the reason that, if it were not the Son of God who was incarnated, there would follow contrariety in the Incarnation against filiation, paternity, and spiration, and the proportion of the filiation of man would be lacking, as would be also the possificability and duration of the Incarnation.⁸¹ Though there are evident differences between his treatment of this same question in the two works, most notably his use of the correlative terminology and the absence of Figure S, Llull's ideas upon the relationship between the Trinity and the Incarnation remain relatively constant throughout this entire period, though at times—and particularly in his final writings—he clearly subordinates the truth of the Incarnation in its function as the world's end to that of God's self-origination in the Trinity. There is initially great emphasis on the way in which the Incarnation acts as a sign of, that is to say, demonstrates or provides an image or reflection of, the operations of the Trinity, though also, at times, Llull indicates that Trinity and Incarnation offer reciprocal demonstrations of each other.⁸² The commonality between Trinity and Incarnation also finds itself reflected in the fact that in certain works Llull uses the same precepts, and indeed, common means, to signify and demonstrate both Articles of Faith.⁸³ It is only in later works such as *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (1294-5), and in final works such as *Liber de concordantia et contrarietate* (December 1313), and *Liber de divina voluntate infinita et ordina-*

⁸⁰ *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, MOG I, vii, 32 (464). For a similar argument, though without the alphabetical notation, see also *Llibre de demostracions*, ORL XV, 418-9. In the previous section (*Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, Distinction III, Part II, Question 8) Llull had demonstrated which Person of the Trinity became incarnate, by analogy with the process according to which fire generates natural heat in its quest for conjunction, this conjunction itself being the medium by which the same heat is the form generated from matter in vegetables or animals, *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, MOG I, vii, 32 (464).

⁸¹ *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, MOG V, v, 156 (514). *Possificabilitas* is the noun deriving from the passive correlative—namely, *possificabile*—of *possificare*, the verb denoting the action of the principle of God's Power or *Potestas*.

⁸² *Llibre de demostracions*, ORL XV, 471.

⁸³ *Disputació de cinc savis* (1294), ATCA 5, 102-57; *Supplicatio Raymundi* (1310), ROL VI, 237; *Liber de participatione christianorum et saracenorum* (1312), ROL XVI, 247-8.

ta (January 1314) that Llull insists upon the relative inferiority of God's Incarnation to the supreme end of His self-origination.⁸⁴

Llull already establishes a parallelism, however, between the Trinity and the Incarnation, the former being the excellent work within the supreme good, by which is signified the Trinity, the latter being the great work the supreme good effects in lower things, by which is signified the Incarnation, in the five conditions of Book IV of *Llibre de demostracions* (1274-6).⁸⁵ This common ground between these Articles is also reasserted in the Fifth Condition where Llull concedes that the demonstrations of the Trinity and Incarnation can be opposed and contradicted by other opinions, namely by what he calls "false, destructible similitudes" ("falses semblances destruables"). God permits this, he explains, so that man should be free to believe or understand the Articles of Faith for, if the Articles were so demonstrable that they could not be contradicted, men could not have faith in them nor would the intellect be so exalted in understanding them.⁸⁶

This intimate relationship between Trinity and Incarnation is again made clear in Book IV, where Llull states that the Incarnation signifies and demonstrates God's infinite internal activity or aseity.⁸⁷ The Incarnation is seen as a means of demonstrating the Trinity at several other points in this work as well.⁸⁸ Chapter 20, § 1, argues that just as the lower good signifies and demonstrates the divine attributes in the supreme good, so it is necessarily fitting that it should give a demonstration of the Trinity. On account of this and further reasons, Llull claims that the Son of God became incarnate to demonstrate that the Father is in the Son, the Son in the Father, and the same for the Holy Spirit. In Chapter 45, §§ 5-6, Llull argues that the Trinity is better demonstrated by the Incarnation than by anything else and in Chapter 49, § 8, contends that the Trinity is more nobly demonstrated to the lower good if there is an Incarnation than if there is none. He goes on to argue that because of the greatness of the gift given to creation by the Incarnation, the gift in the three divine Persons is better signified. Llull states here that "la encarnació demostra que lo Pare dona al Fill, e lo Pare e l Fill donen al Sant Spirit, sens imperfecció de bonea poder &c., e lo do es a perfecció de la bonea poder &c. qui es en la essencia e en les persones."⁸⁹

⁸⁴ *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, MOG V, v, 38 (396); *Liber de concordantia et contrarietate*, ROL I, 397; *Liber de divina voluntate infinita et ordinata*, ROL I, 474.

⁸⁵ *Llibre de demostracions*, ORL XV, 411-3.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 413.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 416.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 495-6, 580-1, 592.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 592.

A further indication of the Incarnation's demonstration of the Trinity occurs in Book IV, Chapter 5, § 4, where Lull explains that this demonstration of the infinite subsistence of the Son of God in the humanity of Christ can only be achieved in creation if that creature (i.e. Christ) is greater in virtue or capacity than all other creatures, namely if it is conjoined with the divinity. However in §§ 3 and 5 of this same chapter Lull clearly states the complementary and reciprocal relations existing between these two Articles, whereby we see that signification operates, in fact, in both directions: that which, in his final works, at least, is construed as ascent and descent. He even claims in § 3, that just as the Trinity is a mirror and demonstration of the Incarnation, so also the Incarnation is to the human intellect a mirror and demonstration of the Trinity ("En axí con trinitat es mirall e demostració de la suberana encarnació, en axí encarnació es al humà enteniment mirall e demostració de trinitat.")⁹⁰ Again these close relations between Trinity and Incarnation are reaffirmed in Book IV,⁹¹ where Lull states that the Trinity, as mirror and demonstration of the Incarnation, offers us the means by which the Incarnation can be made clear by necessary reasons, an evident echo of Book IV, Ch. 8, § 2, where he claims that the Trinity signifies the Incarnation ("con trinitat sia significació de la encarnació del Fill de Deu...").

In Book IV, Chapter 10, § 2, while discussing the presence and activity of God's great mercy in Himself and in creation, Lull again insists on the fact that the Trinity offers a demonstration of the Incarnation ("per assò trinitat es demostrable: per la demostració de la qual, encarnació es demostrable"), and proceeds, with relative succinctness, to illustrate the interrelations between these two truths.⁹² Thus in Book IV, Ch. 13, § 1, Lull feels justified in stating definitively that the Trinity and the Incarnation offer reciprocal demonstrations of each other.⁹³ Lull argues, expressing his arguments in the form of *demonstrationes per negationem* and *per hypothesim*, that if we can prove the Trinity, "la encarnació que nos encercam es probable; cor si trinitat es, cové que encarnació sia", thus asserting the necessity of the Incarnation, but reserving comment with respect to the necessity of his proofs.⁹⁴ What Lull argues, in this particular instance is that if there were a Trinity without an Incarnation, it would be impossible (according to supreme justice and mercy) that these two things,

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 433-4.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 453-4.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 458-9.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 471.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 457-8. Hames 2000, 28, confirms that "Lull's understanding of the nature of the Incarnation proceeded logically from his proof of the Trinity, and if one had accepted the latter, the former became a necessity." As this section of my article shows, however, the demonstrations or proofs are reciprocal.

which would be opposites, should be in the same faith and law.⁹⁵ And in a curious addendum to his earlier proofs, he adduces both the lack of belief of Jews, Muslims, and certain other “infidels” in either of these articles of faith and the belief of Catholics in both, as the reasons why it is *fitting by necessity* that, if there is a Trinity, so must there be an Incarnation (“si trinitas es que encarnació sia”).

In *Disputació de cinc savis* (1294) Llull gives a somewhat fuller explanation of just how the Incarnation is a mirror image (“mirall e figura”) of the Trinity, in place of his earlier, simply declarative, statements.⁹⁶ He states that just as the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are convertible by essence and nature, and remain one essence, one nature, one deity, one God, yet remain distinct on account of their personal properties (such that one Person is not another); so also, in the Incarnation, there is a conversion of divine and human natures within a unity of Person, and yet a difference between both remains, insofar as one nature is not the other.⁹⁷ Thus it is not at all surprising that Llull should declare that he will use a common means of proving the Trinity and the Incarnation (“E car de la sancta trinitat avem donada conexensa, volem-la donar de la sancta encarnació del Fil de Déu, següent la manera que avem tenguda en significar e provar la sancta trinitat de Déu,” emphasis added).⁹⁸ Even in such late works as *Supplicatio Raymundi* (June 1310), and *Liber de participatione christianorum et saracenorum* (July 1312), Llull again uses the same precepts to demonstrate both Trinity and Incarnation.⁹⁹

Echoing and expanding upon his statement of almost twenty years earlier,¹⁰⁰ Llull argues in *Disputació de cinc savis* that the Incarnation is a mirror in which the human intellect might most perfectly reflect and contemplate the operations

⁹⁵ *Libre de demostracions*, ORL XV, 457-8.

⁹⁶ For Llull's use of mirror imagery, see Johnston 1996, 51, where he discusses the epistemological repercussions of Llull's theory of resemblance; stating, with regard to the mirror, that it is the “paradigmatic metaphor for the soul's capacity to receive likenesses.”

⁹⁷ *Disputació de cinc savis*, ATCA 5, 80-81. Though speaking of the deification of man rather than Christ, Williams notes that in Aquinas' discussion (*Summa theologiae*, I, q. 33, a. 3) of the role of the Person of the Father in the Trinity, an analogy is drawn between the relation of the Father to the Son and the Father to his adoptive sons (graced creatures), such that “[i]ntra-Trinitarian relations are mirrored in the relation of Uncreated to created, so that even though there are clear differences between the two (i.e., a shared nature in one case, the absence of such in another) the similarity enables one to envisage the creature's gracing as a form of sharing in modes of Trinitarian existence”, Williams 1997, 8, leading her to conclude that Aquinas “[portrays] the Trinitarian mission as itself an inherently deifying work”, *ibid.*, 10.

⁹⁸ *Disputació de cinc savis*, ATCA 5, 157.

⁹⁹ *Supplicatio Raymundi*, ROL VI, 237; *Liber de participatione christianorum et saracenorum*, ROL XVI, 248 ff.

¹⁰⁰ “En axí con trinitat es mirall e demostració de la suberana encarnació, en axí encarnació es al humà enteniment mirall e demostració de trinitat,” *Libre de demostracions*, ORL XV, 433-4.

of the Trinity, so that this latter be made known.¹⁰¹ The reasons for such reflection of the Trinity by the Incarnation are given as being the lack of multiplication or alteration in both; the fact that the Incarnation is the maximum that can be received by the created world and the limit of God's influence on created nature; and the fact that in both there is an absence of imperfection (of time, place, quantity, motion).¹⁰²

As the years pass, however, Ramon Llull becomes slightly more circumspect in his pronouncements on the relations between the Trinity and the Incarnation, reminding the reader in *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (1294-5) that God's self-origination as a Trinity is the supreme end, while the Incarnation is simply the end of creation.¹⁰³ And again, much later in his production, while writing *Liber de concordantia et contrarietate* (December 1313), Llull states that knowledge of the Trinity is a "scientiam necessariam ad superius" while that of the Incarnation is "ad inferius" and leads to necessary subaltern knowledge, since the Incarnation contains contingent elements ("incarnatio sit a contingentia facta").¹⁰⁴ This superiority of the Trinity over the Incarnation is again reiterated in *Liber de divina voluntate infinita et ordinata* (January 1314), where Llull declares that because divine will and perfection are infinite and ordinate, they require a lower superlative order ("ordinem superlativum inferius") to match their higher superlative order ("ordinem superlativum superius"), "qui ordo superius est a divina trinitate, et ordo inferius est a divina incarnatione."¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

From an early point in his production Llull ascribes a multiplicity of purposes to the Incarnation, among which deification and hominification come to feature strongly, in his later writings, as bi-directional vectors of divine and human influence and refluence, respectively; the influence, that is, of a cause upon its

¹⁰¹ *Disputació de cinc savis*, ATCA 5, 160.

¹⁰² For a similar set of arguments illustrating how the Incarnation is "imatge e figura" of the operation of God's Trinity, see *Coment del Dictat* (1299), ORL XIX, 311, commentary on the lines "Ab encarnar ha Deus mostrat / l'obra que ha en trinitat"; see also *Dictati commentum*, ROL XIX, 398, ll. 219-232.

¹⁰³ *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, MOG V, v, 38 (396).

¹⁰⁴ *Liber de concordantia et contrarietate*, ROL I, 397. With regard to the related question of Llull's pronouncements during his final works concerning the lesser necessity of the Incarnation with respect to that of the Trinity, Ruiz Simon has pointed out, in personal communications, that this may simply be the result of: a) the evolution of Llull's methods of demonstration; and b) his awareness of the fundamental difference between freely-willed and 'natural' acts.

¹⁰⁵ *Liber de divina voluntate infinita et ordinata*, ROL I, 474.

effect and the refluent of that effect upon its cause.¹⁰⁶ But this creator God of Christian revelation, viewed here through a Pseudo-Dionysian filter, also bears a super-abundant and effusive, though freely-given, love towards His creation, a love which it is man's principal duty, his first intention, to reciprocate. Although God's goodness and love, both internally and externally, are among the principal and constant preoccupations of Llull's writings throughout the years, ultimately, he does come to speak of the relationship between God and man in terms of the highest degree of generality or abstraction (which, in Neoplatonic terms, represents the closest approximation to pure Being and possesses the highest degree of reality). Thus he speaks of God as the superlative cause and of man as His created effect; Christ's human nature being the superlative effect, namely, the most perfect among created beings. He further insists that Christ is not merely an effect, however, but, through his dual nature, the very union of cause and effect and that, as effect, He is the supreme reflection of his cause.

Llull, therefore, universalised his arguments and procedures, in an attempt to avoid the specificity of doctrines which, in their origin, are differentially Christian, and explicated the nexus formed by Christ's Incarnation, that is to say, between the uncreated and the created, in terms drawn from the Neoplatonic heritage common to the three medieval monotheistic religions. God's externally diffusive or creative aspect, in Llull as in other medieval Christian authors, is always subordinate to His will, yet is also but one side of His operations; Llull also devoted a special place to the consideration of God's internal activities,

¹⁰⁶ *Llibre de contemplació* (1273-4?), 248:20, states that the reasons for the Incarnation are: to give glory to man, to restore or to recreate the world, and to demonstrate God's Virtues, adding that there are many other reasons which would take too long to recount (!). This work is also filled with references to the manner in which Christ, through both his Incarnation and His Passion, offers an example, variously, of love, goodness, suffering, and nobility, whereby man can more easily override his sensory powers, learn to disdain worldly vanities, become more religious, act virtuously while avoiding vice, and engage in prayer and the contemplation of God, thus fulfilling the Lullian "first intention", *ibid.*, 54:11, 13-15; 123:4; 183:17, 19; 185:10; 248:22, 28-29; 338:1-30. Many of these advantages offered by Christ's example correspond to the express aims of Llull's first Art, *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (1274?), as stated in the Prologue, *MOG* I, vii, 1 (433). See also *Llibre de demostracions* (1274-6) *ORL* XV, 23, 49-50, 531-2. In Book IV, chapter 30, § 3, 531-2, Llull stresses the multiplicity of ends of the Incarnation, without which there would be but one demonstration for a single purpose and the supreme good would be deprived of goodness, power, etc. Thus, alongside the manifestation of God's Virtues and the recreation of man, Llull cites Christ's suffering and death (with regard to His human nature), the descent of His soul into hell, and His bodily resurrection (the other Articles of Faith relating to Christ's humanity) as further purposes of the Incarnation. Clearly it is important for Llull to employ his Arts (as these develop) in the discovery of a multiplicity of topics upon which to base multiple demonstrations of the multiple purposes of the Incarnation, largely for the reasons of maximity specified in the "conditions" from *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* (1274-83). However, we should note that there is a certain degree of calibration regarding these multiple purposes, which increases over time as Llull's priorities shift and become better defined.

namely His self-origination as a Trinity of Persons and the relation this bears to the Incarnation, an Incarnation which casts light both upon God's internal and His external diffusiveness. In this way, it appears that the imperative Llull imposed upon himself in his efforts to generalise the Arts themselves, applied equally to his Christology, in which Christ came to be viewed as the most general creature, namely, that Being who has the greatest commonality, and who possesses this independently—to a certain degree—from the generality of Original Sin. In this way, the Great Arts, in all their generality, and Llull's Christology, in all its focus upon the quite different generality of Christ, became more compatible the one with the other as the role of the atonement effected by the Incarnation became less of a priority.

The tension between the movements of descending influence and ascending refluece, in effect, finds itself resolved in Christ, through his exemplification (as well as, quite literally, his embodiment) of the perfect reciprocal love between God and man; though it is probable that Llull lends greater emphasis to the descending movement of God's influence as superlative cause following the transitional works of 1287-89, here indicating that not only is man's *reditus in Deum* Christocentric, but also, and preeminently so, the divine *exitus a Deo*. The polarity between God and man, between the infinite and uncreated and the finite and created, therefore—if not entirely dissolved—is, at least, successfully mediated by Christ, in whom influence and refluece, deification and hominification, find reciprocal repose.

I also hope to have suggested that the context itself—of Llull's discourse upon causality and, in particular, upon final causality—can, in its own turn, usefully be viewed in the light of the fluctuation and calibration of Llull's language about Christ, as well as in the light of his discourse concerning God's and man's purposes as resumed in the figure of Christ. For Llull's understanding of the nature of the Incarnation—equally a doctrinal term with apologetic ends, a moral example directed at Christians, and an Article of Faith which requires understanding—helps to create the conditions for a shift in hermeneusis (both with regard to any alteration in his interpretations of the Incarnation themselves and changes within the Great Art), a hermeneutic shift which, with respect to the Incarnation, does not eliminate the range of possible interpretations, nor render previous theorisations obsolete, but rather orders them and adjusts their configuration in accordance with the demands of his priorities at any given point.

In Llull's onto-theological worldview, all reality, from the lowest—elementative—level, is already figurative in that it participates in and, to varying degrees, signifies or *stands for* its creator. This is not to say, however, that Llull feels no need to employ figurative language for purposes of elucidation or instruction. His more popular works are filled with analogies, similes, metaphors and compar-

isons of various types; indeed, his Great Arts base themselves upon an analogical exemplarism in which forms of comparison are drawn from his material logic and employed in assessing both beings and truths, that is to say both *ens realis* and *ens rationis*, according to their position on a scale of participation in or signification of the divine attributes. He even replaces the combinatoric model of the elemental theory, on the basis of which connections had been established analogically between beings, with a model in which the Dignities themselves as well as their created manifestations are conceived as resemblances, between which there exist dynamic relations of resemblance; resemblance thus pertains to Being *qua* cause and to beings *qua* caused and *qua* causes themselves.

His use of the language of similitude, likeness or resemblance; of example, figure and image—particularly that of the mirror-image metaphor as the paradigm case of the signification of likenesses to the soul—supposes an essentialist ontology and a realist epistemology, along with an equation between *ens realis* and *ens rationis*, as a result of which Christ represents not only the very real point of return of (corporeal and spiritual) creation to its creator but also that example which participates most greatly in the exemplar and towards which man is obliged to direct the acts of his memory, intellect and will. This language—expressing degrees of identity between being and thought as well as between beings themselves—reveals, in divine influence, a degree of God's immanence in reality, a reality which both points towards and strives to attain its end and perfection in the transcendent. The use of such terminology finds its apogee in the person of Christ: supremely perfect man, cosmological intermediary, and embodiment of both God's perfection of purpose and man's highest finality. Christ as God man, being that point at which the ontological and the epistemological achieve their most superlative coincidence, and being that person in whom the corporeal body and the intellective soul are most nobly conjoined, permits the corporeal—through the spiritual and the spiritual through its conjunction in him with the divine—to find repose in the Supreme Being. In His human nature, Christ signifies man's capacities and aspirations (in particular, man's first intention—a preoccupation, although not exclusively, of Llull's Quaternary Phase); in His divine nature, He signifies God's final cause in creation (God's first intention—a preoccupation, although again not exclusively, of Llull's Ternary Phase) and, both ultimately and super-eminently, God's internal agency: the Trinity which, while remaining superior to the Incarnation, provides its reflection as in a mirror.

Llull's paradigmatic signs are the Trinity and the Incarnation, each signifying the other. The Incarnation is the meaning and purpose of creation as well as the sign of the conversion, unity and difference of Persons in the Trinity (and of the conversion, unity and difference of natures in Christ himself), while the

Trinity is a sign of itself as self-origination and a sign of its own voluntary, benevolent, and loving external diffusiveness. Thus, at the heart of Being, as of created being, that is to say, at the heart of that which must be conceived to bear the greatest resemblance to itself, and to have an infinite degree of self-identity, namely, that Being within which there is concordance without contrariety, lies difference, though difference in unity or identity. For Llull, Christ's superlative reflection or signification of the superlativity of Being, enacts the fullest possible reduction of contrariety in the relationship between man and God and the fullest possible increase in concordance between them.

Though the discussion of these Articles of Faith may disappear, relatively early, from the Arts themselves, they remain in the background (and throughout works in which there is an application of the principles of the Arts) as an *éminence blanche*, co-ordinating the manoeuvres made in their name. The works themselves, Artistic or otherwise, in which these themes receive consideration, contain a multiplicity of arguments, which often have to contend with powerful counter-arguments, yet each possesses, both at the macroscopic and the microscopic levels, an identical finality (viz. the demonstration of the Catholic faith to Muslims, Jews, schismatic Christians and Pagans).¹⁰⁷

So, for Llull, while there can never be any possibility of reducing religious differences to a homogeneous identity of belief, there is, at the level of the fundamental (shared) presuppositions of the three monotheistic faiths a degree of identity, namely those *preambula fidei* (e.g. the similarity of certain articles of the respective faiths, shared Neoplatonic influence and identical cosmologies, etc.), upon the basis of which, implacably and inexorably, he guides his readers towards the incontrovertible conclusions which concur with the differentially Christian Articles of Faith (used here as the conclusions to, rather than as axioms for arguments). For Llull, however, conflict is indeed open, though, at least in his early works (e.g. *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* (1274-83)), mediated by the protocols of courtesy and good order. Ultimately, though, he is not concerned simply to replace non-Christian (or Eastern Christian) beliefs with Latin "orthodoxy," and still less to eradicate any differences in the name of a syncretistic fusion; but rather, by taking cognisance of the beliefs of the "Other," he is intent upon leading "infidels" (and Christians alike) towards an understanding of the universality and truth of the Catholic faith, by means of methods which are, in his eyes, equally universal and equally true.

Robert D. HUGHES

¹⁰⁷ Again, as Anthony Bonner has noted in a recent article, the multiplicity of Llull's arguments in support of a point of doctrine, indicates a multiplicity of possible routes towards the same (Christian) Truth. See Bonner 2003, 57.

Works cited

- AQUINAS, Thomas (1920/2003), *The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Second and Revised Edition, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online Edition Copyright, 2003 by Kevin Knight, consulted (11/03/06) at <<http://www.newadvent.org/summa/>>.
- BONNER, A. (2003): "Les structures de l'Art durant l'étapa quaternària", *SL* 43, 57-82.
- (2005): "Reducere auctoritates ad necessarias rationes", in *Actes de les Jornades Internacionals Lul·lianes. "Ramon Llull al segle XXI"*, ed. M. I. Ripoll Perelló, "Col·lecció Blaquerna" 5, Universitat de les Illes Balears/Universitat de Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca/Barcelona, 47-73.
- BONNER, A. and RIPOLL PERELLÓ, M. I. (2002): *Diccionari de definicions lul·lianes / Dictionary of Lullian Definitions*, "Col·lecció Blaquerna" 2, Universitat de Barcelona – Universitat de les Illes Balears, Barcelona.
- CARRERAS Y ARTAU, T. & J. (1939-43): *Historia de la filosofía española. Filosofía cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, 2 vols., Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, Madrid.
- CONGAR, M.-J. (1st May 1935): "La déification dans la tradition spirituelle de l'Orient d'après une étude récente", *La Vie Spirituelle*, 43, 94-7.
- COLOM MATEU, M. (1982-1985): *Glossari general lul·lià*, 5 vols., Editorial Moll, Palma de Mallorca.
- DAVIES, B. and LEFTOW, B. (eds) (2004): *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- DOMÍNGUEZ REBOIRAS, F. (1996): "El *Dictat de Ramon* y el *Coment del dictat*. Texto y contexto", *SL* 36, 47-67.
- EDWARDS, M. J. (2002): *Origen against Plato*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot.
- GAYÀ, J. (1995): "Significación y demostración en el *Libre de contemplació de Ramon Llull*", *Aristotelica et Lulliana magistro doctissimo Charles H. Lohr septuagesimum annum feliciter agenti dedicata*, ed. F. Domínguez Reboiras, Steenbrugis, in *Abbatia S. Petri*, Martinus Nijhoff International, The Hague, 477-99.
- HAMES, H. J. (2000): *The Art of Conversion: Christianity and Kabbalah in the Thirteenth Century*, Brill, Leiden.
- HUGHES, R. D. (2001): "Deification/hominification and the doctrine of intentions: Internal Christological evidence for re-dating *Cent noms de Dieu*", *SL*, 41, 111-115.
- (2002): *The Christology of Ramon Llull in the Light of his Ars magna*, Doctoral thesis, University of Lancaster.

- (2005): “Ramon Llull’s use of the term *Deificatio* and its cognates in the context of Latin- and Eastern-Christian views of salvation”, in *Actes de les Jornades Internacionals Lul·lianes. “Ramon Llull al segle XXI”*, ed. M. I. Ripoll Perelló, “Col·lecció Blaquerna” 5, Universitat de les Illes Balears/Universitat de Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca/Barcelona, 281-96.
- JOHNSTON, M. D. (1987): *The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- (1996): *The Evangelical Rhetoric of Ramon Llull: Lay Learning and Piety in the Christian West Around 1300*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- LLINARÈS, A. (1990), “Version française de la première partie de la ‘Quadrature et triangulation du cercle’”, *EL* 30, 121-138.
- LLULL, Ramon (1721-42; 1965): *Raymundi Lulli Opera omnia*, 8 vols., ed. Ivo Salzinger, Mainz; facsimile reproduction, ed. F. Stegmüller, Minerva, Frankfurt.
- (1906-50) *Obres de Ramon Llull*, 21 vols., eds. S. Galmés et al., Comissió Editora Lulliana, Palma de Mallorca.
- (1959-present) *Raymundi Lulli Opera latina*, 30 vols. at present, eds F. Stegmüller et al. Vols. 1-5, Maioricensis Schola Lullistica, Palma de Mallorca, 1959-67; vols. 6 ff., Brepols, Turnhout, 1975 ff.
- (1989) *Obres Selectes de Ramon Llull*, 2 vols., ed. A. Bonner, Editorial Moll, Palma de Mallorca.
- (1990-present) *Nova Edició de les Obres de Ramon Llull*, 7 vols., eds. A. Bonner et al., Patronat Ramon Llull, Palma de Mallorca.
- LOHR, C. H. (2000): “The Arabic Background to Ramon Llull’s *Liber chaos* (ca. 1285)”, in *Traditio* 55, 159-70.
- LOSSKY, V. (1957): *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, Translated from the French, James Clarke and Co., Cambridge.
- MEYENDORFF, J. (1974/1979): *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes*, Fordham University Press, New York.
- PERARNAU I ESPELT, J. (2005): *Ramon Llull i la seva teologia de la Immaculada Concepció*, Introduction by Jordi Gayà Estelrich, Publicacions del Centre d’Estudis Teològics de Mallorca 39, Majorca.
- PLATZECK, E. -W. (1953-4): “La figura ‘T’ del Arte Luliano y la doctrina de las significaciones (un capítulo de la gramática especulativa medieval)”, *Studia Monographica et Recensiones*, 9-10, 35-49.
- PRING-MILL, R. D. F. (1991): *Estudis sobre Ramon Llull (1956-78)*, Curial Edicions Catalanes, Barcelona.
- RICOEUR, P. (1974/2004): “Original Sin: A Study in Meaning”, in *The Conflict of Interpretations*, Continuum, London, 265-83; originally published as *Le Conflit des interprétations: Essais, d’herméneutique*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1969.

- RUIZ SIMON, J. M. (1999): *L'Art de Ramon Llull i la teoria escolàstica de la ciència*, Quaderns Crema, Barcelona.
- (2005): “La transformació del pensament de Ramon Llull durant les obres de transició cap a l’etapa ternària”, in *Actes de les Jornades Internacionals Lul·lianes. “Ramon Llull al segle XXI”*, ed. M. I. Ripoll Perelló, “Col·lecció Blaquerna” 5, Universitat de les Illes Balears/Universitat de Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca/Barcelona, 167-196.
- THUNBERG, L. (1985): *Man and the Cosmos: The Vision of St. Maximus the Confessor*, Crestwood, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, New York.
- TRIAS MERCANT, S. (1993): *Ramón Llull, el pensamiento y la palabra*, El Tall Editorial, Palma de Mallorca.
- TRINKAUS, C. (1973-4): “Renaissance idea of the Dignity of Man”, *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, ed. Philip P. Wiener, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, Vol. IV, 136-46.
- VIDAL I ROCA, J. M. (1990): “Significació i llenguatge”, *Catalan Review* 4, “Homage to Ramon Llull”, 323-334.
- WILLIAMS, A. N. (1997): “Deification in the *Summa theologiae*: A Structural Interpretation of the *Prima Pars*”, *The Thomist*, Vol. 61, 219-255; text consulted (10/03/2006) at <<http://www.thomist.org/journal/1997/972AWill.htm>>.

ABSTRACT

El tema principal del discurs lul·lià sobre la semblança és l’encarnació del Crist, especialment aquell punt en què similitud i concordança entre Déu i home són màximes i les seves contràries (diferència i contrarietat) són mínimes. El Crist és conceptualitzat mitjançant les categories de semblança i significació en funció de la seva especularitat i proporcionalitat respecte de la Trinitat. En caracteritzar el Crist com el nexa i el camí entre l’infinit i el finit, Llull aconsegueix que tota diferència entre home i Déu no sigui substancial o metafísica, sinó accidental, causada pel pecat original i anul·lada gràcies a la deificació de la humanitat que es produeix en l’encarnació del Crist.