



**Universitat de les
Illes Balears**
Servei de Biblioteca i
Documentació
Patrimoni bibliogràfic

UNIVERSITAT DE LES ILLES BALEARS



5108829453



Digitized by Google
Digitized by Google
Digitized by Google
Digitized by Google
Digitized by Google



HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.

COLONEL 27TH REGIMENT,

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF

MILITARY SCIENCES.

NEW EDITION, REVISED BY THE AUTHOR.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE,

NEW BOND STREET.

MDCCCLVI.



TABLE OF CONTENTS.

NOTICE xv

BOOK THE SIXTH.

CHAPTER I.

Transactions in Portugal—State of that country—Neglected by the English cabinet—Sir J. Cradock appointed to command the British troops—Touches at Coruña—At Oporto—State of this city—Lusitanian legion—State of Lisbon—Cradock endeavours to reinforce Moore—Mr. Villiers arrives at Lisbon—Pikes given to the populace—Destitute state of the army—Mr. Frere, and others, urge Cradock to move into Spain—The reinforcements for sir J. Moore halted at Castello Branco—General Cameron sent to Almeida—French advanced guard reaches Merida—Cradock relinquishes the design of reinforcing the army in Spain, and concentrates his own troops at Saccavem—Discontents in Lisbon—Defenceless state and danger of Portugal—Relieved by sir J. Moore's advance to Sahagun p. 1

CHAPTER II.

French retire from Merida—Send a force to Plasencia—The direct intercourse between Portugal and sir J. Moore's army interrupted—Military description of Portugal—Situation of the troops—Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and others, to move into Spain—The ministers ignorant of the real state of affairs—Cradock hears of Moore's advance to Sahagun—Embarks two thousand men to reinforce him—Hears of the retreat to Coruña, and re-lands them—Admiral Berkeley arrives at Lisbon—Ministers more anxious to get possession of Cadiz than to defend Portugal—Five thousand men, under general Sherbrooke, embarked at Portsmouth—Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz—State of that city—He demands troops from Lisbon—General Mackenzie sails from thence, with troops—Negotiations with the junta—Mr. Frere's weak proceedings—Tumult in Cadiz—The negotiation fails . . . 11

CHAPTER III.

Weakness of the British army in Portugal—General Cameron marches to Lisbon—Sir R. Wilson remains near Ciudad Rodrigo—Sir J. Cradock prepares to take a defensive position at Passo d'Arcos—Double dealing of the regency—The populace murder foreigners, and

insult the British troops—Anarchy in Oporto—British government ready to abandon Portugal—Change their intention—Military system of Portugal—The regency demand an English general—Beresford is sent to them—Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's troops arrive at Lisbon—Beresford arrives there, and takes the command of the native force—Change in the aspect of affairs—Sir J. Cradock encamps at Lumiar—Relative positions of the allied and French armies—Marshal Beresford desires sir J. Cradock to march against Soult—Cradock refuses—Various unwise projects broached by different persons . . . p. 20

CHAPTER IV.

Coruña and Ferrol surrender to Soult—He is ordered, by the emperor, to invade Portugal—The first corps is directed to aid this operation—Soult goes to St. Jago—Distressed state of the second corps—Operations of Romana and state of Galicia—Soult commences his march—Arrives on the Minho—Occupies Tuy, Vigo, and Guardia—Drags large boats over land from Guardia to Campo Saucos—Attempts to pass the Minho—Is repulsed by the Portuguese peasantry—Importance of this repulse—Soult changes his plan—Marches on Orense—Defeats the insurgents at Franquera, at Ribidavia, and in the valley of the Avia—Leaves his artillery and stores in Tuy—Defeats the Spanish insurgents in several places, and prepares to invade Portugal—Defenceless state of the northern provinces of that kingdom—Bernadim Freire advances to the Cavado river—Silveira advances to Chaves—Concerts operations with Romana—Disputes between the Portuguese and Spanish troops—Ignorance of the generals . . . 32

CHAPTER V.

Soult enters Portugal—Action at Monterey—Franceschi makes great slaughter of the Spaniards—Portuguese retreat upon Chaves—Romana flies to Puebla Senabria—Portuguese mutiny—Three thousand throw themselves into Chaves—Soult takes that town—Marches upon Braga—Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and Venda Nova—Tumults and disorders in the Portuguese camp at Braga—Murder of general Freire and others—Battle of Braga—Soult marches against Oporto—Disturbed state of that town—Silveira retakes Chaves—The French force the passage of the Ave—The Portuguese murder their general Valonga—French appear in front of Oporto—Negotiate with the bishop—Violence of the people—General Foy taken—Battle of Oporto—The city stormed with great slaughter 45

CHAPTER VI.

Operations of the first and fourth corps—General state of the French army—Description of the valley of the Tagus—Inertness of marshal Victor—Albuquerque and Cartoajal dispute—The latter advances in La Mancha—General Sebastiani wins the battle of Ciudad Real—Marshal Victor forces the passage of the Tagus, and drives Cuesta's army from all its positions—French cavalry checked at Miajadas—Victor crosses the Guadiana at Medellin—Albuquerque joins Cuesta's army—Battle of Medellin—Spaniards totally defeated—Victor ordered, by the king, to invade Portugal—Opens a secret communication with

some persons in Badajos—The peasants of Albuera discover the plot, which fails—Operations of general Lapisse—He drives back sir R. Wilson's posts, and makes a slight attempt to take Ciudad Rodrigo—Marches suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the bridge of Alcantara—Joins Victor at Merida—General insurrection along the Portuguese frontier—The central junta remove Cartoajal from the command, and increased Cuesta's authority, whose army is reinforced—Joseph discontented with Lapisse's movement—Orders Victor to retake the bridge of Alcantara p. 61

CHAPTER VII.

The bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the regency—Humanity of marshal Soult—The Anti-Braganza party revives in the north of Portugal—The leaders make proposals to Soult—He encourages them—Error arising out of this proceeding—Effects of Soult's policy—Assassination of colonel Lameth—Execution at Arifana—Distribution of the French troops—Franceschi opposed, on the Vouga, by colonel Trant—Loison falls back behind the Souza—Heudelet marches to the relief of Tuy—The Spaniards, aided by some English frigates, oblige thirteen hundred French to capitulate at Vigo—Heudelet returns to Braga—The insurrection in the Entre Minho e Douro ceases—Silveira menaces Oporto—Laborde reinforces Loison, and drives Silveira over the Tamega—Gallant conduct and death of colonel Patrick at Amarante—Combats at Amarante—French repulsed—Ingenious device of captain Brochard—The bridge of Amarante carried by storm—Loison advances to the Douro—Is suddenly checked—Observations 74

BOOK THE SEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

Anarchy in Portugal—Sir J. Cradock quits the command—Sir A. Wellesley arrives at Lisbon—Happy effect of his presence—Nominated captain-general—His military position described—Resolves to march against Soult—Reaches Coimbra—Conspiracy in the French army—D'Argenton's proceedings—Sir A. Wellesley's situation compared with that of sir J. Cradock 91

CHAPTER II.

Campaign on the Douro—Relative position of the French and English armies—Sir Arthur Wellesley marches to the Vouga—Sends Beresford to the Douro—A division under general Hill passes the lake of Ovar—Attempt to surprise Franceschi fails—Combat of Grijon—The French re-cross the Douro and destroy the bridge at Oporto—Passage of the Douro—Soult retreats upon Amarante—Beresford reaches Amarante—Loison retreats from that town—Sir Arthur marches upon Braga—Desperate situation of Soult—His energy—He crosses the Sierra Catalina—Rejoins Loison—Reaches Carvalho d'Este—Falls back to

Salamonde—Daring action of major Dulong—The French pass the Ponte Nova and the Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre—Soult enters Orense—Observations p. 100

CHAPTER III.

Romana surprises Villa Franca—Ney advances to Lugo—Romana retreats to the Asturias—Reforms the government there—Ney invades the Asturias by the west—Bonnet and Kellerman enter that province by the east and by the south—General Mahi flies to the valley of the Syl—Romana embarks at Gihon—Ballesteros takes St. Andero—Defeated by Bonnet—Kellerman returns to Valladolid—Ney marches for Coruña—Carrera defeats Maucune at St. Jago Compostella—Mahi blockades Lugo—It is relieved by Soult—Romana joins his army and marches to Orense—Lapisse storms the bridge of Alcantara—Cuesta advances to the Guadiana—Lapisse retires—Victor concentrates his army at Torremocha—Effect of the war in Germany upon that of Spain—Sir Arthur Wellesley encamps at Abrantes—The bridge of Alcantara destroyed—Victor crosses the Tagus at Almaraz—Beresford returns to the north of Portugal—Ney and Soult combine operations—Soult scours the valleys of the Syl—Romana cut off from Castille and thrown back upon Orense—Ney advances towards Vigo—Combat of St. Payo—Misunderstanding between him and Soult—Ney retreats to Coruña—Soult marches to Zamora—Franceschi falls into the hands of the Capuchino—His melancholy fate—Ney abandons Galicia—View of affairs in Aragon—Battles of Maria and Belchite 118

CHAPTER IV.

State of the British army—Embarrassments of sir Arthur Wellesley—State and numbers of the French armies—State and numbers of the Spanish armies—Some account of the *partidas*, commonly called *guerillas*—Intrigues of Mr. Frere—Conduct of the central junta—Their inhuman treatment of the French prisoners—Corruption and incapacity—State of the Portuguese army—Impolicy of the British government—Expedition of Walcheren—Expedition against Italy 132

BOOK THE EIGHTH.

CHAPTER I.

Campaign of Talavera—Choice of operations—Sir Arthur Wellesley moves into Spain—Joseph marches against Venegas—Orders Victor to return to Talavera—Cuesta arrives at Almaraz—Sir Arthur reaches Plasencia—Interview with Cuesta—Plan of operations arranged—Sir Arthur, embarrassed by the want of provisions, detaches sir Robert Wilson up the Vera de Plasencia, passes the Tietar, and unites with Cuesta at Oropesa—Skirmish at Talavera—Bad conduct of the Spanish troops—Victor takes post behind the Alberche—Cuesta's absurdity—Victor retires from the Alberche—Sir Arthur, in want of provisions, refuses to pass that river—Intrigues of Mr. Frere—The junta secretly orders Venegas not to execute his part of the operation 148

CHAPTER II.

Cuesta passes the Alberche—Sir Arthur Wellesley sends two English divisions to support him—Sout is appointed to command the second, fifth, and sixth corps—He proposes to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo and threaten Lisbon—He enters Salamanca, and sends general Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of operations—The king quits Madrid—Unites his whole army—Crosses the Guadarama river, and attacks Cuesta—Combat of Alcabon—Spaniards fall back in confusion to the Alberche—Cuesta refuses to pass that river—His dangerous position—The French advance—Cuesta re-crosses the Tietar—Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up the combined forces on the position of Talavera—The king crosses the Tietar—Skirmish at Casa de Salinas—Combat on the evening of the 27th—Panic in the Spanish army—Combat on the morning of the 28th—The king holds a council of war—Jourdan and Victor propose different plans—The king follows that of Victor—Battle of Talavera—The French re-cross the Alberche—General Craufurd arrives in the English camp—His extraordinary march—Observations p. 160

CHAPTER III.

The king goes to Illescas with the fourth corps and reserve—Sir R. Wilson advances to Escalona—Victor retires to Maqueda—Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera—Cuesta's cruelty—The allied generals hear of Sout's movement upon Baños—Bassecour's division marches towards that point—The pass of Baños forced—Sir A. Wellesley marches against Sout—Proceedings of that marshal—He crosses the Bejar, and arrives at Plasencia with three *corps d'armée*—Cuesta abandons the British hospitals, at Talavera, to the enemy, and retreats upon Oropesa—Dangerous position of the allies—Sir Arthur crosses the Tagus at Arzobispo—The French arrive near that bridge—Cuesta passes the Tagus—Combat of Arzobispo—Sout's plans overruled by the king—Ney defeats sir R. Wilson at Baños, and returns to France . . . 181

CHAPTER IV.

Venegas advances to Aranjuez—Skirmishes there—Sebastiani crosses the Tagus at Toledo—Venegas concentrates his army—Battle of Almonacid—Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented by the ill-conduct of the junta—His troops distressed for provisions—He resolves to retire into Portugal—False charge made by Cuesta against the British army refuted—Beresford's proceedings—Mr. Frere superseded by lord Wellesley—The English army abandons its position at Jaracejo and marches towards Portugal—Consternation of the junta—Sir A. Wellesley defends his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain—Takes a position within the Portuguese frontier—Sickness in the army 192

CHAPTER V.

General observations on the campaign—Comparison between the operations of sir John Moore and sir A. Wellesley 205

BOOK THE NINTH.

CHAPTER I.

Inactivity of the Asturians and Gallicians—Guerilla system in Navarre and Aragon—The partidas surround the third corps—Blake abandons Aragon—Suchet's operations against the partidas—Combat of Tremendal—The advantages of Suchet's position—Troubles at Pampeluna—Suchet ordered by Napoleon to repair there—Observations on the guerilla system p. 220

CHAPTER II.

Continuation of the operations in Catalonia—St. Cyr sends Lecchi to the Ampurdam; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian war—Of Verdier's arrival in the Ampurdam, and of Augereau's appointment to the command of the seventh corps—Augereau's inflated proclamation—It is torn down by the Catalonians—He remains sick at Perpignan—St. Cyr continues to command—Refuses to obey Joseph's orders to remove into Aragon—Presses Verdier to commence the siege of Gerona—Reinforces Verdier—Remains himself at Vich—Constancy of the Spaniards—St. Cyr marches from Vich, defeats three Spanish battalions, and captures a convoy—Storms St. Felieu de Quixols—Takes a position to cover Verdier's operations—Siege of Gerona—State of the contending parties—Assault of Monjouic fails—General Fontanes storms Palamos—Wimphen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw succours into Gerona—Monjouic abandoned 229

CHAPTER III.

Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the French frontier—Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter Gerona with succours—Alvarez remonstrates with the junta of Catalonia—Bad conduct of the latter—Blake advances to the aid of the city—Pestilence there—Affects the French army—St. Cyr's firmness—Blake's timid operations—O'Donnel fights Souham, but without success—St. Cyr takes a position of battle—Garcia Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into Gerona—Blake retires—Siege resumed—Garcia Conde comes out of the city—Ridiculous error of the French—Conde forces the French lines and escapes—Assault on Gerona fails—Blake advances a second time—Sends another convoy under the command of O'Donnel to the city—O'Donnel with the head of the convoy succeeds, the remainder is cut off—Blake's incapacity—He retires—St. Cyr goes to Perpignan—Augereau takes the command of the siege—O'Donnel breaks through the French lines—Blake advances a third time—Is beaten by Souham—Pino takes Hostalrich—Admiral Martin intercepts a French squadron—Captain Hallowell destroys a convoy in Rosas bay—Distress in Gerona—Alvarez is seized with delirium, and the city surrenders—Observations 238

CHAPTER IV.

Plot at Seville against the supreme junta defeated by lord Wellesley—Junta propose a new form of government—Opposed by Romana—Junta announce the convocation of the national Cortes, but endeavour to deceive the people—A Spanish army assembled in the Morena under Eguia—Bassecour sends cavalry to reinforce del Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad Rodrigo—He is joined by the Gallician divisions—Santocildes occupies Astorga—French endeavour to surprise him, but are repulsed—Ballesteros quits the Asturias, and marching by Astorga attempts to storm Zamora—Enters Portugal—Del Parque demands the aid of the Portuguese army—Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his reason in detail—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Tamames—Del Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were assembling at Valladolid retires to Bejar, p. 254

CHAPTER V.

Areizaga takes the command of Eguia's army and is ordered to advance against Madrid—Folly of the supreme junta—Operations in La Mancha—Combat of Dos Barrios—Cavalry combat of Ocaña—Battle of Ocaña—Destruction of the Spanish army 262

CHAPTER VI.

King Joseph's return to Madrid—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Alba de Tormes—Dispersion of the Spanish troops—Their great sufferings and patience—The supreme junta treat sir A. Wellesley's counsels with contempt—He breaks up from the Guadiana and moves to the Mondego—Vindication of his conduct for having remained so long on the Guadiana—French remain torpid about Madrid—Observations 274

BOOK THE TENTH.

CHAPTER I.

Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia—Distracted state of affairs in that province—Military position and resources described—Invasion of Andalusia—Passes of the Morena forced by the French—Foolish deceit of the supreme junta—Tumult in Seville—Supreme junta dissolved—Junta of Seville re-assembles, but disperse immediately after—The French take Jaen—Sebastiani enters Grenada—King Joseph enters Cordoba and afterwards marches against Seville—Albuquerque's march to Cadiz—Seville surrenders—Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani—Victor invests Cadiz—Faction in that city—Mortier marches against Badajoz—The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte—Inhospitable conduct of the bishop of Algarve 285

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia—Pursuit of the student Mina—Suchet's preparations—His incursion against Valencia—Returns to Aragon—Difficulty of the war in Catalonia—Operations of the seventh corps—French detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua—Augereau enters Barcelona—Sends Duhesme to France—Returns to Gerona—O'Donnel rallies the Spanish army near Centellas—Combat of Vich—Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of Hostalrich—Augereau again advances to Barcelona—Sends two divisions to Reus—Occupies Manresa and Villa Franca—French troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera—Swartz abandons Manresa—Is defeated at Sabadel—Colonel Villatte communicates with the third corps by Falcet—Severoli retreats from Reus to Villa Franca—Is harassed on the march—Augereau's unskilful conduct—Hostalrich falls—Gallant exploit of the governor, Julian Estrada—Cruelty of Augereau p. 300

CHAPTER III.

Suchet marches against Lerida—Description of that fortress—Suchet marches to Tarega—O'Donnel advances from Taragona—Suchet returns to Balaguer—Combat of Margalef—Siege of Lerida—The city stormed—Suchet drives the inhabitants into the citadel and thus forces it to surrender 314

CHAPTER IV.

Reflections on the siege—Lazan enters Alcanitz, but is driven out by the French—Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa, and assassinated after the action—Siege of Mequinenza—Fall of that place—Morella taken—Suchet prepares to enter Catalonia—Strength and resources of that province 323

CHAPTER V.

Operations in Andalusia—Blockade of Cadiz—Desertions in that city—Regency formed—Albuquerque sent to England—Dies there—Regency consent to admit British troops—General Colin Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy the Spanish lines at San Roque—General William Stewart arrives at Cadiz—Seizes Matagorda—Tempest destroys many vessels—Mr. Henry Wellesley and general Graham arrive at Cadiz—Apathy of the Spaniards—Gallant defence of Matagorda by captain M'Lean of the ninety-fourth regiment—Heroic conduct of a serjeant's wife—General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy Tarifa—French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks, and drift during a tempest—General Lacy's expedition to the Ronda—His bad conduct—Returns to Cadiz—Reflections on the state of affairs 330

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the operations in Andalusia—Description of the Spanish and Portuguese lines of position south of the Tagus—Situation of the armies in Estremadura—Complex operations in that province—Soult's policy 343

CHAPTER VII.

Situation of the armies north of the Tagus—Operations in Old Castille and the Asturias—Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo—Loison repulsed from Astorga—Kellerman chases Carrera from the Gata mountains—Obscurity of the French projects—Siege of Astorga—Mahi driven into Galicia—Spaniards defeated at Mombouey—Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca—The ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain—Massena assumes the command of the army of Portugal and of the northern provinces—Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town—Massena arrives and alters the plan of attack—Daring action of three French soldiers—Place surrenders—Andreas Herrasti—His fine conduct—Reflections upon the Spanish character p. 352

BOOK THE ELEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington's policy—Change of administration in England—Duel between lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning—Lord Wellesley joins the new ministry—Debates in Parliament—Factious violence on both sides—Lord Wellington's sagacity and firmness vindicated—His views for the defence of Portugal—Ministers accede to his demands—Grandeur of Napoleon's designs against the Peninsula—Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanations with the English ministers—Discusses the state of the war—Similarity of his views with those of sir John Moore—His reason for not advancing into Spain explained and vindicated . . . 362

CHAPTER II.

Greatness of lord Wellington's plans—Situation of the belligerents described—State of the French—Character of Joseph—Of his ministers—Disputes with the marshals—Napoleon's policy—Military governments—Almenara sent to Paris—Curious deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart, and the historian Cabanes—Prodigious force of the French army—State of Spain—Inertness of Galicia—Secret plan of the regency for encouraging the guerillas—Operations of those bands—Injustice and absurdity of the regency, with respect to South America—England—State of parties—Factious injustice on both sides—Difficulty of raising money—Bullion committee—Wm. Cobbett—Lord King—Mr. Vansittart—Extravagance of the ministers—State of Portugal—Parties in that country—Intrigues of the Patriarch and the Souzas—Mr. Stuart is appointed plenipotentiary—His firmness—Princess Carlotta claims the regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne of Spain 375

CHAPTER III.

Lord Wellington's scheme for the defence of Portugal—Vastness of his designs—Number of his troops—Description of the country—Plan of defence analysed—Difficulty of supplying the army—Resources of the belligerents compared—Character of the British soldier . . . 389

CHAPTER IV.

Character of Miguel Alava—Portuguese government demand more English troops—Lord Wellington refuses, and reproaches the regency—The factious conduct of the latter—Character of the light division—General Craufurd passes the Coa—His activity and skilful arrangements—Is joined by Carrera—Skirmish at Barba del Puerco—Carrera invites Ney to desert—Romana arrives at head-quarters—Lord Wellington refuses to succour Ciudad Rodrigo—His decision vindicated—Craufurd's ability and obstinacy—He maintains his position—Skirmish at Alameda—Captain Kraüchenberg's gallantry—Skirmish at Villa de Puerco—Colonel Talbot killed—Gallantry of the French captain Guache—Combat of the Coa—Comparison between general Picton and general Craufurd p. 402

Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to Col. Napier	417
Note upon the situation of Spain in 1808, dictated by Napoleon	418
Note on the Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns	422

APPENDIX.

No.		
1.	Seven sections. State of Portugal. Extracts from sir J. Cradock's papers, MSS.	425
2.	Extracts from Cradock's instructions, MSS.	433
3.	Do do. touching supplies, MSS.	434
4.	Three sections. Miscellaneous, chiefly MSS.	437
5.	Extracts from Mr. Frere's correspondence, do. do.	439
6.	Cradock's correspondence on Cadiz, MSS.	440
7.	General M'Kenzie's narrative on Cadiz, MSS.	441
8.	Three sections. Portugal. Cradock's papers, MSS.	446
9.	Sections of the English force in Portugal for January, April, May, June, July, and September, 1809	448
10.	Correspondence between Beresford and Cradock, MSS.	450
11.	Extracts from correspondence touching marshal Soult's conduct, MSS.	454
12.	Sir A. Wellesley to sir J. Cradock	456
13.	Do. do. lord Castlereagh	457
14.	Do. do. do.	458
15.	Do. do. to lord Wellesley	459
16.	General Hill and colonel Stopford on the conduct of the Spaniards, August, 1809	468

17. Returns of the French army in the Peninsula, extracted from the French muster-rolls. State of British army 468
18. Extracts of letters from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, and one from sir John Moore to major-general M'Kenzie, commanding in Portugal, MSS. 475
19. Extracts from the correspondence of Mr. Vaughan, general Graham, colonel Nicholls, and from the official abstract of military reports by the British commanders at Cadiz, MSS. . 481
20. Extracts from king Joseph's correspondence, MSS. 485
21. Extracts of letters from lord Wellington, MSS. 487

LIST OF PLATES.

1. Soult's operations. Minho and Douro	<i>to face</i> 45
2. Victor's ditto. Valleys of Tagus and Guadiana	61
3. Wellesley's passage of the Douro	105
4. Ney's and Soult's operations. Galicia	125
5. Battle of Talavera	165
6. Operations in the Valley of the Tagus	183
7. Suchet's operations. Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia	221
8. St. Cyr's operations. Catalonia. Siege of Gerona	231
9. Areizaga's operations. Ocaña	265
10. Invasion of Andalusia	287
11. Defence of Portugal	391
12. Craufurd's operations	405

NOTICE.

THE manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,* general Graham,† general Pelet,‡ general Campbell,§ captain Codrington,|| and colonel Cox,¶ together with many private journals and letters of officers employed during the war.

Before the Appendix the reader will find an original note by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I published my first volume: it is referred to as confirmatory of my arguments against Joseph's retreat from Madrid.

* Lord Stuart de Rothesay.

† First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena.

|| Admiral sir Edward Codrington.

† Lord Lynedoch.

§ Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar.

¶ Governor of Almeida.



HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULA WAR.

BOOK THE SIXTH.

CHAPTER I.

WHEN sir John Moore marched from Lisbon, the regency established by sir Hew Dalrymple nominally governed that country; but the listless habits engendered by the ancient system of misrule, the intrigues of the Oporto faction, and the turbulence of the people soon produced an alarming state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the functions of government, justice was disregarded, insubordination and murder were hailed as indications of patriotism; and though war was the universal cry, military preparations were wholly neglected, for the nation in its foolish pride believed the enemy had neither strength nor spirit for a second invasion. There was a French faction in Lisbon, the merchants were apprehensive, the regency unpopular, the public mind unsettled. In Oporto, the violence of both people and soldiers was such, that sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments there by sea to preserve tranquillity; and the seeds of disorder were widely cast and sprouting vigorously, before the English cabinet thought fit to accredit a responsible diplomatist near the government, or give a permanent chief to the forces left by Moore. The convention of Cintra was known in England in September; the regency was established and the frontier fortresses occupied by British troops in the

Appendix 1,
§ 1.

same month; yet it was not until the middle of December that Mr. Villiers and sir John Cradock, charged with the conduct of the political and military affairs in Portugal, reached Lisbon; thus the important interval between the departure of Junot and their arrival was totally neglected by the cabinet.

Sir Hew Dalrymple who had nominated the regency, sir Arthur Wellesley, who to local knowledge and powerful talents added the influence of a victorious commander, Burrard, Spencer, all were removed from Portugal, when the presence of persons acquainted with the real state of affairs was essential to the well-being of the British interests. This error was the offspring of passion and incapacity; for if the convention had been rightly appreciated, the ministers would have resisted clamour, and the generals would not have been withdrawn from the public service abroad to meet groundless charges at home. It may be disputed whether Portugal was the fittest theatre for the first operations of a British army; but when that country was actually freed from the presence of an enemy, when the capital and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English troops, when Moore, leaving his hospitals baggage and magazines there as in a place of arms, had marched to Spain, the question was no longer a doubtful one. The ancient relations between England and Portugal, the greatness of the port of Lisbon, the warlike disposition of the Portuguese, and the singularly happy circumstances that there was neither court nor monarch to balance the English influence, and that even the nomination of the regency was the work of an English general, offered such great advantages as could nowhere else be obtained. It was a miserable policy that neglected such an occasion, and retained sir Arthur Wellesley in England while Portugal, like a drunken man, at once weak and turbulent, was reeling on the edge of a precipice.

Sir John Cradock touched at Coruña on his voyage to Lisbon. Fifteen hundred thousand dollars had just arrived there in the *Lavinia* frigate, but Moore's first intention to retreat upon Portugal being then known, Cradock divided this sum, and carried away eight hundred thousand dollars, designing to leave a portion at Oporto, and take the remainder

to Lisbon, that Moore might find money on whatever line he retreated. From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, where sir Robert Wilson had succeeded in organizing under the title of the Lusitanian Legion about thirteen hundred men; this excepted, nothing, civil or military, bespoke either arrangement or common sense. The bishop, intent to acquire supreme rule, was engaged with secret intrigues, and factious designing persons were instigating the populace to violence. Wilson's Legion was a project of the chevalier da Souza, Portuguese minister in London, who was one of the bishop's faction; and the legion was raised, not to repel the enemy but to support that party against the government. The men were promised higher pay, they were clad in uniforms differing in colour from the national troops, and gave the regency, who dreaded the machinations of the turbulent priest, great alarm: it was in truth a most anomalous force, and from its peculiar constitution productive of much embarrassment.

Cradock left three hundred thousand dollars at Oporto, directed the two British battalions in that neighbourhood to march to Almeida, took on board a small detachment of German troops, and set sail for Lisbon. He strongly advised Wilson to move such of his legionaries as were sufficiently organized, to Villa Real in Tras os Montes, a place appointed by the regency for the assembly of the forces in the north; and sir Robert, tired of the folly and disgusted with the insolence and excesses of the ruling mob, did quit Oporto, but having views of his own went to Almeida instead of Villa Real. Lisbon was little better than Oporto; there was no arrangement for present or future defence; and the populace, albeit less openly encouraged to commit excesses, were quite uncontrolled by the government. The regency had a keener dread of domestic insurrection than of the return of the French; whose operations they regarded with even less anxiety than the bishop did, as being further removed than he was from the immediate theatre of war; their extraordinary incapacity and want of vigilance were evinced by the following fact. Sattaro and another person having contracted to supply the British troops,

Appendix 1,
§ 2.Appendix 1,
§ 5.

made a requisition in the name of the English general for all the provisions in the public stores, and sold them to the English commissaries for his own profit!

Cradock's instructions prescribed the reinforcing of Moore's army, and non-interference with that general if events brought him back to Portugal: to hold the capital, Elvas and Almeida, was the limit of his command. He was indeed

directed to encourage the formation of a native
Appendix 2,
§ 1. army, and even to act with it on the frontier;

but he was debarred of political interference, and his relative rank was left unsettled until the arrival of Mr. Villiers, to whom all political and many military arrangements were entrusted. The influence of a general thus fettered, and commanding only a small scattered force, could not produce any real amelioration in the military situation of the country; yet the English ministers, attentive only to the false information obtained from interested agents, imagined, that not only the Spanish but the Portuguese armies were numerous and to be relied upon; and they expected the latter to take an active part in the Spanish campaign. Cradock made it his first object to transmit home exact information of the real strength and efficiency of the native troops. They were nominally twenty thousand; but Miguel Pereira Forjas, military secretary to the regency and the ablest public man in Portugal, acknowledged this force to be a nullity, and that

there were not more than ten thousand stand of
Sir J. Cra-
dock, MSS. serviceable arms in the kingdom, the greatest part

of which were English. The soldiers of the line were unruly; the militia and armed peasantry, animated by a spirit of outrage rather than of enthusiasm, evinced no disposition to submit to regulation: neither was there any branch of administration free from the grossest disorders.

In Portugal the Spanish dollar had a general acceptance. The regency, pretending that a debased foreign coin would drive the Portuguese coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar of its current value. This regulation, true in principle and applicable as far as the Portuguese gold coin which is of peculiar fineness was concerned, being founded upon a falsehood, had a most injurious effect. For the Spanish dollar was in reality

finer than the Portuguese silver cruzado-nova, and would have maintained its value notwithstanding this decree, if the slur thus thrown upon it by the government had not enabled the money-changers to run its value down for the moment. The English soldiers and sailors being all paid in these dollars at four shillings and sixpence, which was the true value, were thus suddenly mulcted fourpence in each by the artificial depreciation of the moment; the men attributed this to fraud in the shopkeepers, the retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, and quarrels between tradesmen and soldiers took place hourly. To calm this effervescence, a second decree was promulgated, directing the dollar to be received at the mint and in the public offices at its real value; it then appeared the government could profit by coining the dollar into cruzado-novas, a circumstance which proved the whole affair to be an unworthy trick to recruit the treasury. This happened in October, and as all the financial affairs were ill managed, and the regency destitute of vigour or capacity, the taxes were unpaid, the hard cash exhausted, and the treasury paper at a heavy discount when Cradock arrived. Upon the scroll thus unfolded he could only read confusion danger and misfortune; and such being the fruits of victory what could be expected from disaster? yet at this period, the middle of December, Moore was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal, followed by the emperor with one French army, while another threatened Lisbon by the line of the Tagus.

Of English troops there were, including the sick, about ten thousand, ill equipped and scattered; and the capital was crowded with women and children, baggage and non-combatants, belonging as well to the army in Spain as to that in Portugal. In the river there were three Portuguese ships of the line two frigates and eight smaller vessels of war; yet none in a state for sea, and the whole likely to fall into the hands of the enemy; for in the midst of this confusion the English admiral, sir Charles Cotton, was recalled without a successor being appointed. The zeal and energy of captain Halket, the senior officer on the station, more than compensated for the departure of the admiral as far as professional duties were concerned; but he could not aid the general, in his dealings with

the regency, as vigorously as an officer of higher rank and formally accredited. Cradock felt his own difficulties, but with disinterested zeal resolved to make the reinforcing of Moore his first care; he had, however, only eight British and four German battalions of infantry, four troops of dragoons, and thirty pieces of artillery, of which six were horsed: there was also a battalion of the 60th regiment, composed principally of Frenchmen recruited from the prison ships, but it had been sent back from Spain because the soldiers could not be trusted near their countrymen. Of these thirteen battalions, two were in Abrantes, one in Elvas, three at Lamego on the Duero, one in Almeida, the remaining six at Lisbon; three of the four battalions in the north were immediately directed to join Moore by the route of Salamanca; of those in the south, two, accompanied by a demi-brigade of artillery, were sent to him from Abrantes, by the road of Castello Branco and Ciudad Rodrigo: meanwhile Mr. Villiers arrived, and Cradock through him addressed the regency on the dangerous state of the country.

He said there was neither activity in the government nor enthusiasm among the people; that the army, deficient in numbers, still more in discipline, was scattered, neglected, and, in this menacing state of affairs, the regency were without system: he proposed, therefore, a general enrolment of all the people, and from the British stores offered to supply a thousand muskets and ten thousand pikes. This offer of pikes appears to have been made in compliance with Mr. Villiers' wishes, and betrayed more zeal than prudence. A general levy and arming of the turbulent populace of a capital at such a conjuncture, was more likely to lead to confusion and mischief than to any effectual defence: the main objects pressing upon the general's attention were however so numerous and contradictory as to render it difficult to avoid errors. It was important to reinforce sir John Moore; but it was equally necessary to keep a force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus; because the fourth French corps had just passed that river at Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo's army and menaced Badajos, which was without arms ammunition or pro-

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Appendix 31,
§ 1. Vol. I.

visions, and moreover the populace were in commotion, slaying the chief persons.

Cradock's instructions were to embark if pressed by a superior force, to carry off the Portuguese navy and stores, to destroy what he could not remove, and to receive on board all the natives who might be desirous of escaping. But to embark the women, children, baggage, and other encumbrances belonging to Moore's army before the crisis was also essential; and it was obvious that the English ministers had prescribed the contradictory tasks of sending troops to Spain and defending Portugal; of exciting confidence and yet openly preparing to abandon the country. And the populace were already so much moved by rumours of the intended embarkation, it was doubtful if even the British non-combatants could get on board; much less could the Portuguese ships of war be carried off, or the forts dismantled, without a tumult which might be fatal to both parties. It was therefore imperative to hold Lisbon and the forts at the mouth of the harbour with strong garrisons, and this with the troops absorbed by Elvas and Almeida reduced the fighting men in the field to insignificance.

Well knowing the temper of the populace, the regency feared to arm them, and were not very eager to enforce the levy; yet to hide their weakness they promised to send six thousand troops to Alcantara to observe the march of the fourth corps,—a promise they never intended and were indeed unable to perform. Forjas, supposed to be inimical to the British influence, roundly declared they neither could nor would move without an advance of money, an aid which Cradock recommended should be given, but he had no power to grant it himself. Moore's letters from Salamanca now reached Lisbon. They intimated that reverses were to be expected, and Cradock, although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal while he could without a breach of his instructions, felt strongly that timely preparation for an embarkation should be made; especially as the rainy season, in which south-west winds prevail, had set in and rendered the departure of vessels from the Tagus very uncertain. Meanwhile the internal state of Portugal

Appendix 2,
§ 1.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

was in no wise amended, or likely to amend. The government had issued a decree, the 23rd of December, for organizing the population of Lisbon in sixteen legions, but, influenced by fear, ordered that but one battalion of each should parade at a time for exercise, and those only on Sundays; nor were the legions at any time to assemble without the order of the general commanding the province. A proposal to prepare the Portuguese vessels for sea was acceded to without any apparent dissatisfaction, but the government secretly fomented the spirit of discontent and suspicion among the people. No efforts were made to improve the regular force, none to forward the march of troops to Aleantara: and so callous

were the regency to the rights of humanity, that a number of French prisoners, captured at various periods by the Portuguese, and accumulated at Lisbon, were absolutely denied subsistence: Cradock, after many fruitless representations, was forced to charge himself with their supply, to avert the horror of seeing them starved to death. Provisions also were withheld from Fort La Lippe, and Leite under the regency's orders urged the British troops to evacuate that fortress.

The march of reinforcements for Moore left only three hundred dragoons and seven battalions available for the defence of Portugal; four battalions were in garrison; the remainder were unable to take the field in default of mules, of which animal the country seemed bereft; yet, as if in derision, Mr. Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos, and the regency of Portugal, were with common and characteristic foolishness pressing Cradock to march into the south of Spain, where there was scarcely a Spanish soldier in arms; and the movement, if it had been prudent or practicable, was against his instructions.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Towards the end of December, the communication with Moore was entirely stopped, and the line of the Tagus, menaced by the fourth French corps, acquired importance. The troops going from Elvas to Spain were therefore directed to halt at Castello Branco; general Richard Stewart, who commanded them, being reinforced with two hundred cavalry, was ordered to watch the roads by Salvatierra and the two

Idanha, and protect the flying bridges at Abrantes and Villa Velha from the enemy's incursions. At the same time a promise was obtained from the regency, that all the Portuguese troops in the Alentejo should be collected at Campo Mayor and Portalegre. Cradock fixed upon Sacavem for the concentration of his main body, intending to defend that point as long as he could with so few troops. He however knew that Almeida, although full of British stores and important in every way, was, with respect to its own defence, utterly neglected by the regency, who regarded with jealousy even the presence of a British force there; wherefore he sent brigadier A. Cameron, with instructions to collect the convalescents of Moore's army, to unite them with the two battalions still at Almeida, and join the army in Spain: if that was judged dangerous, he was to return to Lisbon. In either case, the stores and the sick men lying at Almeida were to be directed upon Oporto. The paucity of cavalry was now severely felt; it prevented the general from ascertaining the strength and objects of the enemy's parties, and the Portuguese reports were notoriously contradictory and false. The 14th dragoons had been disembarked since the 22nd of December, and were destined for the army in Spain; but the commissary doubted if he could forward that small body even by detachments, such was the penury of the country or rather the difficulty of drawing forth its resources; and as many debts of Moore's army were still unpaid, a want of confidence prevented the country people from bringing in supplies upon credit.

In the midst of these difficulties rumours of reverses in Spain became rife, and acquired importance when it was known that four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, the advanced guard of thirty thousand French troops, were actually at Merida, and menacing Badajos, which was destitute of provisions, arms, and ammunition. Had the Portuguese force been assembled at Alcantara, Cradock would have supported it with the British brigades from Abrantes and Castello Branco; but not a man was put in motion, and he, feeling no confidence either in the troops or promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate his own army near Lisbon,

Stewart was, therefore, directed to destroy the bridges of Villa Velha and Abrantes, and fall back to Sacavem. Then the Lisbon populace, supposing they were to be abandoned without necessity, became violently moved; the regency made no effort to preserve tranquillity, and the people proceeded from one excess to another, until it became evident that in a forced embarkation the British would have to fight their allies as well as their enemies. It was at this gloomy period, when ten marches would have brought the French to Lisbon, when a stamp of Napoleon's foot would have extinguished that spark of war which afterwards blazed over the Peninsula, that sir John Moore made his daring movement upon Sahagun, and Portugal, gasping in mortal agony, was instantly relieved.

CHAPTER II.

IT was the advanced guard of the fourth corps which had approached Merida on its way to Badajoz; but in the night of the 26th of December, an officer carrying the intelligence of Moore's movement reached Merida, and next morning the French hastily re-crossed the Tagus and rejoined their main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediately directed upon Placentia. This retrograde movement obviated the immediate danger to Lisbon, and Cradock endeavoured to pacify the people. He directed Stewart, who had been strengthened by two German battalions, to halt at Santarem; he explained his motives to the regency, and urged a more frank and vigorous system; but like the Spanish juntas, they promised everything, and performed nothing. Assenting verbally to all measures, they would never commit themselves by writing, having the despicable intention of disclaiming that which might prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French. Cradock had, however, no power beyond his own personal influence to enforce attention, no successor to sir Charles Cotton had arrived, and Mr. Villiers was wanting in decision and judgment.

Appendix 31,
§§ 1, 2. Vol. I.

Appendix 1,
§ 5.

In the north, Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to Wilson, and marched with two British battalions and a detachment of convalescents by the *Tras os Montes* to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of the retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened his line of march, whereupon he made for Lamego and advised Wilson to retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, having a convoy for Moore's army, was likewise forced to take the road to Oporto, on which all

the British stores and detachments were now directed. Notwithstanding the general dismay, Wilson, who had been reinforced by some Spanish troops, Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents of the British army, rejected Cameron's advice, and proceeded to practise all the arts of an able partizan,—that is to say, he enticed the French to desert, spread false reports of his own numbers, and by petty enterprises and great activity, aroused a spirit of resistance throughout the Ciudad Rodrigo country. This influx of sick men and stores at Oporto, and the prospect of general Cameron's arrival there, became a source of uneasiness to Cradock. A shifting-bar and shoal water rendered the harbour a very bad one for vessels to clear out; it was also one very dangerous for vessels to lie off at that season, and if the enemy advanced, a loss of men and stores was to be anticipated. The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval means, and for seventeen successive days, such was the state of the wind, no vessel could leave the Tagus; captain Halket indeed, contrived at last to send tonnage to Oporto for two thousand persons, and sir Samuel Hood despatched some vessels from Vigo; but the weather long continued unfavourable, the transports could not enter the harbour, and the encumbrances, hourly increasing, produced the most serious embarrassments.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Moore having now relinquished his communications with Portugal, Cradock was to consider how he could hold that country, without risking the destruction of his troops. Portugal has no defensible frontier. The rivers, generally running east and west, are fordable in most places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines of resistance, and, the Zezere excepted, present no obstacles to an enemy on the eastern frontier. The mountains afford many fine and some impregnable positions; but with the length of frontier and difficulty of lateral communications, a general defending it against superior forces would be cut off from the capital if he concentrated his troops; and if he extended them, his line would be immediately broken. The possession of Lisbon constitutes the possession of Portugal south of the Douro, and an inferior army can only protect Lisbon by keeping close to it.

Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente's views for the defence of Lisbon. With seventeen hundred men, he occupied the heights behind the creek of Sacavem—leaving three thousand men in the forts and batteries at Lisbon; and at the request of the regency, who in return promised to assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Villa Velha, he ordered Stewart to halt at Santarem.

That officer had two thousand seven hundred troops, but they had been marching for a month under incessant rain, their clothes were worn out, their equipments ruined, and in common with the rest of the army they wanted shoes. Cameron was now on the

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Douro, Kemmis with the 40th regiment at Elvas, and the army, not exceeding ten thousand men with the encumbrances of forty thousand, occupied three points of a triangle, whose shortest side was more than a hundred and fifty miles! Cradock could not present five thousand fit for action at any point of the position, and the uncertainty of remaining in the country rendered it impossible to make contracts, and drove him to a precarious costly retail system of supply. Yet in this moment of extreme weakness, Mr. Frere with indefatigable folly, was urging him to make a diversion in Spain by the Tagus; Mr. Villiers was as earnest to send a force by sea to Vigo; and Cradock's own instructions prescribed three other objects as incompatible with each other as they were with the projects of Mr. Frere and Mr. Villiers! His means were so scanty that to attain one of these objects was scarcely possible, yet Mr. Canning wrote officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, as if a mighty and well-furnished army was in Portugal, and enforced 'the necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal as long as could be done with the force intrusted to sir John Cradock's command, remembering always that not the defence of Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy's military force, and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in cases of the most extreme necessity.' The enemy's military force! It was three hundred thousand men, and this despatch was a pompous absurdity. The ministers and their agents, haunted by the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese

armies, were incapable of perceiving the bulk and substance of the French host; their system was one of shifts and expedients, every week produced a fresh project, and minister and agent alike followed his own views without reference to any fixed principle: the generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military operations!

Cradock employed so many officers to obtain intelligence that he soon heard of Moore's advance to Sahagun, and again endeavoured to send him a reinforcement by Almeida; yet finally the want of supplies induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers' wishes, and he shipped six hundred cavalry and thirteen hundred infantry for Vigo on the 12th; but ere they quitted the Tagus, intelligence of the retreat to Coruña arrived and they were disembarked.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

At the same time admiral Berkeley reached Lisbon, and Cradock received the first communication from the English ministers, by which it appeared they were more intent to get possession of Cadiz than to defend Portugal. Their anxiety for this object had somewhat subsided after the battle of Vimiero, yet revived with vigour when Moore, contemplating a movement towards the south, suggested Cadiz as a place of arms; an expedition was immediately prepared to go there, but the project failed from the unstable perplexed nature of the cabinet policy and its unsuitable choice of agents.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR OCCUPYING CADIZ.

It was still unknown in England that the supreme junta had fled from Aranjuez, when sir George Smith, who had conducted Spencer's negotiation in 1808, was again sent to Cadiz to treat for the reception of an English garrison; and four thousand men embarked under general Sherbrooke, with orders to touch at Lisbon; those orders were immediately afterwards changed, and he was to make for Coruña, and then other instructions sent him to Cadiz, with his force augmented to five thousand. Mr. Frere was to demand his admission as the only condition upon which a British force could be employed in that part of Spain. The disasters in the northern

Parl. Papers, 1810.

Appendix 6.

parts increased the ministers' anxiety to have Cadiz, and decreased their interest in Portugal. Cradock was commanded to obey any requisition for troops made by the Spanish junta. And so reckless of the real state of affairs were the ministers, that Cradock, whose despatches had been a continual complaint of his inability to procure horses for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them for Sherbrooke's.

Sir George Smith, hasty of temper, but zealous and acute, found at Cadiz as elsewhere, that all persons were engaged with theories and intrigues; that nothing useful had been done for defence; that the ramparts had scarcely any guns mounted, and that two miles in advance of the city an out-work had been commenced upon such a scale that it could not possibly be finished in four months, and with Spanish slowness would take as many years. For a solid general defence, Smith judged twenty thousand good troops to be requisite, but ten thousand would suffice for the city; there were, however, only five thousand militia and volunteers, and not a regular soldier under arms, nor any within reach. The number of guns, mounted and to be mounted, exceeded four hundred; and to serve them there were only two hundred and fifty peasants and volunteers, who being enrolled and clothed in uniforms were called artillery-men. Knowing nothing of Moore's march to Sahagun, Smith calculated upon the immediate approach of the French; wherefore seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being assured the people would willingly admit an English garrison, he wrote to Cradock for troops. The latter, little thinking at such a conjuncture the supreme junta would be more jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies; judging also from his latest instructions, that obedience to this requisition would be consonant to the ministers' wishes; ordered Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with the fortieth regiment, by Seville, and embarked three thousand of the most efficient troops in Lisbon, placing them under general Mackenzie.

They arrived the 5th, but meanwhile Frere, ignorant that Smith, who had no instructions to correspond with him, had demanded military possession of

Appendix 3.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Parl. Papers. 1810.

Appendix 7. Cadiz, opened a separate negotiation with the central junta at Seville, proposing to have the troops received as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to arrange this with the local authorities.

Mr. Frere had meddled much with the personal intrigues of the hour, he was of too slender a capacity to uphold the dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion, and his flimsy thread of negotiation soon snapped under the hasty touch of sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to everything interruptive of their sluggish indolence, had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own body, to Cadiz avowedly to admit the troops, in reality to thwart that measure, and Mackenzie's arrival with an object different from that announced by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England with treachery. The junta finding Frere so easily duped, affected to believe him an ignorant tool, employed by the English cabinet feloniously to get possession of the city, and so represented the matter; but the people of Cadiz and of the neighbouring towns earnestly desired to receive the British. This was so well known to Mr. Stuart and Smith, that they would notwithstanding the reluctance of the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion, but at this critical period the former was sent on a secret mission to Vienna by the way of Trieste, and the latter died: thus the negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it.

Mackenzie found the populace ignorant or incredulous of the disasters in the north, and that they would neither equip their fleet nor permit the English sailors to do it for them; yet he heard their desire for the entrance of his troops publicly expressed, and thought with Smith the matter easy of accomplishment; but it was now wholly in Mr. Frere's hands, and of course failed. The supreme junta had proposed 1°. That the troops should land at Port St. Mary's, to be quartered there and in the neighbouring towns. 2°. That they should join Cuesta's army. 3°. That they should go to Catalonia. 4°. That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, to be attached to the different Spanish armies. Nay, pretending to hold the English soldiery cheap, those self-sufficient men

desired that they should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field!

Frere wished to accept the first of these proposals, but Mackenzie, Smith, and Stuart opposed it for many reasons; not the least urgent of which was, that as the troops could not be re-embarked without some national dishonour, they must have marched toward Cuesta, and thus have been involved in the campaign without obtaining their sole object, *the possession of Cadiz as a place of arms*. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal, namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and join Cuesta with the remainder of the troops. At this time Smith died, Stuart embarked for Trieste, and Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose Frere's wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments for his force could be procured; but he observed, that it was contrary to his instructions and the known wishes of the English government, and liable also in part to the same objections as the first proposition. This was on the 18th of February, on the 22nd, a popular tumult commenced in Cadiz; for the supreme junta, desirous to prove the city required no English garrison, had sent there two regiments of Poles, Germans, and Swiss, deserters or prisoners, and the people, knowing the junta intended to disarm the volunteers of Cadiz, were justly offended that deserters should be trusted in preference to themselves. They stopped the couriers, opened the despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the marquis of Villel, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons suspected of favouring the French he had, brutally, punished some ladies of rank. The populace first endeavoured to kill the state prisoners, and being prevented, committed other excesses, and murdered Heredia, the collector of public rents. During the tumult, which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was repeatedly called for by the mob, and two British officers sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm and obeyed with respect: a manifest proof that sir George Smith had judged well.

Tranquillity was restored the 24th, and Mackenzie, not having received from Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th,

suggested, that of three English battalions in the harbour two should enter Cadiz, and the third proceed to Seville, to unite with the 40th regiment and join Cuesta. Frere, instead of addressing the junta with the authority becoming the representative of a great nation on whose support the independence of the Peninsula rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety; the object was one England had a right to seek, the Spanish rulers no right to refuse; the people wished it, and an appeal to them would have silenced the feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government. Incapable of taking this single and just view, he pressed a variety of trifling points, and in discussing them had more regard to epistolary dexterity than useful diplomacy; and when the great point of admitting troops at all was conceded, he broke off the negotiation upon the question of numbers, whether one or two thousand men! as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost.

Self-baffled in that quarter, he turned towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta and much feared by them, seeking his assistance by holding out the lure of having a British force added to his command; but the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist. 'Although I do not,' said he, 'discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, which should prevent his British majesty's troops from garrisoning Cadiz under such terms and for the purpose which your excellency proposes, I am far from supposing the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it is sufficient they should have them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so important a measure, *unless they should consult me*. With regard to the 4300 men which your excellency is pleased to mention, no doubt I stand in need of them; but I flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura, will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if from any change of circumstances the supreme junta should no longer manifest the repugnance we speak of.'

Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, now returned with ardour to the task of directing the military affairs in every part of the Peninsula. He had seen an inter-

cepted letter from Soult to the king, in which the invasion of Portugal was mentioned, and immediately concluding Mackenzie's troops would be wanted for its defence, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but the general, who knew that a successful defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the last extremity, replied that 'the danger of Lisbon rendered the occupation of Cadiz more important.' This was written the 26th of February, and the 3rd of March another despatch came from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and the danger of Portugal seemed to have passed from the writer's mind. Entering into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that as Soult had failed in an attempt to penetrate Portugal by the Minho, *it was impossible from the position of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan.* Wherefore, he urged Mackenzie to sail for Taragona to aid Reding; and this wild scheme was only frustrated by a despatch from Cradock recalling the troops to Lisbon. Thus ended a transaction indicating an unsettled policy, shallow combinations, and bad agents, on the part of the English cabinet; an unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme junta.

Appendix.
No. 6.

Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the junta to French influence, Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of sir George Smith; and to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the part of the supreme government. It is however obvious the true cause was the false position in which the English ministers had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms and money, without asserting a just influence and making their assistance the price of good order and useful exertion.

CHAPTER III.

CRADOCK'S effort to secure Cadiz proved his zeal and moral courage. The absence of his best troops exposed him to the galling peevishness of the regency, and the gross insults of the populace, and he could not hope with the remnant to hold even the extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest invasion; there was no native force, the government he could not trust, and he had before him the prospect of a forced embarkation and the obloquy which never fails to follow disaster. Elvas and Almeida were evacuated, but the winter gales sealed the harbour of Oporto, and Lamego was crowded with fifteen hundred sick; for the hospitals of Almeida and Salamanca had been sent there, escorts and stores were daily coming in, and the overflowing of the Douro would not let boats descend to Oporto: one large craft had been overset and eighty persons, soldiers and others, drowned.

Cameron hearing of this confusion, changed his route and made for Lisbon, where he arrived early in February with two thousand men, worn down by a march of eight hundred miles under continual rains. Sir Robert Wilson had sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of Idanha Nova; but partly from a spirit of adventure, partly from an erroneous idea

Appendix 4,
§ 1.

that Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force increased by a Spanish detachment under Carlos d'España, and by some volunteers, was still weak, and his operations necessarily confined to a few trifling skirmishes; but his imagination outstripped his judgment; when he had only felt the advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether. Cradock entertained no

such false expectations; he was informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore, and he knew too well the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he had been oppressed by an overwhelming force. He knew Zaragoza had fallen, and twenty-five thousand French troops were thus free to act in other quarters,—that Soult with at least twenty thousand men was on the Minho,—that Romana was incapable of making any head;—that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of Merida threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus;—that all Portugal was in hopeless disorder, his own embarrassments hourly increasing, and the moment was arrived when the safety of his troops must be his chief consideration.

The few despatches received from England led him to suppose the ministers designed to abandon Portugal; but as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first orders, and hold the country as long as he could without risking the loss of his army. He put every incumbrance at Lisbon on board the transports in the Tagus, dismantled the batteries at the mouth of the river, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the military and naval stores in the arsenal, and renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto, but the weather finally forced him to attempt their removal by land.

After Cameron's arrival, the British under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred stragglers from Moore's army, were about eight thousand men; and when the forts and magazines, and the tranquillity of Lisbon, were provided for, only five thousand, not in the best order, could be brought into the field. This force could not cover Lisbon, and Cradock judged it unwise to take a position in advance, from whence he might have to retreat through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, whose many indications of ill-temper left no doubt of hostility under such circumstances. He therefore resolved to concentrate on a position at Passa D'Arcos near the mouth of the Tagus, where he could embark with least danger, and offer most resistance to superior numbers.

Appendix 8
§ 1.

Appendix 9.

Appendix 8,
§ 2.

His arrangements seemed injudiciously conducted. Passa d'Arcos might have been prepared, and the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment; to show a bold front in war is essential, and Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of the maxim. The Lisbon populace, confident like all Peninsulars in their own prowess until the moment of attack, became exasperated; and the regency from natural folly, insincerity, and fear, countenanced if it did not instigate the people to interrupt the British naval and military authorities. It had itself proposed to dismantle the batteries, yet now, formally protested against the measure; and to embarrass the general encouraged the subordinates to make false and ridiculous charges against the executive officers. Neither the admiral nor general were well supported by Mr. Villiers, and the city became tumultuous; mobs armed with English muskets and pikes infested the streets and high-roads day and night, and pretending to seek Frenchmen to kill, assailed all foreigners and even British officers in uniform. The guards who interfered were insulted, couriers were robbed of their despatches, and the disorder became so bad that Cradock planted artillery in the squares expecting an affray. In fine, Lisbon was now as it had been when Junot's army was embarking; and if the English had quitted Portugal they would have been assailed with as much obloquy; for such ever has and will be the fate of unsuccessful allies.

Appendix 1,
§ 5.

Appendix 1,
§ 6.

This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto insult to the British was more openly encouraged; the government of the multitude was there more decided, and from the cities it spread to the villages. The people of the Alemtejo were remarkably apathetic, but from the Minho to the Tagus the country was in horrible confusion; the soldiers, unpaid and scattered without regard to military order, lived at free quarters; the peasantry assembling in bands, the populace of the towns in mobs, intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals at their pleasure, and massacred all persons whom they suspected; the ammunition supplied by England was wasted by constant firing in token of insubordination; and as if the very genius of confusion was abroad,

British *malingersers** principally of Moore's army, added their misconduct to increase the general distress. One Raymundo was the leading instigator at Oporto: coadjutor and creature of the bishop, he was a turbulent and cruel fellow, and having in the first insurrection obtained a momentary influence, has since been elevated by a credulous English writer, into a patriotic hero. He was a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, incapable of a noble action; but suited to this state of anarchy, which caused many of the upper classes to despair of their country's safety by war, and increased the number of those ready to accept a foreign prince as their sovereign, if with him they could obtain tranquillity and an ameliorated constitution. Hence, when the edge of the enemy's sword afterwards fell upon the senseless multitude at Oporto, there was a powerful French party in Portugal. Nevertheless the bulk of the people, furious and disorderly but imbued with hatred of the French, were ready at the call of honour, and susceptible of discipline without any loss of energy.

Appendix 4,
§ 2.

Mr. Villiers, fearing for the safety of the British subjects in Lisbon, urged Cradock to suspend the Passa d'Arcos project, and, as the enemy, contrary to expectation, had not crossed the frontier, the general acceded. This unsettled state of affairs continued until March, when news came that a French fleet was at sea, whereupon two line-of-battle ships were sent to reinforce sir Thomas Duckworth, and the Tagus batteries were again armed. Meanwhile Soult made progress in the north, the anarchy at Oporto continued, and the English government certainly designed to abandon Portugal if the French advanced. For though Cradock was not told so, colonel Trant, an officer well acquainted with Portuguese customs, had actually embarked with instructions to aid the measure. Suddenly the cabinet changed its policy, induced partly by the Austrian war, partly by the failure at Cadiz, partly by public opinion in England; and this change was accompanied by a measure giving the first reasonable hope of success.

* A name given by the soldiers to men who, under pretence of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the field.

Spontaneously, or brought thereto by negotiation, the regency offered the command of their army with the title of marshal, to a British general. The English cabinet, accepting this offer, promised arms, ammunition, clothing, and a subsidy for the payment of a certain number of regular soldiers; thus obtaining a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and gaining, for the first time, a position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England. The Portuguese desired to have sir Arthur Wellesley, but he refused the offer, and it is said sir John Murray, he who afterwards failed at Taragona, sir John Doyle, and the marquis of Hastings, sought for the office; yet, powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, Beresford was finally chosen, and received the local rank of lieutenant-general; to the great discontent of several officers of superior rank, who were displeased that, without any visible claim to superiority, he should be placed over their heads. Information of this change was sent to Cradock, and Sherbrooke was ordered to repair to Lisbon. The latter was near Cadiz when the orders overtook him, and his and Mackenzie's divisions arrived together in the Tagus on the 12th of March: thus the fate of Portugal was again fixed by England. But if Mr. Frere's plan had been followed—if Mackenzie had proceeded to Taragona, and nothing but foul weather prevented him,—if Sherbrooke's voyage had not been delayed by storms,—if sailing from port to port he had, as was probable, been engaged in some other enterprise—if Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to Abrantes—if any of these events had happened, Cradock must have abandoned Portugal: and then how infinitely absurd the proceedings of the English ministers would have appeared, and how justly their puerile combinations would have excited the scorn of Europe.

Beresford reached Lisbon early in March, and, after some negotiation, was empowered to appoint British officers to the command of regiments; being to act himself as he should judge fitting, to ameliorate the condition and discipline of the Portuguese forces. The military polity of Portugal, although fallen into disuse, was severe, precise, and admirably calculated to draw forth the whole strength of the nation; the

army could be completed by coercion, the militia were bound to assemble by regiments, and liable to any service within the frontiers; the remaining male population could be enrolled under the name of *ordenanças*, numbered by battalions in their different districts, and forced by severe penalties to assemble under the orders of the local magistrates, either to work, to fight, to escort convoys, or generally to aid the operations of the army. Beresford fixed his quarters at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops in masses, and recast their system on the model of the British army, establishing, with stern but wholesome rigour, a reform which in process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient, well disciplined, and gallant force, worthy of a high place among the best in Europe: for the Portuguese people, though easily misled and excited to wrath, are of a docile orderly disposition, and very sensible of just and honourable conduct in their officers. This however was not effected at once, nor without crosses and difficulties being raised by the higher orders and by the government—difficulties Beresford could not have overcome, if he had not been directed, sustained, and shielded by the master spirit under whom he was destined to work. The giving British officers command was at first pursued with caution; but when it was supposed safe, almost all military situations of importance were held by Englishmen; and that with other causes produced intrigues, not confined to natives, which in after times seriously affected the existence of the British influence, and even the success of the war.

Cradock's situation was now alleviated; the certainty that Austria would war on France had a marked influence on the regency; and the arrival of Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's divisions, increasing the British force to fourteen thousand men, rendered the populace more cautious of offering insults. Hence, about the middle of March, he encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem, leaving only two thousand men to maintain tranquillity in Lisbon. There was a change also in other parts. The Portuguese regular troops, ten or twelve thousand men, were collected by Beresford between the Tagus and Mondego; and beyond the Mondego colonel Trant, originally sent out to prepare the evacuation of Portugal, assembled a body of

students from the Coimbra university. General Vittoria had two regular battalions in Upper Beira,—the bishop was preparing to defend Oporto with a ferocious multitude—Silveira was in the *Tras os Montes* with five thousand men, and in full communication with Romana, who had collected eight thousand at Monterey. Wilson was on the *Agueda*, watching Lapisse, and having a detachment at Bejar—a few Portuguese regiments were extended from *Salvatierra* to *Alcantara*,—a boat bridge was laid at *Abrantes*, and there were small garrisons there and at *Elvas*. But all these native forces united could not have sustained the shock of ten thousand French for half an hour, and there were fifty thousand hanging on the frontier. Gathering like clouds on the horizon, they threatened many points, yet gave no certain indications of where the storm would burst. Soult with about twenty thousand was endeavouring to pass the *Minho*; Lapisse, although menacing *Ciudad Rodrigo*, kept his principal masses at *Salamanca* and *Ledesma*; and Victor concentrated his between the *Alberche* and the *Tietar*. Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor; the latter could march by *Placentia* against *Ciudad Rodrigo*, the second attack *Oporto*; Victor, drawing Lapisse to him might penetrate by *Alcantara*; he might also attack *Cuesta*, and pursue him to *Seville*, or turn short to the right and enter the *Alemtejo*.

In this uncertainty, Cradock, keeping at *Lumiar* and *Saccavem*, waited for the enemy to develope his plans, and endeavoured to procure the necessary equipments for an active campaign. He formed magazines at *Coimbra* and *Abrantes*, urged the regency to exertion, took measures to raise money, and despatched officers to *Barbary* to procure mules. While thus engaged, he heard that Victor had forced the passage of the *Tagus* at *Almaraz* and was in pursuit of *Cuesta* on the road to *Merida*;—that Soult, having crossed the *Minho* and defeated *Romana* and *Silveira*, was within a few leagues of *Oporto*;—that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting *Ciudad Rodrigo*. The junta of *Oporto* vehemently demanded aid from the regency, and the latter, though little inclined to the bishop's party, proposed that Cradock, uniting a part of the British forces to

the Portuguese troops under Beresford, should march to the succour of Oporto. Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command among the disorderly multitude of that city; yet wished Cradock to move the British to Leiria, and from thence push on to Oporto or return, according to events.

It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended to co-operate in a single plan, but supposing it so, it was essential to drive back or overcome one before the other could come to his aid. Victor was in pursuit of Cuesta, if he continued that pursuit it must be to enter Seville or to cripple his opponent previous to the invasion of Portugal; in either case he would be in the Morena before he could hear of the march from Leiria, and as Cradock had daily intelligence of his movements, there would be time to relieve Oporto and return to the defence of Lisbon. If Soult depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would probably remain on the right of the Douro until the latter was on the Tagus; Lapisse also would be contented for the present with capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. This reasoning did not weigh with Cradock, he would not risk being cut off from Lisbon by one army while he was engaged with another. Portugal, he replied, was in a state of anarchy incompatible with firm resistance and rapid movements,—the peasantry were tumultuous, formidable to everybody but the enemy,—Beresford acknowledged the regular forces were mutinous, choosing when and where to rest, when to fight, when to remain in quarters, and altogether unfit to be trusted within the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British were the only solid resource; but they were too few to divide, and must act in a body or not at all. Lisbon and Oporto were the enemy's objects; which was it most desirable to protect?—the former was of incomparably greater importance than the latter;—the first was near, the second two hundred miles off—and the army was not yet equipped for an active campaign. The troops were ill-clothed and wanted shoes—the artillery was unhorsed—the commissariat possessed only a fourth part of the transport necessary for the conveyance of provisions and ammunition—no activity could imme-

Appendix 10,
§§ 1, 2.

diately supply these deficiencies—some of the articles required were not to be had in the country, to obtain others the interference of the regency was necessary, and all applications to that quarter had been without any effect. Was it wise then to commence offensive operations in the north? The troops of Soult and Lapisse together were estimated at thirty thousand men, of which five thousand were cavalry; the British could only bring fifteen guns and twelve thousand men of all arms into the field: yet if they marched with the avowed intention of relieving Oporto they must accomplish it, or be dishonoured!

But was it consistent with reason to march two hundred miles in search of a combat which the very state of Oporto would render it almost impossible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost? Suspicion was alive everywhere; if Oporto was taken the army must come back, that would be the signal for fresh tumults—for renewed cries that the country was to be abandoned; Lisbon would be in a state of insurrection, and more formidable to the British than the enemy. It was impossible to reckon upon Cuesta's keeping Victor employed, he was personally inimical to the English, and his object was to gain time for the increase of his own force. Victor was apparently pursuing Cuesta, but his parties had appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajos; and only a weak garrison was in Elvas to impede him in the Alemtejo: to cover Lisbon and the Tagus was the wisest plan. In a favourable position, at a prudent distance from that capital, he could wait for the reinforcements expected from England; he invited Beresford to unite with him; a short time would establish subordination; and then the certainty that the capital could not be approached except in the face of a really formidable army, would not only keep the enemy in check, but by compelling him to collect in greater numbers, would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain.

Reasoning thus, Cradock did not overlook the value of his central position; but the difficulty of obtaining true intelligence from the natives, and his want of cavalry, rendered it unsafe to divide his army or to push it far from Lisbon. Beresford's plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock

could engage Soult at Oporto and yet quit him and return at pleasure if Victor advanced, was fallacious; the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto, it was positive they would endanger Lisbon. The proposition was however not made upon partial views, and was advantageously contrasted with the projects of other men, less qualified to advise, who at this period pestered Cradock with projects of a different stamp, and only deserving of notice as showing how the mania for grand operations, that malady of the time, was still raging. To use the British army was the object of all these projectors, yet there was a marvellous variety in their plans. The regency desired the Portuguese and British troops to co-operate for the relief of Oporto, without uncovering Lisbon, which was impossible. Beresford wished the English troops to march alone. The bishop, who was importunate to have British troops under his orders recalled Wilson to Oporto, and it appeared reasonable that the legion should defend the city in which it was raised; but Mr. Frere, writing from Seville, desired sir Robert to remain where he was, and the latter, refusing obedience to the prelate, accepted Spanish rank. The regency, glad of the opportunity to mortify the bishop, approved of his proceedings and adopted the legion as a national corps.

Romana was earnest with Cradock for money, and demanded a thousand British soldiers to aid the insurrection at Vigo; but at the same time Mr. Frere and colonel D'Urban, a corresponding officer placed by Cradock at Cuesta's head-quarters, proposed other plans of higher pretensions. Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen, and ten thousand French troops being thus released, are marching towards Toledo, this is the moment to give a fatal blow to Victor! It is one of those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! In a day or two sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with two thousand five hundred men; augment his force with a like number of Portuguese, who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra; he shall thus turn the right and rear of Victor's army; and his movement cannot be interrupted by the French

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

now at Salamanca and Alba, because the communication from thence to the Tagus by the passes of Baños and Tornevecas is sealed up. While sir Robert thus places five thousand men in the rear of Victor, Cuesta shall attack him in front, with twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry; a matter of easy execution, because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge over the Tagus near Almaraz in an hour and a half; and the conde de Cartoajal, who is at Manzanares in La Mancha with ten thousand infantry and two thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in check. The hope is great, the danger small; and if a few British troops can be added to the force on the Tietar, the success will be infallible! There were, however, grave objections to this infallible plan. Cuesta was near Almaraz, Cradock was at Lisbon, Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo; their line of correspondence was above four hundred miles long, and it is not therefore clear how the combination was to be effected with that rapidity which was said to be essential to the success. Neither is it evident how operations, to be combined at such a distance and executed by soldiers of different nations, could have been successful at all. On the one side, twenty thousand raw Portuguese and Spanish levies were to act on double external lines of operation; on the other, twenty-five thousand French veterans waited in a central position, with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus and the Tietar: in such a contest it is possible to conceive a different result from that anticipated by colonel D'Urban, who also forgot the twelve thousand men with the king in Madrid.

Mr. Frere's plans were not less extensive. Soult, he wrote to Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, will probably desist from his '*unaccountable project of entering Portugal and occupying Galicia at the same time.*' Let the British army therefore, make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca and the neighbouring towns, while the Asturians shall on their side take possession of Leon and Astorga, and open the communication between the northern and southern provinces. Mr. Frere however, fearing, if this plan should not be adopted, the English general would be at a loss for some enterprise, also recommended that the British army should march to Alcantara, and the fortieth

regiment, which hitherto he had retained at Seville, contrary to Cradock's wishes, should join it at that place; then said he, the whole operating by the northern bank of the Tagus in concert with Cuesta, '*may beat the French out of Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid.*' But Soult never thought of holding Galicia, which was Ney's province, and he did mean to enter Portugal. Nor was he likely to refrain when the only army capable of opposing him was abandoning that kingdom to make a '*push*' of four hundred miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca! Moreover the Asturians were watched by Bonnet's division on one side, and by Kellerman's on the other; and the fifth corps was not, as colonel D'Urban supposed, only ten thousand strong and marching upon Toledo, but fifteen thousand strong and near Leon and Astorga.

Imperial
Muster roll,
MSS.

Upon the operations by the line of the Tagus, which were to drive Joseph out of Madrid and attract the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that Cradock was to employ twelve thousand men, Cuesta fourteen thousand, and Cartoajal twelve thousand, in all thirty-eight thousand. Soult had twenty-three thousand, Lapisse nine thousand, Victor twenty-five thousand, Sebastiani fifteen thousand, Mortier a like number, the king's guards and the garrison of Madrid more than twelve thousand, making a total of nearly a hundred thousand men! Hence while Mr. Frere and colonel D'Urban, confiding in Soult's inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto, the second, unconscious of his danger, defeated Cuesta's army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed Cartoajal at Ciudad Real.

CHAPTER IV.

HAVING shown the unhappy state of Portugal and Spain, Soult's operations shall be resumed; for while the other marshals were awing the provinces overrun by Napoleon, or warring down the remnants of the defeated armies, his task was to complete a campaign, in which, traversing all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war he gave stern proof that he was an able commander and of a haughty resolution in adversity.

It has been shown how the inhabitants of Coruña honourably maintained their town until the fleet conveying Moore's army was gone. They were less faithful to their own cause. Coruña was a regular fortress, and many weeks must have elapsed before a sufficient battering train could have been collected by the French in that corner of the Peninsula. Ferrol contained eight sail of the line and some smaller ships of war; the fortifications were regular, with an abundance of artillery and ammunition, the garrison seven or eight thousand strong, consisting of soldiers, sailors, citizens, and armed countrymen, willing to fight; but the chiefs were treacherous. After a commotion in which the admiral, Obregon, was arrested, his successor, Melgarejo, surrendered upon somewhat better terms than those granted to Coruña, and thus in ten days were reduced two regular fortresses, which with more resolution might have occupied thirty thousand men for several months.

While still in front of Ferrol marshal Soult had received the following imperial despatch, prescribing the immediate invasion of Portugal by the north.

‘Before his departure from Valladolid the emperor, foreseeing the embarkation of the English army, drew up instruc-

tions for the ultimate operations of the duke of Elchingen and yourself. When the English army shall be embarked you will march upon Oporto with your four divisions, that is to say, the divisions of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet, the dragoons of Lorge, and La Houssaye, and Franceschi's light cavalry, with the exception of two regiments which his majesty desires you to turn over to the duke of Elchingen, in order to make up his cavalry to four regiments. Your '*corps d'armée*,' seventeen regiments of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, is destined for Portugal, in combination with a movement the duke of Belluno is going to effect. General Loison, some engineers staff and commissariat officers, and thirteen Portuguese, all of whom belonged to the army formerly in Portugal under the duke of Abrantes, will join you, and you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. This is the 21st of January, it is supposed you cannot be at Oporto before the 5th of February, at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, when you shall be near Lisbon, the '*corps d'armée*' of the duke of Belluno, composed of his own three divisions, of the division Leval, and of ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming a body of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida, to make a strong diversion in your favour; and he can push the head of a column upon Lisbon if you find any great obstacles to your entrance, which it is however presumed will not be the case.

'General Lapisse's division of infantry, at this moment in Salamanca, and general Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, will, when you shall be at Oporto, receive the duke of Istria's orders to march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where this division will again be under the command of the duke of Belluno, who will send it instructions to join him at Merida: I let you know this that you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your left flank, as far as Abrantes. Such are the last orders I am charged to give you in the name of the emperor: you will have to report to the king and to receive his orders for your ulterior operations. The emperor has unlimited confidence in your talents for the fine expedition he has charged you with.

'ALEXANDER,

'Prince of Neufchatel, &c.'

Napoleon likewise designed, when Lisbon fell, that Victor should invade Andalusia upon the same line as Dupont; and like Dupont he was to be assisted with a division of the second corps, which, crossing the Guadiana, was to march on Seville. Ney, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry and stragglers, had twenty thousand men, and was to maintain Galicia, confine the Asturians within their own frontier line, and keep open the communication with Soult. Thus, nominally eighty thousand, in reality sixty thousand men, were disposed for the conquest of Lisbon; and in such a manner that forty thousand could afterwards pour down upon Seville and Cadiz when neither Portugal nor Andalusia were capable of resistance. How this mighty preparation failed shall now be shown.

Soult's gross number was forty-seven thousand; but Bonnet's division remained always at St. Ander, eight thousand were detached for the service of the general communications, and the remainder had, since the 9th of November, been fighting and marching incessantly among barren and snowy mountains: hence, stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men were in hospital. The force actually under arms did not exceed twenty-five thousand men, worn

down with fatigue, barefooted, and without ammunition; they had outstripped their commissariat, the military chest was not come up, the draft animals were reduced in number and attenuated

by fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken, the artillery park still in the rear; the sixth corps had not passed Lugo, and two divisions were required to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to obey the emperor's orders was consequently impossible, but Soult, taking quarters at St. Jago Compostella, proceeded to re-organize his army. He fabricated ammunition from the loose powder found in Coruña; obtained hoes partly by requisition, partly from the Spanish magazines, filled as they were with stores supplied by England; he refitted his artillery, rallied most of his stragglers, and in six days was ready to march, though his men were still suffering. On the 1st of February nineteen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty-eight guns were in movement; but to understand his campaign the state of Galicia must be described.

Imperial
Muster roll,
MSS.

S.
Journal of
Operations of
the 2nd corps,
MSS.

When Romana crossed Moore's line of march his troops were disorganized; he plunged with his cavalry into the deep valleys of the Syl and the Minho, but his artillery and infantry were cut up by Franceschi's cavalry, and those who escaped wandered in search of food and shelter in the mountains. Mendizabel halted with a small body in the Val des Orres, guarding the Puente de Bibey, a point of singular strength, hoping thus to cover Orense. Romana, after a time, collected two or three thousand men and took post at Toabado, twenty miles from Lugo. Ney was then at Lugo, having previously sent cavalry, from Villa Franca, to scour the valleys on his left, and Marchand's division by the road of Orense to St. Jago and Coruña. Marchand dispersed Mendizabel's troops the 17th, and after halting some days at Orense, where he established an hospital, continued his march to St. Jago; this operation completed the rout of Romana's army. The marquis, with his cavalry, and the few infantry that would follow him, crossed the Minho, descended into the valley of the Tamega, and took refuge on the 21st, at Oimbra, on the frontier of Portugal, close to Monterey, where he lived upon a small magazine collected for the use of Moore's army

Appendix 4.

In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, he entered into communication with Silveira, and with Cradock, demanding money and arms from the latter; he endeavoured also to reassemble a body of troops, but Blake and other officers deserted him, and these events and the general want of spirit drew from him the following observation:—'I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap prostrates the minds of these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they sacrifice their country and compromise their commander.'

In Galicia the peasants live hardly, and being, like all mountaineers, very tenacious of the little property they possess, disregarded political events which did not immediately affect them. They were with the exception of those in the sea-port towns, slightly moved by the aggression of the French, as long as that aggression did not extend to their valleys, and at first they treated the English and French armies alike. Baird's division in its advance paid generously for supplies, yet it was

regarded with jealousy and defrauded. Soult's and Moore's armies, passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with terror and the people fled from both. The British and German troops who marched to Vigo were conducted without judgment and licentious, the people murdered their stragglers, and showed without disguise their natural hatred of strangers. On several occasions, parties sent to collect cars for the conveyance of the sick had to sustain skirmishes, and five officers, misled by a treacherous guide, were only saved from death by the interference of an old man, after one of the officers had been severely wounded in the head. On the other hand, Marchand discovered so little symptoms of hostility during his march to Orense, that he left his hospital at that town without a guard, under the joint care of Spanish and French surgeons; and the duties of humanity were faithfully discharged by the former without hindrance from the people.

This quiescence did not last. The French generals subsisted their troops by requisitions extremely onerous to a people whose property chiefly consisted of cattle; and the many abuses which attend this mode of supplying an army soon created a spirit of hatred, which Romana laboured to increase, and successfully; for though a bad general, he was intelligent and dexterous to excite a population. Monks and friars laboured to the same purpose. Romana announced death for those who refused to take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition; and all this was necessary, for the authority of the supreme junta was only acknowledged as a matter of necessity—not of liking. Galicia, apparently calm, was therefore ripe for a general insurrection at the moment Soult moved from St. Jago Compostella.

Romana's
Manifesto.

From that town several roads lead to the Minho. The principal one, running by the coast line, crosses the Ulla, the Umia, the Vedra, the Octaven; and passes by Pontevedra and Redondela to Tuy, a dilapidated fortress situated on the Spanish side of the Minho. The second, crossing the same rivers nearer to their sources, passes the Monte de Tenteyros, enters the valley of the Avia, and follows its course to Ribidavia, which being situated at the confluence of the Avia with

the Minho, had a stone bridge over the former, and a barque ferry on the latter river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, connects St. Jago with Orense; and from Orense a fourth road passes along the right bank of the Minho, connecting Ribidavia, Salvatierra, and Tuy, and ending at Guardia, a small fortress at the mouth of the Minho.

As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one convenient for the artillery, was that of Pontevedra, leading by Redondela and Tuy, and from thence by the coast, Soult resolved to pass the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia. Wherefore Franceschi, followed by the main body, took the Pontevedra road, and at Redondela defeated some insurgents, and captured four pieces of cannon; Vigo then surrendered to a detachment, while he marched upon Tuy and took possession of that town and Guardia. La Houssaye's dragoons, quitting Mellid, crossed the Monte de Tenteyro, passed through Ribidavia, and took possession of Salvatierra on the Minho. Pierre Soult, the marshal's brother, who had assembled three thousand stragglers and convalescents between Astorga and Carrion, received orders to enter Portugal by Puebla de Senabria. But the rainy season was in full torrent, every stream overflowed its banks, the roads were deep, the difficulty of procuring provisions great, and Ney was to be put in possession of the administration of Ferrol and Coruña; for Soult had retained and paid the Spanish authorities and garrisons: hence it was the 16th ere the whole corps could be concentrated on the Minho.

That river, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms the frontier of Portugal, and the banks on both sides were guarded by fortresses, originally of considerable strength, but at this time dilapidated. The Spanish fort of Guardia fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was opposed by Valenza, which was garrisoned, and the works better than the rest; Lapella Moncao, and Melgaço, completed the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this moment was the Minho itself, which was now a broad and raging flood, and the Portuguese *ordenanças* and militia had removed the boats and were in arms on the other side; Soult examined the banks with care

and, though all his troops had not arrived, decided to pass at Campo Saucos, a little village where the ground was favourable, and so close to Caminha that the army once across, could easily seize that place and the same day reach Viana on the Lima, within three marches of Oporto.

To attract the attention of the Portuguese, La Houssaye spread his dragoons from Salvatierra along the Minho, and attempted to push small parties across, above Melgaço; but the bulk of the army was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Campo Saucos, and a detachment seized the small sea-port of Bayona in the rear. A division of infantry, and three hundred French marines, released at Coruña and attached to the second corps, were then employed to transport some large fishing boats and heavy guns from the harbour and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. With rollers they were thus carried over two miles of rugged ground, and it was a work of infinite labour; but from the 11th to the 15th the troops toiled unceasingly, and the craft were finally launched in a small lake at the confluence of the Tamuga with the Minho.

In the night of the 15th the heavy guns were placed in battery, three hundred soldiers embarked and dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, hoping to reach the Portuguese side of the latter during the darkness; but the landing was not effected before day-break, and the *ordenança* falling with great fury upon the first who got on shore killed the foremost; the others regained their own side with great difficulty. This had a surprising influence on the issue of the campaign. It was a gallant action, because it might be expected that half-armed peasants collected on the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight of many boats filled with soldiers, some pulling across, and others landing under the protection of a heavy battery, that thundered from the midst of a multitude of troops clustering on the heights, or thronging to the edge of the opposite bank. It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled an operation which would have ensured the fall of Oporto by the 21st of February, when Mackenzie's division was at Cadiz, Cradock's troops reduced to almost nothing, and the English ministers only

wanting an excuse to abandon Portugal;—when the people of that country were in the extremity of disorder, when the Portuguese army was a nullity, and the regency evidently preparing to receive the French with submission. It was the period also when Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the emperor's orders, and consequently when Lapisse and Victor must have fulfilled their part in the subjugation of Portugal.

Soult was now posted in a narrow contracted position, hemmed on the left by Spanish insurgents, who had assembled when La Houssaye passed Orense; they See Plan 4. possessed a rugged and difficult country, and were supported by the army of Romana, which was thought, erroneously, to be at Orense and Ribidavia. In front was the Minho, broad, raging, impassable, and heavy rain forbade the hope that its waters would decrease. To collect means to force a passage would have required sixteen days, but long before that period the subsistence for the army would fail, and the Portuguese be greatly augmented on the opposite bank. There remained then only to return to St. Jago, or, breaking through the Spanish insurgents, to ascend the Minho and open a way into Portugal by some other route. The attempt to pass the river had been baffled the 15th, and the 16th Soult was in march towards Ribidavia upon a new line of operations; and this promptitude of decision was supported by prompt execution; for La Houssaye's dragoons, quitting Salvatierra and keeping the edge of the Minho, though galled by the Portuguese from the opposite bank, twice in the day broke the insurgent bands, and, in revenge for some previous excesses of the peasantry, burnt the villages of Morentan and Cobreira. The main body, passing the Tea river at Salvatierra and Puente d'Arcos, moved by successive divisions along the main road from Tuy to Ribidavia.

Between Franquera and Canizar the road was cut by the Morenta and Noguera; and behind those torrents, eight hundred Gallicians, who had barricadoed the bridges and repulsed the advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon their defence. The passage was forced the 17th, at daybreak, by Heudelet's division, which pursued briskly until, at a short distance from

Ribidavia, the Spaniards rallied upon eight or ten thousand insurgents, arrayed in order of battle on a strong hill covering the town. The French advanced guard halted for the remainder of the division and a brigade of cavalry to come up, and then under the personal direction of Soult, the Gallicians were driven fighting, through the town and across the Avia with great loss: the bodies of twenty priests were found amongst the slain. Whether from fear or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted Ribidavia; but on the 18th a brigade of infantry discovered and dispersed three or four thousand of the insurgents, in the valley of the Avia; while a second brigade, pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close to that place. These brigades, being joined the same evening by Franceschi's cavalry, entered Orense in time to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being cut. La Houssaye's dragoons then took post at Maside, and the remainder of the horse united with Laborde's infantry at Ribidavia: the artillery was still between Tuy and Salvatierra guarded by Merle's and Mermet's divisions. Thus in three days Soult extricated his army from a contracted position, strangled a formidable insurrection in its birth, opened a fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and gained an easy passage into Portugal.

A regiment sent across the Minho by the ferries of Barbantes and Ribidavia, now defeated the insurgents of the left bank, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post on the heights of Merea; the rest of the army, with exception of a division guarding the guns, was concentrated at Orense. The artillery had been baffled by the difficulties of the road from Tuy to Ribidavia; and this, viewed in conjunction with the precarious state of the communication, a daily increasing sick-list, and the number of small detachments required to protect the rear, seemed to forbid the invasion of Portugal. A man of ordinary genius would have failed. Soult with ready boldness resolved to throw the greatest part of his guns and all his other incumbrances into Tuy, as a place of arms, and relinquishing his communication with Galicia, march in one mass upon Oporto; from whence, if successful, he proposed to re-open his communication with Tuy by the

coast-line, recover his artillery and re-establish a regular system of operations.

In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the lightest guns and six howitzers, with some ammunition-waggons, were with infinite labour transported to Ribidavia; the remaining thirty-six pieces, and a vast parc of carriages carrying ammunition hospital and commissariat stores, were put into Tui; where general La Martiniere was left with an establishment of artillery and engineer officers, a garrison of five hundred men fit to carry arms, and nine hundred sick. All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments coming from St. Jago, and the military chest, which was still in the rear and guarded by six hundred infantry, were likewise directed upon Tui: the gates were then shut, and La Martiniere was abandoned to his own resources. From Ribidavia the sick were forwarded to Orense, and the marshal's quarters were established in that town the 24th; but other obstacles were to be vanquished before he could enter into Portugal. The gun carriages were so shaken that three days were required to repair them; it was difficult to obtain provisions, numerous bands of the peasants were still in arms, and were not quelled until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on the Monte Blanco, in the Val d'Orres, and up the valley of the Avia. The French thus lost time and men, and expended ammunition which could not be replaced. Soult endeavoured to soften the people by kindness, soothing proclamations, and a strict discipline. This humane and politic demeanour, joined to the activity of his moveable columns, abated the fierceness of the peasantry; the inhabitants of Ribidavia returned to their houses, those of Orense had never been very violent, and now even lent assistance to procure provisions. It was not however easy to restrain the soldiers; frequent combats, the assassination and torturing of isolated men, and the privations endured, had so exasperated them that their revenge could not always be controlled.

But while Soult was menacing Portugal a horrible anarchy prevailed in that country. At Oporto the bishop had assembled little short of fifty thousand armed persons, and

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

Appendix 11.

commenced a gigantic line of entrenchment on the hills to the northward of that city. This worse than useless labour caused the defence of the strong country lying between the Douro and the Minho to be neglected, and when Soult appeared on the bank of the latter river the upper provinces were struck with terror; then it was the people first understood their danger; then it was the bishop, aroused from his intrigues, thought the French more terrible enemies than the regency. He became clamorous for succour; he recalled Wilson from the Agueda, he hurried on the entrenchments, he pressed Cradock for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and a reinforcement of British soldiers. Wilson as before said disregarded his orders, but the British general while refusing troops, supplied him with arms and ample stores of powder; and sent artillery and engineer officers to superintend the construction of the defensive works, and aid the arrangements. The people were however too licentious for control or advice, and the soldiers had been drawn into the vortex of insubordination: universal hopeless disorder prevailed. Bernardim Freire was the legal commander-in-chief of the Entre Minho e Douro, but all the generals claimed equal and independent authority; and this was perhaps a matter of self preservation, for general and traitor were at that period almost synonymous; to obey the orders of a superior against the wishes of the multitude was to incur instant death. Nor were there men wanting who found it profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and direct its blind vengeance against innocent persons adverse to the prelate's faction, which was not without opponents even in Oporto.

Such was the state of affairs, when the undisciplined gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, compelled Soult to march by Orense; a part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the *ordenanzas* and the militia of the district; but all were in a state of fearful insubordination, and there was no arrangement made for the regular distribution of provisions or any necessary supply. Among the troops was the second battalion

Appendix 1,
§§ 1—6.
See Plan 2.

of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred strong, well armed, well equipped, and commanded by baron Eben, a native of Prussia, who without any known services to recommend him had suddenly attained the rank of major in the British service. This man, destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been left at Oporto when Wilson marched to Almeida; he had orders to follow with the second battalion of the legion, when its clothing and equipment should be completed, but he retained the troops to push his own fortune under the prelate's auspices, and now joined Freire. When the latter reached the Cavado, where fifteen thousand militia and *ordenanças* were assembled, he occupied Braga, placed outposts at Salamonde and Ruivaens, and endeavoured to restrain the troops from wasting ammunition by wanton firing in the street and on the roads. This reform was heinously resented; and as Freire inclined to the regency, the bishop's faction pointed to him as suspected, and rendered the multitude inimical.

Silveira, assuming the command of the *Tras os Montes*, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication with Romana, who had been rejoined at Cimbra and Monterey by his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of eight thousand men. Silveira's force was about four thousand, half regulars, half militia, and he was accompanied by many of the *ordenanças*; but here also they were licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their general. Moreover, national enmity to the Spaniards overcame their sense of a common danger; the latter were evilly treated, and a deadly feud subsisted between the two armies. Appendix 4.
§ 3.


The generals, indeed, agreed to act in concert, offensively and defensively, yet neither of them were the least acquainted with the numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists; and it is a proof of Romana's unfitness for command that he, having the whole population at his disposal, was yet ignorant of everything it behoved him to know relating to his enemy. The French in Gallicia at this period were forty-five thousand, Romana estimated them at twenty-one thousand; the number under Soult was above twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed it to be twelve thousand; and

among these he included Marchand's division of Ney's corps, which he always imagined to be a part of Soult's army.

In this state of ignorance, and elated by the spirit of the peasants about Ribidavia, he anticipated nothing but victory; he knew that on the Arosa, an estuary running up towards St. Jago de Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had risen, and being joined by the neighbouring districts were preparing to attack Vigo and Tuy; hence, partly from his Spanish temperament, partly from his incapacity for war, he was convinced the French only thought of making their escape out of Galicia, and could not even do that. To effect

their destruction more certainly, he also pestered Sir J. Cradock, MSS. Cradock for succours of money, ammunition, and troops; and that officer, anxious to support the cause, sent ammunition, and five thousand pounds in money, but before it arrived Romana was in flight.

He and Silveira having sixteen thousand regulars and militia, besides *ordenanças*, were posted in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega; extending from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a distance of more than fifteen miles. This was the first line of defence for Portugal. Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five thousand men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the Cavado, and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova; but of these twenty-five thousand, only six thousand were armed with muskets: and it is to be observed the militia and troops of the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name. The bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble formed the third line at Oporto. Such were the masses opposed to Soult, but his army, though wearied with toil, disturbed and vexed by insurrections, was of power to break through these multitudes, even as a great ship, feeling the wind, drives through and scatters gun-boats that have gathered round her in a calm.



Explanatory Sketch
of the
OPERATIONS
between the
MINHO & DOURO
1809.

CHAPTER V.

SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

THE Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes, form the northern part of Portugal. Their extreme depth, measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy miles. The Tamega, flowing north and south, separates them; and west of that river a rugged mountain chain, called the Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and Sierra de Santa Catalina, runs nearly parallel to the Tamega. Other chains parallel to that river cut the Tras os Montes, so that all the considerable rivers of that province tumble into the Douro. But the western ramifications of the Gerez and Catalina shoot towards the sea, conducting the waters of the Entre Minho e Douro to the ocean, and consequently at right angles to those of the Tras os Montes. Hence an enemy advancing from the north would pass the Lima, the Cavado, the Ave, to reach Oporto; and if he came from the east, all the rivers and intervening sierras of the Tras os Montes must be passed to reach the Entre Minho e Douro. Soult being near the sources of the Lima and Tamega, could, by the valley of the Lima, penetrate the Entre Minho e Douro; or, by the valley of the Tamega enter the Tras os Montes; and there was a third road between these rivers leading upon Braga, but passing over the Gerez Sierra, impracticable for artillery. The French general had therefore to consider—

1°. If, following the Lima, he should disperse the insurgents between that river and the Minho, recover his artillery, and march against Oporto by the sea-coast.

2°. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, march on Villa Real, near the Douro, and take the Tras os Montes in reverse; or, turning to the right, cross the Sierra de Cabrera

by the pass of Ruivaens, enter Braga, and so go against Oporto.

Of these projects the first was irregular and hazardous; Romana and Silveira could have fallen upon his flank and rear in a difficult country; and as their position covered Chaves the disposing them must be a preliminary to either plan. Soult moved with this intent on the 4th of March. The 5th, his vanguard being at Villa Real and Penaverde, he sent a letter to Romana, in which showing the danger of his position, he advised him to submit. No answer was returned; nor would the bearer have been suffered to pass the outposts, but that Romana himself was in the rear; for he dreaded such an occurrence as likely to breed jealousy and cause his patriotism to be undervalued. This attempt failing, three French divisions of infantry and one of cavalry marched against Monterey. La Houssaye's dragoons covered the left flank, and pushed parties as far as La Gudina, on the route to Puebla de Senabria; the fourth division of infantry remained at Villa del Rey, to cover the passage of the sick and wounded men from Orense; for Soult transported his hospitals and other incumbrances from place to place as the army moved, acting in this respect like the Roman generals when invading a barbarous country.

As the French advanced the Spaniards abandoned their positions, spiked the guns in the dilapidated works of Monterey, and after a slight skirmish at Verim took the road to Puebla de Senabria; but Franceschi followed and overtook two or three thousand as they were passing a rugged mountain. Assailing their rear with a battalion of infantry, he led his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, and forced it to halt; the Spaniards being on rough ground then drew up in one large square to receive the charge; but Franceschi had four regiments of cavalry, each regiment settled itself against the face of a square, and the whole bore down swiftly and with loud cries upon their opponents, who, unsteady, irresolute, dismayed, shrunk from the fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps: those who escaped the horses' hoofs and the edge of the sword became prisoners, but

Sir J. Cra-
dock, MSS.

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

twelve hundred bodies were stretched lifeless on the field, and Franceschi continued his movements on La Gudina.

Romana was then at Semadems, several miles in the rear of Verim, and there was nothing to prevent his falling back to Chaves according to a plan agreed upon between him and Silveira; yet he left Silveira to his fate, and made off with six or seven thousand men towards Bragança, and by Puebla de Senabria regained the valley of the Syl. Meanwhile, two thousand Portuguese infantry with some guns, issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march at the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet had passed Monterey, and Laborde was approaching that place; a slight combat ensued, the Portuguese lost their guns, and were driven down the valley of the Tamega to the village of Outeiro. This defeat and the flight of Romana, caused the Spanish insurgents to return in crowds to their habitations and deliver up their arms; some of the clergy also exhorted the people to peace; and the prisoners taken on the 6th, dissatisfied with Romana's conduct and moved by their hatred of the Portuguese, entered the French service.

Appendix 4,
§ 3.

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

These affairs occupied Soult until the 9th, but his outposts were pushed towards Chaves, Montalegre, and La Gudina, while the main body remained at Verim to cover the arrival of the sick at Monterey. Silveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and deserted by Romana, fell back to a mountain, one league behind Chaves, from whence he could command a view of all the French movements as far as Monterey; his ground was advantageous, but his military talents were moderate, his men, always insubordinate, were now mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed to join the French. He wished to abandon Chaves, his troops resolved to defend it, and three thousand five hundred men threw themselves into that town in defiance of him; he was, according to the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor and declared worthy of death, which he would have suffered but that some of his soldiers continued to respect his orders.

On the 10th, the French sick were close to Monterey, Romana's movement was now known to be a real flight, not

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

a move to create fresh insurrections in the rear, and Soult marched towards Chaves. Merle's division however remained at Verim to protect the hospital, and Franceschi took the road of La Gudina, as if going towards Salamanca; a report that he had actually entered that town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that the French would not pass the Portuguese frontier. Franceschi however, returned by Osonio and Feces de Abaxa, and joining Heudelet, invested Chaves on the left of the Tamega; while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, and Lorge, descending the right bank, beat the Portuguese outposts, took a fort close under the walls, and completed the investment. The place was summoned, no answer was returned, and the garrison, like men bereft of their wits and fighting with the air, made a continual fire of musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered on receiving a second summons, more menacing than the first: the 13th the French entered the town, and Silveira retired to Villa Real.

Chaves had fifty guns, few only being fit for service; it had however a stone bridge, and was more suitable for a place of arms than Monterey; wherefore the sick were brought down from the latter place, and an hospital established for twelve hundred men. Soult's fighting men were now reduced to twenty-one thousand; and partly from the difficulty of guarding prisoners, partly to abate the hostility of the Portuguese, he permitted the militia and *ordenanças*, prisoners, to return to their homes, after taking an oath not to resume their arms; to some of the poorest he also gave money and clothes, and he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular troops taken in Chaves. This gentle proceeding

Noble's
Campaign
de Galice.

was much blamed by some of his officers, especially those who had served under Junot; they desired Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison put to the sword; for they were embued with a personal hatred of the Portuguese, averse to serve in the present expedition, and sought to thwart their general; but the prudence of his conduct was immediately visible in the softened feelings of the country people; the scouting parties being no longer molested, spread on the side of Bragança and Villa Real, and over

the Entre Minho e Douro. The former reported that no capable enemy was in the Tras os Montes; the latter found Freire's advanced guard on the road to Braga.

s.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

From Chaves Soult could reach Oporto by the Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho e Douro; the latter opposed the strongest positions, but the road was shorter, more practicable for guns, better for communication with Tuy; hence when the Portuguese army was heard of at Braga, that line was adopted. The road, however, led through a succession of dangerous defiles, extending from Venda Nova to Ruivaens, interrupted by the Cavado, yet recommencing on the other side. Freire's advanced guards occupied several of them, and he had placed Eben towards Montalegre but recalled him the 14th. The 16th Franceschi forced the Venda Nova defile, and the army forming alternate masses of infantry and cavalry began to pass the Sierra de Cabrez. Meanwhile Lorge, descending the Tamega, ordered rations along the Villa Real road, and then rejoined the main body. The 17th Franceschi won the bridge of Ruivaens and entered Salamonde, whereupon the Portuguese, covered by Eben, fell back on the Pico de Pugalados close to Braga, and Franceschi took post at Carvalho Este, two leagues from that city.

Soult expecting to reach Braga without further opposition, now caused his guns, guarded by Laborde's division, to enter the pass of Venda Nova; but the *ordenanças*, reinforced from the side of Guimaraens, clustered on the mountains to the left, and attacked the column with great fierceness and subtlety. The northern Portuguese peasants are very robust, very handsome, and exceedingly brave; their natural disposition is generous frank and obliging, and they make docile, intelligent, and hardy soldiers. Vehement in anger, and now stimulated by the exhortations and personal example of their priests, they came rushing down the hills like men deprived of reason, and many of them breaking furiously into the French battalions were there killed; the others fled up the mountain pursued by some battalions; but nothing abashed, they made a circuit round the hills, and falling again upon the rear, killed fifty of the stragglers, and plundered the baggage. Thus galled, the

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

French slowly passed the defiles of Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde, to gather in front of Freire.

Eben's
Report,
MSS.

That general was no more, and his troops, reeking from his slaughter, were raging like savage beasts, one moment congregating near the prisons to murder some wretch within, at another rushing tumultuously to the outposts with design to engage the enemy: the *ordenanças* of the distant districts also poured into camp, dragging with them suspected persons and adding to the general distraction. When Freire resolved to retreat, he, with that design, had recalled Eben on the 14th, giving directions to the outposts in front of Braga to retire as the enemy came on; but this, and his attempt to stop the waste of ammunition, gave effect to a plan long prepared by the bishop's faction for his destruction; in Braga he was reviled by the *ordenanças*, who discovered a murderous intention, wherefore he left the army, but was seized at a village and brought back: what followed is thus described by Eben, in his official report to sir John Cradock:—

‘ I did not reach Braga until nine o'clock in the morning of the 17th. I found everything in the greatest disorder; the houses shut, the people flying, and part of the populace armed with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets, I was greeted with loud *vivas*. Though the people knew me, I could not guess the meaning of this. At the market-place, I was detained by the increasing populace, who seized my reins, crying out loudly they were ready to do anything to defend the city, requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest terms of their general. I promised to do all in my power to aid their patriotic zeal, but said I must first speak to him. Upon this, they suffered me to proceed, accompanied by about a hundred of them: but I had not got far on my way to his quarters, when I saw him on foot, conducted by a great armed multitude, who suffered no one to pass, and on my attempting it threatened to fire. I was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse, and this the people applauded. Two men had hold of the general's arms, his sword was taken from him, and the people abused him most vehemently. On my way back to

the market-place, they wanted to shoot me, taking me for general Freire, but I was saved by a soldier of the legion, who explained the mistake. When I reached the market-place I found about a thousand men drawn up; I communicated to them my determination to assist their laudable endeavours to defend themselves, provided they would first permit me to speak to the general, for whose actions I promised to be answerable, as long as I should be with him. I had ordered a house to be got ready for my reception, where the general arrived, accompanied as before; I saluted him with respect, at which they discovered their disapprobation. I repeated my proposal, but they would not listen to it. I perceived the danger of the general, and proposed to take him to my quarters; my adjutant offered him his arm: when I spoke to him he only replied 'save me!'

'At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded by thousands, and heard the loud cry of 'kill! kill!' I now took hold of him and attempted to force my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly wounded him with the point of his sword under my arm. He collected all his strength, rushed through them, and hid himself behind the door of the house. The people surrounded me and forced me from the house. To draw the attention of the people from the general I ordered the drummers to beat the alarm, and formed the *ordenanças* in ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, where the general still was. As a last attempt to save him, I now proposed that he should be conducted to prison in order to take a legal trial; this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in safety; I hoped I had succeeded, as the people demanded to be led against the enemy now rapidly advancing, in number about two thousand. I again formed them, and advanced, but soon after I heard the firing again, and was informed the people had put the general to death with pikes and guns. I was now proclaimed general.' When this murder was perpetrated the people seemed satisfied, and Eben, announcing the approach of a British force ordered the outposts to stand fast as he intended to fight; but another tumult arose when it was discovered that one Villaboas of Freire's staff was in Eben's quarters. The *ordenanças* haled forth the

unhappy man and killed him at the door, the mob shouting and firing volleys in at the windows. Yet, when their fury abated, they forced Eben to come out and show he had not been wounded, expressing affection for him.

In the night the legion came in from Pico de Pugalados, and the following morning a reinforcement of six thousand *ordenanças* came up in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars also arrived in the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like the Spaniards, commonly left their weapons in store, and brought their encumbrances to the field of battle. That evening the corregidor and two officers of rank, with many of a meaner class, were brought to the town and put in jail, the mob being with difficulty restrained from slaying them on the way thither. In this state they were when Franceschi reached Carvalho on the 17th, and if that bold and enterprising soldier could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing, he would have broken into the midst of them with his cavalry; for, of their twenty-five thousand men, eighteen thousand were armed with pikes, the remainder had wasted their ammunition, and the powder in store was not made up in cartridges. But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding it were occupied by what appeared a formidable multitude; hence Franceschi, although reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and skirmishes to alarm his opponents, until the French army could arrive.

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MISS.

While these events passed at Braga, Silveira had again collected a force of militia and *ordenanças* in the *Tras os Montes*; and captain Arentschild, an officer sent by Cradock to aid the bishop, also rallied many fugitives at Guimaraens and Amarante; but in Oporto the people were more intent on murder than defence.

Eben's posts extended from Falperra to Ponte Porto on the Cavado. His main body was seven miles beyond Braga on the Monte Adaufé, a lofty ridge crossing the road of Chaves; the left overhung the Cavado, covering the Ponte Porto; the right was wooded and covered by a deep ravine. Beyond the wood the ridge curved forward and was called the Monte Vallonga, where a mass of troops were posted, but separated

from the main body by an interval of two miles, and by the wood and ravine. Another mass still more advanced crowned an isolated hill flanking the Chaves road, being designed to take the attacking columns in flank. Behind the Monte Vallonga, at the distance of three miles, rose the Falperra ridge, guarded by detachments from Braga and Guimaraens. The Chaves road to Braga led directly over the centre of the Adaufé, and was flanked on the left by a tongue shooting out perpendicularly from that ridge and ending in lofty rocks overhanging Carvalho Este; the Portuguese neglected this tongue and its rocks, and Franceschi seized the former.

Soult arrived the 18th, and to prevent a battle sent in twenty prisoners with a conciliatory proclamation offering a capitulation. The prisoners were immediately slain and the French trumpeter detained. Next day Eben brought up his reserves to the Adaufé; and the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of Monte Vallonga took possession of Lanhoza, a village half-way between that hill and the rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th. Two French divisions were in hand. One of them and the cavalry, drove the Portuguese from Lanhoza and following close carried the isolated hill. The other division then took post, part in Carvalho, part on the rocky headland, where six guns were planted in the night. In this position the French were close to Eben's centre, and a forward move would separate his wings.

BATTLE OF BRAGA.

At nine o'clock on the 20th, Franceschi and Mermet moved to turn the right of the Monte Vallonga; Laborde, supported by La Houssaye's dragoons, advanced against the centre by the ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé; Heudelet, with part of his division and a squadron of cavalry, attacked Eben's left, designing to seize the Ponte Porto. The Portuguese opened a straggling fire in the centre, but the bursting of a gun caused confusion, from which Laborde's advancing masses gave no time to recover. By ten o'clock the whole of the centre was flying down a narrow wooded valley leading from

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

Eben's
Report,
MSS.

the Adaufé to Braga; the French followed hard, and discovering one of their men, a prisoner, mutilated in a dreadful manner and still alive, gave no quarter. Braga was abandoned, the victorious infantry, passing through, took post on the other side, and the cavalry continued the havoc on the road to Oporto; yet so savage were the fugitives, that they stopped at Braga to murder the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail; then casting the mangled bodies into the street they continued their flight: meanwhile Heudelet breaking over the left of the Monte Adaufé descended upon Ponte Porto, winning that bridge and the village on the other side of the Cavado.

Franceschi and Mermet ascended the rugged Monte Val-longa with difficulty, but when they attained the crest, their enemies fled; then they crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens, and on the march they fell in with three thousand Portuguese posted above Falperra, who drew up with their backs to some high rocks and opened a fire of artillery. Franceschi placed his horsemen on either flank, a brigade of infantry against the front, and, as at Verim, making all charge together, strewed the ground with the dead: nevertheless the Portuguese fought valiantly, and Franceschi acknowledged it. The vanquished army lost its artillery and four thousand men, four hundred only being made prisoners. Some of the fugitives, crossing the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, others retired to Oporto, the greatest number took the road of Guimaraens during the fight at Falperra. Eben's official report shows he was at Braga when the action commenced, and fled among the first; for he makes no mention of the fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish at Ponte Porto, and his narrative bears every mark of inaccuracy. Braga was abandoned by the inhabitants, but they returned next day. When the French outposts were established, general Lorge, crossing the Cavado, entered Bacellos, and was well received by the corregidor; for which the latter was a few days afterwards hanged by the Portuguese general, Botilho, who commanded between the Lima and the Minho. At Braga provisions were obtained, and a store of powder which was immediately made up into cartridges for the use of the French; the gun-carriages

and ammunition-waggons were also repaired, and an hospital established for eight hundred sick and wounded: hence it may be judged, that the loss sustained in action since the 15th was not less than six hundred men.

Soult having thus broken the second line of defence, could march directly upon Oporto or recover his communication with Tuy. He resolved upon the former, 1°. Because he knew through spies and intercepted letters, that Tuy although besieged was in no distress; its fire was superior to that of Valença on the opposite bank of the Minho, and the garrison made successful sallies. 2°. Because he heard sixty thousand men, troops of the line militia and *ordenança*, were assembled in the camp covering Oporto; the Portuguese were also in force at Guimaraens, and had broken the bridges along the whole course of the Ave, and it was essential to crush these large bodies before they acquired consistency. Hence, leaving Heudelet at Braga to protect the hospital from Botilho, Soult advanced, ignorant that Silveira had stricken a great blow behind him. For that general reinforced from Beira had remounted the Tamega, invested Chaves the day of the battle at Braga, and the 20th made the garrison, one hundred fighting men and twelve hundred sick, capitulate, after which he retired to Amarante.

Soult moved in three columns. Franceschi and Mermet marched by Guimaraens and St. Justo, to force the passage of the Upper Ave and scour the country towards Pombeiro. Merle, Laborde, and La Houssaye, moved, under Soult in person upon Barca de Trofa. General Lorge led the third column by the Ponte d'Ave. The passage of that river was fiercely disputed; the left column was fought with in front of Guimaraens, at Pombeiro, and at the Puente Negrellos, where the French general Jardon was killed. The march of the centre was arrested at Barca de Trofa by the cutting of the bridge; but Soult ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at San Justo with the help of Franceschi, who came down the opposite bank after the fight at Negrellos. When the left and centre had thus crossed, colonel Lallemand was detached with a regiment of dragoons to assist Lorge, who was held in check at the Ponte d'Ave; Lallemand was at first beaten back, but

being reinforced with infantry he succeeded, whereupon the Portuguese brutally murdered their commander, general Vallonga, and dispersed. The whole French army was now in communication on the left bank of the Ave, the way to Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops were finally concentrated in front of the entrenchments covering that city.

These successes alarmed the bishop; he thought to abandon Oporto, yet recovered spirits when he contemplated the multitude he had assembled, and recollected that the English army was then stronger than it had been since Cradock's arrival: Beresford also had a considerable native force behind the Mondego, and the prelate hoping for their support resolved to fight. He had little less than fifty thousand men, and among them many regulars, two thousand of whom had just arrived under general Vittoria. This officer had been sent by Beresford to aid Silveira, but, being too late, now entered Oporto. The hopes of the people were high; they could not believe the French a match for them, and the preceding defeats being attributed, each to its particular case of treason, the murder of many innocent persons followed as an expiation. None but the bishop dared thwart the mob, and he was little disposed to do so; while Raymundo, and others of his stamp, fomented their fury and directed it to gratify personal enmities. Thus the defeat of Braga caused a tumult in Oporto, and Louis D'Olivera, a man of high rank, who had been cast into prison, was with fourteen other persons haled forth and despatched with many stabs: the bodies were then mutilated and dragged in triumph through the streets.

All the entrenchments were now complete. They consisted of numerous forts, crowning a succession of rounded hills, and where the hills failed, there were earthen ramparts, Plan 3. loopholed houses, ditches, and felled trees, and two hundred guns were mounted. Oporto was behind. Situated chiefly on a descent towards the river, it had a boat-bridge three hundred yards long, forming the only communication with the suburb of Villa Nova; it was commanded from the left bank by fifty guns placed on a bluff craggy height overhanging the river above Villa Nova, and overlooking the city and great part of the entrenched camps. Within the lines

tents were pitched for a greater number than were assembled, and the multitude manned the works with great noise and tumult when the French columns, gathering like thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp.

Soult arrived the 27th. From Braga he had urged the bishop to calm the popular effervescence; and now beholding the works, and reading their weakness even in the numbers guarding them, he renewed his call on the prelate to spare so great a city the horrors of a storm. A prisoner who carried this summons only saved his life by ingeniously pretending he came with an offer of Soult's surrender; but neither this deceit, nor a negotiation prolonged till evening, prevented a continual fire from the entrenchments. The parley being finally broken, dispositions were made for a battle next day. Merle's division, to divert attention from the true point of attack, approached the Portuguese left, and though a prodigious fire was opened, it got into some hollows and enclosures where it maintained its footing. At another point the Portuguese, pretending a wish to surrender, induced general Foy to approach with a companion; the latter was immediately killed, and Foy carried into the town; he was mistaken for Loison, and the people called out, '*Kill Maneta*,' 'kill one hand,' but with great presence of mind he held up both his hands, and the mob being then convinced of their error suffered him to be cast into prison.

Having brought affairs to this awful crisis, the bishop's courage gave way. Leaving the generals Lima and Pareiras to command, he repaired in the evening to the Serra convent, which crowned the rugged hill overhanging the Villa Nova suburb on the left bank of the river: from thence he beheld in safety the horrors of the next day. Meanwhile the tumult was dreadful in Oporto; the bells were rung incessantly, and a thunder-storm arising, the howling wind was in the Portuguese camp mistaken for the enemy; then the whole line blazed with musketry, the roar of two hundred guns mingled with the noise of the tempest, and the Portuguese calling to each other, and uttering loud cries, were agitated at once with fury and terror. So passed the night, yet the morning broke serenely, and at seven o'clock the sound of drums and trumpets,

and the glitter of arms gave notice that the French army was moving to the attack.

BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO.

Merle's feint against the left, which was the weakest part of the line, had perfectly succeeded, the Portuguese generals had their principal masses on that side; but Soult was intent upon the strongest points of the works, designing to force his way through the town, seize the bridge during the fight, and secure the passage of the river. Merle now attacked the left of the Portuguese centre; Franceschi and Laborde assailed their extreme right; Mermet's division sustained by a brigade of dragoons, was in the centre. Lorge was appointed to cut off a body of *ordenança*, posted with some guns in front of the Portuguese left, beyond the works on the road of Villa de Conde. The battle commenced by the wings, Mermet's division being withheld until the enemy's generals, believing the whole of the attack was developed, weakened their centre to strengthen their flanks; then the French reserves, rushing violently forwards, broke through the entrenchments and took the two principal forts, entering by the embrasures and killing or dispersing all within them. Soult instantly rallied his troops in fresh masses and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left wing in the rear, while two others marching straight into the town, made for the bridge: the Portuguese thus cut in two, were soon beaten on all points. Laborde carried in succession a number of forts, took fifty pieces of artillery, and reached the edge of the city, where he halted until Franceschi, who was engaged on his left, joined him: by this movement a large body of the Portuguese were driven off from the tower and being forced back on the upper Douro, were followed by a brigade under general Arnaud.


Merle then seeing the success of the centre was complete, brought up his left flank, carried all the forts to his right in succession, killed a great number of men, and drove the rest towards the sea. These last dividing, fled, one part to the fort of St. Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro,

where, maddened by terror as the French came pouring upon them, they strove, some to swim across, others to get over in small boats; their general, Lima, called out against this hopeless attempt, but they turned and murdered him within musket-shot of the approaching enemy, and then renewing the attempt to cross, perished. Lorge had meanwhile dispersed those on the side of Villa de Conde, and Arnaud hemming in those above the town prevented them from plunging into the river also, as in their desperate mood they were going to do. Nevertheless the battle continued within Oporto. For the two battalions sent from the centre, having burst the barricades at the entrance of the streets, fought their way to the bridge; and there all the horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumulated and the calamities of an age compressed into one doleful hour! More than four thousand persons, old and young and of both sexes, were seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some already on the bridge, others striving to gain it, and all in a state of frenzy. The batteries on the opposite bank opened their fire when the French appeared; and at that moment a troop of Portuguese cavalry, flying from the fight, came down one of the streets, and remorseless in their fears bore at full gallop into the midst of the miserable helpless crowd, trampling a bloody pathway to the river. Suddenly the nearest boats, unable to sustain the increasing weight, sunk, and the foremost wretches, still tumbling into the river as they were pressed from behind, perished until the heaped bodies, rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the space left by the sinking of the vessels. The foremost French, amazed at this fearful spectacle, forgot the battle and hastened to save those who still struggled for life; but while some were thus nobly employed, others by the help of planks got on to the firmer parts of the bridge, and thus crossing the river carried the batteries on the heights of Villa Nova.

This terrible destruction did not complete the measure of the city's calamities. Two hundred men ensconced in the bishop's palace continued to fire from the windows, until the French burst the doors and put all to the sword: every street and house then rung with the noise of the combatants and

the shrieks of distress. The soldiers, exasperated by long hardships, and prone like all soldiers to ferocity and violence during an assault, became frantic with fury when in one of the principal squares they found several of their comrades, who had been made prisoners, fastened upright and living, but with their eyes burst, their tongues torn out, and their other members mutilated and gashed: those who beheld them spared none. It was in vain Soult strove to stop the slaughter, in vain hundreds of officers and soldiers opposed at the risk of their lives the vengeance of their comrades, and by their generous exertions rescued vast numbers that would otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and brutality of the moment; the frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder continued many hours; and what with those who fell in battle, those who were drowned, those sacrificed to revenge, it is said ten thousand Portuguese died on that unhappy day! The loss of the French did not exceed five hundred men.

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.



Exploratory Sketch of
M. VICTOR'S OPERATIONS
AGAINST CUESTA,
March, 1809.

— French
▨ Spanish

CHAPTER VI.

THIS dire carnage at Oporto was followed by important events, but it is essential first to narrate the contemporaneous operations on the Tagus and Guadiana; for the war was wide and complicated and the result depended more on the general combination than the particular movements.

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS.

Soon after the new organization of the French army had taken place, the imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and many detachments, in all forty thousand men, were recalled from Spain for the war in Germany; and the whole force under the king, exclusive of his French guards, was in January two hundred and seventy thousand men and forty thousand horses; a decrease of sixty-five thousand men since the 15th of November, 1808. The Imperial
Muster rolls,
MSS. loss by battle, sickness and desertion, in the four months succeeding Napoleon's arrival in Spain was therefore about twenty-five thousand, a vast number, but two sieges twelve battles, and many combats had happened in that period. The king, commanding the whole, remained at Madrid. Victor, as before shown, was at Toledo with the first corps, Sebastiani was in the valley of the Tagus with the fourth corps. Opposed to them were Cartoajal and Cuesta. The first having fourteen thousand men was at Ciudad Real in La Mancha; the second having nearly seventeen thousand, two thousand five hundred being cavalry, had broken the bridge of Almaraz and guarded the Estremadura line of the Tagus. In this state Victor being to aid Soult in Portugal changed places with Sebastiani. Montbrun's cavalry connected these two generals, and they were supported by the king's guards, the permanent gar-

rión of Madrid, and Dessolle's division; but to understand the military connexion between Soult, Victor, Lapisse and Sebastiani the country on both sides of the Tagus must be known.

That river after passing Toledo flows through a deep valley walled up on either hand by lofty mountains. Those on the right, always capped with snow, run parallel with the river and divide the valley of the Tagus from Old Castille and the Salamanca country, the highest parts being known as the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar, and Sierra de Gata. In these sierras the Alberche, Tietar and Alagon rise, and plough their way in a slanting direction to the Tagus. On the left bank of the latter, the principal mountain, called the Sierra de Guadalupe, extends in a southward direction from the river, dividing the upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura.

The communications between the Salamanca country to the valley of the Tagus were neither many nor good.

1st. By Horcajada, an old Roman road run through Pedrahitá and Villa Franca, crossing the Sierra de Gredos at the Puerto de Pico, and descending by Mombeltran to Talavera.

2nd. The pass of Arenas, nearly parallel to, and only a short distance from the Horcajada road.

3rd. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Placentia.

4th. The Bejar road, crossing the sierra at the pass of Baños, and descending likewise upon Placentia.

5th. The Payo or Gata road, which crosses the Sierra de Gata by the pass of Perales, and afterwards dividing, sends one branch to Alcántara, the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these five passes the two last only were, generally speaking, practicable for artillery.

Two royal roads leading from Toledo and Madrid to Badajoz, unite near Talavera, and follow the course of the Tagus by the right bank as far as Naval Moral, then turning to the left, cross the river at the bridge of Almaraz. But from Toledo westward to the bridge of Almaraz, more than fifty miles, the left bank of the Tagus is so crowded by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de Guadalupe, that it may be called impassable for an army; and this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the

operations on both sides. For Cuesta and Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable Guadalupe, had no direct military communication; but Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could unite on either line of operations by the royal roads above mentioned, or by a secondary road, which running near Yébenes crosses the Tagus by the stone bridge of Puebla de Montalvan, half way between Toledo and Talavera. The rallying point of the French was Madrid, and their lines of defence were the Tagus on one side; the Alberche and the Guadarama on the other. The base of Cartoajal's operations was the Sierra de Morena. Cuesta's first line was the Tagus, his second the Guadiana, from whence he could retreat by a flank march to Badajos; or by a direct one to the defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena, where only he could unite with Cartoajal. But their two armies would not have furnished more than twenty-six thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, and they had no reserve; whereas the two French corps exceeded thirty-five thousand, supported by the reserve under the king: the French therefore, had the advantage of numbers, position, and discipline.

Following Napoleon's orders Victor should have been at Merida before the middle of February; there he would have confined Cuesta to the Morena; and with his twelve regiments of cavalry could have kept all the flat country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. That fortress had no means of resistance, and no Spanish force in the field was capable of impeding the execution of the emperor's order, which was reiterated by the king; yet Victor disobeyed, and the Spaniards thinking him inert from weakness provoked the blow he was disposed to withhold. Cuesta projected offensive movements, and Albuquerque urged Cartoajal to attack Toledo; he refused, but offered Albuquerque a troop with which to act independently. The duke complained to the junta, and Mr. Frere who was to be found in every intrigue and every absurd project supported his complaints. The junta, matchless in folly, ordered Cartoajal to execute Albuquerque's plans, and transferred Albuquerque with four or five thousand men to Cuesta's command. Cartoajal thus coerced, marched with twelve thousand men and twenty guns towards Toledo, and his van-guard drove the Polish

lancers from Consuegra, but Sebastiani coming up with ten thousand men beat it back again to Ciudad Real, where the Spaniards attempted to defend the river in front of that town. The French however soon forced the passage, and in a tumultuary action routed Cartoajal with the loss of his guns and several thousand men. He fled by Almagro, and the cavalry pursued him even to the Sierra Morena. This action, called the rout of Ciudad Real, led to nothing. Sebastiani, who is said to have exaggerated the success, concentrated his army by the king's order on the upper Guadiana and awaited Victor's operations, while the Spaniards rallying at Carolina received fresh levies from Grenada and Cordova.

Meanwhile the king, being informed by Soult that his corps would be at Oporto the 15th of March, reiterated Napoleon's orders that Lapisse should move from Salamanca upon Abrantes, and that Victor should pass the Tagus to drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana. Victor remonstrated, saying Lapisse, who belonged to his corps, would arrive too soon at Abrantes and be without support; yet finding Joseph firm, he collected five days' provisions and prepared to pass the Tagus. Cuesta had sixteen thousand men on that river and eight thousand more in the rear, but Victor estimated his force in position at thirty thousand; a great error, not involuntary. Cuesta was as ill-informed, for this was the moment when, with his approval and from his camp, D'Urban proposed to Cradock, that curiously combined attack already noticed, in which the Spaniards were to cross the Tagus and Wilson was to come down upon the Tietar. This also was the period that Mr. Frere, ignorant that, exclusive of the king's and Sebastiani's troops, at least twenty-five thousand fighting men were in the valley of the Tagus, proposed that twelve thousand British under Cradock should march from Lisbon to drive Sebastiani's corps from Toledo, and consequently as he phrased it, 'from Madrid!' The first movement of Victor awakened these dreamers.

Victor held the bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo, and his posts were pushed down the valley to Venta de Bazagona on the Tietar. Cuesta's position was from Garbin near the Arzo-

bispo bridge to that of Almaraz. His centre was on the Meza d'Ibor, a platform of surpassing strength, perpendicular to the Tagus, but his head-quarters were at Deleytosa, from whence his troops had cut a road to the Meza d'Ibor. Victor had easy access to all the bridges. Cuesta had none practicable for artillery, save to Almaraz; and to that only by passing the almost impregnable Mirabete ridge, which, five miles from Almaraz, crosses the road and bars access to Estremadura. Hence the French general designed to pass by Talavera and Arzobispo, operating with his infantry and some Semelé,
MSS. cavalry against the Spanish right in the Guadalupe, while the artillery, the grand parc and the rest of the cavalry concentrated, to pass at Almaraz by means of a raft bridge. This project proves that Victor knew Cuesta's real force, or he would never have placed his artillery and field stores with a weak guard so close to an enemy in position, who possessed a pontoon train, and could easily have passed the river.

On the 15th, Laval's German infantry and Lasalle's cavalry crossed at Talavera, and, turning to the right, worked a march through the rocky hills until the infantry reached Aldea Nueva somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo, and the cavalry gained a position higher up the mountain towards Estrella. The 16th they advanced a few miles, and the other divisions passed the bridge of Arzobispo, while the artillery and the parcs, with their escort, moved to Almaraz; having orders to watch, during the 17th and 18th, for the appearance of the army on the heights at the other side, and then to launch the raft bridge. Cuesta, seeing these movements, hastened to Mirabete, ordered Henestrosa to defend the bridge of Almaraz with eight thousand men, and reinforced the right wing behind the Ibor, a small river, though now running with a full torrent from the Guadalupe to the Tagus. The 17th, the Spanish outposts were driven over the Ibor; they attempted to re-form on the high rocky bank, but being closely followed retreated to the Meza d'Ibor, the great natural strength of which was increased by field-works. Here their position could only be assailed in front, but Laval's columns pushed rapidly up the mountain, the inequalities of ground covering them in some

sort from the effects of the enemy's artillery: as they neared the summit, the musketry and grape became murderous, yet the Spanish infantry soon fled to Campillo, leaving behind, baggage, magazines, seven guns, and a thousand prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded. The French had seventy killed, and five hundred wounded; and while this action was taking place at Meza d'Ibor, Villatte's division, higher up the Sierra, overthrew a smaller body of Spaniards at Frenedoso, making three hundred prisoners and capturing a large store of arms.

At daybreak on the 18th, Victor discovered from the Meza d'Ibor, that Cuesta was in full retreat to Truxillo, but that Henestrosa remained in front of Almaraz. Wherefore sending Villatte after Cuesta, he led Laval's Germans against Henestrosa, who soon fled over the Mirabete ridge. The raft bridge was then thrown, and on the 19th the French dragoons and artillery crossed, when the former pushed on to Truxillo, from whence Cuesta had retreated leaving Henestrosa with a rear guard. The 20th, Henestrosa was driven over the Mazarna, and with the exception of a dragoon regiment left to guard the raft bridge, the whole French army poured along the road to Merida. General Bordesoult, leading the vanguard of cavalry, having arrived the 21st in front of Miajadas where the road divaricated, discovered some Spanish horsemen in apparent alarm as if hesitating between the roads; the French galloped forward, but in a moment twelve or fourteen hundred Spanish cavalry, placed in ambush, came up at speed on the flanks and charged home. General Lasalle had from a distance observed these movements and immediately rode forward with a second regiment, yet Bordesoult extricated himself by his own valour, though with the loss of seventy killed and a hundred wounded.

After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired to Medellin without being molested, while Victor, spreading his cavalry on the different routes to gain intelligence and collect provisions, established his quarters at Truxillo, a town of some trade and advantageously situated for a place of arms. It had been deserted by the inhabitants and pillaged by the first French troops, yet still fur-

nished great resources; and there was an ancient citadel, which was immediately armed with the Spanish guns, and provisioned from the magazines taken at Meza d'Ibor. During these events, the flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed, injured the raft-bridge and delayed the artillery and stores; wherefore a boat-bridge was ordered, and a fort constructed on the left bank, to be armed with three guns and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty men. These arrangements, and the establishment of an hospital for two thousand men at Truxillo, occupied Victor until the 24th; but his light cavalry covered all the roads with scouting parties, and reported that some of Cuesta's people had retired to Medellin; that five or six thousand were in the Sierra de Guadalupe on the French left; that four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry were behind the river Garganza in front of Medellin, and everything else was over the Guadiana. Merida and the great road from Badajos to Seville were thus uncovered.

Victor was not however disposed to profit from this, for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to Cuesta; and believing he brought nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, feared Cuesta designed to draw him into a difficult country by making a flank march to join Cartoajal in La Mancha; or, by crossing the Guadiana above Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to regain the Guadalupe, and establish a new base of operations on the left flank of the French. Neither Cuesta nor his army were capable of such operations; his line of retreat was solely directed by a desire to join Albuquerque, and save himself in a rugged country. Victor overrated his adversary's skill. Instead of following him closely, he advanced only a few leagues on the Medellin road, and from thence sent his light cavalry to Merida; pushing detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe. On the 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, at the head of two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight hundred Spanish horse, posted on the right bank of the Guadiana, retired at his approach, and crossing that river halted at Don Benito, where they were reinforced by other squadrons; but no infantry were to be seen,

and Victor passing the river took post on the road leading to Mingabril and Don Benito: his situation in the evening being as follows:—

Two divisions of infantry and one incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry, were in position on the road leading from Medellin to Don Benito and Mingabril. The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour Maubourg, were at Zorita, fifteen miles on the left, watching the Spaniards in the Guadalupe. The light cavalry was at Merida, eighteen miles to the right, having patrolled all that day on the roads to Badajos, Seville, and Medellin. Ruffin's division was at Miajadas eighteen miles in the rear.

Before dark, intelligence arrived that Albuquerque was come up with eight thousand men; that the combined troops, twenty-eight thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the table land of Don Benito; that Cuesta, aware how the French were scattered, was prepared to attack the two divisions on their march the next day. Victor, notwithstanding the force of the Spanish army, then decided to fight, and immediately sent orders to Lasalle, Ruffin, and Latour Maubourg, to come down to Medellin; but the latter was directed to leave a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route of Merida, and a brigade at Zorita to observe the Spaniards in the Sierra de Guadalupe. Cuesta's numbers were exaggerated. Blaming everybody but himself for his failure on the Tagus, he had fallen back to Campanarios, rallied his scattered detachments, and returned to Villa Nueva de Serena; where he was joined on the 27th by Albuquerque, who brought up, not the great body supposed, but less than three thousand infantry and a few hundred horse. Some battalions drawn from Andalusia had also arrived, but the whole army did not exceed twenty-five thousand foot, four thousand horse, and eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery: with this force, Cuesta, fearing for Badajos, had returned to fight.

BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.

This town, possessing a fine stone bridge, stands in a hollow on the left of the Guadiana, the bed of which is formed by

the abrupt break of an immense plain on that side. The Ortigosa, a torrent with rugged banks yet passable in places for artillery, cuts this plain, rushing perpendicularly down to the Guadiana. Two roads led from the town across the plain, one to Don Benito on the left, one to Mingrabil on the right, those places being five miles apart. At ten o'clock the French army was concentrated in Medellin having command of both roads, and at one o'clock fourteen thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and forty-two guns, went forth to fight. On the side of Benito the plain was bounded by a ridge, behind which Cuesta concealed his infantry, and only showed his cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him display his line of battle, Lasalle's cavalry, two German battalions, and six guns, moved towards Benito, while Latour Maubourg with four squadrons of dragoons, eight guns and two battalions, having the Ortigosa close on their right, made for a point of the Spanish ridge called the Retamosa. Villatte's division and the remaining Germans, were posted half on the Benito, half on Mingrabil roads; Ruffin's division was a little way in rear, and one battalion remained at the Medellin bridge to guard the baggage.

As the French squadrons advanced the artillery on both sides opened, the Spanish cavalry in the plain retiring slowly to the higher ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed forward; but just as the latter, who had the shortest distance to traverse, approached the enemy's position, the whole Spanish line of battle came suddenly over the edge of the ridge, stretching from the Ortigosa to within a mile of the Guadiana,—a menacing but glorious apparition. Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the duke del Parque, were with the mass of cavalry on the left; Francisco Frias with the main body of infantry was in the centre; Eguia and Portazgo were on the right, which was prolonged to the Guadiana by some scattered squadrons under Albuquerque, who flanked the march of the host as it descended with a rapid pace into the plain. Cuesta's plan was now disclosed. His line overlapped the French left, and he was hastening to cut their army off from Medellin; but his order of battle was on a front of three miles, and he had

no reserve. Victor instantly brought his centre a little forward, reinforced Latour Maubourg with ten guns and a battalion of grenadiers, and pushing forward a brigade of infantry as a support, ordered him to fall boldly on the advancing enemy; at the same time Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure of Cuesta's right wing, was directed to retire towards Medellin, always refusing his own left.

Briskly the Spaniards marched into the plain, and a special body of cavalry with three thousand infantry dashing out from their left met Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars fell upon the French columns of grenadiers and guns in his rear. The hussars, received with grape, a pelting fire of musketry, and a charge in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once; but the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the rest of their own cavalry, came boldly up to Latour Maubourg's horsemen and with a sharp musketry forced them back in disorder; soon however the French rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks with artillery, and fighting all together, overthrew their enemies man and horse: Cuesta was wounded and fell, but being quickly remounted escaped. While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle's cavalry, continually refusing its left, was driven fighting close up to the main body of the infantry, which was disposed on a new front, with a reserve behind the centre; but when Latour Maubourg's division was reformed on the ridge from whence the Spaniards had first descended, the aspect of the battle changed; for then the Spanish left was in flight, and the French right overlapped Cuesta's centre, which, in a long line, wavering and with wide chasms, was still advancing. Victor, seeing the decisive moment had arrived, was going to order a general attack, when he saw an isolated column coming against the rear of his right wing from the side of Mingrabil; wherefore he first detached a brigade and four guns to hold it in check, and then continuing his battle, made Lasalle's cavalry take ground to its left, thus unmasking the infantry of his centre which instantly poured a heavy fire into the Spaniards' line, while Latour Maubourg's dragoons sweeping round its left fell on their rear. Lasalle also galloped in, and a horrible carnage ensued, for the French horsemen continued to follow

and strike until three-fifths of the Spanish army wallowed in blood.

Six guns and some thousands of prisoners were taken, and it was many days ere Cuesta could rally a single battalion: his cavalry however escaped by superior speed. Following general Semelé's journal, of which however I only possess an unauthenticated copy, the French lost but three hundred men, a number so disproportionate as to be scarcely credible. If correct, it indicates a savage rigour of pursuit, for it does not appear that any previous cruelty by the Spaniards irritated the French soldiers. The right to kill in a battle cannot be limited, but a brave soldier should have regard for the character of his country and be sparing of the sword to beaten men.

Most of the French passed the night near the field of battle, but Latour Maubourg's dragoons marched down the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving detachments to watch the roads of Almendralejo and Villa Franca, and give notice if Cuesta made for Badajoz, the design being to intercept him on that line. The 29th, Villatte advanced to Villa Nueva Serena, and Lasalle pushed on to Campanarios. Here all the reports agreed, that Cuesta with a few horsemen was in the Morena, and his troops wandering through fields and bye-roads without power to re-unite. The pursuit then ceased. Victor fixed his head-quarters at Merida, occupied that place and Medellin with his infantry, and formed a belt of cavalry from Loboá on the right to Mingrabil on the left; but from all that country the people had fled, and even the great towns were deserted.

Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possessed a fine bridge and magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and Moorish; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the river close to the bridge, which in eight days was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; six guns were mounted on the walls, an hospital for a thousand men was established there; and a garrison of three hundred men, with two months' stores and provisions for eight hundred, was put into it. Here Victor received fresh orders to invade Portugal, while Lapisse should move on Abrantes, but he again remonstrated, saying he could not keep his communication with Almaraz, unless Lapisse joined him by Alcantara. Badajoz

was however still far from being in a defensible condition ; and as many of the richer citizens, disgusted with mob-rule, were inclined to betray a gate, Victor, whose battering train was still at Truxillo, opened a secret negotiation for this treachery. The parties met at Albuera and were agreed, but the peasants gave the junta notice that some treason was on foot, and the project was baffled. Victor then sent detachments to Alcantara to get intelligence of Lapisse, whose proceedings it is time to notice.

After taking Zamora in January, that general occupied Ledesma and Salamanca, where he was joined by Maupetit's brigade of cavalry. Wilson's legion and the feeble garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his front, and universal terror prevailed. He had ten thousand men, and a powerful artillery ; yet he remained inert until the end of March, and suffered Wilson with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, intercept his provisions, restrain his patrols, and even harass his infantry quarters : this brought him into contempt, and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared. Carlos d'España soon joined sir Robert with a small Spanish force, and the pass of Baños was occupied, which cut the communication with Victor, yet Lapisse did not stir. In April however he advanced towards Bejar, but finding the Baños occupied, turned to his right, dispersed the posts on the upper Ecla and drove the legion, then under colonel Grant, to Ciudad Rodrigo, summoned that place the 6th, and after a slight skirmish near the walls took position between the Agueda and Ledesma. There he received the king's reiterated order to march on Abrantes, but, instead of obeying, marched suddenly through the pass of Perales to Alcantara, thus abandoning all connection with Soult. He was followed closely by Wilson, by d'España, the two battalions at Bejar, and by a multitude of peasants, Spanish and Portuguese ; for he had caused a general insurrection from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, and from Tamames to Bejar. At Alcantara the insurgents opposed his passage, yet he broke through the entrenchments on the bridge, carried the town on the other side, pillaged it and rejoined Victor at Merida on the 19th of April.

This false movement was most pernicious to the French cause; the conquering impulsion of Napoleon's warfare was by that march and by Victor's sullen disobedience dissipated; the invasion became stationary or retrograded, and the allies again assumed the initiative. Soult, not knowing even the localities of the troops by which he was to be supported, was paralyzed at Oporto, while reinforcements from England enabled Cradock to advance towards Leiria; and a sudden violent impetus was given to the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections, which sprung into full activity on both sides, from Alcantara on the Tagus to Amarante on the Tamega. Cuesta also gathered a new army in the Morena. For though the simultaneous defeats at Ciudad Real and at Medellin had at first caused great dismay in Andalusia, the Spaniards, finding they were followed by stagnant inactivity, judged that the Austrian war was forcing or would force Napoleon to abandon Spain: and this notion upheld both the people's spirit and the central junta's authority, which could not otherwise have sustained such follies and defeats. The disasters of Cartoajal had been less than Cuesta's and more excusable, he was far the better soldier; but he had no popular influence and was at once dismissed, and Cuesta was, from fear, placed in command of both armies.

To cover Seville, he took post in the defiles of Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred horse, and two thousand three hundred infantry drafted from the garrison of Seville; these were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from Cadiz, and by three thousand five hundred of Granadan levies; finally, eight thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horsemen, taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, until in the latter end of April they amounted to twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry. Venegas also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina and proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha. Joseph, justly displeased at the false movement of Lapisse, ordered that Alcantara should be re-occupied; but this involved an action, to be noticed hereafter, for the operations on the Douro intimately connected with those on the Guadiana, must be first related.

CHAPTER VII.

WHEN the bishop of Oporto beheld from the Serra convent the final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north, he fled to Lisbon, reconciled himself with the regency, became a member of that body, was soon after created patriarch, and used his great influence in the most mischievous manner; discovering on every occasion the untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition. Meanwhile the fall of Oporto enabled Soult to establish a solid base. He had taken immense magazines of powder, a hundred and ninety-seven pieces of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action, and thirty English vessels loaded with provisions and wind-bound in the river. Repressing disorders after the battle, he renewed his former conciliatory policy, and sought to remedy as far as possible the deplorable results of the soldiers' fury. Recovering and restoring a part of the plunder, he treated the remaining inhabitants with respect, invited those who had fled to return, demanded no contribution, and from the public property supported his troops, and even succoured the most distressed of the population.

His civil and political administration of the Entre Minho e Douro produced however an unexpected effect. The prince regent's desertion was not forgotten, and the national feeling was as adverse to Portugal being a dependency on the Brazils, as it was to the usurpation of the French; a comparison between Soult's government and the horrible anarchy which preceded it, was in favour of the former; while his victories and the vigour of his character, contrasted with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency for the French power. These considerations caused the party, formerly noticed as inimical to the house of Braganza, to revive, and the leaders expressed a desire for a French prince

and an independent government; they even intimated their wish to have Soult, and demanded his concurrence to proclaim in the name of the people that the Braganza dynasty was ended. Soult would not reject a plan offering such important military advantages, and, trusting circumstances would justify him with Napoleon, encouraged the design without actually assenting. He appointed men to civil employments, raised a legion of five battalions, and acted so dexterously, that in fifteen days the cities of Oporto and Braga, the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Pova de Barcim, Feira and Ovar sent addresses expressing their favourable sentiments and bearing thirty thousand signatures of nobles, clergy, merchants and people. These addresses were burned Appendix 11. when he lost Oporto, but the project has never been denied, and the regency even caused an after inquiry to be made, when it was asserted that few were implicated; but the policy of lessening the importance was obvious and the inquisitors if willing could not have probed the whole matter.

This transaction was the foundation of a story, credited even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent crown. The circumstances were suspicious, the conclusion was false. Napoleon wrote to Soult that the rumour had reached him, adding, with a delicate allusion to the marshal's previous services, '*I remember nothing but Austerlitz,*' at the same time he largely increased his command. The policy of Soult's proceeding, and the great influence of the mal-contents was soon proved by the ameliorated intercourse between the army and the people; the fierceness of the latter subsided, and in the Entre Minho e Douro even the priests abated their hostility; the soldiers were no longer assassinated, whereas previously, that cruel warfare was very active and the most malignant passions existed on both sides. Amongst other terrible instances, the death of the young Lameth and the retaliation, may be cited. That officer returning to his quarters from Soult's house was murdered near the village of Arrifana, stripped, and mutilated in a shocking manner; this assassination within the French lines, when the strictest discipline was preserved, violated alike the laws of war and humanity, and provoked a severe punishment; for the violence of the troops

had been with difficulty restrained, and if the general had appeared indifferent on this occasion, his authority would have been set at nought, and the vengeance of an insubordinate army executed.

Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death of a personal friend, Soult directed Thomieres to march with a brigade of infantry to Arrifana and punish the criminals. He was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian, and after a judicial inquiry shot five or six persons whose guilt was said to have been proved. However the principal actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and most of his accomplices escaped across the Vouga to Trant, who, disgusted at their conduct, sent them to Beresford for punishment, but they were well received by him! It would also appear from the sworn testimony of a peasant, that Thomieres, exceeding Soult's orders, put twenty-four innocent persons to death, and his soldiers, after committing many excesses, burned the village. These things showed the direful nature of the contest, but the particular transaction has been adduced by English writers as evincing cruelty in Soult, a charge not sustained by the facts, and belied by his general conduct, which even his Spanish enemies whilst they attributed it to insidious policy admitted to be mild and humane. But quitting this anticipating digression, the military operations shall be resumed.

Communi-
cated by
Col. Trant.

Appendix,
No. 11.

Soult followed up his battle at Oporto with activity, the boat-bridge was restored during the night, the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz were reduced, and Franceschi passing the Douro advanced ten miles on the Coimbra road, with patrols on the Vouga. Mermet was posted in support beyond the suburb of Villa Nova. Oporto was held by three brigades; Lorge's dragoons occupied the walled town of Villa de Conde at the mouth of the Ave. Caulaincourt's brigade of cavalry ascending the Douro to Peñafiel scoured the valley of the Tamega. Another brigade, posted on the Barca de Trofa road, protected the rear of the army, and Heudelet was ordered to forward the hospitals from Braga to Oporto, and be ready to open a communication with Tuy.

Soult's embarrassments were still great. The *Tras os*

Montes was insurgent, and Silveira with eight thousand men, commanded the valley of the Tamega, and after taking Chaves, posted himself in the Entre Minho e Douro, between the Sierra Catalina and the Douro. Lisbon, the ultimate object, was two hundred miles distant, and covered by a British army, whose valour was known, and its numbers increasing. Trant had a considerable native force upon the Vouga, Beresford's army was between the Tagus and the Mondego, and its disorderly condition being unknown appeared formidable at a distance. Following Napoleon's instructions, the French army should have been in Lisbon six weeks before Oporto was taken, and the line of correspondence with Victor being uncertain, his co-operation could not be calculated upon. Lapisse had been unfelt as an aiding power, Soult knew not even that he was at Salamanca; and the three thousand men which Pierre Soult was bringing from the Astorga country had not yet been heard of. To balance these difficulties, a rich city and the command over a fertile country, from whence the principal supplies of the British troops and of Lisbon were drawn, had been gained; a good military base and a prominent political station were obtained; and if the people's fierceness was not quelled they had learned their own inferiority in battle.

In this state the most important matters were to succour Tuy, and to obtain news of Lapisse. Heudelet was to effect the first, Franceschi the second. The latter had spread his posts along the right bank of the Vouga, but the people fled beyond that river, where the rich valleys were protected by Trant. When the defeat at Braga was known, that officer, being well known to the natives, had taken the command of all the armed population, and his force was soon increased; because the catastrophe of Oporto sent thousands of fugitives down, who spread dismay and disorder, and being accustomed to violence and attributing every misfortune to treachery, flocked to him as to a man they could trust. Thus enabled safely to assume an authority which no native of rank could have accepted or refused without danger, he advanced to Sardoal and Aveiro with eight hundred men, and was there joined by Eben and Vittoria, and by Barbacena, who brought him some cavalry; the people however looked on these officers with suspicion, and

Trant retained his command, his force augmenting daily by the arrival of *ordenença*, and even of deserters from Beresford's army.

When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment to occupy the bridge of the Vouga; but the men dispersed in a panic, and the desertion of many thousand *ordanança* followed; a happy circumstance, for the numbers collected behind the Vouga exceeded twelve thousand men, and their extreme violence and insubordination excited terror and impeded measures of defence. Trant finally retained about three thousand men, with which he imposed upon the French, and preserved a fruitful country from their incursions: he was however distressed for money, because the bishop had in his flight laid hands on all that was at Coimbra and carried it to Lisbon. Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade of infantry, contented himself with chasing some insurgents infesting his left flank, while his scouts on the side of Viseu endeavoured to obtain news of Lapisse: but he was still beyond the Agueda.

While Franceschi was thus employed, Caulaincourt's cavalry was menaced on the Tamega by Silveira, and Loison marched to his aid on the 9th of April. Silveira proved too strong for both, and on the 12th forced Loison over the Souza river. Heudelet was meanwhile hastening towards Tuy to recover the artillery parc and dépôt, from which the army had been separated forty days; he was joined at Bacellos on the 6th by Lorge, who had taken Villa de Conde and cleared the coast line. They marched to Ponte de Lima and forced a passage though vigorously opposed, and the 10th arrived in front of Valença on the Minho. The Portuguese had suffered from the fire of Tuy, and the garrison, two hundred men, being without provision capitulated, but ere the French could take possession deserted the place; then the garrison of Tuy which had heard nothing of the army after it quitted Ribidavia, saw with pleasing surprise the French colours suddenly floating over that fortress.

La Martiniere had been reinforced by stragglers and a battalion of detachments which followed the army from St. Jago, and he had three thousand four hundred men; yet

twelve hundred were sick and two-thirds of his horses had been eaten. The Portuguese had passed the Minho and united with the Spaniards to attack him, but frequent sallies kept them off; and when the defeat at Braga became known, the Portuguese repassed the Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martiniere sent three hundred men to take away the garrison of Vigo; that place had however fallen and the detachment regained Tuy with difficulty. The Spaniards on the Arosa Estuary, while Soult was still at Orense, had taken arms under general Silva and the count de Mezeda, but they were finally placed under one Barrois, a colonel, sent by the supreme junta. Their number was considerable. Barrois attacked Tuy, and Silva, aided by the Lively and Venus English frigates, invested Vigo, where the garrison, at first small, was soon increased, because Soult's paymaster-general instead of going to Tuy entered Vigo with his chest and eight hundred men. The commander negotiated for a capitulation, yet distrustful of the peasantry protracted the surrender; and then Romana's stragglers having collected between Tuy and Vigo, Pablo Murillo a regular officer led fifteen hundred to aid the investing force. Acting in concert with captain Mackinley of the Lively he obtained the place: thirteen hundred men and officers, including three hundred sick, marched out with the honours of war and were embarked for England. Four hundred horses and sixty covered waggons, stores and five thousand pounds in money rewarded the victors; and the Spaniards and Portuguese then renewed the attack on Tuy until it was relieved by Heudelet.

Captain
Mackinley's
Despatch.

Maucune's division of Ney's corps arrived the 11th, but finding the place free returned, and the French depôts and guns were directed on Oporto. Heudelet then reduced Viana and the fort of Insoa, placed a small garrison in the former, ruined the works of Valença, returned to Braga, and sent Lorge again to Villa de Conde. The sick were transported in boats along shore from the Minho to Viana Villa de Conde and Oporto; and La Houssaye, having one brigade of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured the country between the Lima and Cavado in rear of Heudelet. All resistance now ceased in the Entre Minho e Douro under the influence of the Anti-

Braganza party; but in the *Tras os Montes*, Silveira advanced, and being joined by Botilho from the *Lima*, boasted he would enter *Oporto* the 15th of April. This boldness was explained to Soult by receiving news of the fall of *Chaves*, of which until then he had not known; it taught him also that to tranquillize the *Entre Minho e Douro* effectually he must destroy Silveira; wherefore he sent Laborde with a brigade, to join Loison and attack the Portuguese general by Amarante, and he directed La Houssaye to cross the *Cavado* and move by *Guimaraens* on the same place. The 15th Laborde reached *Peñafiel*, and Silveira, hearing of La Houssaye's march, retired to *Villamea*. The 18th Laborde put to flight Silveira, who passed the *Tamega* at Amarante and was making for the mountains, when colonel Patrick, a British officer under him, encouraging his battalion, faced about, rallied the fugitives and beat back the enemy. This forced Silveira to stand likewise, and while Patrick stopped on the right bank and covered the bridge with obstinate valour, he took a rugged position on the left bank, overhanging the suburb of *Villa Real*. Next day came La Houssaye, the attack was renewed, and Patrick fell mortally wounded; then the defence slackened and his men retired across the *Tamega*, but the bridge was still to be won. At *Mondin* and *Cavez* above, and at *Canavezas* below Amarante, the bridges were destroyed, and the *Tamega* was in full flood over a deep rocky bed. The Amarante bridge was mined, and barred with three rows of palisades, and a ten-gun battery looked over the barricade: Silveira was in position behind, and his advanced guard was in the suburb.

PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA.

Laborde pushed a flying sap towards the barricade, but the fire forced him to relinquish this work and seek to construct a trestle bridge half a mile below; that also failed, and then the engineer Brochard proposed a method of forcing the stone bridge, so daring that all the generals and especially Foy opposed it: Soult however sent Hulot to ascertain its merits on the spot, and that general approved. The Portuguese mine was constructed with the muzzle of a loaded musket in

the chamber, a string being tied to the trigger and passed over the trenches to secure the greatest precision for the explosion. Brochard was aware of this, but he placed the French troops in the night of the 2nd of May as near the bridge as the necessity of keeping them hidden would permit, and at eight o'clock, the moon shining brightly, sent twenty men down the bank of the river to open a slanting fire against the trenches behind the bridge. The attention of the Portuguese being thus drawn to that side, a sapper, dressed in dark grey crawled out, pushing with his head a barrel of powder which was enveloped in cloth to deaden the sound. Thus advancing, on that side of the bridge which was shaded by the parapet, he placed his barrel against an entrenchment covering the mine and retired; two others followed in succession; but the fourth, after placing his barrel, run back, was descried and wounded. The Portuguese musketry was then turned on the bridge, yet soon ceased, and the barrels were undiscovered. A fifth sapper now attached a sausage seventy yards long, and at two o'clock the whole was completed, the Portuguese remaining unsuspecting.

Brochard judged the explosion would destroy the entrenchments and burn the cord attached to the musket in the mine: the event proved his sagacity. A thick fog arose about three o'clock, the sausage was fired, the explosion made a large breach, Brochard and his sappers instantly leaped forward with buckets to throw water into the mine, and then cutting away all obstacles, and being closely supported by a column of grenadiers, gained the other side before the smoke rose. The grenadiers being followed by other troops, the suburb and the camp above were soon won, and the Portuguese fled over the mountains. This bold and ingenious action cost the French only seven or eight men, while in the previous futile attempts several engineer and artillery officers, and more than one hundred and eighty men fell. It is however singular that there was a ford near the bridge unknown to either side.

Heudelet now came up from Braga, Loison pursued the fugitives, Laborde occupied Silveira's camp, and scoured the left bank of the Tamega up to Mondin. The Portuguese at Canavesas destroyed their ammunition and crossed the Douro.

and over that river also went all the inhabitants of Mezamfrio and Villa Real when Loison's troops were descried. Soult hearing of this, reinforced Loison, directing him to clear the right bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa, to complete the ruin of Silveira's force, and, with a view to the subjection of *Tras os Montes*, to patrol towards Braganza, on which side Bessières had been asked to co-operate: that marshal had however gone to France, and the reply of his successor Kellerman, being intercepted, told the allies he was unable or unwilling to give aid. Laborde was now recalled to Oporto. He took two corps of infantry, leaving a regiment and a brigade of dragoons to guard the communications; but Loison, opposed at Pezo de Ragoa, and observing a great movement on the opposite bank, fell back to Mezamfrio. The 8th he returned to Amarante, his march being harassed by the peasants with a boldness indicating some powerful support; and in truth it was so; a new man was at hand, the whole country was in commotion, and the duke of Dalmatia was suddenly pushed backwards by a strong and eager hand.

OBSERVATIONS.—SPANISH OPERATIONS.

1°. The pervading error of the Spaniards was the seeking to fight, whereas to avoid general battles should have been with them a vital principle. Another error was the making the lines of operation in *La Mancha* and in *Estremadura* of equal importance. *Estremadura* was only an accessory; the first rank belonged to *La Mancha*, because it was more open, and directly menaced Madrid; and because a defeat there endangered Seville more than one in *Estremadura* would do: from *La Mancha* a beaten army must have fallen back on *Andalusia*, from *Estremadura* it might have retired on *Badajos*. But that place being defensible, and of less consequence to the Spaniards than Madrid was to the French, the lead belonged to *La Mancha*, whence the Spaniards could always menace the capital. The army of *Estremadura* might therefore have been reduced to fifteen thousand men, provided the army of *La Mancha* had been increased to forty or fifty thousand; and it would appear, that with a little energy the junta could have

provided a larger force: it is true it would have been beaten, but that was an argument against great battles.

2°. The third great error was the inertness of Valencia and Murcia, or rather their hostility, for they were upon the verge of civil war with the supreme junta. Those provinces, rich, populous, unmolested for eight months, had suffered nothing from Moncey's incursion, had received large succours from the English government, and Valencia had written her pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters of assassination: yet if the force under Llamas which fled from Tudela to Zaragoza be set aside, Valencia and Murcia might have been extinguished without any sensible effect upon the general cause. They were, however, well situated to support Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and La Mancha, and could have paralyzed a large French force by sending an army to San Clemente. It was dread of their doing so made the king restrain Sebastiani after the rout of Ciudad Real. And assuredly the Valencians should have moved; for it is in the variety of their lines of operation a whole people find their advantage: this the observation of that profound military writer, Lloyd, was confirmed in Spain; and Napoleon, always protecting his own communications strongly, sought to break up the Spanish lines by moveable columns.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

1°. Napoleon was as anxious to seize Seville and Cadiz as to get Lisbon, but Lloyd's maxim regulated his proceedings. If Victor had moved at once upon Andalusia, the Portuguese and Valencians could have acted on both his flanks; if Badajos and Lisbon had been his objects the Andalusians could have vexed his communications with Madrid. These difficulties were avoided by the direction given to Soult and Lapisse, whose marches merely prolonged the great line of communication with France; Ney protected the rear of Soult, Bessières protected the rear of Lapisse; he also isolated the Asturias, and thus restricted the Spanish warfare to the south side of the Tagus. The course of conquest was then to have proceeded from Portugal to Andalusia, which would have been assailed in front and flank, while Sebastiani and the king

held the Valencians in check. In this manner a central position would have been constantly retained, and the great communication covered.

2°. That a plan so conceived should have failed without any corps employed suffering a serious defeat, is surprising but not inexplicable. Napoleon's orders were issued when he had no reason to expect a battle at Coruña, when he did not anticipate the severe sufferings of Soult's army from bad weather and long marches, nor that the Portuguese would resist upon the Minho and the Douro. These were miscalculations, and the last depended on the two first, for he designed that Soult's rapidity should forestal defence: the delay cannot however be charged on the marshal, his energy was conspicuous. Napoleon did not make sufficient allowance for the difficulties of the rugged country before Soult, where all the rivers and streams were flooded; and the delay thus caused vitiated Lapisse's instructions. He might indeed have still marched by Guarda upon Abrantes, while Soult moved by Coimbra on Lisbon and Victor invaded the Alemtejo; but the combination was wide, the communication uncertain, and unity of action not easily obtained. Lapisse, however, should certainly have abandoned his connexion with the first corps to march on Viseu, where uniting with Soult after the fall of Oporto, they could have forced a way to Lisbon without regard to Victor's co-operation.

3°. Napoleon seems to have overlooked the chances of delay and combined the movements on too great a scale, giving Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes instead of Lamego and Viseu for the direction of Lapisse's march; but the facts may have been misstated by the acting generals; it is dangerous to censure his military dispositions however faulty they may appear, and his errors, if errors they were, cannot wholly account for failure. He put sixty thousand men in movement against Lisbon, and on sound general principles; we must therefore seek in his lieutenant's conduct why a project of such a master, executed by sixty thousand French veterans, ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had been concocted by the Spanish junta.

OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, ROMANA,
SILVEIRA, AND CUESTA.

LAPISSE.

1°. An intercepted letter addressed to Maupetit from Salamanca, shows how feebly Lapisse endeavoured to communicate with Soult; in that letter he said that '*even so many*' as three hundred men should patrol towards the *Tras os Montes* to get news of the second corps! and this when he should have moved his division in mass rather than failed in that object. At the same time he suffered Wilson to gather head and insult his posts, when he could have dispersed everything in his front and menaced Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. One, if not both those fortresses would probably have fallen; and from thence strong detachments, pushed towards Lamego, would have heard of Soult and aided his progress by threatening Oporto and Braga. Salamanca, where he remained inactive, required no strong force, the open country there was at the mercy of Bessières' cavalry; and so sensible of it were the local junta, that Salamanca and Ledesma refused assistance from Rodrigo when offered, preferring quiet submission.

2°. When the king forced Lapisse to move, he made a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo, so feeble it scarcely called the garrison to the ramparts; and then as if success in Portugal was hopeless, he broke through the pass of Perales, to rejoin the first corps, in opposition to Napoleon's orders and to military sagacity; the first directed him upon Abrantes, the second would have carried him upon Viseu. A march to the latter place, while it insured a junction with Soult, would not have prevented an after movement upon Abrantes; the obstacles were not so great as those on the march to Alcantara and the great error of abandoning the whole country between the Tagus and the Douro, to the insurgents, would have been avoided. Here was one cause of failure, yet the error, although great, was not irreparable. Soult was abandoned to his own resources, but he had obtained an important position in the north; and Victor, reinforced by ten thousand men, was enabled to operate against Lisbon by the Alemtejo more

efficaciously than before: but he was even less disposed than Lapisse to execute his instructions.

VICTOR.

1°. His inactivity after the rout of Ucles has been noticed. If the fourth and first corps had been well handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal would have ventured out of the Morena, much less have established a line of defence along the Tagus. Fifty thousand French troops should in two months have done something more than maintain fifty miles of country on one side of Madrid.

2°. The passage of the Tagus was a successful, but can hardly be called a skilful operation, unless Victor calculated on the ignorance of his adversary. Before an active army having a pontoon train it would be most dangerous to separate in three divisions on an extent of fifty miles, leaving the artillery and parc of ammunition, protected only by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, within two hours' march of the enemy for three days. If Cuesta had concentrated his whole force, the Meza d'Ibor might have been held, and ten thousand infantry with all the cavalry detached across the Tagus at Almaraz to take the French artillery.

3°. When Victor passed the Tagus he let Cuesta escape, and even lost the trace of his army; a fault not excused by pleading the swelling of rivers, protection of communications. If Cuesta's power was despised before the fight, there needed no such circumspection after his defeat: it was not prudence, it was inactivity.

4°. The scattered state of the French the evening before the battle of Medellin indicated want of vigilance. Victor was in a manner surprised; he had allowed Cuesta to retake the initial movement after a defeat, and his first measure to meet the danger was faulty; but this may be better shown when the Spanish operations are discussed.

5°. The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real destroyed the Spanish armies and laid Seville and Badajos open. Blood flowed like water, yet without profit to the conquerors, the French generals seemed to have touched a torpedo. Sebastiani

indeed would have entered the Morena; but the king, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him, and urged Victor to invade Portugal, which he would not do even when reinforced by Lapisse. There was the fatal error of the campaign; all the available British and Portuguese forces were thus enabled to attack Soult; and Victor neither fulfilled Napoleon's orders, nor the king's wishes, nor achieved any useful object himself. He did not invade Portugal, he did not hold Estremadura, nor take Seville, nor hinder Cuesta from twice retaking the offensive; he remained passive in a notoriously unhealthy country, until he lost more men by sickness than three such battles as Medellin would have cost: two months more unprofitably wasted cannot be cited. His reputation debars the supposition of incapacity; his aversion to aid Soult was obvious; but whether it sprung from personal jealousy, a dislike to obey the king, or from a mistaken view of affairs must be left in doubt.

CUESTA.

1°. To defend a river on a long line is generally hopeless, especially when the defenders have not free access to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of others, have shown how the passage of rivers may be won; Eumenes, who prevented Antigonus from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the only general who has baffled a skilful, enterprising enemy in such an attempt. It follows,—that no general should calculate upon success, and should exert great energy and vigilance to avoid disaster—that his retreat should be free and concentric,—that to bring his magazines and depôts close up to the army on such occasions is rashness itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and brought up all his magazines to Deleytosa and Truxillo,—abandoned Mirabete without an effort,—his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy,—his retreat was confused and eccentric,—part of his army retired into the Guadalupe, part went to Merida, and he himself to Medellin.

2°. His retreat upon Campanarios instead of Badajos, being determined by the necessity of uniting with Albuquerque,

cannot be blamed, and the immediate return to Medellin was bold; but its merit was in recovering the offensive immediately after a defeat; wherefore he should not have halted, thus giving the lead again to the French. He should have rapidly fallen upon the scattered divisions of the French, beat them in detail, and rallied his own detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe: the error would have been manifest if Victor, placing a rear-guard to amuse him, had taken the road to Seville by Almendralejos and Zafra.

3°. Cuesta's plan of keeping his infantry behind the ridge at Medellin, until Victor showed his order of battle in the plains, was good; but when the time to show himself came, instead of advancing a weak wavering line he should have thrust his army in masses between Lasalle and Maubourg's columns, which were pushed out like horns on either side. The battle would then have been well begun, separating the French army in three unconnected portions, leaving the Spaniards in close order and masters of the initiative: Cuesta's dispositions made it impossible for the Spaniards to win by courage, or escape by swiftness.

4°. Truxillo, Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, and Medellin, had ancient walls or castles; yet Cuesta, though holding his position on the Tagus from January to the middle of March, never put one of them in a state of defence. They might have been garrisoned by the citizens and peasantry, and would in some degree have compensated for the inferiority of discipline by delaying and hampering the French movements.

SOULT.

1°. This marshal marched in one column upon Tuy, thinking no resistance would be offered; otherwise, a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry should have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho. It seems to have been also an error in Ney, not to have kept Marchand's division of the sixth corps at Orense, until the second corps had effected an entrance into Portugal.

2°. Soult's resolution to place the artillery and stores in Tuy, and march into Portugal, trusting to victory for re-open-

ing the communication, would increase the reputation of any general. Three times before he reached Oporto, he was obliged to halt, and fabricate cartridges for the infantry from the powder taken in battle; his conduct was in every way able and energetic. His military proceedings after Oporto fell were not so admirable; civil affairs engrossed him, and his absence from the field sensibly affected the operations. Franceschi had too much respect for Trant's force, Loison was timid and slow, Laborde's genius seemed to sleep. The importance of crushing Silveira was obvious, and it is essential in war to strike with all possible force. That maxim was not remembered. Caulaincourt was first sent, then Loison, Laborde followed, and altogether they could scarcely effect what so few were employed to do at first. The transactions at Amarante are obscure. The delay before the bridge, the hesitation in action, the frequent references for fresh orders indicated want of zeal, or an opposition to Soult: Noble, in his history of the campaign, refers it to a secret conspiracy which shall be touched upon hereafter.

3°. The great courage of the Portuguese peasantry, and its inefficacy in resistance, proved how useless such efforts are when unsupported by good troops. No country is more favourable than the north of Portugal for such a warfare; the people were brave and robust, they were aided by the organized masses under Romana, Silveira, Eben, and the bishop; yet Soult in the worst season overcame all resistance and stormed Oporto with no greater loss than two thousand five hundred men, including twelve hundred sick captured at Chaves.

ROMANA.

1°. He remained at Oimbra and Monterey, unmolested, from the 21st of January to the 6th of March; he had therefore time to re-organize his forces, and had in fact ten thousand regular troops in tolerable order. He knew on the 11th or 12th that Soult was to pass the Minho between Tuy and Guardia; that the people of Ribidavia and Orense were in arms, those on the Arosa preparing to rise, and consequently that the French must, were it only to seek food, break

out of their contracted position by Ribidavia and Orense, by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to St. Jago. With this information, plain as the writing on the wall, to guide him, Romana should have carried his ten thousand men to Ribidavia, there to take position on Soult's left flank, to rally all the insurgents and organize a formidable warfare. The French could not pass the Minho while he was in advance of Ribidavia; if they turned against him the ground was favourable for battle, a retreat open by Orense to Monterey, and pursuit would have been retarded by the difficulty of moving the guns; if Soult retreated it would have been tantamount to a victory for Romana, who could have followed, communicating as he advanced with the English vessels of war.

2°. Romana having disseminated his small force, was speculating upon his enemy's weakness, his ultimate retreat to France! and was only awakened from his reverie by finding his troops beaten in detail, and no resource left save to join the Portuguese with whom he was at feud, or break his promise to Silveira and fly over the mountains; he adopted the latter. Capable of exciting an insurrection he could not direct one, and though brave and energetic by starts, destitute of military talent: at a later period the duke of Wellington after a long and fruitless discussion, drily remarked, that Romana or himself had mistaken their profession.

SILVEIRA.

1°. His first operations were feeble; he did not repair the works of Chaves, nor aid the important insurrection at Ribadavia. He was without power; his officers held a council of war against his will; thirty were for fighting, twenty-nine against it; the casting voice was given by the voter calling on the troops to follow him! The retaking of Chaves, probably directed by marshal Beresford, was bold; but the subsequent advance upon Peñafiel when La Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga intercept his retreat on Amarante, was rash, and his flight from thence disgraceful; yet thanks to colonel Patrick, Silveira's reputation was established with his countrymen by an action which should have excited their contempt.

BOOK THE SEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

CRADOCK unmoved by the remonstrances and absurd plans addressed to him, had awaited at Lumiar the promised reinforcements from England; but he made every effort to obtain transport for supplies, remounts for cavalry, draught animals for the artillery, in fine to prepare for the field. The regency gave him no aid, and an attempt to procure horses and mules from Barbary having failed, the army was so scantily furnished that, other reasons failing, it could not act on the frontier. Victor's inactivity surprised him, but his resolution to remain at Lumiar was not affected, until he was assured that five thousand of the reinforcements were off the rock of Lisbon. Then he held a council of war. All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto except Beresford, and he admitted that it depended on Victor's movements. It was soon after this council that Victor approached Badajos, Lapisse appeared before Rodrigo, and Soult stormed Oporto. The national instinct of danger then showed the force of Napoleon's plan of invasion. One universal cry of treason was heard throughout Portugal: people and soldiers alike discovered a spirit truly alarming. The latter disregarding Beresford and menacing their officers declared that a thousand traitors must be killed in Lisbon. The regiments in Abrantes abandoned that post and marched to join Trant; but when this disorder was at the worst and a concentric movement of the French would have been fatal, general Hill landed with five thousand men and three hundred artillery horses, and Cradock resolved to advance, moved chiefly

Appendix 3,

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

Appendix 1.

Sir J. Cradock, MSS.

by Beresford who thought it absolutely essential to enable him to restore subordination and secure Abrantes.

Thus about the time Tuy was relieved and Silveira attacked at Peñafiel, the British army was put in motion towards Obidos and Rio Mayor, and the campaign was actually commenced by Cradock. His measures had been all approved by the government, he had struggled through great difficulties, and had just stepped on the path of glory when he was required to yield his command to sir Arthur Wellesley, a younger officer, and go to Gibraltar. This change was not made without a contest in the cabinet, and though neither the choice nor the principle of bringing forward a man of great ability can be censured, sir John Cradock was used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted a command on such terms, and it was not just nor decent to entrap him into this unmerited mortification.

Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock had assembled the army at Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and Peniché; but the admiral, fearing the difficult navigation at that season, would not send victuallers to the latter place, and the magazines there were but scantily supplied. It was then Lapisse made his march to Alcantara, that the re-capture of Chaves became known, and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full spring. Trant's force increased, Beresford had restored order amongst the regular troops and became more urgent for attacking Soult, but Cradock would not move; he had few cavalry, was unable to obtain provisions and forage, was fearful for the safety of Lisbon, and only waited the arrival of his successor to resign the command and repair to Gibraltar. Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22nd of April. On the 24th he signified to the British ministers, that finding affairs in the condition they had contemplated, he would assume the command. From this it appears, the defence of Portugal was even then judged of uncertain promise: the deliverance of the Peninsula was never due to the English ministers, they were vacillating and without knowledge or foresight. It was

Appendix 13.

the firmness and skill of British generals, the courage of British troops, whose fierceness no danger could check, whose hardiness no privations could abate, that remedied the eternal errors of the cabinet and won the long fight.

This unexpected arrival of a victorious commander created the greatest enthusiasm; the regency nominated him marshal-general, the people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence; and those persons, Portuguese and British, who blamed Cradock's prudence spoke largely of future operations: an undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be achieved pervaded the public mind. Like Cradock sir Arthur felt the necessity of covering Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo frontier, and he anxiously compared the enemy's resources with his own. He saw that if the French had any concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse must have marred their combinations, by placing Portugal with its fortresses and all its forces, insurgents, regulars and auxiliaries, between Victor and Soult. Neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those marshals, and Soult's offensive strength was also exhausted. He might establish himself in the provinces beyond the Douro; he could not force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two hundred miles through a country tangled with flooded rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, and nearly as numerous as his own; moreover discontent and conspiracy were in his camp, and of this sir Arthur was aware. Soult then did not menace the capital; but Lapisse by weakening him had increased the power of Victor, who at the head of thirty thousand men, might march upon Lisbon, through an open country; the only barrier being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a movement, or the semblance of it, would draw the British and native armies to that side; and then Soult coming down to the Mondego, might from thence connect his operations with Victor's by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as occasion offered.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's own military resources were,—

1°.—His central position.

2°.—The British and German troops, twenty-six thousand, having under arms, including sergeants, twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred horses and mules; but in the British army corporals and privates only are understood as present under arms; whereas in the French army all military persons, officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, drummers, combatants and non-combatants, are included: a distinction to be borne in mind when comparing the forces on each side.

3°.—The Portuguese troops of the line, of which sixteen thousand were organized and armed. Nearly all these troops were collected between the Tagus and Mondego, and beyond the latter river were Trant and Silveira.

4°.—The militia and *ordenanças* or insurgent force.

5°.—The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, Peniché, and Badajos.

6°.—The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and free use of the coast and river navigation for supplies.

7°.—The co-operation of Cuesta, who had six thousand cavalry and thirty thousand infantry, of which twenty-five thousand were in front of Victor's posts.

His moral resources were the high courage of the English troops, personal popularity, the energy of an excited people, a favourable moment, the presentiment of victory, and a mind equal to the occasion. In a strategic view, to fall upon Victor was best; he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal, his defeat would be most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to the Spaniards; and the greatest body of troops could be brought to bear against him. But Soult held rich provinces, from whence the chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he had the second city of the kingdom, and was there forming a French party; and the regency and people, troubled by the loss of Oporto, loudly demanded its recovery. To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert with Cuesta; but he was ill disposed, and to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir Arthur determined to fall upon the latter; intending, if successful, to organize a system of defence in the northern provinces, and

then, in conjunction with Cuesta, turn against Victor, hoping thus to relieve Galicia more effectually than by following the French into that province.

Lisbon being the pivot of operations, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but he might be impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted with thorns. To effect this, seven thousand Portuguese troops were directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, whither two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry, just disembarked, also marched; and they were joined by three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria. A body of two thousand men, composed of a militia regiment and the Lusitanian legion, which remained near Castello Branco after Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under colonel Mayne, with orders to defend the bridge of Alcantara, and if necessary to blow up the structure. The flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the garrison of the latter place reinforced, and Mackenzie took command of all the troops, Portuguese and British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus. These precautions appeared sufficient, for there was a general disposition, and sir Arthur was not exempt, to think the French weaker than they really were.

Victor could not by a mere demonstration shake this line of defence; and if he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and penetrated by Junot's route, it would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes, already capable of a short resistance; Mackenzie also would have time to line the rugged banks of the Zezere. If, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, Victor should enter the Alemtejo and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and Lisbon, Cuesta promised to follow him closely; and Mackenzie, although unable to prevent the passage of the river, could regain Lisbon, where, aided by the fleet, the citizens, and perhaps by reinforcements from England, he might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro. Victor was eighteen marches from Lisbon, he and Soult could scarcely act in concert; but the allied army, having a sure and rapid correspondence with Cuesta was already within four marches of Oporto.

When these matters were arranged, the main body of the allies marched upon Coimbra, and four Portuguese battalions were incorporated in each British brigade. Beresford retained under his personal command only six thousand. Trant remained on the Vouga, Silveira on the Tamega; Wilson was detached with a small Portuguese force to Viseu, to hang upon Franceschi's left and communicate with Silveira by the way of Lamego. The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions was now somewhat lessened; but the land transport was still scanty; and the admiral, dreading the long shore navigation for large vessels, had no small craft to victual the troops by the coast. The magazines at Caldas were however partly filled, and twenty large country-boats loaded with provisions, the owners being induced by premiums, got safely into Peniché and the Mondego: in fine, the obstacles to a forward movement were great, but not insurmountable.

Sir Arthur reached Coimbra the 2nd of May, and on the 5th concentrated there twenty-five thousand sabres and bayonets, of which nine thousand were Portuguese, three thousand Germans, the remainder British. Soult knew nothing of this army on the Mondego; but many of his officers knew of it and were silent, being engaged in an extraordinary plot; probably a branch of that conspiracy alluded to in this work, as being conducted by the princess of Tour and Taxis. The French soldier's attachment to Napoleon was steadfast, yet human nature shrinks from perpetual contact with death, and they were tired of war. This feeling induced some officers of high rank to form a plan for changing the French government; few of them were inimical to Napoleon personally, but they were republicans, and earnest to reduce the power of the emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the troops, was to make truce with the English, to elect a chief, and march into France with a resolution to abate Napoleon's power, or pull him from his throne. At first they turned their eyes upon Ney, but finally fixed on Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader; it was however easier to resolve than to execute: Napoleon's ascendancy, supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men. Their plot was not entirely relinquished

until after Massena's retreat from Portugal in 1810; but long before that they found the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were so faithful to their great monarch, they would have slain any who openly stirred against him. These facts are stated on the authority of a principal mover in the sedition, and many minor plots had contemporary existence, for this was the spring-time of folly. In Soult's corps the conspirators were numerous, and by their discourses and slow sullen execution of orders, continually thwarted his operations without exciting his suspicions. As he penetrated into Portugal their counteractions increased, and when he arrived at Oporto their design was ripe for execution.

In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, appeared at Beresford's head-quarters, with proposals from the malcontents; who desired to have an English officer sent to arrange a plan for seizing the general and giving him over to the British outposts. This was a detestable project; it is not in the field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the overthrow of their country's institutions. It would be impertinent in a foreigner to say how much, or how long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government; but there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his general in the field, a compact of honour, which it is singularly base to violate: and so it has in all ages been considered. When the Macedonian *Argyraspides* delivered *Eumenes* in bonds to *Antigonus*, the latter, although he had tempted them to the deed and scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, and with the approbation of all men, destroyed them: yet *Antigonus* was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood.

A British field-officer reluctantly undertook to see the conspirators, but in uniform, and it was settled that one of the malcontents should meet him on the lake of Ovar; the boats however passed each other in the darkness, and the English officer, finding himself behind the French posts, returned to Aveiro. There he found Viana and the French adjutant-major *D'Argenton*, who confirmed Viana's story, expressed respect for Soult, but thought it essential to remove him before

an appeal was made to the soldiers: he readily agreed to visit Beresford, saying he was too strongly supported in the French army to be afraid. Beresford was then at Lisbon, D'Argenton went there, saw him and sir Arthur, and then regained Oporto. While at Lisbon he added to his former reasons for conspiring, the erroneous story that Soult aspired to be king of Portugal. When head-quarters reached Coimbra, D'Argenton came again; but this time he was, by sir Arthur's orders, conducted through bye-paths; and so dealt with as to return convinced the allies could not be ready for many days to move on Oporto. During his absence general Lefebre, wrongfully supposed to be a conspirator, had denounced him, and he was now arrested. His guilt was proved by passports signed by admiral Berkeley, which, contrary to sir Arthur's urgent advice, he had insisted on having. Soult, hitherto without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss thus opened beneath his feet, but his firmness did not fail; he offered D'Argenton pardon and reward if he would give the names of the other conspirators, and relate truly what he knew of the allies. He readily betrayed the allies, but sir Arthur's foresight had rendered that tale useless, and even hurtful to Soult. His accomplices he would not betray at first, and, exaggerating the gravity of the plot, defied the marshal, advising him to adopt the conspirators' sentiments as the safest course. This boldness did not last, and Soult, anxious to prove the affair, delayed executing him. He escaped during the subsequent operations, returned to France at a later period, was discovered and shot. The colonels Donadieu and Lafitte were also in communication with sir Arthur, and Lafitte is said to have had a secret interview with him; all were urgent to have the allied force moved so as to favour their proceedings; but the English general sternly replied that his operations should not be regulated by their plots.

Sir Arthur, thinking Silveira was successfully defending the Tamega, resolved to send Beresford and Wilson across the Douro at Lamego, to join him and cut Soult off from the Tras os Montes, designing himself to pass the Douro above Oporto with the aid of Beresford, who would be then strong on the right bank. Thus, including Trant's, Wilson's, and Silveira's

people, thirty thousand men would have interposed between the *Tras os Montes* and *Soult*, who must have accepted a dangerous battle or gone back to the *Minho*, which was then in full flood. This plan was abandoned when it became known that *Silveira* was driven across the *Douro*; and though the intelligence only reached *Coimbra* the 4th, on the 6th the army was in motion with a fresh project adapted to circumstances. Such promptness would seem condemnatory of *Cradock's* previous caution, but the state of affairs was entirely altered. When *Cradock* refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved in discipline. He had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since joined. In the middle of April *Cuesta* was only gathering the wrecks of his forces after *Medellin*; he was now at the head of thirty-five thousand men. The intentions of the British government had then been doubtful; they were no longer so. *Cradock's* influence had been restricted; *sir Arthur* came with enlarged powers, the full confidence of ministers, and had Portuguese rank. His reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind, always prone to magnify the future whether for good or bad, combined to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to dictate to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, and the people; to disregard petty jealousies and intrigues, and calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was debarred. Finally *sir Arthur Wellesley*, habituated to the command of armies, was endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and capacious for war.

CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.

WHEN Laborde returned from Amarante the Portuguese general Botilho came to the Lima, and Lorge's dragoons were detached to watch him; Mermet was at the same time pushed nearer to Franceschi; and thus the French, occupying two sides of a triangle, Oporto being the apex, were extended from the Vouga to the Tamega and presented both flanks to the enemy; the Douro separated the wings, and there was no communication save by the boat-bridge of Oporto: three days were required to unite on the centre, five upon either extremity. This disposition offered sir Arthur two lines of operation. One through Viseu and Lamego, by which he could in four or five marches turn the French left and cut them off from Tras os Montes; the other, leading direct upon Oporto, whereby he could in two marches throw himself unexpectedly and with superior numbers upon Soult's right, with hope of crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro. Those lines were separated by the Sierra de Caramula; but Wilson holding Viseu, and Silveira Lamego, covered the first; and Trant on the Vouga covered the second. Thus masked, sir Arthur resolved to operate by both lines, but to make his chief effort against Oporto; because the French right was most exposed and he could more easily feed his troops near the coast.

Soult knew nothing of sir Arthur's position, numbers, or designs, and had no suspicion of his vicinity; but sensible of his own inability to reach Lisbon he meditated crossing the

Soult, MSS.

See Plan 1.

Tamega, and then, covered by that river and the Douro, pass through Bragança into the Salamanca country. In this view he had sent Loison to Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa; and Mermet's advance

towards the Vouga, was only to support Franceschi's retreat when the movement towards the Tamega should commence. D'Argenton's arrest on the 9th disclosed all the perils of Soult's position. Treason in his camp which he could not probe; a powerful enemy close in his front; the insurgents again in activity behind him; his own troops scattered from the Vouga to the Tamega, from the Douro to the Lima; and under officers necessarily suspected while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown. The view was appalling, but he did not quail. The generals near him vouched for the soldiers' fidelity, and his measures were instantly taken. Loison was directed to keep Mezamfrio if he could, and to hold Amarante tenaciously; the guns and stores at Oporto were sent towards the Tamega, the ammunition was, part removed, part destroyed, Lorge was ordered to withdraw the garrison of Viana and make for Amarante; and D'Argenton was more closely pressed to name the conspirators. But the war was coming on with a flood. Loison had given way on the left, not without suspicion of treachery, while on the right, Wellesley had passed the Vouga and Franceschi was struggling in his grasp.

Sir Arthur had twenty-four guns, one division of horse and three of foot. The cavalry was under general Payne; the first division of infantry under Edward Paget; the second under Sherbrooke; the third under Hill; presenting a mass of sixteen thousand combatants, of which fifteen hundred were horsemen. Beresford's separate corps, consisting of six thousand Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies of riflemen and a squadron of heavy cavalry, moved the 6th upon Lamego by Viseu; and on the 7th, the light cavalry under Cotton, preceding Paget's division moved towards the Vouga bridge, followed by the main body; but they halted the 8th to insure Beresford's co-operation on the upper Douro. The 9th the advance was resumed. Hill's division took the Aveiro road, and the whole reached the line of the Vouga that evening; but Paget came up cautiously and after dark, the design being to surprise Franceschi. That general, having his own cavalry, a regiment of Mermet's division, and six guns, was at Albergaria Nova, eight miles from the Vouga bridge; the remainder of Mermet's infantry was at Grijon, one march in the rear.

Franceschi had just informed Soult that the allies were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant's posts were closing on the Vouga; but he had no suspicion that the whole army was at hand, though an English officer, bearing a flag of truce, had, most imprudently hinted that an attack was being prepared. Sir Arthur's plans were founded partly on a suggestion of the officer who met D'Argenton. He had observed that the lake of Ovar, extending twenty miles behind the French outposts, was unguarded, and all the boats were at Aveiro in the allies' power. Hill was therefore directed to turn Franceschi's right by the lake, and he embarked on the evening of the 9th with one brigade; the fishermen were passive at first, but soon comprehended the object and rushed in crowds to the boats, working with such a will that the flotilla reached Ovar precisely at sunrise the 10th. On that day also Beresford, having united with Wilson, reached Pezo de Ragoa and drove Loison as we have seen back on Amarante. Both flanks of the French were thus turned at the moment sir Arthur fell upon Franceschi; for while the flotilla was on the lake, the attempt to surprise that officer was made.

Cotton, crossing the Vouga with the light cavalry about midnight, had sought to turn the enemy's left while the head of Paget's division moved through the defiles of Vouga upon Albergaria; Trant was to have moved between Paget and the lake, but the whole combination was baffled by one of those petty events which abound in war. The ground beyond the Vouga was not well known, and late in the evening of the 9th, Trant, finding an impracticable ravine, extending from the lake inwards to Olivera de Azemis, would bar his march, passed by the bridge and dragged his guns beyond the defiles, thinking thus to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery. This altered the dispositions; for some gun carriages breaking down impeded the march of Paget's column, and thus Trant led in the centre instead of turning the French right. Meanwhile Cotton, misled by his guides, came in broad daylight upon Franceschi, who was flanked by a wood filled with infantry, and offered a battle Cotton dared not accept. Thus was marred a well conceived project, which would have shorn Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry; for if

Franceschi had been surprised when Hill was at Ovar Mermet could not have re-crossed the Douro.

Cotton was soon aided by Trant, but Franceschi still maintained his ground, being ignorant of the great force in his front, until sir Arthur arrived with Paget's division and drove his infantry from the wood; then he retired, and though hotly pressed extricated himself valiantly, reached Oliveira de Azemis with little loss, and marching all night joined Mermet at Grijon next morning. He had however seen the whole English army, including Hill's troops, and it may create surprise that he was not attacked by that general; but Hill's instructions forbade him to act on the enemy's rear, and he never fell short of or exceeded his orders. Those orders were wise also, though here hurtful; for the principle of operating with small bodies on the flanks and rear of a powerful enemy is vicious; the number of the French on the Douro was unknown, and it would have been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced guard and the main body. Hill was sent to Ovar, partly to ease the line of march, partly to distract the enemy's attention, partly to have a body of men ready for pursuit, who being quite fresh might pass the bridge of Oporto pellmell with the flying enemy, but Franceschi's skilful retreat hindered the attainment of the last object.

COMBAT OF GRIJON.


Paget's division and the cavalry halted for the night at Oliveira; Sherbrooke had passed the Vouga later and remained in Albergaria, but the pursuit was renewed next day, and the men, marching strongly, came up about eight o'clock in the morning with the French, who were posted across the road on a range of steep hills. A wood garnished with infantry covered their right flank; their front was protected by a village and broken ground, but their left was ill placed. The British went briskly up in one column and the head was instantly and sharply engaged, while the 16th Portuguese regiment, quitting the line of march, drove the enemy from the wood; the Germans also, bringing left shoulders forward, turned without halt or check the other flank of the French, who then

abandoned their position with the loss of a few killed and a hundred prisoners; yet on the heights of Carvalho they turned and checked two pursuing squadrons of cavalry until the infantry drew near, and then again fell back: thus fighting and retreating, a blow and a race they wore the day away.

During this running fight Hill was to have menaced the retreat by the coast road; but some error in the transmission of orders caused him to take the way of Feyra, by which he crossed Trant's march and the time lost could not be regained. Sir Arthur halted at dark, the French crossed the Douro in the night and destroyed the bridge. Soult immediately sent all the heavy artillery and baggage still in Oporto along the road of Amarante; and Mermet followed the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having orders to secure the boats there and vigilantly patrol up the bank of the river. All the craft near Oporto were secured, guards were placed at different points, and the French marshal resolved to keep his ground during the 12th, that Lorge's dragoons and the smaller detachments might have time to concentrate at Amarante. Loison, his retreat from Pezo de Ragoa being unknown, was again warned to hold the Tamega as he valued the safety of the army. Soult's attention was principally directed to the Douro below Oporto, because Franceschi's report led him to believe Hill's division had landed at Ovar from the ocean, and he expected the empty vessels would come round and effect a passage at the mouth of the river. Believing Loison to be holding Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, and having disposed three brigades between Oporto and Amarante, he thought his retreat secure; but the conspirators were busy, his orders were neglected and false reports of their execution made.

Before eight o'clock on the morning of the 12th, the British army was secretly concentrated behind the Serra convent height; but the Douro rolled between it and the French, and the latter had hitherto suffered no loss. They could in two marches gain the Tamega with a safe retreat to Bragança; and, in passing, might defeat Beresford whose force was ill-organized and unfit for battle. Sir Arthur had sent it to vex the French line of retreat by Villa Real, and thus induce Soult to take the less accessible road of Chaves and make for

Explanatory Sketch
OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO
 by
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY
May 12th 1809.
AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO
 by
MARSHAL SOULT
March 1809.



Gallicia instead of Leon. That it could not do, unless the French were pressed by the main army, and Soult at Salamanca would be more formidable than at Oporto; and hence the safety of Beresford and the great object of the campaign alike demanded an immediate passage of the Douro. But how pass a river, deep, swift, more than three hundred yards wide, when ten thousand veterans lined the opposite bank? The Macedonian hero might have turned from it without shame!

The Serra rock, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, barred sight of the upper channel, and Soult thinking it secure took his station westward of the city, from whence he could see the lower channel to its mouth: but on the rock stood sir Arthur, searching with an eagle's glance the river, the city, and the country beyond. Horses and baggage were on the Vallonga road, the dust of columns in retreat, and no large force near the river; the guards were few and widely spread, the patrols not vigilant, and an auspicious negligence seemed to prevail. Suddenly a large building called the Seminary caught the English general's eye; it was isolated, with easy access from the river, and surrounded by a high wall extending to the water on either side, offering room for two battalions; and the only egress was by an iron gate opening on the Vallonga road. This structure commanded everything around, except one mound, within cannon-shot but too pointed to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct line to the building across the river was hidden from the town by the Serra rock. Here then with a marvellous hardihood Sir Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to force a passage in face of a veteran army and a renowned general.

PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.

Colonel Waters, a quick daring man, discovered a poor barber who had come over the river with a small skiff the previous night; and these two being joined by the prior of Aramante, who gallantly offered his services, crossed the water unperceived and returned in half an hour with three large barges. Meanwhile eighteen guns were placed in battery on the convent height, and general John Murray was sent with

the German brigade, the 14th dragoons and two guns, three miles up the stream, to the Barca de Avintas, with orders to seek for boats and pass there if possible. When Waters came back with the barges, some English troops followed Murray in support, and others cautiously approached the river close under the Serra rock. It was then ten o'clock, the French were tranquil and unsuspecting, the British wondering and expectant, and sir Arthur was told that one boat had reached the point of passage. '*Well let the men cross,*' was the reply, and on this simple order an officer with twenty-five men were in a quarter of an hour silently placed in the midst of the French army. The Seminary was thus gained, yet the French remained quiet in Oporto. A second boat crossed, no hostile movement followed, no sound was heard, and a third boat passed higher up the river; but then tumultuous noise rolled through Oporto, the drums beat to arms, shouts arose in all parts, and the people were seen vehemently gesticulating and making signals from their houses, while confused masses of troops, rushing out of the city by the higher streets and throwing out swarms of skirmishers, came furiously down against the Seminary. The British soldiers instantly crowded the river bank, Paget's and Hill's divisions at the point of passage, Sherbrooke's where the boat bridge had been cut away; but Paget himself who had passed in the third boat and mounted the roof of the Seminary fell there deeply wounded, whereupon Hill took his place. The musketry, sharp and voluble, augmented as the forces accumulated, and the French attack was eager and constant, their fire increased more rapidly, and their guns opened on the building, while the English guns from the Serra commanded the enclosure and swept the ground on the left so as to confine the assault to the iron gate front; but Murray did not appear, the struggle was violent, the moment critical, and sir Arthur was only prevented crossing in person by the interference of those about him and the confidence he had in Hill.

In this state of affairs some citizens came over to Villa Nova with several great boats; and Sherbrooke's men were beginning to cross in large bodies, when a long loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from the windows,

gave notice that the French had abandoned the lower city: at the same time Murray was descried coming down the right bank of the river. Three battalions were now in the Seminary, the attack slackened, and Hill advancing to the enclosure wall poured a destructive fire on the French columns, as they passed in haste and confusion along his front on the Vallonga road; five guns then came galloping out of the town, but, appalled by the terrible line of musketry from the enclosure, the drivers pulled up, and while thus hesitating a volley from behind stretched many artillerymen in the dust, and the rest dispersing left their guns on the road. This volley came from Sherbrooke's men, who had come through the town, and thus the passage being won the allies had the right bank of the Douro. Sherbrooke from the city now pressed the French rear, Hill from the Seminary sent a damaging fire on the flank of the retiring masses, and far on the right Murray menaced the line of retreat: the rear of the army was still passing the river, but the guns on the Serra rock searched the French columns from rear to front as they hurried onwards.

If Murray had fallen upon the disordered crowds their discomfiture would have been complete; but he suffered column after column to pass without even a cannon-shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, impatient of his timidity, charged with two squadrons of dragoons, and riding over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond, unhorsed Laborde and wounded Foy, yet on the English side, Hervey lost an arm, and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, had to fight their way back with loss. This finished the action, the French continued their retreat, the British remained on the ground they had gained; the latter lost twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former had five hundred men killed and wounded, and five guns were taken. A quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns, the carriages of which had been burnt, were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were captured in the hospitals.

Napoleon's veterans were so experienced, so inured to war-

fare, that no troops could more readily recover from a surprise. Before they reached Vallonga they were again in order with a rear-guard; and as a small garrison at the mouth of the Douro, guided by some friendly Portuguese, also rejoined the army in the night, Soult, believing Loison was still at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped the danger. Sir Arthur Wellesley now brought over his baggage, stores, and the artillery, which occupied the 12th and 13th; and though Murray's Germans pursued on the morning of the 13th, they did not go more than two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been blamed. It is argued that an enemy once surprised should never be allowed to recover while a single regiment could pursue. The reasons for halting were, that part of the army was still on the left bank of the Douro, and the troops had outmarched provisions, baggage, and ammunition; they had made eighty miles of difficult country in four days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, men and animals required rest, and nothing was known of Beresford.

When that general drove Loison from Pezo de Ragoa on the 10th, Silveira, who was then at Villa Real, was ordered to feel towards Mezamfrio; and Beresford, who remained on the Douro, was thus in a position, with the aid of the insurgent peasants, to turn Soult from the Bragança on to the Chaves road. But the 11th Loison again fell back, and Beresford finding him timid harassed his rear-guard; Silveira also advanced, and on the 12th the French posts were driven into Amarante, which Loison abandoned, taking the road of Guimaraens. These events were unknown to sir Arthur on the 13th, but he heard Soult had destroyed his guns and ammunition near Peñafiel, and crossed the mountains towards Braga. Judging this a result of Beresford's operations, he reinforced Murray with cavalry, ordering him to march on Peñafiel; and if Loison lingered near Amarante, to open a communication with Beresford who was to ascend the Tamega and intercept the French at Chaves. Next day the army marched in two columns towards the Minho, the right by Barca de Trofa and Braga, the left by Ponte d'Ave and Bacellos. Towards evening it was judged from the French

movements that Chaves and Montalegre, not Valença and Tuy, would be their line of retreat; the left column was therefore directed on Braga; and Beresford was ordered to move by Monterey upon Villa del Rey if Soult should make for Montalegre. The 15th sir Arthur reached Braga; Murray was at Guimaraens on the right; Beresford, anticipating his orders, was near Chaves, having sent Silveira towards Salamonde to seize the passes of Ruivaens and Melgasso. Soult's capture now appeared inevitable; yet he was already beyond the toils, having by a surprising effort extricated himself from perils as fearful as ever beset a general.

In retreating towards Amarante he had the Douro on his right hand, the Sierra de Catalina on his left, both reckoned impassable; and the narrow way between them was very rugged. Braga was beyond the Sierra, and from thence to Amarante, a road, practicable for guns, run through Guimaraens; but it could only be reached through Amarante. Hence Soult's safety, while penetrating between the mountain and the river, depended upon Loison's holding the Tamega. That general had not corresponded for several days. Colonel Tholosé who had been sent the 12th to ascertain his situation found him at Amarante; yet neither that officer's remonstrances, nor the after intelligence that Soult was in full retreat for the Tamega, could prevent him marching on the 13th towards Guimaraens; he thus abandoned his commander and two-thirds of the army to what appeared certain destruction. This calamity was made known to Soult as he was passing the rugged bed of the Souza torrent. The weather was boisterous, the army, worn with fatigue, was dismayed, and voices were heard calling for a capitulation. But in that terrible crisis the marshal duke justified fortune for having raised him to such dignity. He had accidentally fallen from his horse, and his hip, formerly broken by a shot at the siege of Genoa, was severely injured; but neither pain, nor weakness of body, nor peril, could shake the firmness of his soul. A Spanish pedlar had told him of a path which, ascending the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens; wherefore, silencing the murmurs of treacherous officers and fearful soldiers, he destroyed his guns, abandoned

the military chest and baggage, loaded the animals which carried them with sick men and musket ammunition, repassed the Souza, and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy resolution. The rain fell in torrents, the path such as might be expected in those wild regions, but with a fierce will he forced his troops over the mountain, gained Pombeira, and at Guimaraens found Loison's division. Lorge's dragoons also came from Braga, and thus almost beyond hope, the whole army was concentrated.

Soult's energy had been great, his sagacity was not less conspicuous. The slackness of pursuit after passing Vallonga, made him judge that sir Arthur was pushing for Braga and would reach it first. A fighting retreat, and the loss of guns and baggage, would then ensue, which might fatally depress

the soldiers' spirits. It would also favour the malcontents' views, and already one general, apparently Loison, was urging a convention. Soult replied by destroying the guns, ammunition, and baggage of the two divisions he had reunited, and again took to the mountains on his right. In this manner he reached Carvalho d'Este late in the evening of the 14th, having gained a day's march in point of time. The next morning he drew up the troops, twenty thousand, on the position he had occupied two months before at the battle of Braga; and by this imposing spectacle on the scene of a recent victory aroused the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy reach of generalship! Then he re-organized his army and took the rear himself, giving the advanced guard to Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says '*The whole army was astonished,*' as if it were not a stroke of consummate policy, that the rear, pursued by the British, should be under the general-in-chief; while the front having to fight its way through the insurgents, had a commander whose very name called forth execrations from the natives. '*Maneta dared not surrender!*' Soult thus dexterously forced those least inclined to serve him to act with most zeal; but in sooth, so many were the traitors about him that all the resources of his mind, and all his wonderful bravery, were still required to save the army.

From Carvalho the French gained Salamonde, whence there

were two lines of retreat; the one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova to Montalegre; the other shorter but more rugged, leading by the Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road of Montalegre. The scouts said the bridge of Ruivaens was broken, and defended by twelve hundred Portuguese with artillery; and that another party had been since the morning destroying the Ponte Nova on the Cavado river. The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves, the second would, if completed, cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the soldiers harassed, bare-footed, and starving, the ammunition was injured by the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and was now increasing in violence accompanied with storms of wind; the British would fall upon the rear in the morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was arrived. In this extremity, Soult, addressing major Dulong, an officer justly reputed one of the most daring in the French ranks, said, 'I have chosen you from the whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy; select a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen, endeavour to surprise the guards and secure the passage of the bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report, your silence will suffice.' Thus exhorted, Dulong, favoured by the storm, reached the bridge, killed the sentinel before any alarm was given, and being followed by twelve grenadiers, crawled along a narrow slip of masonry, the only part undestroyed. The Cavado was flooded and roaring in its deep channel, and a grenadier fell into the gulf, yet the waters were louder than his cry. Dulong and the others surprised the nearest post, and then the main body rushed on, and some crossings other, mounting the heights, shouting and firing, scared the peasantry, who imagined the whole army was upon them. Thus the passage was won.

At four o'clock the bridge was repaired and the troops filed slowly over; but the road was cut in the side of a mountain, leaving an unfenced precipice on the left for several miles; and it was finally crossed by the Miserella torrent, which rolling down a gulf was to be crossed by the '*Saltador*' or leaper, a bridge with a single arch, so narrow that only three persons

could walk abreast. This Saltador was not cut, but it was entrenched, and some hundred peasants occupied the rocks on the further side; yet the good soldier Dulong again saved the army; for when a first and second assault had failed he won the bridge by a third effort, in which he fell deeply wounded, but his men carried him forward and the head of the column poured over.

It was full time, the English guns were thundering on the rear, and the Ponte Nova was choked with the dead.

Sir Arthur quitting Braga the 16th, had come about four o'clock upon Soult's rear guard at Salamonde, the right of which rested on a ravine, the left on a steep hill; this position was strong, but men momentarily expecting an order to retire seldom stand firmly. Some light troops turned the French left, Sherbrooke assailed them in front, and after one discharge they fled to the Ponte Nova in confusion, yet, as it was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for some time unperceived, and thus gained time to form a rear guard. When descried at last, the guns opened upon them sending man and horse crushed together over into the gulf, and the bridge and the rocks and the defile beyond were soon strewed with mangled bodies. This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword in a retreat signalized by many horrid and glorious actions. For the peasants in their fury tortured and mutilated the sick and straggling French, the troops in revenge shot the peasants, and the march of the army could be discovered from afar by the smoke of burning houses.

Soult reached Montalegre the 17th, without being followed, save by some cavalry, under colonel Waters, who picked up a few stragglers. Sir Arthur halted at Ruivaens, seemingly without adequate cause, but the 18th renewed the pursuit, and at the Salas river found the enemy in force on the further bank: yet no action took place. Silveira had reached Montalegre from Chaves before this, but had put his men in quarters; and a Portuguese officer carrying orders for Beresford to move on Villa del Rey loitered on the road: this, coupled with Silveira's inactivity, broke the final combination for intercepting Soult, and though Beresford pushed on the 14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi forced them to retire. Soult crossed

the frontier the 19th at Allaritz, and next day entered Orense without guns, stores, ammunition or baggage; his men, bowed with fatigue and misery, were mostly without shoes, many without accoutrements, some without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy-six days before, with twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy; he returned with nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers. Of this number, eighteen hundred were taken in hospitals at Viana and Braga, five hundred in Oporto, thirteen hundred in Chaves. A thousand were killed previous to the retreat, the remainder had been captured or perished within the last eight days. He had entered Portugal with fifty-eight pieces of artillery, he returned without a gun: yet his reputation as a stout and able soldier was nowise diminished.

OBSERVATIONS.

The duke of Dalmatia was thwarted by the conspirators: but the errors of his campaign may be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing them to their true sources.

1°. The spreading of his troops on both sides the Douro, when no certain advice of the movements and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. To clear the front and gather information, it was right Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; but he remained too long in the same position, and did not feel Trant's force positively. Had the latter officer, whose boldness in maintaining the line of that river was extremely creditable, been beaten or forced to retire, the anarchy of the country would have increased; Beresford's troops at Thomar only wanted an excuse to disperse, and the opening of the campaign would thus have been retarded.

2°. That Soult having, as he thought, secured all the boats on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think himself safe for one day, was natural; such a barrier might have rendered Fabius careless; yet there were circumstances indicating negligence. The commanding officer of a regiment reported as early as six o'clock that

Noble.

the English were crossing the river; the report was premature because no man passed before ten o'clock, but it reached Soult, and he sent general Quesnel to verify the fact. Quesnel reported truly that it was an error, and Soult took no further precaution; the patrols were not increased, no staff-officers were employed to watch the river, no signals were established. It was however but three days since D'Argenton's conspiracy had been discovered, and the extent of it was unknown. This should have induced the duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of posts, that the multiplicity of reports might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive. Hence the surprise at Oporto was a fault, atoned for by the high resolution and commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent retreat.

3°. When Loison suffered Beresford to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a great error; when he abandoned Aramante, he relinquished all claim to military reputation. The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy's forces; yet with six thousand men, cavalry infantry and artillery, he, that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not Loison's fault if England did not triumph a second time for the capture of a French marshal.

MOVEMENTS OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

1°. His campaign as a whole displayed sagacity, decision, celerity. When he landed at Lisbon the nation was dismayed by defeats, distracted with anarchy, menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was in possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days he restored public confidence, provided a defence against one adversary, marched two hundred miles through a rugged country, forced the passage of a great river, and caused his other opponent to flee over the frontier without artillery or baggage.

2°. This success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the skill of the general: he was quick to see, active to strike.

The secrecy and despatch with which the army was collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; there were many obstacles to overcome, and D'Argenton, as the sequel proved, would by his disclosures have ruined sir Arthur's combinations, if the latter had not providently given him a false view of affairs. The subsequent march to the Douro was no mean effort; for that rapid advance, against an eminent commander and a veteran army of above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force of which only sixteen thousand were approved soldiers—the remainder were totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, and only three weeks before in a state of open mutiny.

3°. The passage of the Douro would at first sight seem rash; but it really was an example of consummate generalship. The careless watch maintained by the French may be called fortunate, because it permitted the English general to get a few men over unperceived; yet it was not twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers, that could have maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. When sir Arthur said—*'let them pass,'* he was prepared to protect them when they had passed; he did not say so until he knew Murray had found boats at Avintas; and could by descending the Douro, cover the right flank of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of the Serra could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by the wall round the building. Had none but Murray's troops passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had made the attempt at Avintas its march would have been discovered; in the double passage all was secured; the men in the Seminary by the guns, the strength of the building, and by Murray; the latter by the surprise on the town which drew the enemy's attention away from him. Hence it was only necessary to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived and the success was almost certain; while the building was maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be prevented nor harmed by the enemy.

4°. The opportunity offered to Murray might have tempted a blind man. How would his want of hardihood have appeared if Loison had maintained Amarante? Soult would then

have reached Zamora or Salamanca in good order, and have turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, perhaps have taken it, and would certainly have occupied the British army on that side; he would have had free correspondence with Victor, and that marshal must have marched against Seville or against Lisbon. Then sir Arthur's bold and skilful operations, being without adequate results, would have furnished a subject for the abuse of some ignorant writer.

5°. If no halt had taken place at Oporto, Soult must have surrendered on the Souza river. But sir Arthur knew nothing of Loison's failure, or of Beresford's situation; and judging the latter to be menacing Villa Real, conjectured that Soult, to avoid him, would make for the Minho by Villa Pouca and Chaves, or by Guimaraens and Braga: he therefore remained at a point commanding the main roads to that river, whence he could by forced marches intercept the French retreat and force on a battle. If he had once entered the narrow way between the mountains and the Douro, he must have followed Soult in one column; and with little advantage if Loison had been true to his general. Nevertheless Murray, who was sent that way, should have been instructed to press the enemy, which was not done. Here however a political difficulty interfered. The English cabinet, reckless and improvident of preparation, had no firmness, it dreaded misfortune in action: sir Arthur dared not risk a brigade except for a great object, lest a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. This consideration often curbed his naturally enterprising spirit; and to this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which

Joseph's
captured Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

has been censured by military writers, and even by Napoleon, who erroneously supposed it characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his lieutenants for not taking advantage thereof.

6°. From the 14th to the 17th, the marches and encounters were like the wheelings and buffetings of vultures in the air, one general contending for victory, the other for safety. Soult would however have fallen if Beresford had not failed sir Arthur on one point. The French marshal's rear-guard was still in Salamonde the evening of the 16th, Beresford was in

person at Chaves that day, and his troops arrived there early on the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre the 18th, and from Chaves to Montalegre is only one march: he might therefore have been forestalled. Beresford entered Amarante the 13th, an excellent map existed, and he must have known the importance of Salamonde, which was only thirty-two miles off, and that there were roads to it by Freixim and by Mondin, both shorter than the road of Guimaraens and Chaves. Silveira was indeed ordered to occupy Ruivaens and Melgasso, but obeyed slowly, and the Saltador bridge was neglected. Major Warre, one of Beresford's staff, endeavoured to break the Ponte Nova and the Ruivaens bridge, and it was he who gathered the peasants surprised by Dulong; but he had only a single dragoon, and no powder; and the poor people, desiring to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop their retreat. Nor would they destroy the Saltador, because, being the key of all the provincial communications, it was sure to be reconstructed, and as they well knew by their unpaid labour. Soult owed his final escape to these failures in Beresford's operations, especially at the bridges which Warre attempted and would certainly have destroyed, if he had been furnished with powder and a few troops. Silveira was accused of negligence and slowness, yet it would seem there was some mistake as to the instructions, and it was difficult to avoid error where orders were transmitted through officers speaking different languages.

CHAPTER III.

SOULT halted the 20th at Orense, and the next day marched to succour general Fournier, of Ney's corps, who was besieged in Lugo by fifteen thousand Spaniards under general Mabi. To explain this, Romana's operations must be resumed. Having rallied his fugitives at Puebla de Senabria on the border of Leon he made fresh levies and being joined by three thousand Castilians, formed unperceived a new army in rear of Ney, and resolved to surprise Villa Franca del Bierzo where there were only two weak battalions. Sending Mendizabel by the valley of the Syl to take it in reverse, he marched himself by Calcabellos, and after a sharp skirmish captured the garrison and sent it to the Asturias. This effected, he detached men to Orense and Ponte Vedra to aid Morillo and the insurgents about Vigo, where in concert with the English ships of war the patriots were acting so vigorously that Ney's moveable columns daily lost men in fights and by assassinations. The latter were rigorously visited on the districts where they happened, and in Galicia as elsewhere the war assumed a horrid aspect. Referring to this period colonel Barrios told Mr. Frere, he had, in cold blood, drowned seven hundred French in the Minho! an avowal of crime recorded by Mr. Frere without animadversion, but which, happily for humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it would have been execrable.

Parl. Papers,
1810.

After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force increased rapidly, Barrios departed for Seville, Martin Carrera assumed the command near Orense, and the Conde Noroña near Vigo; general Maucune then returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, apprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo.

Romana then abandoned Galicia to enter the Asturias by the pass of Cienfuegos. Coasting along the Gallician frontier until he reached Navia de Suarna, he left Mahi there with the army to observe Ney, and went to Oviedo to redress the crying wrongs of the people. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian junta, so notoriously corrupt and incapable; Romana, after a short inquiry, dismissed the members by virtue of his supreme authority, and appointed new men. This offended Jovellanos and others; it appeared too close an approximation to Cuesta's mode in Leon the year before; and the central government, always selfish, and jealous, and abhorring any indication of vigour or probity in a general, soon afterwards deprived Romana of his command. Meanwhile he resolutely reformed abuses, until his proceedings were suddenly arrested by a vigorous stroke of the enemy; for when Ney understood that Spanish troops had appeared on the Gallician side of the Asturias, and that Romana was exciting the Asturian people, he made combinations to surround and destroy the whole together. The Asturian army, fifteen thousand strong, including the partida of Porlier, called the Marquisetto, was, under Ballesteros and Vorster, at Oviedo and Castropol on the coast. Ney's project was that Kellerman should, with nine thousand men and six guns, drawn from different corps to Astorga, penetrate the Asturias by the pass of Pajares, while Bonnet from Santander broke in by the coast road, and himself with the sixth corps make an irruption by the Conceja de Ibas, a short but difficult way leading from Lugo. When the matter was rife, Ney gave Marchand command in Galicia, left three battalions with Maucune at St. Jago, three more at Coruña under D'Armagnac, placed one in Ferrol, and three with a regiment at Lugo under Fournier. Taking twelve battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry himself, he marched first against Mahi, who immediately abandoned Navia de Suarna and regained the valley of the Syl, but without giving notice to Romana. Ney, more intent to capture Romana than to disperse his troops, then moved by the valley of the Nareca so diligently as to get within one march of Oviedo before his march was known; and Romana, after a feeble effort to dispute the

bridge of Peñafior, sent the only regiment he had to Infesta, and escaped himself, by Gihon, on board an English vessel.

Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by Kellerman, and next day pursued Romana to Gihon; Bonnet also executed his part yet somewhat later, and Vorster, unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the coast. Ballesteros, finding Bonnet had passed between him and Vorster, marched upon St. Andero and captured eleven hundred men, sick and well; the *Amelia* and *Statira*, British frigates, arrived also at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were endeavouring to escape. Bonnet following hard upon Ballesteros, routed him so entirely the 11th of June, that he also saved himself in an English vessel: thus all the prisoners, and amongst them the men taken at Villa Franca by Romana, were recovered. However, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Galicia, had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol; and Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, also retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it might become extremely troublesome to the French. But while Ney was absent, Carrera, advancing from the side of Orense, came to St. Jago de Compostella, at the moment colonel D'Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to give notice of his approaching return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of dragoons in Maucune's camp. This escort was magnified by the Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men; nevertheless Carrera, being joined by Morillo and having eight thousand men, engaged and defeated Maucune the 23rd of May at the Campo de Estrella. The French lost six hundred, and several guns, yet retreated unpursued, though in confusion, to Coruña: meanwhile Mahi, uniting a levy of peasants to his army, invested general Fournier in Lugo.

It was in this state of affairs Soult reached Orense, and heard from the inhabitants, who exaggerated their countrymen's success, how matters stood. The intelligence was alarming, and he sent forward an advanced guard of his stoutest men by

Monforte, to succour Lugo, following himself as rapidly as his exhausted troops could march. The 22nd he reached Gutin, and when his vanguard was descried on the mountains above Lugo Mahi retreated to Mondenedo. Soult entered Lugo the 23rd, heard there of the emperor's success in Austria, and with renewed energy prepared for fresh exertions. The 30th he was joined by Ney, who, ignorant of Mahi's being at Mondenedo, had missed the opportunity of avenging his loss at St. Jago. Romana now joined Mahi, and marching along the Gallician frontier to the sources of the Neyra, crossed the royal road a little above Lugo, plunged once more into the valley of the Syl, gained Orense the 6th of June, and from thence opened a communication with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo: it was an able and energetic movement. At this time Soult received orders to send eleven hundred dragoons and light cavalry to France; but having partially restored his artillery and equipment from the arsenal of Coruña and Ferrol, he concerted with Ney a fresh project to destroy Romana: its failure shall be shown hereafter, for at present it is necessary to resume

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

THE OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE TAGUS.

After the abortive attempts on Badajos, Victor proceeded to recover Alcantara, and the head of his column under Lapisse, entering that town, assailed the bridge the 14th of May. Two thousand Portuguese infantry with fifty cavalry and six guns defended the passage; they had raised works, but Lapisse lined the rocks on the left bank, and skirmished so sharply that the regiment of Idanha gave way; colonel Mayne then sprung a mine without effect, the French forced the passage, and the Portuguese who lost many men, retreated to Puente Segura; whereupon Lapisse sent patrols towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra and Idanha Nova. General Mackenzie hearing of this attack prepared to destroy the boat-bridge at Abrantes, but first advanced to Sobreira Formosa; and this movement, and a rumour that Soult had abandoned Oporto, gave Victor an excuse for again abandoning

Semelé, MSS.

Alcantara. During Victor's absence, Cuesta attacked Merida, but on his return re-crossed the Guadiana and fell back to Zafra, ravaging the flat country as he passed, and forcing the inhabitants to go into the mountains.

Some time before this, Joseph received a despatch from the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching against Lisbon to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult. He was inclined to obey, but doubt pervaded his councils, and, swayed by the following extraneous circumstances, he finally abandoned operations against Portugal. Napoleon thinking the Austrian war, though certain, would not break out so soon as to forestall the organization of a sufficient army in Germany, had left the imperial guards at Vitoria, and sent Berthier to command the troops assembling on the Danube. The Austrians however, apt imitators of the perfidy used towards Spain, attacked the French outposts and declared war at the same moment. Berthier, thus surprised, made a succession of false movements, which would have been fatal if the emperor, journeying day and night, had not arrived at the moment his lieutenant was consummating the ruin of the army. Then was seen the supernatural force of Napoleon's genius. In a few hours he changed the aspect of affairs; in a few days, maugre their immense number, his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed his mastery in an art which up to that moment was imperfect; for never since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a display of military skill made by man. But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the affairs of Germany, that the imperial guards were hurried from Vitoria to the Danube, the great reserve of infantry was struck off the rolls, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France: even Mortier's corps, then on its way to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was preparing to quit Spain. Thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Galicia, and the fate of Soult was unknown, the whole army was actually diminished by forty thousand men; and fifteen thousand more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations.

These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon; Soult might be already at the latter place; if not, he might extricate himself as he could from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward movement; and Victor, whose army was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took position at Torremocha, a central point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry watched the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus, and his communication with Madrid was protected by twelve hundred men placed by the king behind the Tietar. But one timid measure in war generally produces another. Mackenzie's advance to Sobreira Formosa excited the Spanish insurgents in the valley of the Tagus; they communed secretly with those of the Guadalupe, and Victor, fearing for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a division the 22nd of May to protect it. From that period he remained inactive, and his campaign which had opened so well was annulled. He had not aided Soult nor crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos, nor even menaced Seville; and he had lost more men by sickness than would have sufficed to reduce both Lisbon and Seville. Meanwhile the Spaniards recovered strength, and the British army, after defeating Soult, had full time to regain the line of the Tagus. For when Lapisse's forced passage at Alcantara was made known to sir Arthur Wellesley in the night of the 19th, the troops which had not passed Salamonde immediately moved southward; and when Soult's retreat to Orense was ascertained, the rest of the British army and three Portuguese brigades under Beresford followed. Trant was then made military governor of Oporto, and Silveira was to defend the northern provinces with some regular battalions and militia; for Soult's force was judged a crippled one, a conclusion drawn without consideration for that chief's energy. As the army moved southward, the narrow scope of Lapisse's movement was ascertained, and the march relented; Mayne returned to Alcantara, five thousand British troops landed at Lisbon, and the army encamped at Abrantes; but it was very sickly, and many men died.

Sir Arthur had always looked on Victor as the principal, and Soult as the secondary object of the campaign; and he had obtained the ministers' leave to enter Spain if the safety of Portugal was secured. In that view he had intreated the supreme junta and Cuesta to avoid a serious collision until the British army could act in concert. The junta assented to this advice, and Cuesta so far acceded that he did not seek a battle; but he exposed his advanced posts, was disdainful of sir Arthur's abilities, and expressed doubts of his desire to co-operate, because 'the British system was never to expose their troops, and hence they never gained decisive actions by land.' Cuesta's knowledge of both friend's and enemy's strength and positions was always inaccurate, and his judgment false; he never gained a decisive action, and lost every army he commanded. He was discontented with the movements against Soult, saying the French hold of Galicia would be thereby strengthened, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals was attempted, namely, the surrounding an enemy without thought that the surrounded might be the strongest. Sir Arthur in contradiction, affirmed, that to drive Soult over the Minho and make a combined attack afterwards upon Victor would *permanently deliver Galicia*. The two generals were thus at issue. Sir Arthur's plan was followed, Galicia, as he predicted, was abandoned by the French, and they never returned during the war! When the British army came back to the Tagus Cuesta was importunate for a joint offensive operation against Victor, but insisted upon tracing the plan of campaign; his views were however so unsound that sir Arthur, though willing to meet his humour, could not concede the smallest point without danger. Time was thus lost in idle discussion which might have been employed in useful action, for the arrival of the British army on the Tagus had falsified Victor's position at Torremocha. As late as the 10th of June he had only one division guarding the bridge of Almaraz; and he could not discover the English movements, screened as they were by the Tagus, by the insurrection, and by Mackenzie's corps of observation: hence it was possible to reach Almaraz while he was still at Torremocha, and so cutting him off from Madrid, place him between two fires. This did not escape the penetration of

Parl. Papers,
1810.

Semelé, MSS.



Explanatory Sketch of
NEY & SOULTS
OPERATIONS IN GALICIA
June, 1809.

Romana & Noronas
 Ney & Soult

} Positions

either commander; but sir Arthur renounced the attempt, partly because his troops, sickly and fatigued, wanted shoes, partly that he had no money, and few supplies; chiefly that Cuesta would neither concentrate his scattered forces, nor retire, and Victor might therefore have crushed him and yet found time to meet the British army on the Tietar. Beresford marched however with three brigades upon Castello Branco, and Victor, hearing from the king of Soult's retreat, immediately resolved to recross the Tagus, first destroying the bridge of Alcantara to secure his left flank. Appendix 14.

Colonel Mayne was at the bridge, but unfortunately his original order to blow it up if the enemy advanced, had not been rescinded when the return of the army had rendered that measure unnecessary. Nor had Mayne kept this order so secret but Victor heard of it, and sent a detachment with a view to provoke its execution. He succeeded, and that noble monument of Trajan genius was broken. Yet such is the nature of war that not long afterwards each army found its fall alike injurious to their interests, and as a matter of taste and of military utility both sighed over the ruined arches of Alcantara. Victor passed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 19th, removed the boat-bridge, and took post at Plasencia. Meanwhile Beresford returned to the north of Portugal, now again menaced by Soult; for during the forced inactivity of the British at Abrantes, the relative positions of the opposing armies were being changed in a manner to govern the result of the succeeding campaign.

Ney met Soult at Lugo with little cordiality on either side, yet they agreed, that the first should march from Coruña by St. Jago and Vigo against Carrera and the conde Noroña; that the second should enter the valley of the Syl to drive Romana upon Orense, where Ney might reach him and thus crush the Gallician warfare. Soult was then to menace the *Tras os Montes* by Bragança, in the view of keeping sir Arthur in the north while Ney opened a direct communication with the king and Victor. Soult marched on the 1st and 2nd of June to Monforte; and Franceschi, who was on the Fereira river, having La Houssaye's dragoons in support, was directed to scour the road to St. Jago, and then fall down the right

bank of the Tamburga towards Orense. At Monforte Soult halted six days to get up stores and to scour the country, for Romana had again raised the peasantry of the valleys; but on the 9th, Loison having entered the Val des Orres, feigned a movement towards Villa Franca as if he expected a French force from that side, yet the 10th passed the Syl and descended towards the Puente de Bibey. The 12th Franceschi, reinforced with infantry, reached Monte Furada on the Syl, and connected himself with Loison by Laronca. He was followed by Soult, who sent detachments towards Dancos and between Villa Franca and Lugo; Loison then forced the Puente de Bibey and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes: thus all the valleys descending to the upper Minho were cleared, and Romana was forced back to the lower Minho.

On the 13th Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, occupied Bollo and the Hermitage bridge, and patrolled to Gudina, Monterey, and the Sierra de Porto as far the sources of the Bibey. This was to ascertain by what road Romana would evade Loison, and to prevent his passing the left of the French army to regain the Asturias by Puebla de Senabria. On the 19th Soult, finding Romana was at Monterey, judged he would again attempt his former movement to Puebla de Senabria; wherefore he moved the army up the valley of the Bibey upon Viana, where there was a bridge and where many roads united. That day Franceschi fell in with the head of Romana's force and repulsed it, and next evening the whole French army was concentrated near Viana. Romana retreated precipitately during the night and many of his men dispersed, but Soult continued his movements until he reached the great road from Castille to Orense. From thence he sent Heudelet to threaten the Tras os Montes, and Mermet's infantry, reinforced with Lorge's dragoons, to observe the road of Puebla Senabria: Laborde and La Houssaye remained in reserve while Soult marched with the van guard to La Gudina. These movements led to many skirmishes, the most important at the Puente de Bibey, a position so strong it is inconceivable how men with arms could be persuaded to abandon it.

Romana's state was become desperate when a fresh misun-

derstanding between the French marshals saved him. Ney had entered St. Jago with ten thousand men, and Carrera fell back to Puente Vedra, where Noroña took the command and placed himself behind the Octavem river. His main body was at the bridge of San Payo, and the 7th Ney came up. Noroña had thirteen thousand men, nine field pieces, and two eighteen-pounders. Seven thousand men only were armed, but all the artillery was in battery at San Payo; that bridge was cut and swept by the heavy guns, a reserve of three thousand men were at Redondela, and sixty stragglers from sir John Moore's army, aided by some seamen and marines occupied the forts of Vigo. Some gun-boats, one manned by English seamen under captain Winter, having come up the river to San Payo, during the 7th, some desultory firing took place, and on the 8th two feeble attempts to force a passage at San Payo and Soto Mayor, were repulsed; but these were feints designed to occupy the Spaniards until some officers sent to ascertain Soult's position came back. They reported, on the authority of the peasants, that Soult was retreating to Castille; and I have been assured by an officer of Ney's personal staff, that he rashly concluded personal feelings had swayed Soult to betray the 6th corps, and in this error returned in wrath to Coruña. Soult, thinking this an underhand policy to keep him in Galicia, then stopped his operations and so Romana and Noroña were saved. For the latter could have been kept behind the Octavem while a column marched to Orense and barred Romana's escape; and Noroña, though his conduct was spirited and able and his position strong, could not afterwards have resisted ten thousand French troops led by the daring Ney: the principal object of keeping sir A. Wellesley in the north also vanished, he had reached Abrantes the day Ney arrived at San Payo. The duke of Dalmatia then marched to Zamora whither his sick had been sent, and his brother, Pierre Soult, had conducted three or four thousand convalescents and stragglers. To Zamora also the king sent artillery and stores to re-equip the troops, who had been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, and were, men and officers, dispirited alike by privations and the horrible nature of the warfare.

From Zamora Franceschi was sent on a mission to the king, and, refusing an escort, fell into the hands of the '*Capuchino*' an insurgent chief. He was transferred to Seville, and the supreme junta, treating him as criminal instead of the brave soldier he was, with infamous cruelty put him in a dungeon at Carthagea. The citizens ashamed of their rulers planned his escape, but he died in confinement at the moment his deliverance was certain. When his young wife, the daughter of count Mathieu Dumas heard of his fate, she refused nourishment, and expired!

S. Journal of Operations, MSS. Soult entered Zamora the 2nd of July, having rejected a proposition to hold Galicia jointly with Ney. The latter then formed a camp at Betanzos, disabled the land defences of Ferrol and Coruña, destroyed the arsenals and abandoned the province; but the Spaniards still dreaded him so much, that captain Hotham, commanding an English squadron off Coruña, found them hostile, and was compelled to spike their guns on the sea lines and force a Spanish garrison, left by Ney at Ferrol, to surrender. That marshal reached Astorga the 30th of July, having brought off his own and Soult's sick from Lugo. Thus Galicia was delivered. The peasantry had fought gallantly, but it was to protect their property; and when the French withdrew, the same motive led them to resist the payment of tithes and rents; their efforts were sustained also by English ships, arms, and money. It cannot be said they drove Ney from the land, he retained every important post to the last; and single French divisions had at different periods traversed the country from Coruña to Tuy: neither could the Gallicians prevent his overrunning the Asturias. Soult told the king that Galicia would wear out the strongest army, unless some great central points were fortified, from whence moveable columns could overrun the country; this plan of forts and columns was also Napoleon's view; and Soult thought six weeks labour and fifty thousand pounds would effect the object. But it was

Intercepted Despatches.

not the efforts of the Spaniards, it was the quarrels of the marshals, and the appearance of the British army on the Tagus, that delivered Galicia; for an intercepted letter, from Soult to the king, expressly assigned the danger menacing Victor

and Madrid as his reason for quitting the province, and his views were just, his march provident, yet it necessarily drew Ney after him: that marshal could not remain cooped up in a corner and estranged from the general operations. Galicia was therefore delivered by sir Arthur Wellesley.

Soult's movement upon Zamora, skirting the Portuguese frontier, drew Beresford as we have seen to the north, and all the regular Portuguese troops capable of acting were immediately collected round Almeida. The duke del Parque was at Ciudad Rodrigo, and that part of Romana's force cut off by Soult's previous movements had taken refuge there: thus not less than twenty-five thousand Portuguese and Spanish troops were around those fortresses. But these changes on the great line of invasion were rendered more important by simultaneous events on the eastern line, especially in Aragon, where Blake with a force of more than twenty thousand men, inflated by the success at Alcanitz, was menacing Zaragoza. Suchet had a detachment under general Faber near the mountains of Daroca, Blake attempted to cut it off, and though Faber retired in time to the Xalon, the Spaniards captured a convoy on the Huerba, and the 14th of June skirmished with the French at Bottorita. Blake then pushed a detachment into the plain of Zaragoza, and that city was so disturbed and Aragon so generally excited, that Suchet had some thoughts of retiring to Navarre; but Zaragoza was too important to abandon, and finally he resolved to fight a battle, for which Spanish imprudence offered him a fair field.

BATTLE OF MARIA.

On the 15th Blake slowly formed his troops near the village of Maria, on a line perpendicular to the Huerba, occupying both banks of that river. His cavalry was on the right, and towards two o'clock he extended his left to outflank the right of the French; but Suchet, now rejoined by Faber and a brigade from Tudela, stopped the evolution, by attacking that wing with some cavalry and light troops. The Spaniards then regained their first line of battle, and Blake attempting to reinforce his centre and left was immediately engaged in a

severe conflict. He repulsed the first assailants, but a violent storm arising, the armies could not see each other although close together, and the action ceased for a time. The position was surrounded by ravines, and the only retreat was by the bridge of Maria which was behind the right; hence

Suchet's
Memoirs. when the weather cleared, Suchet, having detected the defect, first engaged the centre and left, and then forming a column of cavalry and infantry broke quite through the Spanish horse and seized the bridge. Blake, at all times intrepid, concentrated the infantry of his centre and left, and stood for the victory, but the French overthrew him with great slaughter. One general, twenty-five guns and many standards were taken, yet darkness enabled the Spaniards to escape by the ravines, and they rallied the next day at Bottorita. The French lost a thousand men and general Harispe was wounded. During the fight, general Laval had remained with a brigade on the Monte Torrero to awe Zaragoza; he was now sent down the Ebro to cut off Blake's retreat, but neglecting that business suffered the Spaniards to retire unmolested in the night of the 16th. Their rear guard was attacked at Torrecilla on the 17th, and on the 18th the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake reinforced by some detachments had still fourteen thousand combatants, yet they were dispirited, and he had lost nearly all his guns. Suchet had fifteen thousand fighting men excited by victory.

BATTLE OF BELCHITE.

Blake occupied a range of hills half enclosing the town. His right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, was inaccessible for cavalry; the left was well covered. Behind the right a hill, topped by a building, overlooked all the position; it was held by a reserve, and offered a general rallying point, because there was easy communication from it to the left wing. The centre was on rough ground containing the walled town of Belchite, and the position was so compact, that after filling this line there was a strong reserve. Blake's design was to fight with his centre and right, but

Suchet.

Blake's
Despatch.

Suchet broke his dispositions by attacking the right and left simultaneously, while the centre was vexed by skirmishers. The left attack was the principal one, the French, preceded by a fire of artillery, soon closed, and though the Spanish guns fired heavily from the centre and right, the vigour of the attack, aided by the accidental explosion of a baggage waggon, created a panic on the left which spread along the line: Blake charged with his cavalry but failed, and the confusion which ensued was thus described by himself. 'One regiment fled without firing a shot, it was followed by another, and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun, and in a few moments the whole position was abandoned.'—'Thus we, the generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to make head against the enemy.' Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real spirit. Stung by this disgrace, he reproached his troops, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and with a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at Alcanitz.

This battle and the pursuit, in which were taken about four thousand prisoners and all the artillery ammunition and baggage of the Spaniards, made Suchet master of Aragon, and rendered the fifth corps under Mortier, who was at Valladolid, disposable for offensive operations. Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman's and Bonnet's divisions, three complete *corps d'armée*, furnishing six thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry disposable between Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, the loss of Galicia followed, yet Napoleon's invasion was unbroken; his troops had been stricken severely and shrunk from further aggression, they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his system.

CHAPTER IV.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, although passionate to enter Spain, was held back by various difficulties. His killed and wounded had not exceeded three hundred but the deaths from sickness were many. Four thousand men were in hospital, and fifteen hundred employed as escorts and in depôts. A reinforcement of five thousand had joined the camp, yet there were only twenty-two thousand combatants, and those liable to sudden diminution, because the ministers, still intent on Cadiz, authorized Mr. Frere to draw a garrison from sir Arthur's force whenever the junta agreed to admit one: the army was therefore weak in everything but spirit, the commissariat was deficient in transport, the soldiers nearly barefoot and without pay, the military chest empty, the hospitals full.

Appendix,
No. 14.

At a low estimation two hundred thousand pounds a month were required, and only one hundred and sixty thousand had been obtained in the two months of May and June, thirteen thousand being a temporary loan effected at Oporto. At Lisbon the rate of exchange was high, and notwithstanding the increased value conferred on government paper by the success on the Douro, that rate was rising. The Spanish dollar passed for five shillings, but Spanish gold sunk so much in value, that the commissary-general sent all he got from England or could collect in Lisbon, to Cadiz, to truck for dollars. Yet in all commercial places the exchange rose against England because of her great and increasing paper issues; and those issues, the extravagant supplies to Spain, and the Austrian subsidy, rendered it impossible to provide specie for the army, save by purchasing it all over the world with treasury bills and at an enormous loss. This evil, great in itself, opened a wide door to fraud, and made the war between France and England not so much a glorious contest of arms as a

struggle between public credit and military genius, victory being to the first nearly as pernicious as defeat.

Want of money, sickness, Cuesta's temper, and many minor difficulties kept the army inactive until the end of June. Victor's retreat from Torremocha, and the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one obstacle to offensive operations. Then sir Arthur, knowing eight thousand additional troops were off the rock of Lisbon, commenced a march by the northern bank of the Tagus, meaning to join Cuesta on the Tietar, and arrange a plan of operations against Madrid. But previous to embarking on that full broad stream into which the surges and eddies of the warfare which succeeded Napoleon's departure merged, it is fitting to show the general state and the exact strength each party brought to the encounter.

FRENCH POWER.

	Men.	Horses.
The French, having received a reinforcement of conscripts, amounted, in the beginning of July, including the king's guards, to.....	275,000	
In hospital	61,000	
Stragglers and prisoners borne on the states, 7,000 }	68,000	
Total under arms	207,000	36,000
The military governments, lines of correspondence, garrisons, and detachments, absorbed	32,000	3,000
<i>Present under arms in the field,</i>	175,000	33,000

The strength and situation of each *corps d'armée* was as follows:—

Under the King, covering Madrid.

	Inf. & Art.	Cavalry.
First corps, Victor, in the valley of the Tagus	20,881	4,200
Fourth corps, Sebastiani, La Mancha	17,490	3,200
Division of Dessolles, Madrid	6,864	
King's French guards, Madrid, about	4,000	1,500
Total	49,235	8,900

In Old Castille, under marshal Soult.

	Inf. & Art.	Cavalry.
Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca	17,707	2,883
Fifth corps, Mortier, Valladolid	16,042	874
Sixth corps, Ney, Astorga, and its vicinity	14,913	1,446
Total	48,662	5,203

In Aragon, under general Suchet.

	Inf. & Art.	Cavalry.
Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcanitz, &c.	15,226	2,604

In Catalonia, under marshal Augereau.

	Inf. & Art.	Cavalry.
Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona	30,593	2,500

To these must be added twelve hundred men belonging to the battering train; four thousand infantry under Bonnet at Santander; two thousand two hundred cavalry under Kellerman in the Valladolid country. The fortresses were—St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, St. Andero, Burgos, Leon, Astorga, on the northern line.—Jaca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora, on the central line. Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern line.

This exposition shows with what a power Napoleon had fastened upon the Peninsula during his six weeks' campaign. Much had been lost since his departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards down, and like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes was immovable to their writhings. Nevertheless, the state of Spain was an ameliorated one, compared to that which, four months before, the vehemence of the emperor's warfare had produced. The elements of resistance were again accumulated, and the confidence of success was in full vigour; for it was in the character of this people, while grovelling on the earth to suppose themselves standing firm, and when crawling in the gloom of defeat to imagine they were soaring in the full blaze of victory. The cessation of conquest caused by the personal jealousies of the marshals and the king's want of vigour, was attributed to fear, to weakness, to the pressure of the Austrian war. It was not considered that the want of unity, checking conquest, would cease when the French were placed on the defensive; the might of France was not duly weighed, and the strength of Austria was unduly exalted. The disasters at Ucles, Almaraz, Zaragoza, Rozas, Cardadeu, and Valls; at Ciudad Real, Medellin, Braga, Oporto, and in the Asturias, were all forgotten; the French had been repulsed from Portugal! they had not taken Seville! This was weakness; and when the French were supposed weak, the others, by

a curious reasoning process, concluded they were themselves strong. Hence the fore-boasting was at this period like that after Baylen, and the estimates of relative numbers almost as absurd. The utmost amount of the French force was not thought to exceed one hundred and twenty thousand, even by sir Arthur Wellesley; of these fifty thousand were supposed to be on the French side of the Ebro, and the whole only waiting for an excuse to abandon the Peninsula.

SPANISH POWER.

The Spanish armies, numerous on paper, and the real amount considerable, were inadequate to the exigencies and the resources of the country. Before Blake's strength was broken at Belchite, there were under arms twelve thousand cavalry, and one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, exclusive of irregular bands and armed peasantry. After Blake's defeat, the regular forces, capable of taking the field in the south-eastern provinces, were about twenty thousand, of which ten thousand under Coupigny were watching Barcelona or rallying under Blake; the remainder were in Valencia, where Caro, Romana's brother, had taken the command. In the north-western provinces there were twenty-five thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were in Galicia, three or four thousand in the Asturias under Vorster and Ballesteros, the remainder under del Parque, who was directed to organize a new army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. In Andalusia, or covering it, there were seventy thousand men. Of these, twenty-three thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry were assembled in the Morena near St. Elena and Carolina, under Venegas; thirty-eight thousand, including seven thousand cavalry, were in Estremadura under Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of both armies. These three grand divisions were called the armies of *the right, the centre, and the left.*

Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, Mequinenza, Taragona, Tortosa, Valencia, Carthagena, Alicant belonged to the army of the right; Cadiz and Badajos to that of the centre; Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and Ferrol to the army of the left. The

Spanish troops were not serviceable in proportion to their numbers, most of them were new levies the rest ill-trained; the generals had lost nothing of their presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their mutual jealousies were as strong as ever. Cuesta, hating the junta, was feared and hated in return, and Venegas was placed at the head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. Romana also was obnoxious to the junta, and in return, with more reason, the junta was despised and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia, generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to the public welfare, satisfied if the war was kept from their own doors. In Catalonia there never was any unanimity. Blake had abandoned Romana in Galicia, and was Cuesta's enemy; for these reasons he was invested with supreme power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia. The armies of Cuesta and Venegas were hotbeds of petty factions. Albuquerque wanted chief command, and Frere intrigued for him, being still under the delusion that he was to conduct the military instead of the political service. In April he had pressed on the junta, that five thousand cavalry and some infantry, taken from Cuesta and Venegas, should be given to Albuquerque for offensive operations in La Mancha: this, he said, would, '*if the enemy refused to take notice of it, become a very serious and decisive movement.*' And without informing sir Arthur, or awaiting the result of his march against Soult, he pretended to the junta, that the co-operation of the British army with Cuesta, which it was the English general's first wish to attain, could only be the price of assent to this ridiculous project! In his zeal to procure an army for Albuquerque he even urged that Venegas should be displaced, but Cuesta and the junta alike, peremptorily rejected that plan as passing all decorum. Frere attributed this to mean jealousy of Albuquerque's high birth and capacity; yet the junta had sufficient reason to refuse the duke an independent command; for though a brave good officer he was duped by a woman who corresponded with the enemy. Fearing to anger him she was not at first meddled with; but finally she was shut up, and meanwhile he could not be entrusted with command. Thus Mr. Frere's intrigues failed, and sir Arthur neglecting his project, advised the junta

not to weaken but reinforce Cuesta, not to assail the French in La Mancha or Estremadura, but to preserve a strict defensive in all quarters.

At this time the supreme junta was in dread of the old junta of Seville, and its folly, arrogance, and neglect of the public weal furnished ample grounds for attack. After the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, the king had employed Joachim Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his service, to negotiate for the submission of the junta. The proposals were spurned, and in suitable terms, for dignified sentiments and lofty expressions were never wanting to the Spaniards; yet taken with their deeds, they were but a strong wind blowing shrivelled leaves. The junta failed not to make the nation remark their patriotism, and on every occasion loudly praised themselves; they were however Spaniards of a different temper; men anxious to check the abuse of power, to lay bare ancient oppressions, and recur to first principles for present reforms and future government. They avowed the misrule which had led to the misfortunes of Spain; and knowing that national independence may co-exist with tyranny, yet is necessarily joined with civil and religious liberty, they desired to assemble the ancient cortex and give the people assurance that independence was worth fighting for; and that their sufferings and exertions would lead to a sensible good instead of a mere choice between an old and new despotism. These men were powerful enough to have a manifesto to their purpose drawn up by the junta; and it would have been published if the English ministers had not interposed, for their object was not to serve Spain but to hurt Napoleon. Frere opposed the publication, and not ambiguously hinted that England's displeasure, and the vengeance of the partizans of despotism in Spain, would fall on the junta if this approach to liberty was made. He assured his own government that he thought it right to check a tendency to freedom at the outset; but he knew the members of the junta would '*shrink from the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures which they held out,*' an expression meant for praise! His sentiments were then very agreeable to his immediate superior Canning, and furnish a curious contrast to the liberality which that politician afterwards thought it for his interest to affect.

Pretending to write as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed don Martin Garay:—

‘ If we have indeed passed three centuries under an arbitrary government, let us not forget that it is a price which we pay for having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of the globe; that the integrity of this immense power rests solely on these two words, religion and the king. If the old constitution has been lost by the conquest of America, our first object should be to recover it; but in such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so much in the acquisition. From this consideration, it appears to me that we ought to avoid, as *political poison*, any *annunciation of general principles, the application of which it would be impossible to limit or qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should quote them in favour of themselves*. But let us allow that we have made a *bad exchange in bartering our ancient national liberty for the glory and extension of the Spanish name*. Let us allow that the nation has been deceived for three centuries, and that this error should at all hazards, be immediately done away. Even though it were so, it does not appear *very becoming the character of a well educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of his forefathers*, or to complain of what he has lost by their negligence or prodigality; and still less so, if it is done in the face of all the world: and what shall we say of a nation who would do this publicly, and after mature deliberation?’

This opposition caused the manifesto to be suppressed, and a new one, more consonant to Mr. Frere’s notions of what was due to their forefathers, was published, and a promise to convoke the cortes given, but without naming any specific time. The junta, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not as a body disposed to give free institutions, and now proceeded to prop up their own tottering power by severity. They had issued, previous to the manifesto, a menacing proclamation, in which they endeavoured to confound their political opponents with the spies and tools of the French; and having established a tribunal of public security, they caused it to publish an edict, in which all men who endeavoured to raise distrust of the junta, or who tried to overturn the government by popular

commotions, or other means by the junta reprobated, were declared guilty of high treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards, and sold to Napoleon: their punishment was to be death, and confiscation of property. Any person propagating rumours tending to weaken or soften the hatred of the people against the French, was instantly to be arrested and punished without remission, and rewards were offered for secret information upon these heads. This atrocious decree was not a dead letter. Many persons were seized, imprisoned, and executed, without trial or knowing their accusers. But the deepest stain upon the Spanish character, at this period, was the treatment experienced by prisoners of war; thousands, amongst them part of Dupont's troops who were only prisoners by a breach of faith, were sent to the Balearic Isles without any order being taken for their subsistence; and the junta when remonstrated with cast seven thousand ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera. At Majorca numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants in the most cowardly and brutal manner, and those left on Cabrera suffered miseries scarcely to be described. The supply of food, always scanty, was often neglected altogether, there was but one spring on the rock, and it dried up in summer; clothes were never given save by English seamen, who from compassion assisted them when passing the island. Thus afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness they lived like wild beasts while they could live, but perished in such numbers that less than two thousand remained to tell the tale of this inhumanity: it was no slight disgrace to England that her government failed to interfere.

And what were the efforts made for the defence of the country by this barbarous junta, which, originally assembled to discuss the form of a central government, had unlawfully retained their delegated power and used it so shamefully? There was a Spanish fleet and sailors sufficient to man it in Carthagea, and there was another fleet with abundance of seamen in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood and others pressed the junta constantly to fit these vessels out and use them, or place them beyond the reach of the enemy; their remonstrances were unheeded, the sailors were mutinous for want of pay, and

Appendix 7. even of subsistence; yet the government would neither fit out the ships themselves, nor suffer the English seamen to do it for them. When Romana and the insurgents of Galicia were praying Cradock to give them a few stands of arms and five thousand pounds, the junta possessed many millions of money; and their magazines in Cadiz were bursting with the continually increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving from England, which were left to rot as they arrived, while from every quarter not yet subdued, the demand for these things was incessant. The fleet in Cadiz might have been at sea early in February; in a week it might have been at Vigo with money and succours of all kinds for the insurgents in Galicia; after which, by skilful operations along the coast from Vigo to St. Sebastian, it might have occupied an enormous French force on that line of country. Instead of a fleet, the junta sent colonel Barrios, an obscure person, to steal through by-ways, to take command of men who were not in want of such leaders, and to murder prisoners.

In like manner, the Carthagena fleet could have been employed on the Catalonian and French coasts. The junta's real means were enormous, but their warfare was one of virulent publications against the French, and the assembling miserable peasants in masses, to starve for a while and then be cut to pieces by their experienced opponents. The system of false reports, also was persevered in without relaxation:—*'The French were beaten on all points—the marshals were slain or taken—their soldiers were deserting, or flying in terror at the sight of a Spaniard—Joseph had plundered and abandoned Madrid—Zaragoza had not fallen.'* Castro, envoy to the Portuguese regency, so late as April, anxiously endeavoured to persuade that government and the English general, that Zaragoza had never been subdued, and that the story of its fall was a French falsehood! In June, official letters were written to Beresford from the neighbourhood of Lugo, dated the very day Soult's army relieved that town, but not to give intelligence of that event; they announced the utter defeat of that marshal, and the capture of Lugo itself! The amount of the killed and wounded, the prisoners, were exactly stated, and

deceived Beresford, notwithstanding his experience of the people he had to deal with.

Proofs of the junta's corruption and incapacity are not confined to the records kept by British officers. Romana, a few months later, upon the question of appointing a regency, thus described their conduct: '*He himself had doubted if the central junta was a lawful government, and this doubt was general in the provinces through which he had passed; yet he had, to preserve the nation from anarchy, not only yielded obedience to it, but had forced the provinces of Galicia, Leon, and Asturias to do the same; because he thought an illegal government might be useful if it deserved the confidence of the people, and they respected its authority. The central junta was not thus situated; the people, judging of measures by their effects, complained that the armies were weak, the government without energy; that there were no supplies; that the promised accounts of the public expenditure were withheld; and yet, all the sums drawn from America, all the succours granted by England, the rents of the crown, and the voluntary contributions were expended. The public employments were not given to men of merit and true lovers of their country. Some of the junta rendered their power subservient to their own advantage; others conferred lucrative appointments on their relations and dependents. Ecclesiastical offices had been filled up to enable individuals to seize those rents for themselves which ought to be appropriated for the public service. There was no unity to be found; many of the junta cared only for the interest of their particular province, as if they were not members of the Spanish monarchy; they confirmed the appointments of the local juntas, without regard to fitness, and even assigned recompences to men destitute of military knowledge, who had neither seen service nor performed the duties assigned to them.*'

'*The junta, divided into sections, undertook to manage affairs in which they were unversed, and which were altogether foreign to their professions. Horses, taken from their owners under pretence of supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger in the sea-marshes; and many important branches of administration were in the hands of men suspected, both from their own*

conduct, and from their having been creatures of that infamous favourite who was the author of the general misery'

It was at this period the *Partidas* first commenced the *guerilla*, or petty warfare, which has been so lauded, as if that had been the cause of Napoleon's discomfiture. Those bands were many, because every robber who feared a jail, or could break from one; every smuggler whose trade had been interrupted; every friar disliking the trammels of his convent; every idler who wished to avoid the ranks of the regular army, was to be found either as chief or associate in a *partida*. The French, although continually harassed by the cruel murder of isolated soldiers and camp followers, and sometimes by the loss of convoys and strong escorts, were never thwarted in any great object by these bands; but the necessity of providing subsistence, and attaching men to his fortunes forced the guerilla chiefs generally to plunder his own countrymen; and one principal cause of the sudden growth of the *partidas* was the hope of intercepting the public and private plate, which under a decree of Joseph was being brought to Madrid; for he was driven to forced loans and to seize the property of suppressed convents and proscribed nobles, to maintain even the appearance of a court. This description will apply generally to the *partidas*, and *quadrillas* as the bands formed of smugglers were called; yet there were some chiefs actuated by nobler motives, by revenge, by a gallant spirit, and honest ambition, thinking thus to serve their country better than by joining the regular forces. Among the principal leaders may be placed, Renovales and the two Minas in Navarre and Aragon; Porlier, in the Asturias; Longa, in Biscay; Juan Martin, called the *Empecinado*, who vexed the neighbourhood of Madrid; Julian Sanchez in the Gata and Salamanca country; doctor Rovera, Pereña and some others in Catalonia; the frayle Nebot in Valencia; Julian Palarea, the *Medico*, between the Moreno and Toledo; the curate Merino, *El Principe*, and Saornil in Castille; the friar Sapia about Soria, Juan Abril near Segovia.

Renovales, a regular officer, raised the peasantry of the valleys between Pampeluna and Zaragoza after the fall of the latter city, but was soon subdued. Juan Martin, Rovera,

Julian Sanchez, and the student Mina, discovered military talent, and Sanchez was a very bold and honest man. But Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of the student, outstripped his contemporaries in fame. He shed the blood of prisoners freely, yet rather from false principle and peculiar circumstances than from any real ferocity, for his natural disposition was manly and generous; he did not possess any peculiar military genius, but to a sound judgment, he added surprising energy and a constant spirit. By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders of his own country, and never would suffer any *hidalgo* to join his band. From 1809 until the end of the war, he held the provinces bordering on the Ebro; and though often defeated and chased from place to place, he yet gradually increased his force, until, in 1812, he was at the head of more than ten thousand men, regularly paid and supplied by different means, one of which was remarkable:—he established a treaty with the French generals, by which everything but warlike stores, coming from France, had his safe conduct on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the subsistence of his followers: English succours were however his chief resource.

That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress of the French, is proved by the constant attempts of the principal chiefs to introduce the customs of regular troops; and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than fifty thousand of these irregular soldiers at one time in Spain; and so severely did they press upon the country, that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the good will of the nation would have been the extirpating of the *partidas*. Nevertheless this great unquestionable advantage was derived from them, and especially by the British; the French could never communicate with each other nor combine their movements except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph: an advantage equal to a reinforcement of fifty thousand men.

PORTUGUESE POWER.

Under the military polity already described, the ranks of the regulars and militia were rapidly filled, and England supplied arms and equipments. The Capitães Mor, or chiefs of districts gathered the ordenanças for defence, and the people, for the second time relieved from invasion by a British army, were disposed to accept the guidance of their deliverers. But the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded the efforts to draw forth the military resources of the kingdom. And so reluctant were the people to become soldiers, that, notwithstanding their hatred of the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority of the soldier's condition over that of the peasant or artizan, the recruiting even to the end of the war, presented the odious spectacle of men marched in chains to reinforce armies which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to have been a sacred cause. The actual number of regular troops armed and organized was about fifteen thousand; but notwithstanding their courage Beresford was reluctant to act with them separately from the British troops. Of the fortresses in a condition for defence the most important were Elvas, Albuquerque and Almeida in the first line; Abrantes and Peniché in the second; the citadel, and forts of Lisbon, Palmela and Suteval in the third. But there were many other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of the country to assemble upon. Hence, Portugal offered, not only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in itself, central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the English general to act without reference to the Spanish government or Spanish commanders: an advantage more justly appreciated at the end of this campaign than at the commencement. Such were the relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula, yet to take an enlarged view of affairs it is necessary to look beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest in Spain was now become an integral part of the great European struggle against France.

Napoleon had entered Vienna, and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube; but a severe check, at the battle of Esling, so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he deemed it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his empire for one gigantic effort which should restore the terror of his name. The appearance of inactivity, assumed by him while thus mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and as their hopes rose their boasts became extravagant, more especially in England, where to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow was regarded as a heinous offence. The government, buoyed up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble and effectual warfare in Portugal, than of nourishing and aiding the secondary and rather degrading hostility of conspirators, malcontents, and military adventurers in Germany. While sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two other armies were simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the French empire. The one of twelve thousand men drawn from Sicily, was to invade Italy, the southern parts of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on the Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the coast of England, where forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could boast of, and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies of the world combined, composed an armament designed to destroy the great marine establishment which the French emperor had so suddenly and portentously created at Antwerp.

So vast an expedition had never before left the British shores, neither any one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously conducted. The marine and land forces combined, numbered more than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of the bravest; the object in view was comparatively insignificant; yet it was not obtained; and this ill-fated army with spirit, and strength, and zeal, to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth perished in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren. And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of national honour that men were found in Parliament base enough to reprobate

the convention of Cintra, to sneer at sir John Moore, and to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even glorious! The operation against Italy was less unfortunate, not more ably conducted, and equally abortive. What with slow preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted; although during that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen and the energy of Salicetti the minister of police. It was indeed the wish of the English ministers to have the troops in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but yielding to the representations of sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make this display of military foolery. However it is not with the bad or good success of these expeditions this history has to deal; but with that direful ministerial incapacity, which suffered two men notoriously unfitted for war, to dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects, while a renowned commander placed at the most important point was left without an adequate force.

For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsula contest, sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were collected in mass, at the right place and communicating with a British force; for the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny of France, the principal army of that country had met with an important check; the great conqueror's fortune seemed to waver, and the moment had arrived when the British government was called to display all its wisdom and energy. The duke of York had performed his duty. He had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers; but the latter knew not their value, and instead of concentrating them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on the frontier of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding them; yet he commenced a campaign, upon which the fate of the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken

all the coasts of Spain, were waiting in Sicily and England for orders, which doomed the one part to mockery, the other to an inglorious and miserable death. Shall the deliverance of the Peninsula then be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted policy of men who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle under all the burden of their folly?

BOOK THE EIGHTH.

CHAPTER I.

CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA.

IN the foregoing chapters the real state of affairs in the Peninsula has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different aspect to the English general; because false informations, egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to mislead sir John Moore, were renewed at this period, and the allied nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters describing the enemy's misery and fears, nor was the camp free from these inflated feelings. Beresford was so credulous of French weakness, as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajoz, that Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers; nay sir Arthur himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the junta, perhaps also a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come. He had not then, as he did afterwards to his cost, probed Spanish rulers and Spanish generals, who were alike importunate for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support. And the English general was eager enough to fight: for he had gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt that if the duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of Cradock, be compelled to take some defensive position near Lisbon, an object of suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people.

There were three lines of offensive operations open:—

1°. *To cross the Tagus and join Cuesta's army, make Elvas and Badajos the base of movements, and attack Victor in front.* This line was circuitous, Estremadura could not supply provisions and forage, and the march of the British would have been too rapid for convoys. The enemy could cover himself by the Tagus, and the operations of the allies would have been cramped between the Sierra de Guadalupe and the mountains about Albuquerque and Alcantara; strong detachments must have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon on the right bank of the Tagus, and the communication between Victor and Soult being free, Beresford's corps would have been endangered.

2°. *To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the base of movements, and operate, in conjunction with Beresford del Parque and Romana, by Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas occupied the attention of the first and fourth corps on the Tagus.* This would separate the British from the most efficient, to act with the weakest and most irregular of the Spanish armies, and would leave Cuesta to the ruin his headstrong humour would certainly provoke. The loss of Seville, or of Lisbon, would inevitably follow, and the instructions of the English ministers now made the defence of the latter city paramount to every other object, save the military possession of Cadiz.

3°. *To march upon Plasencia and Almaraz, form a junction with Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, while Venegas operated in the same view by the line of La Mancha.* The obstacles in the way of this plan were—1°. Exposing Cuesta to a defeat by Victor before the junction; and after the junction the combinations would still be dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas's movements. 2°. The march would with reference to Soult's corps be a flank march; an unsafe operation at all times, but here, moving through the long narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly dangerous. Nevertheless it was adopted; nor were the reasons in favour of it devoid of force. The French immediately protecting Madrid were only estimated at fifty thousand; confidential officers, sent to the head-quarters of Cuesta and Venegas, ascertained their respective armies to be thirty-eight thousand for the first,

twenty-five thousand for the second; they were well armed and equipped, and the last certainly the best and most efficient army the Spaniards had yet brought into the field; and when Roche, the military agent, warned sir Arthur that however well Cuesta's men looked, they were not to be trusted, his admonition was disregarded. The English force in Portugal amounted to thirty thousand men, exclusive of the sick; twenty-two thousand being under arms on the frontier, and eight thousand at Lisbon. Thus it appeared that a mass of ninety thousand regular troops could be brought to bear on fifty thousand; besides which, there were Wilson's legion, a thousand strong, and the Spanish *partidas* of the Guadalupe and Sierra de Bejar.

As the ridge of mountains separating the valley of the Tagus from Castille and Leon was impracticable for artillery, except at Baños and Perales, it was supposed the twenty thousand men under Beresford and del Parque would suffice to block those passes, and that Romana, moving by the Trason Montes, would join del Parque: thus thirty thousand men, supported by two fortresses, would protect the flank of the British army in its march from Plasencia towards Madrid. But this calculation was false. Romana remained ostentatiously idle at Coruña; sir Arthur, never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of them; and having no experience of Spanish promises, trusted them too far, and misjudged the force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth corps at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid was unknown to him; the strength of Soult's corps, and the activity of its chief were underrated: instead of fifteen or twenty thousand harassed French troops without artillery, as he supposed, there were seventy thousand fighting men well equipped behind the mountains!

On the 27th of June, the English army, organized in the following manner, marched into Spain:—

Artillery.

Six brigades,	30 guns,	Major-general Howorth.
---------------	----------	------------------------

Cavalry.

Three brigades,	3047 sabres,	Lieutenant-general Payne.
-----------------	--------------	---------------------------

Infantry.

1st division of 4 brigades,	6,023	bayonets,	Lieut.-general Sherbrooke.
2nd do. 2 do.	3,947	do.	Major-general Hill.
3rd do. 2 do.	3,736	do.	Major-general Mackenzie.
4th do. 2 do.	2,957	do.	Brigadier-general Campbell.

5 divisions, 13 brigades, 19,710 sabres and bayonets,
1,287 engineers, artillery, and waggon-train.

Grand total 20,997 men, and 30 pieces of artillery.

Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon; and the other troops in march from that city, being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets, were organized in three brigades, under major-general Lightfoot and the brigadier-generals, Robert Craufurd and Catlin Crawford; but the leading brigade, under Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon the 28th of June. The troops moved in two columns upon Castello Branco, one by Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a boat-bridge was established. From Castello Branco they marched in one column, a flanking brigade, under general Donkin, exploring the country between Zarza Mayor and the Tagus. The 10th they reached Plasencia and were joined by one cavalry regiment and two battalions of infantry from Lisbon. Cuesta was then at Almaraz, and Victor whose intermediate movements must be noticed was at Talavera de la Reyna. The valley of the Tagus had been exhausted by the fourth and fifth corps, but the fertile valley of Plasencia was untouched; hence Victor, whose troops, weakened by the tertian fever, required good nourishment, resolved at first to take post there and throw a bridge over the Tietar at Bazagona. From Plasencia he could in two marches fall upon Cuesta if he passed the Tagus at Almaraz, and he could closely observe sir Arthur's movements, and open a communication with Soult and Mortier by the pass of Baños; but when his bridge at Bazagona was finished and his light troops were foraging the valley of Plasencia, the king, who had already withdrawn many of his forces to reinforce Sebastiani, ordered him to fall back upon Talavera, leaving rear guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order arrived the 22nd of June, it was the result of an indecision which none but great men and fools are

free from in war; the first because they see clearly, the last because they see nothing.

Sebastiani had reported that Venegas was reinforced and ready to invade La Mancha; and the king swayed by this false information, and disturbed by Cuesta's advance; alarmed also by Blake's progress towards Zaragoza the result of which was then unknown; had ordered St. Cyr to move to the aid of Suchet, and first weakened and then withdrew Victor from the Tietar: he even called Mortier up towards Avila, though, following Napoleon's orders, he should have been at Salamanca. Designing to fight Venegas, Joseph advanced to the Jabalon river in La Mancha; but the Spaniard retired to the Morena, and the king leaving some troops at Toledo returned to Madrid and restored Victor's troops. While he had been following a shadow, that marshal was in real danger; for the Jabalon was six long marches from Madrid, and for ten days the duke of Belluno having only fourteen thousand men, remained at Talavera without support, when sixty thousand men were menacing him from different points. Victor escaped damage, but his weakness served Cuesta, who had crossed the Tagus the 23rd June and pushed an advanced guard to Oropesa. He had thirty-eight thousand men, yet quietly allowed fourteen thousand French to make a flank march for three days only twelve miles from his position. And his negligent method was so obvious, that Victor's cavalry were preparing to punish him, when taking alarm, he recrossed the river again and proceeded to finish his bridges.

It was on the 28th of June that Victor, having removed his hospitals and depôts from Arzobispo, placed himself behind the Alberche, having an advanced guard in Talavera, and outposts at Calera and Gamonal; his detachments on the left watched the Tagus from the mouth of the Alberche to the Guadarama stream; on the right they observed, from Escalona, the Vera de Plasencia and the passes leading upon Avila. During this retrograde movement, unable to transport his pontoons, he burned fifteen at Bazagona and threw ammunition into the Tietar; his troops had been four days on quarter rations and were sickly, the Tagus was fordable, his flank was exposed, the danger imminent; but the British were still

at Abrantes, Cuesta was incapable, and affairs remained in this state until the English army reached Plasencia. Sir Arthur had seen the letter from Soult to Joseph, taken upon Franceschi, and had conversed with that general while passing towards Seville a prisoner; he thus learned that the 2nd corps was at Zamora, and the 5th corps at Valladolid; but of Ney's march from Galicia he knew nothing, and the tenour of Soult's letter seemed to recommend the retention of Galicia. Moreover an intercepted letter from Victor, dated the 23rd of June, was so desponding, that taken in conjunction with Soult's picture of difficulties, the general impression of French weakness and dismay was augmented.

Sir Arthur, though far from suspecting his real peril, finding two corps d'armée were behind the mountains on his flank, took additional precautions. He warned Beresford to watch the French movements and look carefully to the pass of Perales; and as the pass of Baños was also to be guarded, he applied to Cuesta. That general reluctantly consented that two battalions from his army, and two already quartered in Bejar on the other side of the pass, should unite to defend it; and that del Parque should also send troops to the pass of Perales. These measures would have sufficed against Soult if he had been as crippled as he was supposed to be, but were futile against his real power; and they became ridiculous when Cuesta sent only six hundred men with twenty rounds of ammunition: but this was part of a system which was now weighing heavily on the English general.

Cuesta was always dreaded by the supreme junta; and when the defeat at Belchite crushed Blake as a rival, the junta sought to make Venegas a counterpoise, by increasing his army and giving him the best troops. Still Cuesta was powerful, and to lessen him was a common object with the junta and with Mr. Frere, who wished to raise Albuquerque. Cuesta's natural obstinacy and violence were exacerbated by these intrigues, in which he erroneously thought sir Arthur was concerned; and hence, when the latter came to him at Mirabete on the 10th, and proposed at the instigation of Mr. Frere, that ten thousand men should be detached to Avila and Segovia, Cuesta absolutely refused, and would only give

two battalions and a few cavalry to reinforce Wilson, who was to act in the mountains on Victor's right. This refusal again baffled Mr. Frere, whose design was to have the detachment placed under Albuquerque; and it also forced the junta to other expedients for reducing the authority of Cuesta, whose obstinacy however saved his troops; the ten thousand men would have gone into the midst of the fifth corps, which, in expectation of such a movement, was at Villa Castin; and having been rejoined by colonel Briche's detachment from Catalonia it was eighteen thousand strong and supported by Kellerman's independent cavalry at Valladolid: the Spaniards would thus have been crushed, the campaign would have been ruined, and sir Arthur Wellesley's influence in Spain would have been destroyed at the outset by Mr. Frere's shallow pernicious intrigues.

At Mirabete the discussion between Cuesta and the English general lasted two days, but finally terminated in an agreement that both generals should march on the 18th against Victor; and that Venegas should push through La Mancha to Fuente Duenas and Villa Maurique on the upper Tagus. If Venegas' movement drew Sebastiani to that side, he was to be held in play while the allied armies defeated Victor; if Sebastiani disregarded it, Venegas was to march on Madrid, while sir Robert Wilson, reinforced with some Spanish battalions, was to menace that capital on the opposite quarter. But behind this fair plan foul intrigues were in activity which were to render it null. Previous to entering Spain, sir Arthur had ascertained that the valleys of the Alagon and Arago, and those between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo, were capable of nourishing his army, and he had sent commissaries there to purchase mules, and arrange with the alcaldes for the supply of the troops; he had obtained also warm assurances from the supreme junta that every needful article should be forthcoming, and their intendant-general, Lonzano de Torres, was at the British head-quarters with full powers. Relying upon these preparations he crossed the frontier with scanty means of transport, and without magazines; for Portugal could not furnish what was required, and the Portuguese peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting their own country; yet the

hazard did not appear great, because Mr. Frere, writing officially, described the people of Estremadura as viewing ‘*the war in the light of a crusade, and carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause!*’

From Castello Branco to Plasencia is but seven days’ march, but that time was sufficient to prove the bad faith of the junta, and the folly of Mr. Frere. Neither mules for transport, nor the promised help of the authorities, nor aid of any kind could be procured; and Lonzano de Torres, although to sir Arthur he freely acknowledged the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the inhabitants and the shameful conduct of the supreme junta; afterwards, without shame, asserted that the British troops had always received and consumed double rations, and were in want of nothing. This assertion was repeated by Martin de Garay the Spanish secretary of state, Appendix 15. the whole being a concerted plan, to afford the junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting a slur upon the English general’s conduct, if any disasters should happen. Sir Arthur, seriously alarmed for the subsistence of his army, wrote upon the 16th to Mr. Frere and to O’Donoghue, the chief of Cuesta’s staff; he stated to both the distress of the troops, and intimated his resolution *not to proceed beyond the Alberche*, unless his wants were immediately supplied. Faithful, however, to his agreement with Cuesta, he prepared to put his force in motion for that river.

On the 15th he knew that Ney had abandoned Coruña, but it was thought he had been recalled to France, and no change was made in the plan of campaign; it was not suspected that the sixth corps had then been sixteen days at Astorga, and in this ignorance the British general plunged into the valley of the Tagus. The line of march was intersected by several rivers with rugged banks and deep channels, whose flow is not much out of parallel with the Tagus. The course of the Alberche is nearly enclosed by that of the Tietar, and Wilson, ascending the right bank of the latter, gained the pass of Arenas which leads on Avila, and the pass of San Pedro Bernardo which leads upon Madrid. In this position, having four thousand troops, he covered the rich Vera de Plasencia and menaced Victor’s communication with the king. The

Semelé, MSS. French marshal was alarmed lest a movement See Plan 6. of the British army in the same direction should in a few marches nullify his position on the Alberche, and intercept his retreat to Madrid. He judged ill. That line of march was too rugged for rapid movement. Victor had twenty-five thousand men, and could not be trusted so near Cuesta; it was therefore essential to join the latter and the British general resolved to cross the Tietar, at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas upon Oropesa.

It is said the French are in military matters quicker than the English. Victor had wasted many days dragging pontoons from the Tagus to the Tietar, and he destroyed them when he retired; an English officer of the staff corps took the materials of an old house, felled some pine trees three miles from the Tietar, and in one day threw a solid bridge over that river by which the army passed on the 18th. The 20th it reached Oropesa, and halted the 21st. On that day Cuesta passed Oropesa and concentrated his whole force at Vellada, with exception of a small detachment sent up the southern bank of the Tagus to menace the enemy's bridge at Talavera. Victor immediately reinforced his posts at Talavera. His position seemed critical. The allies, covered by the Alberche, might still reach Escalona before he could, and might take post at Maqueda to cut him off from Madrid or push through Brunete to that capital. His sources of intelligence were however sure. He sent hussars to watch the upper Alberche and support the troops opposed to Wilson; and on the 21st, when Cuesta was in motion, he recalled his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions behind the Alberche.

On the 22nd, the allies moved forward in two columns, and Cuesta attacked the French rear guard near Gamonal with incredible ignorance, timidity and absurdity. Latour Maubourg, riding boldly on to the table land of Gamonal with only two thousand dragoons, forced Zayas to display the first Spanish line of fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; nor would he have gone back at all if the red uniform of England had not been descried on his right, when supported

by some infantry he regained the Alberche without loss. Six thousand Spanish horse and many batteries were close on his rear, yet they would not make even a partial charge, and by two o'clock the whole French army was concentrated. Ruffin's division on the left touched the Tagus and guarded the bridge over the Alberche, which was under the fire of fourteen guns; the heavy cavalry were in second line near the bridge, and the other divisions occupied higher ground on the right overlooking the surrounding country. Here they remained two days.

It was difficult to obtain information from the Spaniards by gentle means, and hence the French were usually better served than the British; the native generals never knew, nor cared to know anything about their enemy until they felt his blows; and up to this period sir Arthur's best sources of information were the intercepted French letters. Victor had been in position without change of numbers since the 7th, yet the inhabitants of Talavera could not or would not say anything about his strength or situation; nor could either be discovered until sir Arthur ascended the mountains south of the Tagus and from thence looked into the French position. The outline of an attack was then agreed upon, but when the details were to be arranged Cuesta went to bed! The British troops were in arms at three o'clock, next morning, Cuesta's staff were not aroused until seven o'clock, and finally the old man objected to fighting that day. There was more than inertness in these proceedings. Victor was well assured the allies would not attack, he had corrupted some of the Spanish staff, and the result of the discussions between sir Arthur and Cuesta at which only one officer on each side was present, became known to the enemy twenty-four hours afterwards; Cuesta himself was suspected of the treachery but apparently without reason.

In the course of the 23rd the Spanish outposts gave notice that the French were going to retreat, Cuesta then became willing to attack and proposed to examine the ground; he came in a coach with six horses, and when the rugged ground forced him to descend, he threw himself under a tree and went to sleep! Yet he was always ready to censure and thwart every plan of his great coadjutor. This time indeed he consented to fight, and the troops were put in motion early

on the 24th; but Victor had been again duly informed, and withdrawing his troops from the upper Alberche, fell back in the night to Torrijos. Thus the first combination failed, and the enemy's forces were accumulating dangerously around the allies; for Venegas had not passed Danyel, the king was collecting his whole strength between Toledo and Talavera, and Soult was gathering a more formidable power behind the mountains of Bejar. Sir Arthur knew not of this last danger or he would doubtless have returned at once to Plasencia, and secured his communications with Lisbon and with Beresford: but there were other powerful reasons to stop his advance.

Before he quitted Plasencia he had completed contracts with the alcaldes of the Vera de Plasencia, for two hundred and fifty thousand rations of forage and provisions, which, added to his previous collections, would have furnished supplies for ten or twelve days, a sufficient time to beat Victor and gain a fresh country. These rations had not been delivered, and his representations on the subject were by Cuesta and the junta disregarded; wherefore he gave both notice for the second time that he would not move beyond the Alberche, unless his wants were immediately supplied. This was unheeded, no means of transport had been provided for him, his troops were on half allowance, absolute famine approached, and when he demanded food he was answered with false excuses and false statements. Without food he could not move, but as his advance had been made in the exercise of his own discretion and without orders from his government, he had no room for hesitation, and expressing warmly his discontent with the supreme junta: he then declared he would withdraw from Spain altogether. This state of affairs and Cuesta's folly justified his anger, but the faithless and perverse conduct of the junta, only partially known to him, exceeded even the measure of Cuesta's obdurate folly. After consenting to the general plan of operations, the junta concluded that the allies in the valley of the Tagus would suffice to overthrow Joseph, and secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part; arguing with a stupid cunning that, keeping him safe, they would have a powerful force under one of their own creatures to maintain their power, while Cuesta's defeat if it happened would be to them a gain.

Venegas obeyed these treacherous orders, and the welfare of millions was made the sport of men who, never tired of praising themselves, have been by English writers lauded for patriotism!

As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying everything and doing nothing, sir Arthur's remonstrances drew forth many official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions, after their manner, but produced no amelioration. Mr. Frere also, thinking it necessary to make some apology for himself, declared the evil was deep rooted, and he had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils blighting the Spanish cause were deep-seated; and Mr. Frere, who could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, an indispensable preliminary to military operations and within his province, thought himself competent to direct all the operations themselves, which were in the province of the generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of the day, to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders, to insult sir John Moore, to pester sir John Cradock with warlike advice, and to arrange the plan of campaign for sir Arthur Wellesley's army without that officer's concurrence!

CHAPTER II.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S declarations were lost on Cuesta. A French army was retreating before him, the Pyrenees rose on his sanguine view, and, resolving to be first in Madrid, he pushed forward, reckless alike of military precautions and the friendly warning of the English general, who vainly recommended him to communicate quickly with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know he had separated from the British army. Heedless and headstrong, Cuesta crossed the Alberche, and not knowing by which road the French had retired pursued them on both. The 25th he sent one column to Torrijos and marched himself to St. Ollalla as if chasing a deer, but on the 26th he found that he had been hunting a tiger. Sir Arthur foreseeing the result of this folly had, notwithstanding his declaration, sent Sherbrooke with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry across the Alberche to Cazalegas, where, being centrally situated with respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support Cuesta and communicate with Wilson, who had been in the latter place since the 23rd. But a great and signal crisis was at hand, which can only be understood by an exact knowledge of the situations and proceedings of all the armies involved in this complicated campaign.

On the 30th of June, Soult, then at Zamora, had received a despatch from the emperor dated near Ratisbon and conferring on him the supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders to concentrate them and act decisively against the English. '*Wellesley*,' said Napoleon, '*will probably advance by the Tagus against Madrid; in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him.*' Thus, even at that distance and without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this all-knowing soldier foresaw the

leading operations as soon, and as certainly, as those who projected them. Soult imparted these instructions to the king, and made known his own opinions and designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of sir Arthur; but judging from the cessation of hostility in the north that he was in march to join Cuesta, he proposed to draw Suchet's corps to Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo and menace Lisbon; which he justly observed, would bring the English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal. And if, as some supposed, sir Arthur should unite at Bragança with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to oppose them.

In pursuance of this view, Soult ordered Mortier to approach Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the 2nd corps; Ney also was directed to march with the sixth corps by the left bank of the Esla to Zamora. But the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment the king, alarmed by Sebastiani's report, drew the fifth corps to Villa Castin, while Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon, mortified also at being placed under the orders of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, sorely crossed by these untoward circumstances, then sent his brother's division of light cavalry and Heudelet's infantry from Zamora and Toro to Salamanca; with orders to explore the course of the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and scour the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was still charged with the general government of the province. On the 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became known, and it was manifest sir Arthur had no design to act north of the Douro; then Soult advanced with the remainder of the second corps to Salamanca; and partly by authority, partly by address, made Ney put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier's dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile the king returned from the Jabalon, and though incredulous of sir Arthur's junction with Cuesta, agreed to Soult's project

against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier to regain Valladolid.

On the 13th of July Soult, hearing that the British army, reinforced from Lisbon, was on the eastern frontier of Portugal and meant to operate by the Tagus, again moved the king as to the siege of Rodrigo, promising to have his own three corps in full activity within fifteen days if his demands were complied with. The most important of these demands were a battering-train; the concentration of numerous detachments which weakened the active bodies; and a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts to enable the old troops employed on the communications to join their eagles. Victor should,

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

he said, watch Cuesta and prevent his uniting with the English to disturb the siege; and be prepared also to join the other corps and give battle if one became necessary: when Ciudad fell, Almeida could be invested and the English communication with Lisbon menaced. Joseph replied on the 17th through marshal Jourdan. He approved of the plan but could not meet the demands. He proposed instead, that Soult should reinforce Kellerman and Bonnet with ten thousand men, to seize the Asturias and strengthen the communications with France. This drew the following remonstrance:—*‘Under present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. Let us concentrate on a few points, capable of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall recover all our ground.’* Then reiterating his own advice, Soult concluded thus:—*‘I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed.’* It is remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at the same time, says, *‘I conceive the French are dangerous only when in large masses.’*

During this correspondence, Heudelet’s division, having pushed del Parque’s advanced guards back on Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that a great movement of troops was taking place near that city; and that sir Arthur, advancing quicker than was expected, had already reached Plasencia. Wherefore on the

18th Soult directed Mortier upon Salamanca, and reinforced Heudelet with Mermet's division, Ney remaining on the Esia facing the Tras os Montes. Thus not less than fifty thousand men were about Salamanca, with cavalry-posts pointing towards the pass of Baños, on the day sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him!


Having put his three corps in motion, Soult despatched Foy to Madrid to tell of sir Arthur's march and arrange future combinations. '*It is probable,*' he said, '*that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will compel the English general to change his plan; but if he shall already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, to fall upon him altogether and crush him. Thus his campaign will be finished, and our operations may go on with advantage.*' Foy reached Madrid the 22nd, and a few hours afterwards the king heard that the allies were at Talavera, and that Wilson, whose force was strangely exaggerated, was at Escalona. The die was cast. Joseph left general Belliard with three thousand men in the Retiro, ordered Soult to move instantly on Plasencia, and marched himself with his guards and reserve by Mostoles to join Victor. The 23rd, being at Naval Carneiro, he got notice that Victor would retreat in the night to Torrijos, and would be in two days behind the Guadarama river; whereupon turning to his left he descended the Guadarama and effected his junction the 25th. Meanwhile Sebastiani, deceiving Venegàs near Danyel, made forced marches to join the king; but he left three thousand men at Toledo to compel Venegas if he advanced to cross the Tagus higher up at Aranjuez. Thus fifty thousand combatants and ninety pieces of artillery were concentrated on the morning of the 26th behind the Guadarama stream, within a few miles of Cuesta's advanced guard. The Spanish main body was then at St. Ollalla, Sherbrooke was at Casalegas, and sir Arthur at Talavera; the French were therefore in full march to attack while the allies were separated in four unconnected bodies, of which three were enclosed as in a net by the Alberche and the Tagus. Napoleon's stroke on such

an occasion would have been swift and deadly: Joseph was slow.




Victor had acted like an able commander when he fell back on Toledo instead of Madrid. Toledo was the strategic pivot upon which the French movements turned. It was only through that city Venegas could co-operate with the allies on the Alberche, and if the latter advanced to connect themselves with him Soult's operations rendered their destruction certain: every step forward was a stride towards ruin. The king knew Foy would on the 24th reach Soult, who being about Salamanca was only four marches from Plasencia and might be in the valley of the Tagus the 30th; hence to insure success the royal army needed only to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This plan Soult recommended, the king assented, and marshal Jourdan strenuously supported it. Cuesta's folly, Venegas' duplicity, the separation of the allies, the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of famine, a circumstance not unknown to Victor, greatly facilitated this project; and it did not preclude the king from punishing the Spanish army, scattered as it was, without order discipline or plan. Cuesta had some perception of his danger on the 25th, and gave orders to retreat on the 26th. But the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama at two o'clock in the morning of that day, drove the Spanish cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon, where Zayas had drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand horsemen, and eight guns on a plain.

COMBAT OF ALCABON.

Zayas had his right on the road of Domingo Perez, his left on a chapel of the same name. Latour Maubourg's cavalry advanced in a parallel line against the position and a cannonade commenced; but when the head of the French infantry appeared in sight the Spaniard's broke, and fled in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed at full gallop by the horsemen, who pressed them sorely; the panic would then have spread through the whole army but for the courage of Albuquerque, who came up with a division of three thousand fresh cavalry, and held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated in the greatest disorder



*The Battle of
TALAVERA
at the period of the final attack.
28th July 1809.*

Gay's Infantry
 English
 French
 Spanish

towards the Alberche. At St. Ollalla the pursuit slackened, the main body halted, and the advanced guards, save a few cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo; no attempt was made to profit from the unconnected position of the allies—a gross and palpable error; for either by the sword or dispersion the Spaniards lost four thousand men, and such was their fear it required only a slight pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque indeed showed front, but his efforts were unavailing, and the disorder continued to increase, until Sherbrooke, marching out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent. There was no concert between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was unfavourable to a retiring party, and as yet no position upon which the combined forces could retire had been agreed upon. What then would have been the consequence if the whole French army had borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered masses!

Sir Arthur seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a battle was at hand; and being persuaded that in a strong defensive position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock, besought Cuesta, while Sherbrooke's people could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where there was ground suited for defence. Cuesta's uncouth nature again broke forth. His beaten army, dispirited, fatigued, bewildered, were clustering on a narrow slip of low flat land between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas; the first shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of dispersion; yet it was in vain sir Arthur pointed out this, and entreated him to avoid the fall of the rock thus trembling over head: he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by further retreat, that he would fight where he stood, and in this mood passed the night. At daylight, the British general renewed his solicitations, at first fruitlessly, but when the enemy's cavalry came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly yielded, yet, addressing his staff with frantic pride, said, '*He had first made the Englishman go down on his knees.*'

Notes by
the Duke of
Wellington,
MSS.

Now by virtue of his genius sir Arthur assumed the com-

mand of both armies. He left Mackenzie's division and a brigade of cavalry to cover a retrograde movement, took a position six miles in the rear, and recalled Wilson who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, and would certainly have entered Madrid. Between the Alberche and Talavera the country was a plain covered with olive and cork trees; and nearly parallel with the Tagus at a distance of two miles, a chain of round steep hills bounded this woody plain. Beyond these hills, and separated from them by a deep and rugged valley something less than half a mile wide, was the mountain-ridge which divides the Alberche from the Tietar; hence a line drawn perpendicular to the Tagus would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles, and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains. Sir Arthur taking Talavera, which was built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right of the Spaniards there; drawing them up in two lines, their left resting upon a mound where a large field-redoubt was constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry was posted. The front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud walls, breast-works and felled-trees; the Spanish cavalry was posted behind their infantry; and their rear was supported by a very large house in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their disposition be even seen; thus one-half of the line of battle was rendered nearly impregnable, yet held by the worst troops.

This front was prolonged by the British infantry. Campbell's division formed in two lines touched Cuesta's left; Sherbrooke's division stood next to Campbell's, but arranged on one line only, because Mackenzie's division, destined to form the second line, was then near the Alberche. Hill's division should have closed the left of the British, by taking post on the highest hill in the chain before mentioned as bounding the flat and woody country, yet from some cause unknown the summit of this height was not immediately occupied. The whole line was two miles in length; the left rested on the ravine between the round hills and the mountain; the front was covered by a water-course, which commencing about the centre of the line became deep as it passed

the left and was a chasm in the valley. Part of the British cavalry was with Mackenzie, part in the plain beyond the left, part behind the great redoubt at the junction of the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty guns. The Spaniards could only produce thirty-three or thirty-four thousand men, yet they had seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with forty-four thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; the French came on with eighty guns, and including the king's guards nearly fifty thousand men, of which seven thousand were cavalry; but what a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did not exceed nineteen thousand.

Appendix 9.

Joseph had put his army in motion before day-light the 27th. Latour Maubourg's cavalry led the march, Victor, Sebastiani and the royal guards and reserve followed in succession. At one o'clock Victor reached the heights of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, then taking up their position, could be seen, but their dispositions could not be made out because the forest masked them. Victor however, knowing the ground, guessed their true position, and the king following his advice directed Sebastiani against the allied right, the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself against their left: the guards and the reserve supported Sebastiani. Two artillery roads led from the Alberche; one, the royal road to Talavera, was taken by the fourth corps and the reserve; the other, passing by the *Casa des Salinas*, led directly against the allies' extreme left and was taken by Victor, who to reach the Casa had to ford the Alberche and march two miles through the forest. A thick dust indicated the presence of Mackenzie's division and a brigade of cavalry near the Salinas, and no patrols had been sent out, a negligence which brought on the

Semelé's
Journal,
MSS.

COMBAT OF SALINAS.

About three o'clock, Lapisse and Ruffin's divisions came so suddenly on, that the British outposts were surprised and sir

Arthur who was in the Casa hardly escaped capture. The charge was hot, the English brigades were separated, and being principally young soldiers fired upon each other, and were driven in confusion from the forest to the plain. In the midst of this disorder the 45th, a stubborn old regiment, and some companies of the 60th rifles kept good array, and sir Arthur in person restored the fight; the enemy was thus checked; but the division lost about four hundred infantry, and, supported by two brigades of cavalry, hastily crossed the plain to regain the position. Mackenzie took post with one brigade behind the guards in the centre; colonel Donkin finding the hill on the extreme left still unoccupied crowned it with the other brigade, and so accidentally filled the position: the cavalry formed in column behind the left.

Victor brought his artillery, his light cavalry and Villatte's infantry, to the Casa, and then issuing from the forest, rapidly crossed the plain, and made up with a fine display close to the left of the allies, where he seized an isolated hill in front of Donkin and opened a heavy cannonade. About the same time the 4th corps and the reserve approached the allies' right, and sent their light cavalry forward to make Cuesta show his line of battle. The horsemen rode boldly up and commenced a pistol skirmish, whereupon the Spaniards made a general discharge of musketry and then, as if deprived of reason, ten thousand infantry and all the artillery broke and fled. The artillerymen carried off their horses, the infantry threw away their arms, the adjutant-general O'Donoghue was foremost in flight, and even Cuesta himself went off slowly. The panic spread and the French charged, but sir Arthur flanked the main road with some English squadrons, and the ditches on the opposite side rendered the ground impracticable for horsemen; the Spaniards who remained used their muskets with effect and the French finally retreated with some loss. Most of the runaways fled to Oropesa, saying the allies were defeated and the French in hot pursuit; thus the rear became a scene of incredible disorder; the commissaries went off with their animals, the pay-masters carried away their money-chests, the baggage was scattered, and the alarm spread far and wide. Nor is it to be concealed,

that some English officers disgraced their uniform on this occasion. When Cuesta recovered himself he sent many cavalry regiments to head the fugitives and drive them back, and part of the artillery and some thousands of the infantry were thus recovered during the night; yet in the next day's fight, the Spanish army was less by six thousand men than it should have been, and the redoubt in the centre was silent for want of guns.

COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.

The hill on the left of the British was the key of the position. It was steep, rugged towards the French, and rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom, but towards the English side it was of smoother ascent. Victor seeing Donkin's brigade feeble and the high point of the hill unoccupied, conceived the design of seizing the latter by a sudden assault; the sun was sinking, yet the twilight, and the confusion amongst the Spaniards on the allies' right, appeared so favourable for this project, that without informing the king he directed Ruffin's division to attack; Villatte followed in support, and Lapisse was ordered to engage with the Germans, as a diversion for Ruffin, yet not seriously. The assault was quick and vigorous. Donkin repulsed the assailants in his front, but others turning his left, gained the top of the hill. At this critical moment Hill was sent to his aid; it was nearly dark, and that officer, while giving orders to the colonel of the 48th regiment, was shot at by some troops from the highest point, thinking they were stragglers from his own ranks firing at the enemy, he rode up to them in company with his brigade-major Fordyce, and in a moment found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed, and Hill's horse was wounded by a grenadier who roughly seized the bridle also, but the general, spurring hard, broke the man's hold, and galloping down met the 29th regiment, which he led up with such a fierce charge the French could not sustain the shock.

Having thus happily recovered the summit he brought up the 48th, and a battalion of detachments composed of sir John Moore's stragglers; and these in conjunction with the 29th

Semelé's
Journal,
MSS.

and Donkin's brigade presented an imposing mass. In time they came, for the French troops repulsed were only a part of their ninth regiment forming Ruffin's van; the other two regiments of his division had got entangled in the ravine, and the attack had only subsided. Lapisse also was in motion and soon opened his fire on the German legion, while all the battalions of the 9th regiment, having reformed again, mounted the hill in mass. The fighting now became vehement, and the opposing flashes of musketry seen in the darkness showed with what a resolute spirit the struggle was maintained; the combatants were scarcely twenty yards asunder and the event seemed doubtful; yet soon the well-known shout of the British soldier was heard above the din of arms, and the enemy's broken troops were driven once more into the ravine below. Lapisse who had made some impression on the German legion immediately abandoned his false attack, and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost eight hundred men, and the French about a thousand. Then the bivouac fires blazed up on both sides, and the French and British soldiers were quiet; but, at twelve o'clock, the Spaniards on the right, hearing some horsemen moving, opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which lasted for twenty minutes without any object; and during the remainder of the night, the whole line was frequently disturbed by their desultory firing which killed several men and officers in the British lines.

Victor having learned from the prisoners the exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown, reported his own failure to the king, and proposed that a second attempt should be made next morning at daylight. Jourdan opposed this as a partial enterprise which could not lead to any great result; Victor was earnest for the trial, spoke of his intimate knowledge of the ground, won Joseph's assent, and immediately made the following dispositions for the attack. His own artillery being formed in one mass, on a height corresponding to that on which the English left was posted, commanded the great valley on its right, could sweep heavily along the summit of the hill in front, and obliquely search the whole of the British line to the left as far as the redoubt between the allied armies. Ruffin's division was placed in advance, Vil-

latte's in rear of this artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine. Lapisse occupied some low table land opposite to Sherbrooke's division, Latour Maubourg's cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse, and Beaumont's cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin. Hill's division was concentrated in their front, the English cavalry was massed behind the left, the parc of artillery, and hospitals, were established, under cover of the height, between the cavalry and Hill.

COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.

At daybreak Ruffin's troops, drawn up two regiments abreast and supported by a third in columns of battalions, went forth against the left of the British, some directly against the front, some by the valley on their right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid and steady, they were followed by Villatte's division, and the assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, which rattled round the height and swept away the English ranks by sections. The sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, and then the French guns were pointed towards the British centre and right, while the grenadiers closed upon Hill, and the height sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the compact formation of the troops on both sides, and here and there, small bodies were seen struggling for the mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied and reached the summit; but the English reserves were always ready to vindicate their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy. Hill was wounded, and his men fell fast, yet the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step by step at first and slowly to cover the retreat of their wounded; yet finally, unable to sustain the increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke in disorder, and returned to their own position covered by the renewed play of their powerful artillery.

To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made,

for the English guns were few and of small calibre; and when sir Arthur desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him two pieces! yet those were serviceable, and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy's retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred, but the English cavalry, having retired during the night for water and forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the mountain beyond the left, taught the English general that he should have prolonged his flank on that side; wherefore, obtaining Bassecour's division from Cuesta he placed it on the mountain, and brought up a mass of his own cavalry behind the extreme left, with the leading squadrons looking into the valley: at the same time Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta, came there with his horsemen, and thus a formidable mass, six lines deep, was presented in opposition.

Joseph now held a council with Jourdan and Victor upon the expediency of a general battle. Jourdan said, 'When the valley and the mountain were unoccupied on the 27th, the Spaniards should have been menaced to attract attention; then, in the night, the French army should have been silently placed in columns at the entrance of the valley ready to form in order of battle at day-break, perpendicular to the English position, and so have assailed that hill from whence Victor has been twice repulsed. That disposition would have forced the allies to change their front, and during their movement they might be attacked and beaten; it cannot now be attempted as the English general has occupied both valley and mountain. *The only prudent line is to go behind the Alberche and await Soult's operations on the English rear.*' Victor opposed this. He promised to carry the hill notwithstanding his former failures, provided Sebastiani would assail the centre and right at the same time, finishing his argument thus: '*If such a combination fails it is time to renounce war.*'

Joseph was embarrassed. He liked Jourdan's counsel, yet feared Victor would cause the emperor to believe a great

opportunity had been lost; and while thus wavering, a despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared he could only reach Plasencia between the 2nd and 5th of August. A detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared near Toledo, that general's advanced guard was approaching Aranjuez, and the king was troubled by the danger of Madrid, because the stores, reserve artillery, and general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there: moreover, the tolls at the gates formed almost the only pecuniary resource of his court, so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war. These considerations overpowered his judgment; adopting the worse counsel, he resolved to succour the capital, but first to try the chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war. Joseph should have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult, the advantages were obvious, the success sure. The loss of Madrid was nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary. If he thought otherwise, he should have fought for it before; that is, he should have drawn the fifth corps to him and fallen with the utmost rapidity upon Cuesta the 26th; his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, and before twelve o'clock on the 27th, the English army would have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. Having neglected that opportunity when his army was full of ardour, he now with singular inconsistency, resolved to fight when his enemies were prepared, strongly posted, and in the pride of success; the confidence of his own troops being shaken by the partial action of the morning.

While the French generals were engaged in council the men on both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger, the regular service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces of wheat in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who had fought, and who were yet to fight so hardly. In the Spanish camp confusion and distrust prevailed, Cuesta inspired terror without confidence, and Albuquerque, from conviction or instigated by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp charged with this

message delivered it to Donkin, who carried it to sir Arthur. The latter, seated on the summit of the hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat startling message without so much as turning his head, and then drily answering—‘*Very well, you may return to your brigade,*’ continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of the man; but throughout that day, sir Arthur’s bearing was that of a general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity the fate of fifty thousand men depended.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

Soon were the dispositions of the French completed. Ruffin on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, and moving by the foot of the mountain turn the British left. Villatte was to menace the hill with one brigade, and guard the valley with another; which being strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, was to connect Ruffin’s movement with the main attack.

Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons and the king’s reserve, was to pass the water-course in front of the English centre, and fall with half his infantry upon Sherbrooke’s division; while the other half, connecting its attack with Villatte’s brigade, mounted the hill and made a third effort to master that important point.

Milhaud’s dragoons were on the main road opposite Talavera, to keep the Spaniards in check; the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into the centre behind Sebastiani, who was to assail the right of the British line. Part of the light cavalry supported Villatte’s brigade in the valley, part remained in reserve, and a number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the principal mass remained on the French hill with the reserve of light cavalry: there also Victor stationed himself to direct the movements of the first corps.

From nine o’clock in the morning until midday, the field of battle offered no appearance of hostility. The weather was

intensely hot, and the troops on both sides mingled without fear or suspicion to quench their thirst at the little brook which divided the positions. Before one o'clock however, the French soldiers were seen to gather round the eagles, and the rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour later, Joseph's guards, the reserve and the fourth corps were descried near the centre of the king's position marching to join the first corps; and soon the table-land and height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered with dark and lowering masses. At this moment, some hundreds of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, returned in one body, and were by the French supposed to be Wilson's corps joining the army; nevertheless, the duke of Belluno gave the signal for battle, and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who came on with the swiftness and violence of a hail-storm, closely followed by the broad black columns in all the majesty of war.

Sir Arthur Wellesley from the summit of the hill on his left viewed the whole field of battle. He saw the fourth corps rushing forwards with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, clearing the intersected ground in their front, and falling upon Campbell's division with infinite fury; yet that general, assisted by Mackenzie's brigade and two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts. The British soldiers, putting the French skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, broke their front, lapped their flanks with fire, and giving no respite pushed them back with a terrible carnage. Ten guns were taken, but as Campbell prudently resolved not to break his line by a pursuit, the French rallied on their supports and made head for another attack; then the British artillery and musketry played vehemently upon them, a Spanish cavalry regiment charged their flank, they retired in disorder, and the victory was secured in that quarter.

While this was passing on the English right, Villatte's division, preceded by the grenadiers and supported by two regiments of light cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left; and beyond Villatte, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the mountain. Sir Arthur ordered

Anson's brigade of cavalry, composed of the 23rd light dragoons and the first German hussars, to charge the head of these columns. They went off at a canter, increasing their speed as they advanced and riding headlong against the enemy; but in a few moments, a hollow cleft which was not perceptible at a distance intervened, and at the same moment the French, throwing themselves into squares, opened their fire. Colonel Arentschild, commanding the hussars, an officer whom forty years' experience had made a master in his art, promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase, '*I will not kill my young mans!*' The twenty-third found the chasm more practicable, the English blood is hot, and the regiment plunged down without a check, men and horses rolling over each other in dreadful confusion; yet the survivors, untamed, mounted the opposite bank by twos and threes; Colonel Seymour was severely wounded, but general Anson and major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, passing through the midst of Villatte's columns which were pouring in a fire from each side, fell with inexpressible violence upon a brigade of French chasseurs in the rear. The combat was then fierce, yet short, for Victor seeing the advance of the English, had detached his Polish lancers and Westphalia light-horse to the support of Villatte, and these fresh men coming up when the twenty-third, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs, entirely broke them. Those who were not killed or taken, made for Bassecour's Spanish division and so escaped; yet with a loss of two hundred and seven men and officers, about half the number that went into action.

During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the English centre; his artillery aided by the great battery on his right opened large gaps in Sherbrooke's ranks, and though the French came up to the British in the resolution to win, they were driven back in disorder. In the excitement of success the English guards followed with reckless ardour, but the French reserves of infantry and dragoons advanced, their repulsed men faced about, the batteries smote the guards in flank and front so heavily they drew back, and at the

same time the Germans being sorely pressed got into confusion : Hill and Campbell stood fast on the extremities of the line, yet the British centre was absolutely broken, and fortune seemed to incline to the French. Suddenly the forty-eighth, led by colonel Donellan, was descried advancing through the vast disordered masses, which seemed sufficient to carry it away bodily ; but wheeling back by companies that regiment let the crowds pass through, and then resuming its proud and beautiful line fell on the flank of the victorious French columns, plying them with such a destructive musketry, and closing upon them with such a firm regular step that their offensive movement was checked. Then the guards and Germans rallied, a brigade of light cavalry came up at a trot, the artillery battered the French flanks without intermission, they wavered, lost their impulse, and the battle was restored.

In all actions there is one critical moment which will give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When the guards first made their rash charge, sir Arthur, foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth down from the hill, although a rough battle was going on there, and at the same time he directed Cotton's light cavalry to advance. These dispositions gained the day ; the British became strongest at the decisive point ; the French relaxed their efforts ; the fire of the former grew hotter, and their ringing shouts—sure augury of success—were heard along the whole line. In the hands of a great general, Joseph's guards and the reserve, might have restored the combat, but all combination was at an end on the king's side ; the fourth corps, beaten on the French left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion ; the troops in the great valley on the French right, amazed at the furious charge of the twenty-third, and awed by the sight of four distinct lines of cavalry still in reserve, remained stationary ; no impression had been made on the key hill, Lapisse was mortally wounded, his division had given way in the centre, and the whole army finally retired to the position from whence it had descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers and an augmented fire of artillery. The British, exhausted by toil and want of food and reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, could not

pursue; the Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o'clock all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the morning. The battle was scarcely over when the dry grass and shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable rapidity across a part of the field, scorching in its course both the dead and the wounded.

Two British generals, Mackenzie and Langworth, thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and nearly eight hundred serjeants and soldiers were killed; three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, and more than three thousand seven hundred serjeants and privates wounded. Nine officers and nearly six hundred and fifty serjeants and soldiers were missing; making a total loss of more than six thousand two hundred, of which five thousand four hundred fell on the 28th. The French had Marshal Jourdan, MSS. Semelé, MSS. above nine hundred, including two generals, killed; about six thousand three hundred wounded, and one hundred and fifty made prisoners; furnishing a total of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, of which four thousand were of Victor's corps. Ten guns were taken by Campbell's division, seven were left in the woods by the French. The Spaniards returned about twelve hundred men killed and wounded, but their accuracy was much doubted.

The 29th, at day-break, the French army quitted its position, and before six o'clock was again in order of battle behind the Alberche. That day Robert Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third fifty-second and ninety-fifth regiments, and immediately took charge of the outposts. Those troops had been, after a march of twenty miles, huddled near Malpartida de Plasencia when the alarm caused by the Spanish fugitives spread to that part; Craufurd, fearing for the army, allowed only a few hours' rest, and then withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, re-commenced his march with a resolution not to halt until the field of battle was reached. As the brigade advanced crowds of the runaways were met with, not all Spaniards, but all propagating the vilest falsehoods: '*the army was defeated,*'—'*Sir Arthur Wellesley was killed,*'—'*the French were only a few miles distant;*' nay, some, blinded by their fears, pretended to point out the enemy's advanced

posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful scene, the troops hastened rather than slackened their impetuous pace, and leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body; having in that time passed over sixty-two English miles in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the 'delicacy of modern soldiers!'

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Sir Arthur Wellesley's courage in accepting battle with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, was more remarkable than the dispositions which gave him the victory. Could he have held his ground if the French strength had been reserved for the great battle instead of being wasted in isolated attacks the evening of the 27th and morning of the 28th? A pitched battle is a great affair; all moral and physical resources must be employed to win; and all may be too little. Jourdan had well conceived the plan of placing the army unperceived on the left flank of the English; yet sir Arthur had forethought of such a movement, and designed to meet it with his left wing and cavalry, using the large house in the wood as a supporting post, while with his right he seized the position abandoned by the French and cut them from the Alberche. Then calling in Wilson's corps, which was near Cazalegas, the contending armies would have exchanged their lines of operation; and the French, unless they won a complete victory, would have gained nothing, whereas the allies would even under defeat have insured their junction with Venegas: Madrid and Toledo would have fallen to them also, and the fertile La Mancha have been opened.

2°. Victor's dispositions were bad. The attempt to turn the English left with one division was puerile. The whole of Ruffin's and half Villatte's division were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment; how then could the former have developed its attack when five thousand horsemen were menacing its flank? To enable it to do so the greatest part

of the French cavalry should have preceded the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all before Soult reached Plasencia.

3°. It is said sir Arthur should have used the Spaniards to complete the victory. It would have more likely led to defeat; neither Cuesta nor his troops could be safely handled. The infantry of the first and fourth corps were twenty thousand, repulsed, not discomfited troops. The cavalry, the king's guards and Dessolle's reserve were untouched and alone sufficient to meet the Spaniards; and a second panic would have had deplorable results, as those who know how rapidly French soldiers recover from a repulse, will acknowledge.

4°. Hard honest fighting distinguished the battle of Talavera and proved the exceeding gallantry of the French and English soldiers. The latter owed much to their leader's skill and something to fortune; the French owed their commanders nothing; but thirty thousand of their infantry vainly strove for three hours on the 28th, to force sixteen thousand British soldiers, who were for the most part so recently drafted from the militia that many of them still bore the distinctions of that force on their accoutrements.


CHAPTER III.

IN the night of the 29th the king withdrew the fourth corps, the guards and the reserve, to St. Ollalla, and sent a division to succour Toledo. The 1st of August he took post at Illescas, from whence he could intercept Venegas' march on Madrid, and he left Victor on the Alberche to assail the allies when Soult's operations should cause them to retreat. Meanwhile Wilson, quitting Cazalegas, returned to Escalona, and Victor, thinking the whole English army was moving that way, retired in alarm by Maqueda to Santa Cruz de Retamar; he would have gone even to Mostoles if a retrograde movement of the allies had not recalled him to the Alberche. Sir Arthur's troops had suffered so much that the 29th and 30th were passed in establishing hospitals, and in fruitless efforts to procure food and assistance to save his wounded from perishing. Both Cuesta and the people of Talavera had ample means, yet would neither give food to the living nor assist to bury the dead; the corn secreted in Talavera would have supported the army for a month, but not a measure could be obtained for the starving soldiers. To keep their provisions was a natural instinct, yet the apathy with which they beheld the wounded dying and the sound sinking from hunger, did strangely contrast with Mr. Frere's assertion that all Spaniards, *'looked upon the war in the light of a crusade, and carried it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause.'* This conduct was never effaced from the soldiers' recollection—Badajos and St. Sebastian suffered long after for the churlish behaviour of the Talavera people. But personal rancour was always the main spring of Spanish patriotism. Cuesta's troops, so disgraced in battle, and the citizens of Talavera, saved by the bravery of the men to whom they refused assistance, were busy after the battle beating out the brains of wounded Frenchmen, and were

only checked by the British soldiers, who in some instances fired on the perpetrators of that horrible iniquity. Cuesta also displayed his ferocity. He whose incapacity, indolence, and stupid selfish pride had rendered his army inefficient and all but caused its destruction, now assumed a Roman severity, and decimated the regiments which had given way in the evening of the 27th. Above fifty he slew in this manner, and if his cruelty had not been mitigated by the earnest intercession of sir Arthur, more men would have been destroyed by this savage old man in cold blood than had fallen in battle.

Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of Soult's movements, their eyes were fixed on Madrid; but the 30th it was known that twelve thousand rations had been ordered for the 28th at Fuente Dueña by that marshal, and twenty-four thousand at Los Santos, a town situated between Alba de Tormes and the pass of Baños. Cuesta, secretly conscious he had neglected the latter post, suggested that Wilson should be sent there; but sir Arthur, who wanted him at Escalona to renew his intercourse with Madrid, proposed that a Spanish corps should go: indeed, he still slighted the danger, and hoped the result of the battle would check Soult's march. Cuesta refused at the time, and again on the 31st when the application was renewed; yet hearing that Soult was in Bejar he sent Bassecour on the 2nd of August to defend the pass of Baños. That place was four long marches distant, Cuesta knew the enemy had been within one march of it on the 31st, and scarcely had Bassecour departed when it became known that Soult was in Plasencia, that Baños had been abandoned without a shot, the battalions from Bejar dispersed, and those sent by Cuesta withdrawn to Almaraz, by the marquis de la Reyna, who declared an intention to destroy the boat-bridge there. This stirred Cuesta and he proposed that half the allies should attack Soult. Sir Arthur would not divide his army, yet offered to go or stay in mass, and being desired to choose, said he would go, with which Cuesta seemed content.

In the night Wilson announced the appearance of the French near Nombella, whither, unconscious of the effect produced by his presence at Escalona, he had taken his infantry, sending his guns to St. Roman near Talavera. Sir Arthur,



*Operations of the
BRITISH FRENCH & SPANISH ARMIES
in July & August, 1809.*

little thinking Wilson's march had caused Victor's retreat, imagined the latter's design was to crush that partizan and open a communication with Soult by the Tietar valley. Such a movement would necessarily send Cuesta from Talavera, and therefore the Spanish general's promise was demanded and obtained, to provide transport for removing the English wounded: he broke it disgracefully, and the British general had yet to learn the extent of his bad faith. Still making light of Soult's army, which he estimated at fifteen thousand, sir Arthur moved on the 3rd with seventeen thousand men, designing to join Bassecour and give battle; but at this time there was murmuring in the camp, and the generals being called together, some of them thought, or affected to think it a council, and one offered advice; wherefore they were laconically informed they had been called to receive orders not to offer suggestions.

On the 24th of July, Foy brought Soult the king's concurrence for the combined operations projected, whereupon he repaired to Salamanca, designing to unite the three corps there; but hearing of Victor's first retreat from the Alberche to the Guadarama river, he directed Mortier to march the 28th upon Plasencia by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and placed La Houssaye's and Lorge's dragoons under his command: the remainder of the 2nd corps were to follow whenever Ney, who closed the rear, should be in motion. That effected, he wrote thus: *'My urgent desire is that your majesty may not fight a general battle before you are certain of the concentration of all my forces near Plasencia. The most important results will be obtained, if your majesty will abstain from attacking until the moment when a knowledge of my march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which he must do or he is lost.'*

On the 29th the fifth corps being at Fuente Roble, information was received that Beresford had reached Almeida with an army on the 27th, wherefore Mortier threw out strong detachments on the side of Ciudad Rodrigo. Meanwhile a long-expected convoy of artillery and ammunition reached Salamanca, and Ney wrote from Toro, that he would be in that town the 31st. The 30th, the fifth corps drove the

s.
Journal of
Operations,
2nd corps,
MSS.

Spaniards from the pass of Baños, and the second corps, quitting Salamanca arrived at Siete Carrera. The 31st, the fifth corps reached Plasencia, the second corps entered Fuente Casa, Fuente Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos. Plasencia was then full of convalescents, detachments, and non-combatants, and when the French arrived, two thousand men, including five hundred of the Lusitanian legion, made for Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; four hundred sick, following Soult's accounts, were captured, together with a field store. During these rapid marches the French were harassed by the peasantry, the villages were deserted, the cavalry wandered far and near to procure subsistence, and several slight skirmishes and some pillage took place. The 31st the head of the second corps entered Plasencia, which was, like other places, deserted, and vague reports that a battle had been fought between the 26th and 29th was the only intelligence obtained; on the second, an advanced guard moved to the Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were directed towards Coria, to acquire news of Beresford, who was now said to be moving along the Portuguese frontier. On the 3rd, the fifth corps and the dragoons, passed the Tietar and reached Toril, the out-posts being pushed to Cazatejada and Sierra de Requemedas: the second corps remained at Plasencia, awaiting the arrival of the sixth corps, the head of which was now at Baños. Thus on the 3rd of August, the king and Sebastiani being at Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta at Talavera, sir Arthur at Oropesa, and Soult on the Tietar, the narrow valley of the Tagus was crowded in its whole length by the contending troops.

Wellesley and Cuesta being only one march apart held the centre, yet their united forces did not exceed forty-seven thousand. The French required three days and a battle to unite; but they had more than ninety thousand combatants of which fifty-three thousand were with Soult. In this singular state of affairs all parties were ignorant of the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor and the king, frightened by Wilson's partizan corps of four thousand men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, equally frightened by Victor, was

Appendix 30,
§4. Vol. I.

retiring from Talavera. Joseph imagined the British to be twenty-five thousand, and sir Arthur estimating Soult's force at fifteen thousand, was marching with twenty-three thousand, Spanish and English, to engage fifty-three thousand: meanwhile Soult, unable to ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. The fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear the weight for twenty-four hours, yet fortune so ordained that no irreparable disaster ensued.

At five o'clock on the evening of the 3rd, the English general knew that Soult was at Naval Moral between him and the bridge of Almaraz. At six o'clock Cuesta advised him that Joseph was again advancing, that intercepted despatches indicated a greater force with Soult than was supposed, and that he would quit Talavera that evening, in other words abandon the British hospitals! To this sir Arthur replied that the king was several marches distant, that Venegas should menace him on the upper Tagus, that Soult's strength was exaggerated, and Victor's movements too undecided to cause this sudden abandonment of Talavera: wherefore he required him to remain until the next day to cover the evacuation of the English hospitals. But Cuesta was already in march, and his columns were descried early on the 4th coming down the valley. Bassecour's division joined them soon after from Centinello, and the English patrols found the French near Naval Moral.

Sir Arthur had now seen the intercepted letters and found that Soult had at least thirty thousand men; that marshal had also intercepted English letters which told him the allies were still at Talavera on the 1st and ill-informed of his movements: thus the one general perceived his danger the other his advantage at the same moment. On the French side Mortier was ordered to take a position at Cazatejada, to seize the boat-bridge of Almaraz if it was not destroyed, and to patrol towards Arzobispo; the second corps was directed upon the same place, and the head of the sixth corps entered Plasencia. The further progress of the allies was thus barred in front, the Tagus was on their left, impassable mountains on their right; and it was certain Cuesta's retreat would immediately bring the king and Victor down upon their rear—the peril was

apparent to every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a general disquietude. No man trusted in the Spaniards, and the recollection of the stern conflict at Talavera, aided by a sense of exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed men and officers: the army was ready to fight, yet all felt it must be for safety not for glory. In this trying moment, sir Arthur abated nothing of his usual calmness and fortitude. He knew not indeed the full extent of the danger, but assuming the enemy in front to be thirty thousand, and Victor to have twenty-five thousand in his rear, he saw he must beat two marshals separately within three days, if he continued the offensive; a feat not to be accomplished with starving tired troops inferior in numbers. To remain on the defensive was equally unpromising, because the road from Talavera to Arzobispo led through Calera in rear of Oropesa, whereby Victor could intercept the only line of retreat; a battle must then be fought in a bad position, against the united French forces, estimated to be fifty thousand strong.

One resource remained. To pass the bridge of Arzobispo immediately, and take the line of the Tagus, before the French could seize the Col de Mirabete and intercept the road to Truxillo and Merida—a hard alternative—but the long-cherished error relative to Soult's weakness had dried up the springs of success, and left the campaign, like a withered stem, without fruit or foliage. Cuesta doggedly opposed this project, Oropesa was a good position of battle, he would fight there! sir Arthur then sternly declared the English army should go, and that declaration saved the Peninsula. At six o'clock in the morning the parc and baggage were in movement, while the troops, reinforced by a battery and some convalescents escaped from Plasencia, remained to cover the passage of stores, and wounded men who had come from Talavera in a pitiable condition. About noon the columns marched, and at two o'clock the army having gained a position on the left bank, the enemy's combination was baffled! During the passage, several herds of swine which, following the custom of the country, had been feeding in the woods under charge of the swineherds, were fallen in with, and the soldiers instigated by hunger, broke their ranks, and run in upon the animals as in a charge, shooting,

stabbing, and like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the beasts were yet alive: the ferocity of hunger thus displayed was a horrid spectacle, and the loss of the herds a calamity for the poor peasants.

While the army moved towards Deleytoza, Craufurd's brigade and six guns were directed to gain Almaraz, secure the boat-bridge and oppose any attempt to seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The way was very rugged, and the guns were dragged up the Meza d'Ibor by the men, yet, on the evening of the 5th Almaraz was secured. Head-quarters were established on the 7th at Deleytoza; the artillery occupied Campillo; the rear-guard held the impregnable Meza d'Ibor; the sick and wounded were sent to Merida, though to convey them both ammunition and treasure carts were unloaded. Meanwhile Soult unwittingly continued his march, and Mortier reached Naval Moral, his advanced guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and his patrols fell in with the Spanish cavalry at Arzobispo the 5th, just as Cuesta was passing the bridge. On the 6th the Spanish rear-guard which had remained on the right bank was driven across the bridge by Mortier, Ney reached Naval Moral, and the second corps entered Gredo.

On the 7th Mortier reported that the allies were all over the Tagus, and that Arzobispo bridge was barricadoed and raked by twenty guns; that Cuesta had left there two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, but his main body was at Meza d'Ibor. Soult immediately brought up the second corps and sent the light cavalry to open a communication with the king by Talavera; where Victor had captured about fifteen hundred English sick and wounded the 6th, and treated them with the generosity to be expected from a gallant and courteous nation, for the French and British soldiers cherished the usages of honourable warfare. The 7th Victor passed the Tagus by the Talavera bridge, and pushed his van-guard down the left bank to Aldea Nueva within a few leagues of Cuesta's position. Soult was menacing it in front, and having observed the Spanish horses, when brought to drink, came far into the stream at one point, sounded there for a passage in the night and discovered a deep but practicable ford, a mile above the bridge. The second and fifth and a division of the sixth corps,

were assembled early on the 8th to force this passage, when Soult, hearing of Victor's movement, and seeing that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, leaving only a weak rear-guard, thought the allies were all retreating; wherefore, pursuing his design, he sent Ney's division back to him, and the plan of a ford below Almaraz, by which that marshal might cross the river, seize the Mirabete, and fall upon the allies as they came out of the defiles between Deleytoza and Truxillo.

COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.

No retreat was in contemplation. Albuquerque's cavalry had merely sought shelter from the heat in a wood five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry were sleeping or loitering without guard or thought of danger, when about two o'clock Mortier, who had secretly assembled six thousand cavalry near the ford, sent Caulaincourt's brigade into the river. The Spaniards run to their arms and their batteries opened on the horsemen. Mortier soon overwhelmed their gunners with a concentric fire from his superior artillery, while Caulaincourt gaining the left bank, took the batteries in reverse, cut down the gunners and broke the infantry. Albuquerque hearing the firing then came down with all his horsemen in one huge disorderly mass, and Caulaincourt was like to be overpowered; but the rest of the French cavalry soon joined in the fight, and one brigade of infantry forded the river while another burst the barriers of the bridge, and the Spanish foot being dispersed Albuquerque was driven back; a general rout ensued and five guns with four hundred prisoners were taken.

Soult anxious to improve his success called on Victor to move in two columns upon Guadalupe and Deleytoza, designing to support him with his own and Mortier's corps while Ney seized the Mirabete. This if executed would have ruined Cuesta's army and forced sir Arthur to a disastrous retreat; for so complete was the surprise that some English foragers fell into the enemy's hands, and Cuesta's conduct throughout, after he had passed to the left of the Tagus had been fatuitous. When he first marched to Meza d'Ibor, he left fifteen

guns upon the road, which Albuquerque's flight uncovered, and a trumpeter attending an English flag of truce, treacherously or foolishly, made the fact known to the French, who immediately sent cavalry to fetch them off. The British military agent at the Spanish head-quarters was kept in ignorance of the disaster at the bridge; and sir Arthur only knew of it by Albuquerque's arrival at Deleytoza on the evening of the 9th. He had before urged Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to cover the movement; but when he reached the Meza on the 10th he found the country covered with fugitives, and the old man haughty and helpless as ever. His ammunition and forty guns were on the wrong side of the Ibor, within sight and cannon-shot of the French from the right bank of the Tagus; and they would have been taken by the first patrols if sir Arthur had not persuaded the Spaniards to drag them up the Meza height without Cuesta's knowledge. Disorder folly and stupid obstinacy were paramount. In this crisis the impending danger was averted by the king, who recalled Victor to support the fourth corps against Venegas; and by fortune, for Ney failed to discover the ford at Almaraz, and on the 11th the allies' line was re-established. Sir Arthur's head-quarters were then fixed at Jaraicejo, Cuesta's at Deleytoza. The British guarded Almaraz on the left; the Spaniards occupied Campillo and the Meza d'Ibor on the right. The 12th Cuesta resigned, and Eguia who succeeded him, seemed to be reasonable, but the evil was in the Spanish character. The allied position was now however compact, the reserves could easily support the advanced posts, the rear was open, the Meza impregnable. If the French passed the river at Almaraz on the left, no easy matter, they would be huddled in a dangerous manner in contracted ground between the Meza, the Mirabete and the river; they could not pass between Almaraz and Arzobispo, and on the right the Meza was impregnable.

Soult, thus thwarted, conjectured sir Arthur would repass the Tagus by Alcantara, to rejoin Beresford; and the five thousand British troops under Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were then near the frontier of Portugal. Hence he

resolved to march upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, to threaten Beresford's and sir Arthur's communications with Lisbon; and at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation. Sir Arthur he said was not yet in march for Alcantara, and it was dangerous to invade Portugal in a hasty manner; the army could not be fed between Coria, Plasencia and the Tagus; and as Salamanca was again in possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting the sixth corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to cover Castille. Joseph, dreading fatigue and privations in a wasted country during the autumnal heat, sided with Ney,—and indeed the emperor's orders, dated at Schoenbrun the 29th of July, forbad offensive operations until the reinforcements which his recent victory at Wagram enabled him to send, should reach Spain. The second corps was therefore directed to take post at Plasencia; the fifth corps relieved the first at Talavera; and the English wounded being given over to Mortier, he with a chivalrous feeling would not suffer his own soldiers, though suffering severe privations, to receive rations until the hospitals were supplied. Ney then marched to Valladolid, for the king was alarmed lest an insurrection, just excited in that country by del Parque, should spread over Castille and Leon.

On the 12th Ney reached Baños, and to his surprise found the pass occupied by Wilson with four thousand men. That partizan, being at Nombella when the British army left Talavera, had been put in communication with Cuesta, and on his retreat had also retired to Velada a few miles north of Talavera; from whence, being only twenty-four miles from Arzobispo, as Cuesta did not entirely pass the Tagus until the 6th, he could have joined sir Arthur; but he knew not this and prudently crossing the Tietar made for the mountains, trusting to his activity for escaping. Villatte had pursued him on the 5th to Nombella; a detachment from Avila watched for him in the passes of Arenas and Monbeltran; Foy waited for him in the Vera de Plasencia; nevertheless, he broke through their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the Sierra de Lanes, and getting into the valley of the Tormes reached Bejar. From thence, thinking to recover his commu-

nications with the army, he marched towards Plasencia by the pass of Baños, and thus met Ney returning to the Salamanca country. The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why sir Robert gave battle to the sixth corps. His position, although difficult to approach, was not one to stop a whole army; and accordingly, when the French overcame the local obstacles the fight was at an end: the first charge put his whole force to flight. Ney having recovered the line of the Tormes resigned his command to general Marchand and returned to France. But while these things happened in Estremadura La Mancha was the theatre of more important operations.

CHAPTER IV

WHEN Victor retired from the Alberche, thinking Wilson was the forerunner of sir Arthur's army, the king, taking the same view, marched with the reserve in the night of the 3rd to Mostoles, leaving Sebastiani at Illescas; but when Wilson retreated the 4th, he concentrated all his own force at Valdemoro to attack Venegas, while Victor advanced towards Talavera. Venegas, in pursuance of his secret orders, had loitered about Daymiel and Tembleque, and the 29th of July was at Ocaña, having outposts at Aranjuez; his rear was at Yebes, one division under Lacy was in front of Toledo, and a small French post was surprised by a partida chief on the right of the Tagus. The 30th of July he heard of the battle of Talavera; and as Lacy had reported the appearance of an enemy on the road beyond Toledo he was immediately reinforced and had Mora given as his point of retreat. On the 2nd of August, Venegas, falsely informed by Cuesta that the allies were going to march upon Madrid, concentrated all his troops at Aranjuez, pretending he also would march on the capital; for the junta, having no wish to see Cuesta at the head of sixty thousand men in that capital, had before the battle of Talavera forbid him to enter and named another governor.

This prohibition would have been disregarded by Cuesta, but Venegas was obedient, and under pretence of danger to his flanks if he marched, remained at Aranjuez, where, his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming from Toledo, he yet performed no service to the general cause. The 3rd, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente Largo, and leaving six hundred infantry and some cavalry near Toledo, concentrated his army between Aranjuez and Ocaña. In this position he remained until the 5th, when his advanced guard was

driven from the Puente Largo across the Tagus; his line of posts on that river was then attacked by the French skirmishers, and under cover of a heavy cannonade his position was examined. The bridges above and below Aranjuez were broken, and the French resolved to pass the Tagus at Toledo. With this intent, they recrossed the Xarama river and marched in the direction of that city, while Venegas, still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, foolishly dispersed his other divisions at Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He was desirous of defending La Mancha; the central junta, with more prudence, wished him to retreat into the Sierra Morena. Mr. Frere proposed that his army should be divided, one part to enter the Morena, the other to march by Cuenca upon Aragon, and so menace the communications with France! and the admirable absurdity of the proposal would probably have caused it to be adopted, if Sebastiani's movements had not put an end to the discussion. That general, crossing the Tagus at Toledo and at a ford higher up, drove the Spanish left back upon the Guazalate the 9th of August. The 10th, Venegas concentrated his army at Almonacid and held a council of war, wherein it was resolved to attack the French on the 12th, but the time was miscalculated, for on the 11th Sebastiani commenced

THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID.

Venegas had, including two thousand five hundred cavalry, more than twenty-five thousand men, with forty pieces of artillery. Composed of the best regiments in Spain, this army was well armed and clothed, and the generals of divisions were neither incapacitated by age nor destitute of experience; most of them had been employed in the previous campaign. The village of Almonacid was in the centre of the position, and was occupied, as well as some table-land in front, by two divisions of infantry under general Castejon. The left wing, under Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road to Consuegra. The right wing, under Vigodet, was drawn up on some rising ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, under Giron, and the greatest part of the artillery, were posted behind the centre, on a rugged hill

crowned by an old castle: the cavalry were on the extremity of each wing.

The French reserve, under Dessolles, was still some hours' march behind, when Sebastiani, after observing the Spanish dispositions, resolved to attack with the fourth corps only. The Polish division marched against the front, Leval's Germans turned the flank of the hill on which the Spanish left was posted, and two French brigades were directed upon the centre. After a sharp fight the Spanish left was put to flight, but Venegas, outflanking the victorious troops with his cavalry, charged and threw them into disorder; at that moment Dessolles arriving with Sebastiani's reserves restored the day, and the Spanish cavalry, shattered by musketry and the fire of a battery, was in turn charged and broken by the French horse. Venegas rallied his troops on the castle-hill behind the village; but then the king came up with the remainder of the reserve, the Poles and Germans continued their march against the left flank, and nine fresh battalions fell upon the centre, while six battalions forced the right: the height and the castle were thus carried. Venegas, to cover his retreat, attempted a stand in the plain behind, but two divisions of French dragoons charged and the disorder became irremediable: the Spaniards throwing away their arms dispersed, and were pursued for several hours. Following the French account, three thousand of the vanquished were slain, four thousand taken, with all the guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages. The French loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. The defeated army took shelter in the Morena, Sebastiani occupied Aranjuez, Victor entered Toledo, and the king returned in triumph to Madrid.

Still the Anglo-Spanish army held Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and sir Arthur was not without hope to resume offensive operations. He knew Ney had returned to Salamanca, and erroneously believed Mortier commanded only a part of the first corps, the remainder being at Toledo. His own strength was seventeen thousand; Beresford had reached Moraleja with twelve or fourteen thousand Portuguese, and five thousand British were fast coming up under Catlin Crawford and Lightburn; wherefore if Soult invaded Portugal, he designed

to follow him by the south bank of the Tagus, while Beresford, reinforced with Crawford and Lightburn's troops checked him north of that river. He judged the French too weak to pass his right flank by La Mancha and invade Andalusia; for he knew not of Venegas' defeat at Almonacid, and he still so underrated his enemy's force, as to contemplate re-crossing the Tagus, and in conjunction with Beresford falling upon their right at Plasencia. For his own front he had no fear, and he was taking measures to restore the broken arch of the Cardinal's bridge over the Tagus, with a view to this operation against Plasencia, when the Spanish government and its generals, again forced him to look solely to the preservation of his own army. He was however groping in the dark.

Writing to lord Castlereagh, he estimated the French in the Peninsula at one hundred and twenty-five thousand, of which twenty thousand were in Catalonia, fourteen thousand in Aragon, and seventy thousand opposed to himself. Now there were two hundred and fifty-three thousand fighting Frenchmen in Spain, exclusive of the governments, garrisons, and five thousand royal guards not included in the emperor's army. In Catalonia, there were, not twenty but fifty thousand; in Aragon not fourteen, but twenty-eight thousand. And opposed to the British there were, not seventy, but one hundred and seventy thousand good troops, one hundred thousand being ready to march and strike, without calling in a detachment or displacing a garrison! Nevertheless upon this false data, sir Arthur acted and successfully, thus illustrating his own happy fortune and the king's incapacity for war.

Imperial
Muster rolls,
MSS.

From the 23rd of July, when the bad faith of the junta, the apathy of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the latter had daily increased; sir Arthur while remonstrating with Cuesta and the junta, warned them of the consequences and refused to pass the Alberche; but his representations, and his halt at Talavera, were disregarded by men, who, judging from their own habits, concluded his actions would also be at variance with his professions. He demanded food, and was

Appendix 5.

answered by false statements of what had been, and false promises of what would be done. His glorious service, far from exciting the gratitude of the Spanish government rendered it more perverse. His soldiers were weakened by hunger, his sick perishing for want of necessary succours, his commissaries were without means of transport; and when he applied for only ninety artillery horses to supply the place of those killed in the action, Cuesta, on the very field of battle, with the steam of English blood reeking in his nostrils, refused this request: and two days afterwards abandoned the wounded men to an enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing as the most ferocious and dishonourable of mankind.

After the retreat over the Tagus the heavy sufferings of the troops increased, and the warmth of their general's remonstrances rose in proportion to the ill-treatment they experienced; but the replies, nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became insulting to general and army. '*The British were not only well but over supplied:—they robbed the peasantry, pillaged the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired:—the retreat of the army across the Tagus was unnecessary; Soult ought to have been destroyed; the English general must have secret motives, which he dare not avouch:*'—and other calumnies of the like nature. But from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, although the Spaniards were generally well fed, the English soldiers had not received ten full rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and, twice a week, a few ounces of flour with a quarter of a pound of goat's flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers; and this scanty supply was procured with much labour, for the goats were to be caught on the hills and killed by the troops. It was, perhaps, upon this additional hardship that the accusation of selling provisions was founded, for in such cases, it is in all armies the custom that the offal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals; but the famine in the camp was plainly proved by this very fact; the goat's offals sold at this time, for three or four dollars, double the usual price of the whole animal: and men and officers outbid each other for the wretched food.

It has been said British soldiers are less intelligent, and less able to sustain privations than the soldiers of any other nation: this is one of many vulgar errors promulgated respecting them. That they should be constantly victorious, and yet have inferior military qualifications, does not appear a logical conclusion; but the truth is, that, saving the greater sobriety of the Spaniards and Portuguese, the English soldiers possess all the most valuable military qualities in as high, and some in a much higher degree than any other nation. They are rapid and intelligent as the French, obedient as the German, enduring as the Russian, more robust than any; and with respect to food, no man of any nation can with less than two pounds of solid food of some kind daily do his work well for any length of time. A general charge of pillaging is easily made, hard to disprove; yet at this time the Spanish troops did not only pillage but wantonly devastate the country without excuse; for, the three days succeeding the defeat of Arzobispo excepted, their rations were regular and sufficient. The charge of intercepting convoys should have been reversed. *The Spanish cavalry intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies.* Appendix 16.

Before the middle of August, there were in the six regiments of English cavalry a thousand men dismounted, and the horses of seven hundred others were unserviceable. The baggage animals died in greater numbers, the artillery cattle were scarcely able to drag the guns, and one third of the reserve ammunition was given over to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were required for the conveyance of sick men, of which the number daily increased. Beresford experienced the same difficulties in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. Numerous desertions from the Portuguese army, caused by a dislike to enter Spain, had delayed his campaign until the last days of June, when he crossed the Portuguese frontier, and from that moment the usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced. Romana continued at Coruña. Del Parque, full of mighty projects, was indignant that Beresford would not blindly adopt his recommendations; and both generals were ignorant of the real Appendix 15.

strength of the French; but the Spaniard was confident and insisted upon offensive movements, while Beresford, a general by no means of an enterprising disposition when in the sole command of an army, contented himself with taking up a defensive line behind the Agueda. In this he was justified. 1°. By his instructions, which compelled him to look to the pass of Perales and the defence of the frontier line; 2°. By the state of his army, which was only half organized, and without horsemen or artillery; 3°. By the conduct of the Spanish authorities. For the Portuguese troops were not only refused provisions, but those which had been stored by sir Arthur in the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo with a view to operate in that quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for a debt pretended to be due for the supply of sir John Moore's army. The claim itself was of doubtful character, and Cradock had offered to pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher for its being due, a preliminary which had not been complied with. There was also an English commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to liquidate that and any other just claim upon the British military chest; but the cabildo, like all Spaniards, mistaking violence for energy preferred this display of petty power to the interests of the common cause. Meanwhile Soult passed the mountains by Baños, and Beresford, moving in a parallel direction, crossed them at Perales, and reached Moraleja about the 12th of August. There he rallied the troops and convalescents cut off from Talavera, and took post the 17th behind the Elga, covering the road to Abrantes.

In this state of affairs the supreme junta offered sir Arthur Wellesley the rank of captain-general, and sent him a present of horses. Accepting the rank, he refused the pay, as he had before refused that of the Portuguese government, and the junta then pressed him to renew offensive operations; yet, acting as if they thought these honours would compensate for the sufferings of the troops, they made no change in their system. Sir Arthur was, however, now convinced that Spain was no longer the place for a British army. He relinquished further operations in that country, sent his cavalry to the neighbourhood of Caceres, broke down another arch of the Cardinal's bridge to

prevent the enemy from troubling him, and, through the British ambassador, informed the junta he would retire into Portugal. This created the wildest consternation, for in their swollen self-sufficiency the junta had disregarded all warnings; and now acting as they had before acted with sir John Moore, endeavoured to avert the consequences of their own evil doings by vehement remonstrances and the most absurd statements:—*'The French were weak, the moment propitious for driving them beyond the Pyrenees:—'the uncalled-for retreat of the English would ruin the cause:'* and so forth. But they had to deal with a general as firm as Moore, and in the British ambassador they no longer found an instrument suited to their purposes. Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses to be called great, yet of an extended capacity, and a genius at once subtle and imperious, had come out on a special mission,—and Mr. Frere, whose last communication with the junta had been to recommend another military project, was happily displaced: yet even in his private capacity he made an effort to have some of the generals superseded, and the junta, with a refined irony truly Spanish, created him the *marquis of UNION*.

At Cadiz the honours paid to lord Wellesley were extravagant and unbecoming, and his journey from thence to Seville was a triumphant procession; but these outward demonstrations of feeling did not impose upon him beyond the moment; his brother's correspondence and his own penetration soon enabled him to make a just estimate of the junta's protestations. Disdaining their intrigues, and appreciating a general's right to direct the operations of his own army, he seconded sir Arthur's remonstrances with firmness; and taking the latter's statements as a guide and basis for his own views, urged them upon the Spanish government with becoming dignity. The junta, protesting the welfare of the British army was the principal object of their care, did not fail to prove very clearly upon paper, that the troops had been ever since their entry into Spain amply supplied; yet, to satisfy the English general, they invested don Lorenzo Calvo, a member of their body, with full powers to draw forth and apply all the resources of the country to the nourishment of both armies.

This gentleman's promises and assurances were more full and formal than M. de Garay's, and equally false. He declared that provisions and forage in vast quantities were actually being delivered into the magazines at Truxillo, when in fact there was not even an effort made to collect any. He said the British should be served although the Spanish troops should thereby suffer; and at the same time he compelled the alcaldes of a distant town to send into the Spanish camp provisions which had been already purchased by an English commissary. In fine lord Wellesley had arrived too late; all the mischief that petulance folly bad faith violence and ignorance united could inflict was already accomplished; and while he was vainly urging a vile, if not a treacherous government, to provide sustenance for the soldiers, sir Arthur withdrew the latter from a post where the vultures in their prescience of death were already congregating. The 20th, the main body of the British army quitted Jaraicejo, and marched by Truxillo upon Merida. The light brigade under R. Craufurd, being relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the road of Caceres to Valencia de Alcantara, and the pass of Mirabete bore ample testimony to its previous sufferings. These troops, which, only three weeks before had traversed sixty miles in a single march, were now with difficulty and after many halts able to reach the summit of the Mirabete, although only four miles from their camp; and the side of the mountain was covered with baggage, and the carcasses of many hundred animals who died in the effort to ascend.

When the retreat commenced, the junta, with the malevolence of anger engendered by fear, calumniated the man to whom only ten days before they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, and to whose courage and skill they owed their own existence. '*It was not the want of provisions,*' they said, '*but some other motive that caused the English general to retreat.*' This was openly and insultingly stated by Garay, by Eguia, and by Calvo, in their correspondence with lord Wellesley and sir Arthur; and at the same time the junta industriously spread a report that the true reason was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous demands of the English ministers, who had required the cession of Cadiz and the island of Cuba

as the price of further assistance. But the only firmness they had shown was in resistance to the just demands of their ally. At Talavera, sir Arthur had been forced to give over to the Spaniards the artillery taken from the enemy at Meza d'Ibor; he had sacrificed a part of his ammunition to obtain conveyance for the wounded men; and to effect this movement from Jaraicejo without leaving his sick behind, he abandoned his parc of ammunition and stores; but then the Spanish generals, who had refused the slightest aid to convey the sick and wounded men, found ample means to carry off all these stores to their own magazines. In this manner, almost bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers who had withstood the fierce efforts of the enemy, were driven as it were ignominiously from the country they had protected to their own loss.

The 24th, head-quarters being at Merida, a despatch from lord Wellesley was received. He painted in strong colours the terror of the junta, the distraction of the people, the universal confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate their distress, he proposed the British army should, notwithstanding the past, endeavour to cover Andalusia, by taking in conjunction with the Spanish army a defensive post behind the Guadiana, its left to be on the frontier of Portugal. To facilitate this he had presented a plan to the junta for the future supply of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier and of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty on that point. But he rested this project entirely upon political grounds. He who for many years had with despotic power controlled the movements of immense armies in India, now carefully avoided any appearance of meddling with the general's province. 'I am,' said he, 'fully sensible not only of the indelicacy, but of the inutility of attempting to offer any opinion of mine in a situation where your own judgment must be your best guide.'—'Viewing, however, so nearly, the painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I have deemed it my duty to submit to your consideration the possibility of adopting an intermediate plan.' Let this letter be compared with Mr. Frere's to sir John Moore on a similar occasion.

This despatch caused sir Arthur to halt at Merida for some days. He was able there to obtain provisions, and he wished to allay the excitement occasioned by his retreat; yet he refused to co-operate again with the Spaniards. 'Want,' he said, 'had driven him to separate from them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have justified him for doing so. To take up a defensive position behind the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable, and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at the moment by Eguia, was so strong that if the Spaniards could defend anything they might defend that; and he advised them to send their pontoon bridge to Badajos, and remain on the defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. But, it might be asked, was there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The French were as numerous if not more so than the allies; and with respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing game as before. Baños and Perales must be guarded, or the force in Castille would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army. Who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to detach, the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could, Avila and the Guadarama passes remained, by which the enemy could reinforce the army in front—for there were no Spanish troops in the north of Spain capable of making a diversion.

'But there was a more serious consideration, namely, the constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We, in England,' said sir Arthur, 'never hear of their defeats and flights, yet I have heard Spanish officers telling of nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, I believe, have never been published. In the battle of Talavera,' he continued, 'in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not engaged—whole corps threw away their arms and ran off when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these dastardly soldiers run away they plunder everything they meet. In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of the British army, which was at that moment bravely fighting in their cause.

For these reasons he would not again co-operate with the Spaniards; yet, taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would hang upon the enemy's flank, and thus, unless the latter came with very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana.'

This reasoning was conclusive, and ere it reached lord Wellesley, the latter found, that so far from his plans relative to the supply having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the junta. That miserable body, at one moment shrinking with fear, at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy's being about to retire to the Pyrenees, and even to the interior of France! And, assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well as of their own, importunately pressed for an immediate combined offensive operation by the troops of the three nations to harass the enemy in his retreat! yet, at the same time, they ordered Eguia to withdraw from Deleytoza behind the Guadiana.

Eguia reached La Serena the 31st, and Venegas who had rallied his fugitives in the Morena, being reinforced from the depôts in Andalusia, the two armies amounted to about fifty thousand men, of which eight or ten thousand were horse, for the Spanish cavalry being swift seldom suffered much. But the tide of popular discontent was now setting full against the central government; the members of the ancient junta of Seville worked incessantly for their overthrow; Romana, Castaños, Cuesta, Albuquerque, all, and they were many, who had suffered dishonour at their hands were against them, and the local junta of Estremadura insisted that Albuquerque should command in that province. Thus pressed, the supreme junta, thinking Venegas a man devoted to their wishes, resolved to increase his forces, and for that purpose gave Albuquerque the command in Estremadura; yet allowed only twelve thousand men, and sent the remainder of Eguia's army to Venegas: at the same time a last effort was made to engage the British general in their proceedings. They offered to place Albuquerque under his orders if he would undertake an offensive movement; but their plans, being founded on vile political intrigues, could in no wise alter sir Arthur Wellesley's determination, which was the result of enlarged military views.

He was ready and watchful to aid Ciudad Rodrigo if it was assailed, because the safety of that fortress was necessary to the security of Portugal; but he refused to co-operate with the Spanish troops in Estremadura, and the 4th of Appendix 15. September his head-quarters were established in Badajos. Romana delivered his army to del Parque and repaired to Seville. Venegas advanced into La Mancha, yet, at the approach of a very inferior force of the enemy, retired with the confusion of a rout to the Morena. The English troops were then distributed in Badajos, Elvas, Campo Mayor and other places, on both banks of the Guadiana; the brigades already in Portugal were brought up to the army, and the lost ammunition and equipments were replaced from the magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem. Beresford, leaving some light troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar, and this eventful campaign of two months terminated.

The general loss of the British was considerable. Above three thousand five hundred men had been killed, or had died of sickness, or fallen into the enemy's hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from want, exclusive of those lost in battle; the soldiers were depressed, and a heart-burning hatred of the Spaniards was engendered by the treatment all had endured. To fill the cup of disaster the pestilent fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which fatigue and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made frightful ravages: dysentery, that scourge of armies, raged, and in a short time several thousand men died in the hospitals.

CHAPTER V.

OBSERVATIONS.

DURING this short campaign, the armies on both sides acted in violation of the maxim which condemns '*double external lines of operation,*' and the results vindicated the soundness of the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, the reputation of the commanders, was achieved. Yet neither sir Arthur Wellesley, nor the duke of Dalmatia, nor marshal Jourdan, can be justly censured, seeing that the two last were controlled by the king and the first by circumstances of a peculiar nature. The French marshals were thwarted by Joseph. The English general had to regulate his movements, not by his own military views, but by the actual state of the Spaniards' operations, and with reference to the politics and temper of that people.

La Mancha was the true line by which to act against Madrid; but when the British were on the frontier of Portugal the junta refused Cadiz as a place of arms; and without Cadiz or some other fortified sea-port, neither prudence nor his instructions would permit sir Arthur to operate on that side. He adopted then, not what was fitting in a military sense, but what was least objectionable among the few plans that could be concerted with the Spanish generals and government; they were resolved to act with strong armies in Estremadura and La Mancha; he could only maintain a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or unite with Cuesta in the valley of the Tagus: his territorial line of operations was therefore one of necessity, and criticism must be confined to the execution. That he did not greatly err in his conception of the campaign, is to be inferred from the fact, that Napoleon, Soult, Victor,

and Jourdan, simultaneously expected him upon the very line he followed. He was thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas failed to aid him, and the fatal error relative to Soult's forces, under which he laboured throughout, vitiated all his operations! yet he shook the intrusive monarch roughly in the midst of fifty thousand men.

Let him be judged, not by what did, but what would have happened if Cuesta had been active and Venegas had performed his part loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish forces at Naval Moral happened the 22nd of July. Victor was then with twenty-one thousand men in position behind the Alberche, the fourth corps was near Madrilejos in La Mancha, Joseph at Madrid, where Foy had just arrived to concert Soult's movement upon Plasencia. The king and Sebastiani could not reach the scene of action before the 25th or 26th of July; nor could Soult influence the operations before the 1st or 2nd of August. If then the allied army, being sixty thousand strong with a hundred pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning of the 23rd, he would have been beaten, and driven upon Madrid or Toledo; and as the country immediately in his rear was open, ten thousand horsemen could have been launched in the pursuit. Wilson would have been on his flank, if, neglecting a junction with the fourth corps, he had taken the road to Madrid; if he took the Toledo road, he and Sebastiani would have been separated from the king, who did not reach Vargas until the evening of the 25th, and who would not in this case have been able to advance beyond Naval Carneiro. Now, admitting that superior discipline and experience had enabled the French troops to effect their retreat on either line without any serious calamity, what would have followed?

1°. If Victor joined the king, the latter could only have retired by Guadalaxara upon the third corps, or have gone by the Guadarama towards Soult.

2°. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps must have retreated to Guadalaxara, and the king would have joined them there, or have pushed for the Guadarama to meet Soult. No doubt that marshal, having so powerful an army, would in either case have restored Joseph to his capital, and cut sir

Arthur's communication with Portugal by the valley of the Tagus; nevertheless, a great moral impression would have been produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, which was moreover the general depôt of all the French armies. Venegas, Cuesta, and sir Arthur, would also have been united on one line of operations, that of La Mancha, which would probably have forced the junta's consent to the occupation of Cadiz. In this view it must be admitted the plan was conceived with genius.

Victor's position on the Alberche was strong, he commanded twenty-five thousand veterans, and the Spaniards were bad in the field; hence it may be said a movement of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence to Maqueda, would have been preferable to a direct attack at Salinas; because the allies, thus suddenly placed in the midst of the French might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly have cut the king off from the Guadarama passes and forced him back upon the Guadalaxara. But with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a general undertake an operation requiring celerity and the nicest calculation? The false dealing of the junta no prudence could guard against; yet experience proves, that without extraordinary good fortune, some accident will always happen to mar the combinations of armies acting upon '*double external lines.*' And so it was with respect to Venegas; for that general, with a force of twenty-six thousand men, was held in check for five days by three thousand French; and the battle of Almonacid proved he knew not when to advance nor when to retreat.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's patience under the foolish insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted firmness with which he protected the Spanish army require no illustration. When Cuesta fell back from St. Ollalla on the 26th, the British could not retreat with honour; and there is nothing more memorable in the history of this war, nothing more creditable to the personal character of the English chief, than the battle of Talavera considered as an isolated event. Nevertheless it proved the allies were unable to attain their object; for notwithstanding Victor's ill-judged partial attacks on the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, notwithstanding the final repulse of the

French, all the advantages of the movements as a whole were with the latter. They were on the 31st of July, including the garrison of Toledo, still above forty thousand strong, and maintained their central position, although it was not until the 1st of August that Soult's approach caused any change in the views of the allied generals. This brings us to the fundamental error of sir Arthur's operations. That he should engage himself in the narrow valley of the Tagus with twenty thousand British and forty thousand Spanish troops, when fifty thousand French were waiting for him at the further end, and above fifty thousand others were hanging on his flank and rear, shows the greatest masters of the art may err: he who wars walks in a mist, through which the keenest eyes cannot always discern the right path. *'Speak to me of a general who has made no mistakes in war,'* said Turenne, *'and you speak of one who has seldom made war.'*

Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error:—"When I entered Spain I had reason to believe I should be joined by a Spanish army in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as that it had kept in check during nearly three months after a defeat, a French army at one time superior and at no time much inferior."—"I had likewise reason to believe the French corps in the north of Spain were fully employed; and although I had heard of the arrival of marshal Soult at Zamora on the 29th of June, with a view to equip the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible that three French corps consisting of thirty-four thousand men under three marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca without the knowledge of the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the junta of Castille; that these corps could have been moved from their stations in Galicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting free for general operations any Spanish troops which had been opposed to them, or without any other inconvenience to the enemy than that of protracting to a later period the settlement of his government in those provinces;—and that they could have penetrated into Estremadura, without a shot being fired at them by the troops deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals.' Thus however the facts were, then and always. The military preparations of Spain, like

figures in a phantasmagoria, however menacing in appearance, were invariably found to be vain and illusory: and that sir Arthur's error was not fatal is to be attributed to three causes:—

1°. The reluctance of Ney to quit Astorga;—2°. Mortier's march upon Villa Castin instead of Salamanca;—3°. Victor's vehemence in urging the battle of Talavera: in fine, jealousy among the marshals and the undecided temper of the king.

If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have concentrated the three corps near Salamanca before the 20th, and would have reached Plasencia before the 28th of July; the allies must then have forced their way into La Mancha or been crushed. Could they have done the former without another battle, without the loss of all the wounded men? could they have done it at all? The British, including Robert Craufurd's brigade, were seventeen thousand fighting men on the 29th, yet wasted with fatigue and hunger; the Spaniards were above thirty thousand, but in them no trust could be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and courage of the highest order. The intrusive king was at the head of forty thousand good troops. Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered by the intrigues of the junta, was as nought in the operations, while Soult's step, stealthy when the situation of affairs was obscure, would have been impetuous when a light broke on the field of battle: it is scarcely possible to conceive the allies forcing their way in front before that marshal would have fallen on their rear.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

Joseph was finally successful; yet it may be affirmed, that with the exception of uniting his three corps behind the Guadarama on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings were an uninterrupted series of errors. He would not suffer Soult to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo with seventy thousand men in the end of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas, overbalanced in his mind the advantages of this bold and grand project, which would inevitably have drawn sir Arthur from the Tagus—would have interrupted all military communication between the northern and southern provinces—would

have ensured possession of Castille and Leon, and have opened a broad way to Lisbon. Cuesta and Venegas could it is said have marched against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas, acting on external lines and whose united force did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! The king, holding a central position with fifty thousand French veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and rejecting Soult's plan drew Mortier to Villa Castin: truly, this was to avoid the fruit-tree from fear of the nettle at its stem!

Sir Arthur's advance to Talavera was the result of this great error, but, having thus incautiously afforded Soult an opportunity for striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was concerted. The king, with equal judgment and activity, then united all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta, pushed back the latter upon the English army, and forced both to stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their front when the real point of danger was in the rear. This was skilful, but the battle which followed was a palpable, an enormous fault. The allies could neither move forward nor backward without being worse situated than in that strong position, which seemed marked out by fortune herself for their security. Until the 31st, Venegas was not even felt; hence till that day the French position on the Alberche might have been maintained without danger, and on the 1st of August the head of Soult's column was at Plasencia. Suppose the French had merely made demonstrations on the 28th, and retired behind the Alberche the 29th; would the allies have dared to attack them in that position? the conduct of the Spaniards on the evening of the 27th answers the question. Moreover Joseph, with an army compact active and experienced, could with ease have baffled any efforts of the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered himself by the Guadarama river and the Tagus in succession; and the farther he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult's operation. These operations furnished another proof that double external lines are essentially vicious. The French combined movement, desirable from the greatness of the object, was safe because of the powerful force at each point; and the

occasion was so favourable that, notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor the reluctance of Ney and the unsteady temper of the king, the fate of the allies was, up to the evening of the 3rd, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, as the central position held by the allies cut the line of correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the king's despatches were intercepted and the whole operation even at the last hour was baffled. The first element of success in war is, that everything should emanate from a single head; and it would have been preferable that the king, drawing the second and fifth corps to him by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should with the eighty thousand men thus united have fallen upon the allies in front. Such a combination if not so brilliant of promise as the one adopted, would have been more sure, and the less a general trusts to fortune the better:—she is capricious!

When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another beaten at Almonacid, and Wilson's irregulars were dispersed at Baños, the junta had just completed the measure of their folly by quarrelling with the British army, the only force left that could protect them. The French were therefore masters of the Peninsula, yet they terminated their operations at the very moment when they should have pursued them with redoubled activity, since the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances of the campaign were alike favourable. For Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the British expeditions against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into life, the latter was already corrupting in death. Joseph was assured he would receive reinforcements, none of any consequence could reach his adversaries; and in the Peninsula there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, Aragon, and the Castilles were subdued, Gerona closely beleaguered, and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, unable to succour that noble city. Valencia was inert, the Asturias still trembling, Galicia was in confusion. Romana, commanding fifteen thousand infantry without cavalry or artillery, was then at Coruña, and dared not quit the mountains. Del Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but could not make head against more than a French division; the battle of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops; Estremadura

and Andalusia were weak, distracted, and incapable of solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese armies, the one at Jaraceijo, the other at Moraleja.

In this state the line of resistance may be said to have extended from the Sierra Morena to Coruña—weak from its length, weaker than the allied corps, separated by mountains, rivers and vast tracts of country, and having different bases of operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad Rodrigo, could not act in concert except offensively; and with how little effect in that way the campaign of Talavera had proved. The French were concentrated in a narrow space, and having only Madrid to cover were advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements. The allied forces were for the most part imperfectly organized, and would not altogether have amounted to ninety thousand fighting men. The French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous from their discipline and experience, more dangerous than they held a central position and their numbers were unknown to their opponents: moreover, having in four days gained one general and two minor battles their courage was high and eager. The Spaniards even acknowledged that the fate of the country depended then entirely upon the British troops, and doubtless they were soldiers of no ordinary stamp: yet there is a limit to human power in war as well as in other matters.

Imperial
Muster rolls,
MSS.

Correspondence of Lord
Wellesley
with Calvo
and Garay.

Sir Arthur was at the head of some seventeen thousand men of all arms, and about five thousand more were between Lisbon and Alcantara: but the whole French army could in two days have been concentrated in the valley of the Tagus. Soult alone, of all the associated generals, appears to have viewed this crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he been permitted to follow up the attack at Arzobispo on the 8th of August, what could the seventeen thousand starving British troops, encumbered with the terror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against the seventy thousand French that would have stormed their positions on three sides at once? The hardy, enduring English infantry might have held their ground in one battle, but could they have fought a

second? Would not a movement of the first corps by Guadalupe, would not famine alone, have forced the ten or twelve thousand men remaining, if so many were left, to abandon the banks of the Tagus, to abandon their piles of ammunition and their wounded men, to retreat towards Portugal, and with little hope when harassed by six thousand horsemen, for Soult had eighteen regiments of cavalry.

Suppose the strength of Meza d'Ibor and Mirabete had baffled all the enemy's efforts; that seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the sixth corps, in pursuance of Soult's second proposal, had crossed the frontier of Portugal. Sir Arthur, contemplating such an event, meant to follow them in any movement they might make against Lisbon; but there were two ways of following; the one by the south bank, the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now if he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal's bridge, and so connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy's rear, it could only have been while he was ignorant of Venegas' defeat, and when he imagined the French to have but thirty thousand men in the valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy thousand, and without endangering Madrid could have invaded Portugal with at least fifty thousand men. If he designed to move by the south side of the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the 12th, would have been cut off and thrown back upon Almeida. It is true Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding in the country about Plasencia and Coria, and the prudence of Soult's project might in that respect have been somewhat questionable. But Ney was averse to *any* invasion of Portugal, and to an unwilling mind difficulties enlarge beyond their due proportion; moreover his talents were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a campaign, and Soult's opinion must on this occasion be allowed greater weight. The Vera de Plasencia and the valleys of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were exceedingly fertile and had been little injured; and the object was not to fix a base of operations, but to obtain momentary subsistence until a richer country could be opened.

Admit the march on Lisbon was not feasible at that mo-

ment; or that Beresford with his Portuguese and the five thousand British troops on the line of invasion, could have delayed the enemy until sir Arthur, moving by the left of the Tagus, was enabled to cross that river and interpose between the French and Lisbon; there still remained the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The emperor's instructions were indeed pleaded, but those were general, and founded on the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of the future; they were not applicable at the moment and would have been disregarded by a general with a tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain the intrusive king was not a great commander, when he might have entered the temple of victory with banners flying he stretched himself at the threshold and slept. The departure of the English army from Spain was a remarkable epoch in the Peninsula war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French, had been acted upon and failed; the long-cherished delusion, relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency, was thus dissipated. The transactions of the campaign of 1809 form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All the objections which had been made to sir John Moore's conduct, being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while the soundness of that general's views were confirmed in every particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking resemblance to each other.

Sir Arthur Wellesley and sir John Moore advanced from Portugal to *aid the Spanish armies*. The first general commanded about twenty thousand, the last about twenty-three thousand men, but there was this difference in their situation; in 1808 Portugal was so disorganized as to require a British force to keep down anarchy; in 1809 Portugal furnished a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army was acting in co-operation with the British.

Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men under Romana, and there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him. Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards under Cuesta; and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand under Venegas, while from twenty to

twenty-five thousand others were acting in Galicia and Leon.

Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into the heart of Spain, to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations; and thinking a powerful army commanded by a man of the greatest military genius was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless, feeling some practicable demonstration of the difficulties to be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a movement too delicate and dangerous to be adopted unless for a great political object. To relieve the southern provinces, and convince the English government, and the English public, they had taken a false view of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river, and he went forward with a boldness marking the consciousness of superior talents: but he never lost sight of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established a second line of retreat upon Galicia, and kept a watchful eye upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. When in front of Soult's corps and ready to attack the expected storm burst, yet by a rapid march Moore saved himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente was untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon, and the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a battle, embarked.

It was objected—1°. That Moore should have gone to Madrid;—2°. That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo, instead of at Coruña;—3°. That he overrated the strength of the enemy, undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the Spaniards, and being of a desponding temper lost the opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro: a battle gained, and it was assumed that a battle must have been gained had he attacked, would, it was said, have assuredly broken the enemy's power and called forth all the energies of Spain. Sir John, however, said Spanish enthusiasm was not great, that it evaporated in boasting and

promises which could not be relied upon,—that the British army was sent as an auxiliary not as a principal force,—that the native armies were all dispersed before he could come to their assistance, the enemy too strong to contend with single-handed. Wherefore it was prudent to re-embark, and choose some other base for operations to be conducted upon sounder views of the state of affairs, or to give up the contest altogether; seeing little hope of final success could be entertained, until the councils and dispositions of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died, and the English ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent an auxiliary army to Spain, although the system still existed which he had denounced as incompatible with success.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice and a better could not have been made, was placed at the head of this army. After giving Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also advanced to deliver Spain; but like sir John Moore, he was cramped for want of money; and like Moore he was pestered with false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short-sighted views and displaying great ignorance of war. Nevertheless he adopted, and as far as the inveterate nature of the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project, which like Moore's had for its object to overpower the French in his front, and by forcing them to concentrate, relieve the distant provinces and give full play to the enthusiasm of the Spaniards.

When Moore advanced there were no Spanish armies to assist him, the French were above three hundred and twenty thousand strong, and of those two hundred and fifty thousand were disposable to move against any point; moreover, they were commanded in person by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the duke of Wellington, that his presence alone was equal to forty thousand good troops. When sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the Peninsula did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand men; of these only one hundred thousand could be brought to bear on his operations, and he was assisted by sixty thousand Spaniards well armed and tolerably disciplined. He underrated the French numbers by at least one hundred thousand men, an

amazing error for so great a general to make; yet his plans were certainly laid with great ability upon the data furnished to him; but he trusted to Spanish promises and to Spanish energy and did not fail to repent his credulity. He delivered and gained that battle which Moore had been reproached for not essaying; and then it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior numbers, was not to be destroyed or even much dispirited by one defeat. And while this battle was fighting, Soult came down upon the flank and rear of the English with fifty thousand men; a movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from Madrid upon the flank and rear of sir John Moore. This last general saved himself by crossing the Esla in the presence of the French patrols; in like manner sir Arthur evaded destruction by crossing the Tagus within view of the enemy's scouts: so closely timed was the escape of both.

When Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching him, asserted that the French were on the point of ruin; and even at Astorga Romana continued to urge offensive operations. When sir Arthur retired from Jaraceijo, the junta, reproaching him, asserted that the French were upon the point of retiring from Spain, and general Eguia proposed offensive operations.

In explaining his motives and discussing the treatment he had met with, sir John Moore wrote thus to his own government: '*The British were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not equal to encounter the French, who have at least eighty thousand men, and we have nothing to expect from the Spaniards, who are not to be trusted; they are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise, backward to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of flying before the enemy; they refuse all assistance, and I am obliged to leave ammunition stores and money behind. The Spanish armies have shown no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring spirit; and that which has not been shown hitherto, I know not why it should be expected to be displayed hereafter.*' Such were his expressions.

When sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the Spaniards, he also writing to his government, says:—'We are here worse

off than in a hostile country; never was an army so ill used;—the Spaniards have made all sorts of promises;—we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army; on the contrary, we were obliged to lay down our ammunition, to unload the treasure, and to employ the cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The common dictates of humanity have been disregarded by them, and I have been obliged to leave ammunition, stores, and money behind. *Whatever is to be done must be done by the British army, but that is certainly not capable, singly, to resist a French army of at least seventy thousand men.*

Moore's last advice to his government was against sending an auxiliary force to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the same spirit, withdrew his troops; and from that moment to the end of the struggle, he warred indeed for Spain and in Spain, never in conjunction with Spain. 'I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again,' was his expression when speaking of this campaign, and he kept his word. That country became indeed a field on which the French and English armies contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats or victories, the promises or the performances of the Spaniards scarcely influenced the movements. Spain being left to her own devices, was beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project, yet made no change in her policy; and while Portugal endeavoured to raise her energy to a level with that of her ally, Spain sought to drag down England to the depth of folly and weakness in which she herself was plunged. The one would not sacrifice an atom of false pride to obtain the greatest benefits; the other submitted, not with abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility to every mortification rather than be conquered; and the effects of their different modes were such as might be expected. Portugal with English guidance and aid, although assaulted by an infinitely greater number of enemies in proportion to her strength, overthrew her invaders the moment they set foot upon her soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, army after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, and every defeat sensibly diminished the heat of resistance.

Napoleon once declared that a nation resolved to be free could not be conquered, and the Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestos, as if to say it was all that was necessary. But Napoleon contemplated a nation like the Portuguese, making use of every means of defence whether derived from themselves or their alliances; not a people puffed with conceit lavish of sounding phrases, such as perishing under the ruins of the last wall, yet beaten with a facility that rendered them the derision of the world; a people unable to guide themselves yet arrogantly refusing all advice: such a nation is ripe for destruction.

This campaign of 1809 which finished the third epoch of the war was prolific of instruction. The jealousy of the French marshals, the evils of disunion, the folly of the Spanish government, the absurdity of the Spanish character, were placed in the strongest light. The vast combinations, the sanguinary battles, the singular changes of fortune, the result so little suitable to the greatness of the efforts, demonstrated the difficulty and uncertainty of military affairs: it was a campaign replete with interest, a great lesson from which a great commander profited, for he had experienced the weakness of his friends the strength of his enemies, and felt all the emptiness of public boasting. Foreseeing that if the contest was to be carried on it must be in Portugal, and that unless he himself could support the cause of the Peninsula it must fall, his manner of making war changed; his caution increased tenfold, yet abating nothing of his boldness he met and baffled the best of the French legions in the fulness of their strength. He was alike unmoved by the intrigues of the Portuguese regency, and by the undisguised hatred of the Spanish government; and when some of his own generals, one of them on his personal staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the ruin of the army, caused the puny energy of the English ministers to quail as the crisis approached, he with gigantic vigour pushed aside these impediments, and steadily keeping to his own course proved himself a sufficient man to uphold and to conquer kingdoms.

BOOK THE NINTH.

CHAPTER I.

WHEN Galicia was delivered by Sir Arthur Wellesley's campaign, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation against the great French chain of communication; but this advantage was feebly used by the Spaniards; Kellerman's division at Valladolid and Bonnet's at Santander, sufficed to hold both Gallicians and Asturians in check, and thus rendered the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus collaterally as well as directly of little advantage to the allies. In other parts of Spain the war was progressively in favour of the invasion, though subject to many crossings and always painful. Thus in Biscay which had been hitherto tranquil, and in Navarre, which had been so submissive that the guns employed against Zaragoza were conveyed without an escort by the country people from Pampeluna to Tudela, the guerilla system was now springing up. And when the battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the partidas obtaining some petty successes at the moment Blake had lost reputation by that defeat, were suddenly and largely augmented by deserters from the army, who flocked to them to hide past disgrace and live in greater ease: for the regulars, ill-provided, suffered all the restraints without the benefits of discipline, while the irregulars lived licentiously and purveyed for themselves.

Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains and every range became the mother of a guerilla brood. On the left of the Ebro, the Catalonian colonels, Baget, Pereña, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, brought their migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca and Barbastro. From thence



SUCHET'S OPERATIONS
1809. 1810.

operating on both sides of the Cinca they vexed the communication between Zaragoza and the French out-posts, and maintained intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon. On the right of the Ebro, Gayan, operating from the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, and the town of Daroca, fortified the convent of Nuestra Señora del Aguilar, situated on a rock near Carineña, and pushed his out-posts into the plain of Zaragoza.

On Gayan's left general Villa Campa occupied Calatayud with two regular regiments, and levied a large force with which he cut the line between Zaragoza and Madrid. Beyond his position, other bands descending from the Moncayo mountains infested Tarazona, Borja, and the communications between Tudela and Zaragoza. Mina, called the student, vexed the country between Tuleda and Pampeluna. The inhabitants of the high Pyrenean valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, took arms under Renovalles. This officer, captured at Zaragoza had broken his parole, but he pleaded a previous breach of the capitulation; his principal post was the convent of San Juan de la Peña, built on a rock remarkable in Spanish history as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish conquerors; the bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested there, and the Aragonese superstitiously believed it invulnerable. From this post, Saraza, acting under Renovalles, menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, Pedroza, and Theobalda, completed as it were the investment of the third corps. All these bands, amounting to twenty thousand armed men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts of the French army, while Blake, having rallied some troops at Tortoza, abandoned Aragon and established himself at Taragona.

Suchet pushed scouting parties to Tortoza and Morella, and having thus ascertained Blake's final retreat, placed Meusnier's division on the Guadalupe, repaired the castle of Alcanitz on the right bank of the Ebro, and with the rest of the army menaced Mequinenza and Lerida. Then leaving Habert's division on the Cinca he returned in June to Zaragoza, and being sensible that arms alone cannot render conquest permanent, projected a system of civil administration calculated

to support his troops, yet with some security of property for the people who should remain tranquil. But as no plan could succeed while the mountains swarmed with partidas, he determined to war down the bands and harden his troops before he attempted new conquests.

Commencing on the side of Jaca he dislodged Saraza, and put ten months' provisions in the castle. Then he drove Gayan from Nuestra Señora del Aguilar, and at the same time Pedrosa was repulsed near Barbastro, and Pereña defeated by Habert. Some troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his force at Uzed, Daroca was secured, the vicinity of August.

Calatayud and the mountains of Moncayo scoured, and the district of the Cinco Villas occupied. During these operations Saraza, descending from St. Juan de la Peña, slew seventy men close to Zaragoza; but three days after five French battalions stormed that sacred rock and pursued Renovalles up the valleys of Anso and Echo, where he obtained a capitulation for his men without surrendering himself. These operations having partially cleared Aragon on the side of Navarre and Castille, Suchet turned against the bands from Catalonia. Baget, Pereña, and Pedrosa were chased from the Sierra de Guarra; and though they rallied between the Cinca and the Noguerra, and were joined by Renovalles, they were again routed by Habert, and took refuge in Lerida and Mequinenza. Suchet then occupied Fraga, Candanos, and Monzon, established a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, and prepared to invade the valleys of Venasques and Benevarres, and thus open a new communication with France. The inhabitants getting notice of his project took arms, and being joined by the dispersed partizans defeated a French regiment which had marched in October from Graus to meet them. While fighting its way back, the neighbouring peasants came down the hills to kill the sick, but the inhabitants of Graus opposed this barbarity; and Suchet affirms that such instances of humanity were not rare in Aragonese towns.

During this Venasque insurrection, the governor of Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candanos to be attacked, and the whole circle of French cantonments were vexed. At Belchite, at Molino, Arnedo, and Soria, there were petty actions.

Mina continued to intercept the communication with Pampluna, and Villa Campa having rallied Gayan's people, and gathered others, seized the rocky mountain of Tremendal, where a large convent served as a citadel to an entrenched camp. Colonel Henriod marched from Daroca with two thousand men and three guns against this convent, which was on the upper part of a ridge shooting out from a mountain crest and overhanging the town of Origuela. The flanks were protected by steep rocks, and Henriod seeing that an open attack must fail, skirmished towards evening with six companies as if to turn the Spanish right; the Spaniards immediately gathered on that side, and by the light of the bivouac fires saw the French baggage and main body retiring, although Henriod was still engaged in the skirmish; hence, when the action ceased, Villa Campa, thinking it a retreat, was thrown off his guard. Then Henriod who had kept his skirmishing companies concealed close to the position, secretly scaled the rocks, rushed amongst his sleeping enemies, killed five hundred, and put the rest to flight.

On the other side of the Ebro the valley of Venasque was now successfully attacked, and the people disarmed; and though petty combats were fought in many places the obstinacy of the Aragonese gradually gave way. In December Suchet, being assisted from Madrid by a moveable column under general Milhaud, took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection of Aragon was effected: the interior was disarmed, the *partidas*, though still hanging on the frontier, were forced to recruit from other provinces, and the Aragonese were so robbed by the smaller bands that a smuggler of Barbastro raised a counter *partida*, with which he chased and suppressed many of them.

Reinforcements from France were now poured into Spain and Suchet was soon enabled to extend his operations. The original Spanish army of Aragon was reduced to eight thousand men; part were wandering with Villa Campa, part were in Tortosa, the rest about Lerida and Mequinenza, and those fortresses were the only obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps; in them the Spanish troops who

still kept the field took refuge when closely pressed by the invaders. The policy of the supreme junta was always to form fresh corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies; and hence Villa Campa, keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and still infested the western frontier of Aragon; Garcia Novarro, making Tortosa his base of operations, lined the banks of the Algas and menaced Alcanitz; while Pereña, trusting to Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the Segre. But Suchet's positions formed a circle round Zaragoza. Tudela, Jaca, and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned, and his main body being on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupied Alcanitz, Caspe, Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque. Of these, the first, third, and fourth were places of strength, and his situation was militarily and politically very imposing. One year had sufficed to reduce the towns, break the armies, conciliate the Aragonese—at that time the most energetic portion of the nation—and to place the third corps, with reference to the general operations of the war, in a formidable position.

1°. The castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro, at the entrance of the passes leading into Valencia; thus furnishing a base from which Suchet could invade that rich province, or place the Catalonian army between two fires when the seventh corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat.

2°. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps, while Fraga, having a wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons.

3°. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida, its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage the country between Lerida and Venasques, and the co-operation of its garrison with the troops at Barbastro and Benevarres could always curb Pereña.

4°. Venasques enabled Suchet to communicate with the moveable columns appointed to guard the French frontier, and Jaca rendered him independent of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca and the Guada-

lupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected the operations of the third with the seventh corps; and these two armies will be found gradually approximating until they formed one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against the south.

Suchet's projects were however retarded by insurrections and embarrassments in Navarre, which at this period assumed a serious aspect. The student Mina daily increased his forces, and by hardy and sudden enterprises kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon, one of Joseph's Spanish adherents appointed viceroy of Navarre, was at variance with the military authorities, and all the disorders attendant on a divided administration and a rapacious system ensued. General D'Agout, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of being in Mina's pay, and his suicide during an investigation seems to confirm the suspicion, but the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive venal and weak. To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, Suchet was by the emperor directed to repair there with a part of the third corps. He soon restored order in Pampeluna and eventually captured Mina himself; yet he was unable to suppress the system of the *partidas*; '*Espoz y Mina*' took his nephew's place, and to the end of the war the communications of the French were troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this celebrated man—undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the *partida* chiefs. Jan. 1810.

Here it may be observed how inefficient this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and how, even as an auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by its evils. It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that it commenced; it was in those provinces it could effect the greatest injury to the French cause; and it was in those provinces conducted with the greatest energy although less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain; a fact showing that ready and copious succours may be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were: when so assisted, men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own exertions. The *partidas* of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia,

mustered at one time above thirty thousand men accustomed to arms, and often commanded by chiefs of undoubted enterprise and courage; yet they never occupied half their own number of French at one time, never absolutely defeated a single division, never prevented any considerable enterprise, never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a single 'corps d'armée.' A whole nation thus acting must in time destroy the most numerous armies, but no people will thus persevere. The aged, the sick, the timid, the helpless, are hinderers of the bold and robust, and it must be difficult to procure arms and stores; for it is not on every occasion that so rich and powerful a people as the English will be found in alliance with insurrection. When the invaders follow up their victories by such prudent conduct as Suchet and some others of the French generals adopted, the result is certain. The desire of ease natural to mankind prevails against the suggestions of honour; and, though the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and tranquil: notwithstanding the violent measures resorted to by the partida chiefs to fill their ranks, one third of their bands were French and British deserters.

To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy; to direct their energy wisely is far more difficult, and if misdirected the result will be more injurious than advantageous; it was misdirected in Spain, and to represent it otherwise is to give false lessons to posterity. When Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of lord Wellington, that great man enforced a military organization upon totally different principles. The people were indeed compelled to resist the enemy, but under a regular system which restrained all classes within just bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation was rendered subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently is to confess weakness. It is to say the government being unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy. The partida system was the offspring of disorder, which is in war weakness, accompanied by ills sufficient

to produce national ruin. Habits of unprincipled violence and licentiousness are quickly contracted in irregular warfare, and render men unfit for the duties of citizens; and yet with singular inconsistency this system has been lauded by English politicians who in the name of freedom condemn regular armies, although a high sense of honour, devotion to the country, and decent manners are essential to their organization.

Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one great man is sufficient to save a nation; but where every person makes war in the manner most agreeable to himself, there will be more robbers than generals. Almost the first exploit of Espoz y Mina was to slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen. Mina would never permit in his district any other partida, and strove always to raise his own to the dignity of a regular force; and the French general St. Cyr, after much experience of their irregular warfare, thought Spain suffered more from it than she gained. For he says, 'Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans, I admired them; but as they often exceeded the bounds of reason, their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without advantage. When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which defends it, it is beyond question the population should come to the assistance of the troops and lend them every support; but, without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on to the field of battle.'—'It is inhuman to place their inexperience in opposition to hardened veterans.'

'Instead of exasperating the people of Catalonia, the leaders should have endeavoured to calm them, and directed their ardour so as to second the army on great occasions. They excited them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to embark if they were on the coast; if inland, to take to the mountains, and perish of misery within sight of their own homes thus abandoned to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people's ardour was exhausted daily in partial operations, and hence, on great

occasions, when they would have been eminently successful, they were not to be had. Their good will had been so often abused by the folly of their leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain. The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and ill-used them when broken by defeat. They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often as dangerous to their own party as to the enemy. The atrocities committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic, abated their zeal and caused the middle classes to desire peace as the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at first, began to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, but for the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in Spain would never have remounted the throne.

‘The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the slaves of their duty and of the state; certain of death a little sooner or a little later, they like the Spaniards were victims of the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted warfare; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out this disposition prematurely; and that unhappy people were themselves the victims of a cruelty, which, either of their own will or excited by others, they had exercised upon those troops who fell into their power; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a contrary system would in a little time have broken up the seventh corps,—seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners naturally inclined to desert. But the murder of all wounded and sick and helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion which at first menaced total destruction ceased entirely.’

Such were St. Cyr’s opinions, and yet the struggle in Catalonia, of which it is time to resume the relation, was not the least successful in Spain.

CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.


IT will be remembered that St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. His whole attention was then directed towards Gerona, and to hasten Reille's preparation for the siege of that place he sent a second detachment under Lecchi to the Ampurdam. During this time Coupigny continued at Tarragona, and Blake made his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans and Wimphen, had composed Reding's left wing, were continually skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich; and the partisans, especially Claros and Rovira, molested the communications in a more systematic manner than before.

Lecchi returned the 18th of May, with intelligence that Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that Verdier had replaced Reille, and marshal Augereau was at Perpignan on his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the command of the seventh corps. This gave St. Cyr infinite discontent; for notwithstanding his assertions that Napoleon wished to destroy him, he desired to keep his command. In his Journal of Operations, he declares his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and he treats him with sarcastic contempt; but official documents show that Napoleon superseded St. Cyr for his want of zeal.

Augereau had served in Catalonia during the war of the revolution, and imagined he had then acquired an influence which might be revived on the present occasion. He framed a proclamation vying with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes, but the latter, however turgid, were in unison with the

feelings of the people; whereas this proclamation, though sent to Catalonia escorted by a battalion, was on the very frontier met by colonel Porta, who defeated the troops, and tore down the few copies which had been posted. Augereau, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan, and St. Cyr continued to command, yet reluctantly, because, as he affirms, the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon's ill-will. The most serious affront mentioned was the permitting Verdier to correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr's. For these reasons, the latter says he contented himself with a simple discharge of his duty, which, rightly interpreted, means a neglect of that most important of all duties, zeal for the public welfare; but Napoleon cannot be blamed for coldness towards an officer, who, however free himself from encouraging the Oporto conspirators, was certainly designed for their leader: it is rather to be admired that the emperor discovered so little jealousy. A man who has raised himself to the highest power, must inevitably give offence to his former comrades; for as all honours and rewards flowing from him are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries; the sanction of time is wanting to identify the sovereign with the country, and the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is patriotism.

While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as we have seen, directed him to enter Aragon and stop Blake's movement against Suchet; this order he refused to obey, and with reason; it would have been a great error to permit Blake's false movement to occupy two 'corps d'armée,' and so retard the siege of Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the Spaniards' possession, and St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all his operations, and now wished to forestal Augereau, was extremely urgent to commence the siege without delay; while Verdier having failed at Zaragoza, was cautious of attacking a town



which had twice baffled Duhesme. When pressed to begin, he said, he could not, after placing garrisons in Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand men before Gerona, which from the great extent of the works were insufficient.

St. Cyr replied that the garrison did not exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, considering that a depôt of provisions, established for the service of the siege at Figueras, must by delay be exhausted, as well as the supplies which he had himself collected at Vich, he sent all his own cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdam; and having thus augmented Verdier's troops to eighteen thousand men, again urged him to be expedite. These reinforcements marched the 23rd of May, and the twelve thousand men remaining under arms continued to hold the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the migueletes often skirmished with the advanced posts, and the inhabitants of the town remained in the mountains, unsheltered and starving, yet resolute not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed partly to fear, more to a susceptibility of grand sentiments distinguishing the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable for hardihood in the field, the Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude; they endure calamity, men and women alike, with a singular and unostentatious courage. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and, instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more than becomes either wise or brave men.

Early in June, having consumed nearly all his corn, St. Cyr resolved to approach Gerona and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in that district. He first sent his sick and wounded under a strong escort to Barcelona, and disposed his reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without loss; the active troops, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, then passed the mountains separating Vich from the districts of Gerona and Hostalrich, and the headquarters were fixed at Caldas de Malavella on the 20th. The

fort of St. Felieu de Quixols on the coast was stormed the 21st, the Spanish privateers sought another harbour, and the French occupied a half circle extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola, thus cutting off the communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Coupigny, Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros. During the march, three Spanish battalions were defeated, and a convoy coming from Martorel and destined for Gerona was captured. St. Cyr calls this force the forerunner of Blake's army, a curious error, for Blake was on that very day being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. There was at this period no Catalan army, the few troops in the field acted independently, and Coupigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona; where he and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and political intrigues than with military affairs, were thwarting each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations were alike weakened by internal divisions. Verdier was slow, and more attentive to the facilities afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within the works; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the 6th of May; it was not till the 4th of June that reinforced with Lecchi's division he completed the investment on both sides of the Ter. On the 8th ground was broken, and thus, while Blake was advancing against Zaragoza, in other words seeking to wrest Aragon from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands.

THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA.

When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of the contending forces were as follows. Eighteen thousand French held the Ampurdam and invested the place. Of this number four thousand were in Fernando de Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier found the first-named fortress, notwithstanding its great importance, *destitute of a garrison* when he first arrived from France: a fact consistent with

lord Collingwood's description of the Catalan warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed to them by others. St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, covered the siege with twelve thousand men, and Duhesme, having about ten thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona. Imperial
Muster rolls,
MSS. Forty thousand French were therefore disposed between that city and Figueras, while on the Spanish side there was no preparation. Blake was still in Aragon, Coupigny with six thousand of the worst troops was at Taragona, the Milans watched Duhesme, Wimphen with a few thousand held the country about the upper Llobregat; Juan Claros and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olat and Ripol; and in the higher Catalonia small bands of migueletes were dispersed under different chiefs. The somatenes had their own system of warfare; disregarding the generals, as in the time of Reding, they robbed the regular troops whenever a favourable opportunity occurred. The Spanish privateers dislodged from St. Filieu, resorted to Palamos-bay, and the English fleet under lord Collingwood watched that no French squadron, or even single vessels, should convey provisions by the coast.

From Gerona, Mariano Alvarez called loudly on the generals, and even on the *Supreme Central Junta* for succour. His cry was disregarded. When the siege commenced his garrison did not exceed three thousand regular troops, his magazines and hospitals were scantily provided, and he had no money; yet his lofty spirit was in no manner daunted nor his fortitude abated. The works were little changed since the first siege; but, as in Zaragoza, a mixture of superstition, patriotism and military regulation was employed to call forth the moral as well as physical force of the city. Here likewise a sickness, common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the ranks of the besiegers; and here also women were enrolled as the '*Company of Sta. Barbara*, to carry off the wounded and wait upon the hospitals: at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers! To evince his own resolution, the governor forbad the mention of capitulation

under pain of death; but severe punishment was only announced, not inflicted. Alvarez, capable of commanding without frenzy, had recourse to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence was, and one of suffering, yet unstained by cruelty, and rich in honour.

On the 4th of June the siege commenced. The 12th, one mortar-battery at Casen Rocca on the left of the Ter, and two breaching-batteries established against Fort Monjouic, being ready to play the town was summoned in form. The answer was an intimation that all flags of truce would be fired upon. The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken, and the 14th the batteries opened against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca. The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men.

On the 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, outworks of Monjouic, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel, and the French erected breaching-batteries four hundred yards from the northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their works, but a practicable opening was effected the 4th of July, and the assault was ordered, though the flank fire of the works was not silenced, the glacis not crowned, nor the counterscarp injured. A half moon in a perfect state, covering the approaches to the breach, was proved on the night of the 4th, and the assault was then ordered; yet the storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these four days, as the batteries ceased to play, the Spaniards retrenched and barricadoed the opening. However, at four o'clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column leaped out of the trenches, cleared the open space, descended the ditch, and mounted the breach; but the defences were strong, and the assailants, taken in flank and rear by the fire from the half-moon, the covered way, and the eastern bastion, were driven back: twice they renewed the attempt and failed with a loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The success was however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed

the garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, between Monjouic and the city.

About the period of this assault St. Cyr, finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of Souham's division from Santa Coloma de Farnés, and posted it on the left of the Ter at Bañolas. The French troops on the side of Hostalrich were thus reduced to eight thousand men under arms, although an effort to raise the siege was expected; for Alvarez's letters to Blake were intercepted, and that general was collecting men at Taragona. Nevertheless St. Cyr, anxious to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before Blake could reach the scene of action, detached general Fontanes from St. Filieu with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some squadrons of dragoons, to take Palamos. In passing the flat coast near Torre Valenti, Fontanes was cannonaded by six gun-boats, which his artillery soon caused to sheer off, and he then approached the place and twice summoned the governor, but was treated with contempt each time. It was important to reduce Palamos because it had a good roadstead, and was but one march from Gerona, and the works though partly injured were capable of defence and there were twenty guns mounted. Situated on a narrow rocky peninsula, it had only one land-front, the approach to which was over a plain commanded on the left by some rugged hills, where the somatenes had assembled; Fontanes drove them from thence and a third time summoned the place, but the Spaniards brutally killed the bearer and the Italians instantly stormed the works. The Catalans fled towards the shore, from whence their vessels put off in fear, and then Fontanes' troops, turning the town, intercepted the fugitives and put all to the sword.

Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans arrived near Hostalrich, and began to harass Souham's outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr's attention to that side, while a reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left of his line into the city. In pursuance of this project, fifteen hundred chosen men, under the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, endeavoured to penetrate secretly through his posts at Llagostera; they were

accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishman also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing general Pino's posts unobserved. Unfortunately a straggler was taken, and St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, judged the attempt to break through would be made in the night by the road of Casa de Selva; wherefore he placed one body of men in ambush near that point, and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column. So it happened. The Spaniards came through the hills at dusk, and received the fire of the ambuscade; they escaped by a hasty retreat, yet the next day fell in with the other troops and lost a thousand men; those who got away were ill-used and robbed of their arms by the somatenes. St. Cyr declares that Marshal offered to capitulate, but fled during the negotiation and abandoned his men; the Spanish general Coupigny said the men abandoned Marshal and refused to fight, that Rich run away before he had seen the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. Marshal's flight however was to Gerona, where he afterwards fell, fighting gallantly.

This failure was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle had reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was thus debarred the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was unshaken, yet he did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Coupigny, and even denounced his inactivity to the supreme junta. Coupigny pleaded Blake's absence, want of provisions, and the danger of carrying the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona; and he also adduced Marshal's attempt, as proof of due exertion. He could not deny that Gerona had been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches a bombardment and an assault without any succour; and that during that time, he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect. From the prisoners St. Cyr ascertained that neither Coupigny nor Blake designed to succour Gerona until sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as on the besieged, should weaken the French; this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have forgotten that, with an open

breach, a town, requiring six thousand men to man the works and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at any moment.

After the failure at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced formal approaches, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan. His operations were retarded by Claros and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French frontier. To check those chiefs a brigade was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja; and the fortified convent of St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort and Monjouic, being taken, the communication between the latter place and the city was cut off. The 4th, the glacis of Monjouic was crowned, the counterscarp blown in, the flank defences ruined, the ditch passed, and the half moon before the curtain carried by storm, yet no lodgment was effected. Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan, and two hundred Spaniards coming from the sea-coast with provisions, penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking their countrymen still held it, and were made prisoners. The 5th the engineers ascertained, that the northern bastion was hollow, and the troops after storming it would have to descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet; the line of attack was therefore changed for one against the eastern bastion, where a second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for assaulting on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th the garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and regained Gerona. Thus Monjouic fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches and one assault.

CHAPTER III.

VERDIER, elated by his success, boasted of the difficulties he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great; for the rocky nature of the soil had forced him to raise trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and said fifteen days would suffice to take the town; whereupon the Spaniards, indignant at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions. Meanwhile Claros and Rovira, having two thousand five hundred migueletes, attacked Bascara, a fortified post between Figueras and Gerona. A convoy escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde, and though the commandant of Figueras, uniting some '*gens d'armes*' and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the post on the 6th, the escort of the convoy, falling back on France, spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. The latter refused this ill-timed demand, and in his Memoirs takes occasion to censure the system of moveable columns as more likely to create than suppress insurrections; as harassing to the troops, weakening the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing the peasantry must always be more moveable than the columns, and better informed of their marches and strength. If an army is so morally disorganized that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, this argument is unanswerable, and the system was inapplicable to the situation and composition of the seventh corps; but with good officers and good combinations moveable columns supported by small fortified posts are effective. Napoleon was the creator of that system, and his views, opinions, and actions, will in defiance of all

attempts to lessen them go down with a wonderful authority to posterity.

Soon after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, led secretly through the mountains by two officers named Foxa and Cantera, arrived in the evening on the Ter, and attempted to pass that river near Angeles; being baffled they descended lower in the night, crossed the water at St. Pons, and entered Gerona at day-break. This daring exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison, but its strength was wasted by pestilence, the French works advanced and the Spanish generals outside remained inert. Alvarez and his council protested strongly against the cold-blooded neglect of those who owed them succour; and the junta of Catalonia forwarded their complaints to the central junta at Seville, with the following remonstrance.

‘Our commanders have no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they say they act in conformity to a plan approved by your majesty. Can it be true that your majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to her own feeble resources? If so, her destruction is inevitable; and should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity when they see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead or in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when this most interesting place can obtain no help from them?—‘Do you not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is sufficient to freeze the ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this bulwark of our frontier be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no longer any real existence.’

This address produced a decree to afford Catalonia succour, money was promised, and Blake received orders to raise the siege. But never did the language of the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake made only two feeble efforts to save the heroic, and suffering city; the central junta, then intent

upon thwarting and insulting the English general after the battle of Talavera, thought no more of Gerona; and the junta of Catalonia, so eloquent so patriotic with the pen, was selling to foreign merchants the arms supplied by England for the defence of their country!

Towards the end of August, when the French fire had opened three breaches, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of Gerona to ashes, Blake marched from Taragona with a force of eight or ten thousand regulars. First proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, to Vich, he then passed the mountains to St. Hillario, and was joined by Wimphen and the Milans. As he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, and could direct twenty thousand men against the circle of investment, his arrival alarmed the French; for the pestilence was also among them, the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained many thousand patients, and the battalions in the field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal strength; the generals rose from sick-beds to take the command of their brigades; and the covering army, inferior in numbers, was extended along thirty miles of mountainous wooded country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake's operations. Verdier was filled with apprehension, but St. Cyr's best qualities were developed. A learned and practised soldier, firm in execution, decided and prompt in council; wanting perhaps in original and daring views, yet able to struggle with difficulties, he said 'an immediate battle was to be desired, because his men were of confirmed courage. Blake's inaction was rather to be dreaded, for not more than two days' food could be procured to supply the troops when together; and it would be necessary so to scatter them again that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. Already the Spaniards were skirmishing near Bruñola, Blake expected no reinforcements, and would probably act immediately; hence it was fitting to concentrate as many men as possible in the course of the night, and next day deliver battle: there were still ten thousand good soldiers under arms, without reckoning what might be spared from the investing corps.'

Blake, with an army numerous but not spirited, was from

frequent defeat become cautious without being more skilful. He sought only to throw supplies into the town; forgetting that a relieving army should not protract but raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. He had collected two thousand beasts of burden, loaded with flour, in the mountains of Olot, with an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. Garcia Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man, undertook to conduct them to Gerona by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to the line of the French attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused Henry O'Donnel to fall upon Souham's posts near Bruñola on the evening of the 31st of August, supporting him with a detachment under general Logoyri; colonel Lander was to collect the migueletes and somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession of '*N. S. de los Angeles*,' a convent, situated on a high mountain behind Monjouic; Claros and Rovira were to harass the French on the side of Casen Rocca, and thus the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy had to pass.

O'Donnel commenced the operation by winning the position occupied by one of Souham's battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, with an impetuous charge, recovered the ground, and though general Logoyri renewed the skirmish, he could make no further impression. St. Cyr had now transferred his quarters to Fornels, and was urged to concentrate on the left of the Ter, partly because it was thought Blake would attempt that side; partly that being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in detail during their march. He replied that Blake must be timid, or he would have fallen on Souham with all his forces and broken the covering line at once; wherefore, seeing that opportunity neglected, he did not fear to concentrate on the Oña, by a flank march, under the beard of such an unskilful adversary. In this view Souham, marching at night, took post the 1st at daybreak on the heights of San Dalmaz and Hostalnou; and at eight o'clock Pino's Italians prolonged his line by the left in rear of the village of Rieudellot, while four miles in rear, on the main

road to Gerona, Verdier supported them with a strong detachment from the besieging corps. Lecchi was sick, but his division under Millosewitz guarded the bridge of Salt and the flat ground about St. Ugenio, having orders to cross the Ter and attack Rovira and Claros if they should press the Westphalian division left at St. Pons. The trenches under Monjouic were guarded, the mortar battery at Casa Rocca was disarmed, and the Westphalians if attacked were to retire on Sarria and protect the parc and trenches.

As a thick fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, both armies remained apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather cleared, and St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions. Blake's columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas; but scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and descended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy. Having thus gained the flat ground he was in rear of Millosewitz, Verdier's troops, the nearest support, being six miles distant and separated by rugged heights. Millosewitz had placed no guards, and thus the Spaniards getting close up to the main body with one home charge put it to flight; the fugitives in their panic at first went towards the town, and being fired upon, turned towards the heights of Palau, making for Fornels; and they would have gone into Blake's camp if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from viewing that general's positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino's division, he sent them back to Salt, and made Verdier follow Garcia Conde with the reserve, but it was too late; the latter had entered the place, Alvarez had destroyed the works near St. Ugenio, and thinking the siege raised sent five hundred sick men to the convent of St. Daniel, which had been abandoned by the French two days before.

Verdier passed the bridge of Salt and marched down the left of the Ter to save his parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for the Westphalian troops had hastily retired across the Ter before these partizan chiefs. The place

was thus succoured for the moment, but Blake made no further movement and Alvarez was little benefited: the convoy had not brought more than seven or eight days provisions, and the reinforcement, enough to devour the food, was insufficient to raise the siege by sallies. And while Millosewitz's troops were flying on one side of the Ter, Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other side, led Alvarez to think Blake's army victorious; wherefore he did not destroy the bridge of Salt, and Verdier used it as we have seen to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde's men, might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, and retaken Monjouic before Verdier could have come to their support.

St. Cyr having now only one day's provisions left, resolved to seek Blake and deliver battle; but the Spanish general went up the mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and thus enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate his troops. This effort to relieve Gerona, made on the 1st September, was creditable to Garcia Conde, yet so contemptible with reference to the means at Blake's disposal, that Alvarez believed himself betrayed; trusting thenceforth only to his own heroism, he permitted Conde's troops to go back or to remain as they pleased, exacting from those who stopped an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the rations of the garrison, first to one-half, afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, which caused some desertions; the great body of soldiers and citizens were however firm as their chief; and the townsmen, sharing their scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in everything.

Conde's success was due partly to the negligence of the French, yet their extended cantonments, on the evening of the 31st, gave Blake an opportunity of raising the siege without much difficulty. Nor were St. Cyr's dispositions for the next day perfectly combined; giving Blake credit for sound views, he was so expectant of a great battle that he forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to penetrate; hence it was a fault to leave only two thousand men there, fronting the garrison, and offering their rear to a

relieving army which could steal unnoticed through the mountains until close upon them: cavalry posts at least should have been established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to have been at too great a distance from the town, the firing in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier's reserve, and the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves.

St. Cyr says, his generals of division were negligent, and hindered by sickness from visiting their outposts; that he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills; that his advice was disregarded and he forbore to exercise authority from the peculiar situation in which he had been placed by the emperor. He, however, acknowledges that his soldiers answered honestly to every call he made, and he was bound to enforce every measure necessary to maintain their honour: in other respects his prudence and vigilance beseemed his reputation. It was not so with Blake, the whole of his operations proved that he was incapable of any great enterprise; he should have come up with a resolution to raise the siege or perish. He contented himself with a few slight skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions; and then, notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned away with a cold look and a donation that mocked its wants.

When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile, came out at daybreak on the 3rd with fifteen hundred men and the beasts of burden. He halted for a time at the gate to examine the country in front with his glass, and as everything appeared favourable he was beginning to move, when the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had indeed posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the Spaniards; but the French, forgetting the ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at daylight, and with a cry of astonishment the Spanish column hastily retreated again into the town. Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and

concluding the next attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr drew Mazzuchelli's brigade from behind Palau to the valley of the Oña, to fall on Conde's rear when he should again come forth. He likewise put a battalion on the hills to head the Spanish column and drive it back, either upon Mazzuchelli's brigade, or upon La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino's division.

On the 4th, one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending the heights on which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed in single files along a by-path leading to Castellar da Selva. Mazzuchelli saw them plainly yet did not attack, waiting for the fire of the battalion ahead; and that battalion did not fire because, as Mazzuchelli did not attack, it was supposed the Spaniards were part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double error, and with great readiness filed off to his left, turned the right of the battalion in his front and gained Castellar without hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed plied their guns against the rear of his column. Informed by the peasants at Castellar that troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, Conde made for Caza de Selva, where Pino having notice of his approach directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge crossing his line of march. These battalions took a wrong direction, the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their rear was attacked by Pino's personal escort, which took fifty men and some mules, the main body escaped with honour.

There were now four open breaches in Gerona, Mazzuchelli's brigade and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable; but the French store of powder failed, and ten days elapsed before a fresh supply could be obtained: Alvarez profited of this interval to retrench and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, and forced the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but Lander, the officer sent by Blake on the 31st of August to

seize the convent of *Madonna de los Angeles*, had fortified that building and introduced small supplies of provisions. This revived in the mind of Alvarez a plan for taking possession of the heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, by which, in conjunction with the post at *Madonna de los Angeles* and with the assistance of Blake's army, he hoped to maintain an open communication with the country. This bold and skilful conception he was unable to effect, because in a sally from the Capuchins on the 6th he was beaten by a single French regiment, and the same day Mazzuchelli's Italians stormed *Madonna de los Angeles* and put the garrison to the sword.

During these events Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira, who were posted at *St. Gregorio*, near *Amer*, but he was repulsed with loss and the French general Joba was killed. The 13th the batteries recommenced their fire, and Alvarez making a general sally by the gate of *San Pedro*, beat the guards from the trenches, and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, Verdier, thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required assistance from *St. Cyr*. The respective engineers of the covering and besieging forces did not agree; the latter declared the breaches practicable, the former denied it; adding, that while fort *Calvary* was held by the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted. Meanwhile, from negligence or the disputes between *St. Cyr* and *Augereau*, five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained at *Perpignan*, when Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the assault; nor were there officers to lead that number, so wasting was the sickness: the covering army was scarcely better off, and Blake was again in position at *St. Hilario*; nevertheless *St. Cyr*, seeing no better remedy, consented to the storm provided *Calvary* were first reduced. *Souham* watched Blake, *Pino* was to make a false attack, and on the 19th Verdier's troops advanced in three columns down the valley of *Galligan*; but the *Calvary* had not been taken, and its fire swept the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell before they reached the walls, and when the summit of the largest breach was gained, the French batteries, continuing their play, brought

down a large mass of wall upon the attacking column, which was repulsed from all the breaches and lost six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering army to the assault, and affirmed that he designedly caused failure, moved thereto by personal jealousy. Thus complaining he returned to France. St. Cyr asserted that the troops behaved well, and in council proposed to continue the attack, but, being resisted, turned the siege into a blockade.

St. Cyr's
Journal of
Operations.

Blake now advanced, and from the 20th to the 25th feigned to raise the blockade, his design being to introduce another convoy. St. Cyr, divining this object, and judging he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let him pass the covering line and then fall on him before he could reach the town. Souham was therefore placed behind Palau, Pino at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi's division of the investing troops was to meet the Spaniards in front while the two former came down upon their rear. Blake, assembling his troops on the side of Hostalrich, made a circuitous route to La Bispal and the heights of St. Sadurni, from whence he detached ten thousand men under Wimphen to protect the passage of the convoy. Henry O'Donnel led the escort, and at daybreak on the 26th, breaking through the French troops at Castellar, reached the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the battalions he had driven before him rallied on the heights of San Miguel and returned to the combat, while St. Cyr, coming with part of Souham's division upon the left flank of the convoy, forced the greater part to retrograde. Pino also run up from Casa de Selva against Wimphen's rear-guard, a rout ensued, and Blake made no effort to save the distressed troops. O'Donnel with a thousand men and two hundred mules got into the town, the remainder of the convoy was taken, the Italians gave no quarter, and three thousand Spaniards were slain.

After this action, some troops were sent to menace Blake's communications with Hostalrich and he retired by the side of St. Filieu de Quixols. Thus Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings, now almost insupportable. Without money,

without medicines, without food, pestilence within the walls, the breaches open. 'If the captain-general,' said Alvarez, 'be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or Gerona will soon be a heap of carcases and ruins, the memory of which will afflict posterity!' Meanwhile the state of the French was greatly improved; for St. Cyr had repaired to Perpignan where he found Augereau in good health, and forced him to assume the command. Then, he says, everything needful was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found in the state of Napoleon's affairs. Peace had been concluded with Austria, the English expeditions had failed, all the resources of France were become disposable, and not only the seventh, but every corps in Spain was reinforced: moreover Verdier expressly affirmed, that the emperor had before furnished ample means to take Gerona, and that St. Cyr had wilfully impeded the operations.

Augereau, escorted by five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, reached Gerona the 12th of October. The following night, O'Donnel, issuing on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, forced Souham's quarters, made that general fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction with Milans at Santa Coloma. This was as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable siege. Augereau continued the blockade, yet offered an armistice for a month, with free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period; yet so steadfast was the man and his followers this offer was refused notwithstanding the grievous famine; and on the 29th Blake again took possession of the heights of Bruñola. Souham put him to flight, whereupon Augereau detached Pino against the town of Hostalrich which fortified with an old wall and towers defended by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle was strong; nevertheless it was carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there captured, although Blake was only a few miles off.

At this time rear-admiral Baudin, sailing with three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, for

Barcelona, was intercepted by admiral Martin, who burned or drove on shore the smaller vessels of war, and forced the crews to burn two of the line-of-battle ships. The store-ships and a few armed vessels took refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, protected their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort, and presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board disposed for defence besides the shore batteries; captain Hallowell however destroyed the whole after a vigorous resistance, which cost the British more than seventy men killed and wounded.

Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions became frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to force the inflexible Alvarez to surrender, went over to the enemy. During November, the French were inactive for want of powder, but famine and sickness were doing their work with terrible rigour, and the 6th of December ammunition having arrived, the suburbs of Marina and Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the towers beyond the ramparts were carried by the besiegers. Alvarez was thus confined to the circuit of the walls, and cut off from the Capuchin and Constable forts; he had been ill for some days, yet rising for a last effort made a general sally on the 7th, retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts, and opening a way to the outworks of the Constable carried off the garrison: the next day overcome by suffering he became delirious. A council of war assembled, and after six months of open trenches Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the troops were to be exchanged, the inhabitants to be respected, and none but soldiers to be considered prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza.

French and Spanish writers alike affirm, that Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigour and contumely which excited every person's indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks were, under an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last accusation admits of dispute. The monks had formed themselves into a regular corps named the Crusaders; they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform; and being to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said

that to constitute them prisoners was a violation, although it might be a harsh interpretation of the capitulation. Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France, but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration. If Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Constancy under terrible sufferings protracted this siege. But constancy alone could not have baffled the progress of the engineer; the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. The French combinations were not scientific; and this, saving the right of Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the defence.

2°. St. Cyr says the attack on Monjouic was ill judged and worse executed. The principal approaches should have been conducted against the Marcadel; because the soil there was easy to work, full of natural hollows and clefts, the defences open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the Casen Rocca: on the side of Monjouic, the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the flying sap with great loss and difficulty. And when the Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been covered by the Oña and Monjouic; the forts of the Constable and Capuchin, complete in themselves, would have remained to be taken. These things are however ordinarily doubtful; and it must always be a great matter with a general to raise the moral confidence of his own army, and sink that of his adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive success.

3°. The faulty attack on Monjouic is less doubtful than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of rules account for failure. The result was the delay of a whole month in the progress of the siege, during which disease invaded the army; and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the trenches.

4°. The assault on the body of the place was not well conducted. Hence, if the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of Germans, Italians, and French in the army, the maladministration of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost and so many more kept from their duty, be considered, it is surprising that Gerona was taken at all.

5°. The foregoing conclusions affect not the merits of the besieged; the difficulties and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely, they endured unheard-of sufferings with constancy, and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are good and evil principles in man, how dependent upon accidental circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the same Alvarez who one year before surrendered the Barcelona Montjuic at the insolent summons of Duhesme! The influence of a base court had then degraded public feeling and what was weak in his character came to the surface; but in times more congenial to virtuous sentiments the nobility of the man's nature broke forth.

6°. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. The men who came against Zaragoza were less numerous than those who came against Gerona; the regular garrison of Zaragoza was thirty thousand, that of Gerona three thousand. The armed multitude in the one amounted to twenty-five thousand, in the other they were less than six thousand. Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza, and the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance; above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush for, the fighting was more successful, the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy greater, the suffering within the walls neither wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled that

of Zaragoza, and every proceeding tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of human nature: there was less of brutal rule, more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of generous men.

7°. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia and landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege: it was not necessary to equip this army for a campaign, a single march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post; and if that place had been occupied by English troops and supported by a fleet, greater means than the French could have collected in 1809 would not have reduced Gerona. The Catalans were not more tractable nor more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies; but the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in their possession, the long difficult lines of communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of their convoys, would have rendered the invaders' task most difficult.

8°. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy of the Valencians had been characterised by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The local junta, not content with asserting an exclusive authority, imagined it possible to maintain Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should be conquered: hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no impression. With a regular army of ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagena, the junta of this rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, did not even put the fortified towns of its own frontier in a state of defence; and carelessly beheld the seventh and third

corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few days' march from Valencia itself, two solid bases for further invasion. But the operations of the '*Central Supreme Junta*' must now be resumed, to show how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, the fortunes of the Spanish people, were sported with by those who had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula.

CHAPTER IV.

WHEN sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia relative to the cause of that movement were so far successful that no open revolt took place; yet the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, and measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the junta, and transport them to Manilla. The old junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition, no good could be expected from the change, otherwise, such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, some violent remedy being necessary to purge off the complicated disorders of the state.

'Spain,' said lord Wellesley, *'has proved untrue to our alliance because she is untrue to herself.'*—*'Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.'*—*'No alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and national infirmity.'*

This discontent of the British ambassador led the conspirators to impart their designs to him; but he, being accredited to the existing government, apprised it of the danger, concealing however the names of those engaged in the plot. The junta immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred, yet still averse to yield power projected a counter scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading under licences with the towns occupied by the enemy; this regulation and some peculiarly heavy exactions they now rescinded; and, as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of

patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived. These commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members of the junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, every member of the existing junta to have in rotation a place; the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; the council, so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that assembly. Thus by a simple change of form the present and future authority of the junta were to be confirmed. And the proposal in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of lord Wellesley, merely to obtain momentary popularity and entirely unconnected with enlarged views of government.

This project was foiled by Romana. Being of the commission he dissented from his colleagues, and drew up the accusatory paper quoted in another part of this history. Yet the bad acts therein specified were not the only charges made at this period. It was objected that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult of access, insolent of demeanour; that some amongst them having as merchants contracted for supplying the army, did in their public capacity raise the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles. Romana proposed a regency of five persons, not members of the junta. It was to be assisted by a fresh chosen junta of five members and a procurator-general, to be styled '*The Permanent Deputation of the Realm.*' One of this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the Cortes until the meeting of that assembly, which he thought could not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong in favour of civil liberty, was ill-considered. The '*Permanent Deputation,*' being to represent the Cortes, would have possessed the right of controlling the regency; and the numbers and dignity of both being equal, their interests opposed, a struggle would have commenced, in which the latter, having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not fail to conquer, and no Cortes would have been assembled.

Some time before this, when frightened by sir Arthur's retreat from Spain, Martin de Garay had asked lord Wellesley's advice as to the best form of government. He recommended a '*Council of Regency*,' and like Romana proposed a second council; yet with this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the details for electing the members of Cortes, for whose convocation a proclamation was to be immediately published, together with '*a bill of rights*' founded on an enlarged conciliatory policy, and having equal regard for the interests of the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of this while danger menaced the junta; but when the command of the armies had been settled, and the first excitement abated, his solicitude for the improvement of the government ceased. Lord Wellesley, however, condemned the existing system as much for its democratic form as for its inefficiency; the English ministers thought of Spain only as tending to uphold the aristocratic system.

To evade Romana's proposition, the junta announced that the national Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March following. Having so far met the public wishes, they made a virulent attack on the project of a regency, affirming, not without some foundation as regarded Romana's plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, trample on the king's rights, would never assemble the Cortes, and be corrupted by the French. Then enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which deceived nobody; for to use the words of lord Wellesley, '*no plan had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses, or relief from exactions; and the administration of justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security of persons and property, and every other great branch of government were as defective as the military establishments.*'

However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull the public wrath, and the junta resolved to recommence offensive military operations; which they fondly imagined would crush the enemy and establish their own popularity and power. Encouraged by a false but general impression

throughout Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France, they raised fresh levies in Estremadura and Andalusia, incorporated them with the remains of Cuesta's army, and thus formed a body of sixty thousand soldiers, nearly ten thousand being cavalry. Nor was this matter of difficulty; for, owing to the feeble resistance made, the war had hitherto drawn little on the population, the poorer sort never evaded a call for personal service, and the enormous accumulation of English stores and money at Cadiz and Seville were sufficient for every exigency.

In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha, but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province, moved towards him, he regained the Morena. The first and fourth corps then occupied La Mancha, the second and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and Toledo, the reserve was at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, detached the prince of Anglona with eight hundred horsemen to reinforce del Parque, and took post himself behind the Guadiana. In the latter end of October Eguia covered Seville with sixty thousand men on the La Mancha line; Bassecour with ten thousand covered it on the Estremadura line, and six thousand were kept by the junta as personal guards behind the Morena. In the north the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo; where del Parque had been joined by the prince of Anglona, and by the Gallician divisions of Carrera and Mendizabel, thirteen thousand strong, and completely equipped from the English supplies at Coruña. Thus strengthened, del Parque entered the Sierra de Francia and sent his scouting parties to Baños, while Santocildes, moving from Lugo, took possession of Astorga with two thousand men and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, which, after forcing Wilson at the Baños, had been quartered between the Tormes and the Esla. In this situation a French detachment attempted to surprise Astorga, but was repulsed, and Ballesteros, having again collected eight thousand men in the Asturias and armed and equipped them from the English stores, came down to that place and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in this, he

entered Portugal by the road of Miranda and from thence proceeded to join del Parque. Thus the old armies of Galicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Galicia a general disposition to resist the authority of the central junta.

Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, had demanded in September, through Perez Castro the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join him. The demand was referred to sir Arthur Wellesley who gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon the following reasons, which give a clear and interesting view of the military state of affairs at this period.

‘The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since. But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate the duke del Parque’s intended operations. He could march a part or the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon del Parque and Beresford, with the corps of Ney which was at Salamanca, of Soult, which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which was near Valladolid; in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them from destruction.

‘In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced position, would be liable to a fatal disaster, so like-

Letter from
sir A. Welles-
ley, Sept. 23,
1809, MSS.

wise would the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed then, that if any one of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the commencement of the argument, forbade a general co-operation with any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to resume those defensive positions which they ought never to have quitted. Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the enemy's hands, was resolved not to give the duke del Parque any assistance to maintain his forward position; and he advised the Portuguese government not to risk Beresford's army in a situation which could only lead to mischief.

'The proposed operation of the duke del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose those troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an attempt on that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the other corps, which must be put in motion if Ciudad was to be saved; and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact position which the duke del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain that in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other probable or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, he had long been of opinion the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of

the allies; and Portugal at least, if not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period which the enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize and equip and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be accomplished, unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were much more important to all parties than any desultory successful operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success was doubtful and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies; who must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of men, and what was worse, time which would have been more usefully employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort.'

This reasoning made no impression upon the Spanish junta or their general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army

Correspondence with don M. Forgas, Oct. 19, 1809, MSS.

would be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. '*When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have the means, and will engage to carry into execution as far as any person can engage to carry into execution a military operation.*'—'*When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food as was the case when lately in that country.*'—'*When decided answers shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be sent into Spain.*' Thus sir Arthur replied, and del Parque commencing operations by himself, moved towards Ledesma to favour the junction of Ballesteros. General Marchand immediately drew together at Salamanca eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him; whereupon, without having effected his junction, he fell back to Tamames, and took post on the side of a mountain of remarkable strength. There he awaited the enemy with a thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be accounted experienced soldiers.

BATTLE OF TAMAMES.

Losada commanded the Spanish right, Belvedere the reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballesteros could arrive, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th, and immediately fell upon del Parque's left. The Spanish cavalry fled, and their infantry, surprised in the midst of an evolution by the French horsemen, were thrown into disorder and the artillery was taken. However, Carrera, Mendizabel, and the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered the guns and discomfited the French with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers, but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss and fearing to be enclosed by Ballesteros in that disordered state, then retreated to Salamanca.

Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st, when, being joined by Ballesteros, he pushed with nearly thirty thousand men for Ledesma, crossed the Tormes on the 23rd, turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off Marchand's retreat; but that general had timely information and was already at Toro behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames had reached Madrid, Dessolles' division was detached through the Puerto Rico to reinforce the sixth corps, and Kellerman was directed to advance from Valladolid and take the command of the whole. Del Parque hearing of this reinforcement fell back by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while these events were taking place in Castille, the central junta, having finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha.

CHAPTER V.

IN the arrangement of warlike affairs difficulties are always overlooked by the Spaniards, who are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success; this continues until the hour of battle, and then, when it might be of use, generally abandons them. Now the central junta, having, to deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur retreated to the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their confidence, that, for-naming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a provisionary system for the future administration of the capital, with a care which they denied to the army that was to put them in possession.

Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and Albuquerque was distasteful to the junta; wherefore, casting their eyes upon Areizaga, they chose him; having only the recommendation that at the petty battle of Alcanitz Blake noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter end of October, and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as the junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from Madrid. This movement was to commence early in November, and Villa Campa with the bands from Aragon were to assist; and when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, Albuquerque, having succeeded Bassecour in Estremadura, also received instructions to cause a diversion by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna. Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join Albuquerque, and thus

nearly ninety thousand men were to be put in motion against Madrid, precisely on that plan which sir Arthur had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Every chance was in favour of the French, and Areizaga's irruption was an extreme example of military rashness. The project of uniting del Parque's forces with Albuquerque's at Talavera was certain to fail, because the French masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on del Parque's rear.

Partly to deceive, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate, and permitted Areizaga to march under the impression that it was so. Nothing could be more untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley went to Seville, held repeated Appendix 18,
§ 1. conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the junta, reiterated his former objections to offensive operations, and warned his auditors that this peculiarly ill-judged project would end in the destruction of their army. But the Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even officially inform him of Areizaga's march until the 18th of November, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, on the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance, and with a vehemence deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and del Parque's forces: sir Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act, and he assured the junta that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever.

OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.

Areizaga, after publishing an address to the army marched on the 3rd from La Carolina, with sixty pieces of artillery and fifty to sixty thousand men, of which eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the baron Crossand, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters; which was a scene of gaiety and boasting, for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. Moving by the roads of Manzanares and

Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation and without military equipment save arms, the men young, robust, full of life and confidence, and without impediments of any kind made nearly thirty miles each day; they moved however in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route; and with so little order, that the peasantry of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings and carried off their effects.


At first the French were incredulous of this strange incursion, yet soon became aware that some great movement was in agitation, though uncertain from what point and for what specific object. Jourdan had returned to France, Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his advice the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted

S.
Journal of
Operations.
MSS.

towards Talavera, for the false reports had in some measure deceived the French as to the approach of the English, and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the junta. The second corps, now commanded by Heudelet, occupied Oropesa and Arzobispo on the 5th, having an advanced guard at Calzada, while scouting parties watched Naval Moral and the course of the Tietar. Mortier's corps was concentrated at Talavera; half a division of the fourth corps garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolles' troops; the other half, under Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud's cavalry at Ocaña. Victor's force, twenty-one thousand strong, was at Mora and Yébenes, a day's march in advance of Toledo; but his cavalry under Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole army including the French and Spanish guards, was above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolles' division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains.

In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that six thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia,





Arcizaga's
OPERATIONS
 1809.

- French before the Battle
- - - Spaniards d?
- French in Battle
- - - Spaniards d?

while a second column, passing the Puerto de Piche, had fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos. All the prisoners said the Spanish army was above fifty thousand, and Victor immediately concentrated the first corps at Yébenes, keeping his cavalry at Mora: he thus barred the roads leading upon Toledo. On the 8th there were no Spaniards in his front, yet the exploring officers sent towards Ocaña were chased back by cavalry; hence Soult judged what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga, continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The detached division of the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by Aranjuez, to Ocaña, making up eight thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry on that point the 9th, and Victor on the same day fell back to Ajofrin.

On the 10th, Gazan's division of the fifth corps moved from Talavera to Toledo, and Victor who had reached the latter town, moved up the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who, holding fast at Ocaña, had sent six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards, continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them towards Ocaña.

COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.

Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only Sebastiani's cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios and Ocaña, concluded it was unsupported, and let the Spanish horse charge; the French went behind their infantry, which was close at hand, and opened a brisk fire on the advancing squadrons who were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the whole mass of the French cavalry, were beaten with the loss of two hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga's main body then came up, Sebastiani fell back, and next morning took position on some heights covering Aranjuez. The Spaniards entered Dos Barrios, and there their impetuous movement ceased; they had come down from the Morena like a stream of lava, and burst into La Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them; yet this swiftness of execution

was but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or position, and without a plan of action, Areizaga had rushed like a maniac into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, trembling and bewildered.

From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and wrote to his government of Sebastiani's stubborn resistance, and of the doubts which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the junta eagerly demanded the assistance of the British army, and commanded Albuquerque and del Parque to unite at Talavera; the former commenced his movement immediately, and the junta did not hesitate to assure their generals and the public that sir Arthur was also coming on. Areizaga thus encouraged, made on the 14th a flank march by his right to Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been concentrated from every quarter.

To the south of Ocaña the ground is open and undulating; but on the north the ramifications of the Cuenca mountains, leading down the left bank of the Tagus, presented at Santa Cruz ridges which, strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for Sebastiani to cover that place. Soult was awake to his adversary's projects. He did not believe indeed he would dare such a movement unless certain of support from the British army, and therefore kept the different corps quiet on the 11th, awaiting Heudelet's report from Oropesa; and in the night it arrived, stating, that rumours of a combined Spanish and English army being on the march were rife, yet the scouts could not discover that the allied force was actually within several marches. Soult then put all his masses in activity, judging, if the rumours should be true, that his central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return by Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of the Tagus. Victor hastened his march to Aranjuez, Mortier concentrated at Toledo, Heudelet replaced Mortier at Talavera, in readiness to close towards the army. Finally, information being received of del Parque's retreat from Salamanca to Bejar, and of the

re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth corps, Dessolles' division was recalled to Madrid. During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in march, Liger Belair continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna; and Sebastiani preserved his offensive positions in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th the general movement was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the Spaniards in front, one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the king's guards at Madrid formed a reserve for Sebastiani and Victor. Heudelet was at Talavera, Dessolle in the Guadarama, returning to the capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios when Areizaga's flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new combinations.

On the evening of the 15th, it was known the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry over the Tagus; Victor then leaving one brigade at Aranjuez moved rapidly with his own and Sebastiani's troops up the left bank of the Tagus to force on a battle, and the bridge of La Reyna and Aranjuez were broken to tempt Areizaga by an appearance of timidity: but while these dispositions were being made, that general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus, and his cavalry detachments scoured the country and skirmished from Arganda to Aranjuez. At the same time the partidas reinforced with regular troops compelled the garrison of Guadalaxara to retire upon Arganda; but the next night, a French detachment surprised them in the former town, killed two or three hundred, and took eighty horses and a gun.

On the 16th the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon; and during this time Mortier, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to Victor. The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on the approach of Victor stayed the work, and withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus. The 18th, the cavalry of the first corps having now reached Villarejo de Salvanes, he destroyed

his bridges, called in his detachments, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la Zarza.

Hitherto his continual movements and unsettled plans rendered it difficult to fix a field of battle, but now the march to St. Cruz laid his line of operations bare, and the French masses were close together; Victor could press on the front with the first corps, and the king, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on the rear by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. No danger could arise from this double line of operations, because a single march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga; and if the latter should assail either, each would be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew the Spaniards were encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused Mortier, then in march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez, and Sebastiani received a like order. The king arrived at Aranjuez on the evening of the 18th, with the royal French guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of Dessolle's division, in all ten thousand men; and the same day Victor concentrated the first corps at Villarejo de Salvanes, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique and attack the Spanish position on the 19th.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges near Aranjuez in two hours; and about one o'clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, passed the Tagus, partly at the bridge of La Reyna, partly at a ford. Milhaud with the leading squadrons immediately pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen, and was thus led to the table-land between Antiguella and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. Having only twelve hundred dragoons he was going to retire, but at that moment general Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the whole furnishing a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these troops came Sebastiani, who took the command at the instant when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were advancing to the charge. The

Spaniards came on at a trot, and Sebastiani directed Paris to fall with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers upon their right flank; this charge executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused considerable confusion, which the Spanish general endeavoured to remedy by closing to the assailed flank. But to effect this he formed his left centre in one vast column, whereupon Sebastiani, seizing the critical moment, charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserves; the enormous mass yielding to the shock gave way in disorder, many were slain, several hundred wounded, and eighty troopers and five hundred horses were taken: the French loss bore no proportion, but general Paris was killed and several superior officers were hurt.

This unexpected encounter led Soult to believe Areizaga was endeavouring to recover his line of operations, and the examination of the prisoners confirmed this opinion. In the night Victor sent word that only a rear-guard was to be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza, and this also was reported by the scouts; it was therefore sure that the Spaniards were in march, and a battle would be fought next day. Areizaga had in fact retraced his steps by a flank movement through Villa Rubia Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon the king's forces as they opened out from Aranjuez; he arrived the 19th at Ocaña, and judging from the cavalry action the French could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same plain in two lines a quarter of a mile asunder.

Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine commencing half a mile eastward of the town, and continually deepening, bends on a curve to the west, until it connects itself with certain rugged gullies whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this ravine the Spanish left was posted across the main road from Aranjuez to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña; the centre was in front of the town, which was occupied as a post of reserve; the right wing stretched in the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge, having the shallow part of the ravine in rear. The cavalry was on the flank and behind the right wing. In rear of the army there was an immense plain, which closed in towards Noblejas and was

there fringed with rich olive woods, which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, then filing by the road from Zarza.

Joseph passed the night of the 18th in re-organizing his forces. The cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one regiment left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under Mortier, who was also empowered if necessary to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded by Senarmont. The royal guards remained with the king, Soult directed the whole of the movements, and before daybreak on the 20th, all the army marched with the intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever they were found. At Antiguera Joseph turned to his left, gained the table-land of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga's army in order of battle; the French cavalry instantly formed to the front to cover the advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish out-posts fell back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the front and opened a sharp fire. There were about forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery in line; the French had only twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and fifty guns, including the battery of the royal guard. Areizaga's position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was paralyzed by the ravine; it could neither attack nor be attacked; the centre was scarcely better situated; and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horsemen, who were dispirited by the action of the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of attack.

BATTLE OF OCAÑA.

At ten o'clock, Sebastiani's cavalry, gaining ground to the left, turned the Spanish right. Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed in front, followed the cavalry and drove Zayas from

the olive-woods. Girard followed Leval in second line, and Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, while another lined the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle presented two masses in attack, the principal one flanked by the cavalry was to turn the Spanish right, the second to keep the centre in check; and each were supported by reserves. The dispositions were completed at eleven o'clock, at which hour Senarmont united thirty pieces of artillery and opened a shattering fire on Areizaga's centre. Six guns detached to the French right, played at the same time across the ravine against the Spanish left, and six others swept down the deep hollow to clear it of the light troops. The Spaniards, though undisciplined and badly commanded, discovered no fear; their cries were loud and strong their skirmishing fire brisk, and from the centre of their line sixteen guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval's and Girard's columns as the latter pressed on towards the right. To mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the Spaniards gave back, their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine by a flanking fire of grape, and Senarmont immediately drawing the artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and prolonging his fire to the left raked Areizaga's right wing in its whole length.

During this cannonade, Leval constantly pressing forward, forced the Spaniards to change their front by withdrawing their right wing behind the shallow part of the ravine. By this change, the whole army, still forming two lines a quarter of a mile asunder, was pressed into a convex form having the town of Ocaña in the centre, and Senarmont's artillery tore their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry approaching them, they suddenly retook the offensive, their augmenting fire dismounted two French guns, Mortier was wounded slightly, Leval severely, and the leading French divisions wavered and gave back. The

moment was critical, but Mortier like a great commander brought up Girard's division through the intervals of the first line and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one regiment in square on the left flank; for he expected that Areizaga's powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge for the victory. Girard's fire soon threw the Spanish first line into disorder, and meanwhile Dessolles, who had gained ground by an oblique movement, seeing the enemy's right thus shaken, seized Ocaña itself and issued forth on the other side. The light cavalry of the king's guard, followed by the infantry, likewise poured through the town, and on the extreme French left, Sebastiani with a rapid charge cut off six thousand infantry and forced them to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little from the cannonade and had never made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off entirely, and the second line of infantry also gave ground when the front fell back upon it in confusion: Areizaga, entirely confounded, then ordered the left wing which had scarcely fired a shot to retreat and quitted the field himself.

For half an hour after this the superior officers who remained endeavoured to keep the troops together in the plain, striving to reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolles' united after passing Ocaña and pressed on with rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: finally, Sebastiani, having secured his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind and charged full in the front with five regiments of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke and fled, each man for himself, across the plain; but on the right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine, leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios in an oblique direction, continually contracted the space, and the pursuing cavalry, arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men and forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all quarters, and such was the route that the French were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, but to their credit inflicted no rigorous execution: hundreds after being deprived of their arms, were desired in raillery to return to their homes

and abandon war as a trade they were unfit for. This fatal battle commenced at eleven o'clock; before two, thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty carriages, twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six hundred inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards made for the mountain of Tarancon, others followed the various routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena, and many saved themselves in Valencia and Murcia.

During the fight, Victor, who had passed the Tagus by a ford, re-established the bridge of Villa Maurique before ten o'clock in the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, following Areizaga's traces. At Villatobas his light cavalry captured twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on took a thousand of the fugitives making for Tarancon. Being thus apprised of the result of the battle he halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward to La Guardia, where they joined Sebastiani's horsemen, and together continued the pursuit to Lillo, capturing five hundred men and three hundred horses. This finished the operations of the day. Only eighteen hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred men killed and wounded, the Spaniards five thousand; and before nightfall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand captives were in the hands of the conquerors!

S.
Journal of
Operations,
MSS.

Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, he met general Benaz with a thousand dragoons, who had been detached to the rear before the battle commenced; this body he directed on Madrilejos to cover the retreat of the fugitives; but so far had the panic spread, that when Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz's men fled without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight: even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry belonging to all regiments could be assembled at Manzanares, and still fewer at La Carolina.

Wellington
to lord Liver-
pool, Nov. 30,
1809, MSS.

CHAPTER VI.

JOSEPH halted at Dos Barrios, but spread his army over La Mancha to the fort of the Morena, and then returned with his guards and Dessolles' first brigade to Madrid. Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La Mancha; but del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in Castille, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolles' division had returned from Old Castille on the 19th, and Joseph's uncertainty as to the British movements, compelled him to keep all his troops in hand; nevertheless, fearing if del Parque gained any advantage over the sixth corps an insurrection would take place in Leon, he sent Gazan's division of the fifth corps from Toledo, through the Puerte Pico, to Marchand's assistance; Kellerman being directed to take the command of the whole.

During these events, sir Arthur, now lord Wellington, remained quiet about Badajos, for there was no mode in which he could help the Spaniards with a prospect of success, or safety for his own army. Albuquerque, following his orders, had seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being joined by the duke del Parque; but the latter who had thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolles' division was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and had therefore advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes the 17th, two days before the battle of Ocaña. Hence when Albuquerque expected him on the Tagus he was engaged in serious operations beyond the Tormes, and having reached Alba the 21st, sent a division to take possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned: the 22nd he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and Carpio.

Kellerman, having collected all the troops of his government, was joined by Marchand, and moving by Medina del Campo, fell with a body of horse upon the Spaniards at Fresno on the 23rd. Their cavalry fled at once, yet their infantry standing firm repulsed the assailants, and the 24th del Parque carried his whole army to Fresno. His intent was to give battle, but on the 26th fresh and imperative orders to join Albuquerque reached him, and he commenced a retrograde movement; Kellerman, without waiting for the arrival of Gazan's division, instantly pursued, and his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army, at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes. This attack was repulsed and the French fell back upon their supports; but the duke, seeing an action was inevitable, recalled the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one division, over to the right bank.

Wellington
to lord Liver-
pool, MSS.

BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.

Scarcely was del Parque's line formed, when Kellerman came up with two divisions of dragoons and some artillery. He sent one division to outflank the right, while with the other he charged fiercely upon the front; the Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the right were broken and sabred; those on the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallying his cavalry on the other side of the river, brought them back to the fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the left wing under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made good their retreat across the river; yet not without difficulty and under the fire of some French infantry which arrived just in the dusk. During the night del Parque retreated upon Tamames unmolested, but at day-break a French patrol came up with his rear, whereupon the whole army throwing away their arms fled outright; Kellerman entered Salamanca and did not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete. Del Parque however rallied his army in the moun-

tains behind Tamames, and in ten or twelve days again collected twenty thousand men, but without artillery; few of them had preserved their arms; and such was their distress for provisions, that two months afterwards when the British arrived on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of the sufferings of those famished soldiers: many actually died of want and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed nor murmured! Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and feeble in battle, are patient to the last degree in suffering.

This result of del Parque's operations amply justified lord Wellington's advice to the Portuguese regency; in like manner the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by Albuquerque's advance to Arzobispo, justified that which he gave to the central junta. It might therefore be imagined the latter would have received his after-counsels with deference;

Wellington
to lord Liver-
pool, Dec. 7,
1809, MSS.

but the course of that body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before the rout of Alba he proposed that ten thousand men, to be taken from del Parque, should *reinforce Albuquerque to enable the latter to maintain the strong position of Meza d'Ibor and cover Estremadura for the winter.* Del Parque's force, thus reduced one-third, could, he said, be more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive on the northern frontier of Portugal; a movement long projected, and, as he informed them, only delayed to protect Estremadura until the duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement. The reply of the junta was an order, directing Albuquerque immediately to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena behind the Guadiana. Estremadura was thus abandoned to the enemy, and Albuquerque placed in a bad position; his front being open to an attack from Almaraz, his right flank and rear to one from La Mancha.

This foolish contemptuous proceeding was followed by del Parque's defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, and Wellington at once commenced his march for the north. He drew twenty thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were again collected in La Carolina; and that

eight thousand men who had escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuenca under Echevarria. The numbers reassembled in the Morena were therefore, the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña considered, sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for the moment; and there was no reason why the British army should remain in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. Albuquerque's retrograde movement he judged a device of the junta to force him to defend Estremadura, but it only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to engage in serious operations on that side, yet to have retired when that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable; wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus and marched into the valley of the Mondego, leaving Hill with a mixed force of ten thousand men at Abrantes. Indeed the Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal, that many officers thought he had stopped too long, but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings.

It was not the battle of Talavera, it was the position maintained by him on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved Andalusia from subjection. This is easy of demonstration. Joseph having rejected Soult's projects against Portugal and Ciudad Rodrigo, dared not invade Andalusia by Estremadura with the English army on his right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La Mancha without drawing Wellington into the contest; but Andalusia was at this period the last place where the intrusive king desired to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried Wellington beyond the Morena; nor could the junta in that case have refused Cadiz as a place of arms to their ally; and then the whole force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English army behind the Morena. Areizaga had sixty thousand men, Albuquerque ten thousand, and it is therefore no exaggeration to assume that a hundred thousand could have been organized for defence: moreover all the Portuguese troops in the south of Portugal, would have been available to aid in the protection of Estre-

madura. From Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and, posted at the former, the allied army could have protected Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement would force the French to concentrate round the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of the Morena, having their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, and their right by Murcia and Valencia; having rich provinces and large cities behind them, a free communication with the sea, and abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.

It was a perception of these advantages that caused sir John Moore to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the northern line for his operations. Lord Wellesley also, impressed with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some plan of this nature; and the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have done so but for the impossibility of dealing with the central junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he would undertake the defence of Andalusia; conditions they would not accede to, and without them he could not be secured against the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle against reason. This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English, but political and moral considerations weighed most in that argument. It was for the protection of Andalusia and Estremadura during a dangerous crisis of affairs, that Wellington persisted at such an enormous sacrifice of men to hold his position on the Guadiana; yet it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother's wishes than his own judgment that he remained after Arizaga's army was assembled. Having proved the junta by experience, he was more clear-sighted as to their perverseness than lord Wellesley. The latter being in daily intercourse with the members, listening to their ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of future exertion, clung longer to the notion, that Spain could be put in the right path; and that England, in conjunction with the nations of

the Peninsula might war largely, instead of restricting herself to the comparatively obscure defence of Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government.

Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. Kellerman remained at Salamanca to watch the movements of del Parque, Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud was detached with a division of the fourth corps and some cavalry against Echevarria, but on his arrival at Cuenca, found the latter had retreated by Toboado to Hellin in Murcia: he then concerted operations with Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, but, as the Spanish regiments of Joseph's guard had fought freely against their countrymen, and many of the prisoners taken at Ocaña had offered to join the invaders' colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph; they were willing to serve the French emperor, not the intrusive monarch of Spain. Spanish authors assume that none entered the enemy's ranks save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view and were successful must be supposed, or the numbers said to have reassembled in the Morena and at Cuenca cannot be reconciled with the loss sustained in the action. However, the battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the offensive operations, which the Austrian war and the re-appearance of a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful, the enemy again took the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Although certain the British army would not co-operate in this short campaign, the junta publicly said it would join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus; the improbability of Areizaga's acting without such assistance gave currency to this fiction, and an accredited fiction is in war often more useful

than the truth; for this they may be commended: but when, deceiving their own general, they permitted him to act under the impression he would be so assisted, they committed not an error but an enormous crime. Nor was Areizaga much less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, no understanding with the allied commander as to their mutual resources and intentions, had taken place. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga's movement on Dos Barrios: it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so strong, no town so guarded, that may not by a fortunate stroke be carried; yet who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government. No general is bound to obey orders, at least without remonstrance, which involve the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but victory; and many great commanders have refused victory rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

2°. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general first met with opposition, and halted for three days, without a plan, ignorant alike of the situation of the first corps on his left flank and of the real force in front; yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward with his whole army on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus; Areizaga would thus have placed fifty thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry on the 12th in the midst of the separated French corps; for their concentration was not effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from the Morena at all; seeing that the calculable chances were all adverse, and the troops not such as could improve accidental advantages.

3°. The flank march from Dos Barrios by Santa Cruz to turn the French left and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of a hundred miles; and as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus the Tajuña and Henares, only great rapi-

dity could give a chance of success. Areizaga was slow; so late as the fifteenth he had passed the Tagus with but two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French, moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid; and when only one corps out of the three opposed to him approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. Joseph by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat; and then he who on the 10th had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani when the latter had only eight thousand men, sought a battle on the same ground with the king who was at the head of thirty thousand; the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yevenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this Spanish general who pretended to treat his adversaries as if they were blind men.

4°. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of Albuquerque's and del Parque's operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga's, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere's former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on the supposition that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia, which would however have been still exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Suppose the Spanish general and his army were capable of such a difficult operation as taking an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th. But on the 16th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting men, were in a condition to teach Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. In fact there were no mountains to hold. Between Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain, and on the

18th, there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha: the former was chosen, Areizaga's army was destroyed, and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot; and when the men, undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to be led into action he commanded a retreat, quitting the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

5°. The French combinations were well-arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced to do aught but commend movements eminently successful; yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga's rush from the mountains was so unexpected, and rapid, it might well make his adversaries hesitate; this was perhaps the reason why the first corps circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked it in front at Zarza on the 19th; a curious arrangement, because it might in conjunction with the fourth corps, then at Toledo, have fallen on the flank and rear from Mora a week before; that is during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours' march. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus, Areizaga did not quit Dos Barrios until the 13th, and remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore, the Spanish general was permitted to lead; and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez from the 9th to the 14th, was a masterpiece. It must however be acknowledged, that Soult could not at once fix a general who marched fifty thousand men about like a patrol of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary's positions or his own line of operations.

6°. In the battle, the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralyzed the left of the Spaniards, was very skilful; the disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners,

artillery, and other trophies of victory, prove the talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops; why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military genius of his advising general? was he distracted by disputes amongst the different commanders? did the British army at Badajos alarm him? or had he ulterior projects of aggrandizement in his thoughts which prevented him from doing justice to the interests of his brother? The latter has been affirmed; and accurate knowledge upon such points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

7°. Lord Wellington absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Arizaga's army exceeded fifty thousand men, Albuquerque's ten thousand; thirty thousand were under del Parque, who had just overthrown at Tamames the best troops in the French army; Villa Campa and the partida bands on the side of Cuenca were estimated at ten thousand; in fine there were a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms; and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why then was the man who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the junta? *'Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war.'* He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, and foresaw, to use his own expressions, *'that after one or two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some and defeats sustained by others, all would have to retreat again.'* yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy's superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him

Letter to lord
Liverpool,
MSS.

triumphant through the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those who assert that Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, and blame sir John Moore's conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the chances of war had sent him to his grave: but in all times the wise and brave man's toil has been the sport of fools!

8°. The battle of Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection; after his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon forced him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled under foot at Ocaña; and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them everywhere acting on the defensive, and everywhere weak.

BOOK THE TENTH.


CHAPTER I.

NAPOLEON, victorious in Germany, was ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula; but he complained of the past inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When del Parque's defeat on one side and Echevaria's on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia; yet immediately recalled it, as well as the first corps, which since the battle of Ocaña had been near the Morena. The march of this last corps through La Mancha was remarkable; for the first time since the commencement of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives. The king's vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in Navarre under Renovalles and Mina; partly because lord Wellington had informed the junta of Badajos as a matter of courtesy that he was about to remove, and his confidential letter being published and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, made Joseph think it a cloak to some offensive project. However, the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the Spaniards, and emboldened the French partisans, who were very numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia; and when the troubles in Navarre were quieted by Suchet, and the establishment of the British army on the Mondego became known, Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, no slight consideration, for his ministers were reduced to abso-


lute want from the non-payment of their salaries, and his troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, that 'war should support war,' paid only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the military chest.

Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the national Cortes had been short-lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the passions of the people, and afforded the old junta of Seville, the council of Castille, and other enemies of the central junta, an opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious; and this discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the junta published a manifesto, assuring the people there was no danger,—that Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of France,—that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall upon the enemy's rear,—that a second Baylen might be expected. But while thus attempting to delude the public they issued a decree for a levy of one hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money belonging to private persons, appropriated sums left for pious purposes to the service of the state, and sent property to Cadiz being prepared to transfer the seat of government to that town. To weaken their adversaries, they offered Romana the command of the army in the Morena, imprisoned the conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox, and confined the marquis of Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, in Pensicola. The conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a dungeon, where it is believed his infamous existence terminated. The celebrated Padre Gil was sent on a mission to Sicily, and on the passage thus spoke to an English gentleman, '*They have sent me on this embassy to get rid of my never ceasing remonstrances; and I have submitted to this banishment for fear I might be got rid of in another way!*'

Romana refused to serve, and Blake, recalled from Cata-



Invasion
OF
ANDALUSIA
1810.



lonia, was appointed to command the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; most of the other generals kept aloof, and in Galicia, Noronha, resigning his command, issued a manifesto against the junta: the public hatred then increased, and the partisans of Palafox and Montijo, certain the people would be against the government under any circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence violence. Andalusia was but one remove from anarchy when the intrusive monarch reached the foot of the Morena with a great and well organized army. Meanwhile the military preparation of the junta harmonized with their political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men, issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand poniards; as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation could or ought to defend itself. Areizaga had still twenty-five thousand men at Carolina in the Morena, Echevarria had eight thousand at Hellin, five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops at Carolina were however dispirited and disorganized, Blake had not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders transmitted almost daily by the junta, could contrive no reasonable plan of action until the movements of the enemy enabled him to disregard all instructions. Thus amidst a whirlpool of passions intrigues and absurdities Andalusia was destined to sink, although a mighty vessel and containing all the means of safety.

That great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected on the right by Murcia, on the left by Portugal, both in possession of the allies. The northern frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but between those provinces the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbad all military communication until near the Morena, where, abating somewhat of their surly grandeur, they leave a space through which troops could move from one province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of Andalusia. Towards

La Mancha, the Morena was so savage, that only by the royal road to Seville could guns pass, and through a terrible defile called the Despenas Perros, from whence the road descended by La Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, a way led through the Puerto del Rey, yet it and other bridle routes fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little beyond the Despenas Perros.

Santa Cruz de Mudela, being just in face of the Despenas Perros, was a position menacing the principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha; and eastward of that place the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From thence, roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, leading to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.

On the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or rather paths, penetrated into the kingdom of Cordoba. One entering the mountains by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz; beyond these roads the ridges separating La Mancha from Estremadura begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo. Hence an army entering Estremadura to invade Andalusia, must pass the Morena, moving by one or all of three great roads; namely, from Medellin and Llerena to Guadalcanal, from Badajos to Seville by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo, or, by Xeres de los Caballeros, Fregenal and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way through Belalcazar to Guadalcanal. All these routes, except that of Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, led, after crossing the mountains, into the valley of the Guadalquivir, whose waters at first roll westward, washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba; then bending gradually towards the south, they flow by Seville and are finally lost in the Atlantic.

To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen whose old walls were armed. His left occupied the passes of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba,

his centre was established at La Carolina, and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little skill and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection of the enemy. Here it may be well to notice an error as to mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men who with some experience of war have yet taken a contracted view of their profession. From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. But local strength is nothing if the flanks can be turned by other roads, and few positions are so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can, and a numerous infantry, crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon make the defenders retreat or fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious. Such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an army may operate in defence of more exposed situations, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them: a bridge is a defile, yet troops are never posted in the middle, but behind a bridge to defend the passage. By extending this principle, mountain-passes can be best made most available; and though the practice of some great generals may be quoted against this opinion, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place detachments in the defiles of mountains, and keep the main body behind, ready to reinforce the detachments when attacked, or to fall on the enemy's columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills.

Pierced by many roads and defended by feeble dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; yet, as they came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his army either at Almaden de Azogues or Agudo, had operated against their right flank, he must have been beaten or masked by a strong detachment before Areizaga could have been safely attacked. Nor was Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an obstinate defence.

Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar. These ridges cut off a narrow tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean, while the space between them and the Morena is broken by less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand divisions of country: 1°. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2°. The lower, or open country, about Seville. 3°. The coast-tract, between the mountain and the Mediterranean, which is studded in its whole length with sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places.

No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and thus descending, the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But to reach the Mediterranean coast the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be crossed, and most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing the valleys whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, and Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified and still retaining their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty of besieging those places while a Spanish army was stationed at Alcala Real or Ecija, while the mountains on both flanks and in the rear were filled with insurgents, and while Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey's sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in the province, and with his accustomed celerity fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were matured. But in this, the third year of the war, the junta were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. Those once forced,

Seville was open. From that great city the French could penetrate into all parts, and their communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital of the province and from its political position the most important town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and all establishments necessary to a great military power.

INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.

The number of fighting men employed for this enterprise was about sixty-five thousand. Soult directed the movements, but the king was disposed to take a more prominent part in the military arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. To cover Madrid and to watch the British army, the second corps was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments pushed into the valley of the Tagus; two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara. Gazan's division was recalled from Castille, Milhaud's from Aragon. The first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king's guards, and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed upon Andalusia. The army by easy marches gained the foot of the Morena, where Milhaud's division, coming by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of menacing demonstrations, made along the front of the Spanish line of defence between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena; and the 18th, Joseph arrived at Santa Cruz de Mudela, the whole army being then collected in three distinct masses.

In the centre, the artillery, the king's guards, the reserve and the fifth corps, under Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto del Rey. On the left, Sebastiani occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes with the fourth corps, and prepared to penetrate by Venta Quemada and Puerto San Esteban into the kingdom of Jaen. On the right, Victor, placing a

detachment in Agudo to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues with the first corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, Areizaga's line of defence in the Morena, and Albuquerque's line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened.

On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles of Esteban, and made a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the Guadalquivir, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains of Ubeda secured the bridges over the Guadalquivir. In the centre, Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan's division, crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works; the pass was then abandoned, and Mortier pouring through with the main body and the artillery, reached La Carolina in the night; next day he took possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen: more fatal to the Spaniards than the French, for the foolish pride engendered by that victory was one of the principal causes of their subsequent losses. Victor then pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, his patrols appeared close to Cordoba, and his flanking parties communicated with the fifth corps at Andujar. Thus two days, and a few skilful combinations upon an extent of fifty miles rendered vain the lofty barrier of the Morena, and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains.

In Seville all was anarchy; Palafox and Montijo's partisans were secretly ready to strike, the ancient junta openly prepared to resume their former power, the timid and those who had portable property endeavoured to remove to Cadiz; but the populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls. This multitude, scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence, and the central junta, fearing alike the enemy and their own people, prepared to fly. Faithful however to their system of delusion, even while their packages were being embarked for Cadiz,

they assured the people that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, but no danger could thence arise because del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque; and those generals being stronger than the enemy would fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena and gain a great victory! It was on the 20th of January when the Morena was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was published; it was not until the day after, that the junta despatched orders for del Parque, who was then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo, to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which such great things were expected!

Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger of the crisis, left Contreras at Medellin with four thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos, and marched himself on the 22nd, with about nine thousand towards Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; he had scarcely commenced his movement when he learned that Agudo and Almaden were occupied, and the French patrols already at Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat upon Seville. In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos and his own artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he moved with his infantry to Guadalcanal. During the march he received contradictory and absurd orders from the junta, some of which he disregarded, others he could not obey; but when the Morena was forced he descended into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 25th, and immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy's progress.

Now the storm, so long impending over the central junta, burst at Seville. Early on the 24th a great tumult arose, mobs traversing the city called out for the deposition of the junta and the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and Montijo were released, the junta of Seville was re-established by acclamation, and the central junta, committing the defence of Andalusia to that body, endeavoured to reach Cadiz, each member as he could, but all with the full intention of re-uniting and resuming their authority: on the road, however,

some of them were cast into prison by the people, and some were like to be slain at Xerez. The junta of Seville had no intention that the supreme central junta should ever revive; Saavedra, the president of the former, calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his old army, made some other popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to the junta at Badajos, inviting them to take into consideration the necessity of constituting a regency. This was readily acceded to, but the events of war crowded on and overlaid their schemes. Three days after the flight of the central junta, treason and faction were so busy amongst the members of the Seville junta that they also disbanded. Some remained in the town, others, amongst them Saavedra, repaired to Cadiz: the tumults were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume the command and defend the city, but he evaded this dangerous honour and proceeded to Badajos.

Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville elected a military junta, and discovered the same disposition as the people of other towns in the Peninsula had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza had then assumed command they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined city; but there were none so firm, or so ferocious; a feeling of helplessness produced fear in all, and Seville was ready to submit to the invaders who were close at hand; for Areizaga had been driven from Jaen by Sebastiani, that place had surrendered with forty-six guns mounted on the walls, and though the Spanish general made one more stand, he was again beaten with loss of all his artillery and his army dispersed. Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away their arms escaped to Gibraltar; Areizaga fled with a remnant of horse into Murcia, where he was superseded by Blake; Sebastiani entered Grenada, and was received with apparent joy, so entirely had the government of the central junta extinguished the former enthusiasm of the people.

The capture of Jaen secured the left flank of the French, and the king moved with the centre and right to Cordoba, where also the invaders were received without any mark of

aversion. Thus the upper country was entirely conquered. But the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before the city. Judging now that no serious opposition would be made in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada and seize the Grenadan coast, with a view to facilitate the attack on Valencia; and to insure success, he desired Suchet to make a combined movement from Aragon, promising that a strong detachment from Andalusia should meet him under the walls of Valencia. Dessolles meanwhile occupied Cordoba and Jaen, but the first and fifth corps and the king's guards proceeded towards Ecija, where, it will be remembered, Albuquerque's cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th.

As the French approached the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to Seville or Cadiz, the way to the latter being through Utrera; but from Ecija there was a road through Moron to Utrera shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. Albuquerque then despairing for Seville resolved to make for Cadiz, and to forestal the enemy gained Utrera with great expedition, journeying night and day until the 3rd of February, when he reached Cadiz. Some French cavalry skirmished with his rear at Utrera, but he was pursued no further, save by scouting parties, for the king had now altered the original plan of operations. The first corps, instead of pushing for Cadiz, marched by Carmona against Seville, where the advanced guard arrived on the 30th. Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence, seven thousand soldiers, chiefly fugitives from the Morena, were in garrison, and the populace, still governing and announcing a lofty determination, fired upon the bearer of a summons. Nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered with all its stores founderies and arsenals complete, and on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. Thus the lower country was conquered, and there was only Cadiz and the coast tract lying

between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to subdue.

Victor was now sent against Cadiz, Mortier against Estremadura, and Sebastiani had already placed fifteen hundred men in the Alhambra, seized Antequera, and incorporated among his troops a Swiss battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service at the battle of Baylen. He was desirous to establish himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people, led by a Capuchin friar, imprisoned the local junta, and collected in vast numbers, armed in all manners, above Antequera and Alhama, where the road from Grenada enters the hills. This insurrection, spreading along the mountains and even in the Viega or plain of Grenada, was not to be neglected. Sebastiani feared that the insurgents, having Gibraltar on one flank Murcia on the other, and many seaports and fortresses in their country, would organize a regular warfare. To stop this he penetrated the hills, and drove the Spaniards upon Malaga, near which place his advanced guard, under Milhaud, defeated them with a loss of five hundred men and entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished found a refuge on board some English ships of war, the rest submitted. More than one hundred pieces of heavy, and twenty pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British merchandize, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection was entirely quelled, for in every other part both troops and peasantry were terrified and submissive to the last degree.

General
Campbell's
Correspondence from
Gibraltar,
MSS.

Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such diligence as to reach Chiclana on the 4th, and it is generally supposed he might have rendered himself master of the Isla de Leon; for the defensive works were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of sir George Smith's negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the canal of Santi Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque's troops were harassed, dispirited, ill-

clothed, badly armed and in every way inefficient: the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities as usual occupied with intrigues and private interests. In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the canal. Venegas was governor of Cadiz, but when it was known the central junta had been deposed at Seville, a municipal junta, chiefly composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot, and being as inflated as any preceding governing body, would not suffer the fugitive members of the central junta to assume authority. However, by the advice of Jovellanos the latter appointed a regency not taken from among themselves; and though the Cadiz junta vehemently opposed this proceeding at first, the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere, brother of the plenipotentiary, finally induced them to acquiesce. On the 29th January, the bishop of Orense, general Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed regents until the Cortes could be assembled, but Leon was afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain. The council of Castille, which had been reinstated before the fall of Seville, then charged the deposed junta, and truly, with usurpation—the public voice added peculation and other crimes—the regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their papers, sequestrated their effects, threw some of the members into prison, and banished others to the provinces, thus completely extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly some of unsullied honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent of speech and dexterous in argument: yet Spain is not the only country where men possessing all the grace and ornament of words, have proved to be mean and contemptible statesmen.

Albuquerque, elected president of the municipal junta and commander of the forces, now endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its real strength, after an ineffectual summons proceeded to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile,

Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, under the Visconde de Gand, which had retired towards the Morena; they evaded him and fled to Ayamonte, where they might have been destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve would not from national jealousy suffer them to pass the Portuguese frontier. Mortier however neglected them, to pass the Morena by Ronquillos and Monasterio; he summoned Badajos the 12th of February, but Contreras was in the place, and the French marshal finding it, contrary to his expectation, in a state of defence, retired to Merida. This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch of the war; operations which had in three weeks put the French in possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajos, Olivenza and Albuquerque in the other province. These were great results, yet more might have been obtained, and the capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.

From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles and the French took ten days to traverse them, a tardiness for which there appears no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations and seeming cordiality with which the towns and even the villages greeted him, moved slowly; he imagined Seville would open her gates at once, and thinking the possession of that town would produce the greatest moral effect in Andalusia and all over Spain, changed the first judicious plan of the campaign, to march thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville had been however transferred along with the government to Cadiz, and Joseph was deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque; but fearing to leave a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon his flank, he resolved first to reduce Seville. He met with no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition as left him only the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation; the first his humanity forbad, the latter cost him time which was worth

Mr. Stuart's
Correspondence,
MSS.

his crown; for Albuquerque's proceedings were only secondary, the ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz.

The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona; previous to his arrival there, his movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be invaded, but fettered by his orders or ill-informed of the enemy's movements his march upon Agudo was too late; and his after-march upon Guadalcanal was the forced result of his position: he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos. From Guadalcanal he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23rd, and he might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of taking such a decided part was dependent upon the state of public sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque, indeed, supposed the French to be already in possession of the place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; but they could easily have entered it on the 24th, and as he believed they had done so, it is obvious he had no confidence in the people's disposition: in this view, his determination to cross the Guadalquivir and take post at Carmona was fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered Seville a lost city, and when the French approached, we find him marching with a surprising energy towards Cadiz. Yet he was again late in deciding, for the enemy's cavalry moving by the shorter road to Utrera overtook his rear-guard; and the infantry would assuredly have entered the island of Leon with him if the king had not directed them upon Seville: the ephemeral resistance of that city therefore saved Albuquerque, and he saved Cadiz.

CHAPTER II.

LORD WELLINGTON'S plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia. The stupendous campaign he was then meditating involved relations with every part of the Peninsula, and it is necessary to trace the Spanish operations in all quarters previous to describing it, lest frequent references should destroy the unity of narrative.

OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.

While quelling the disorders in Navarre, Suchet had directed
 Plan 7, an active pursuit of the student Mina, who, avail-
 P. 220. ing himself of the quarrel between the military
 governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country
 between Pampeluna and Tudela. He was then at Sanguessa.
 Harispe, with some battalions, marched against him from Zارا-
 goza, detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to
 surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the
 valleys of Ainsa and Mediano cut him off from the Cinca river.
 Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampe-
 luna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its
 line of march and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French
 line of communication; the garrison however made a strong
 resistance and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period
 reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a
 division under Loison was at Logroño; wherefore Harispe
 having, in concert with that general and with the garrison of
 Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puente de Reyna,
 and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers,
 launched a number of moveable columns which chased Mina
 into the high parts of the Pyrenees, where cold and hunger
 caused his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself
 escaped with seven followers, and when the French were track-

ing him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity truly Spanish, repaired to Olite in disguise, that he might see the new general pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.

But Suchet, while seemingly occupied with the disputes between the French officers and Joseph's civil authorities in Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials for a methodical war of invasion beyond the frontiers of Aragon; and when Reynier, coming from France with troops intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, he returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some petty actions had taken place, but his general arrangements were not disturbed; and the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona and other events in Catalonia baffled Napoleon's calculations, and this first destination of the third corps was changed. Suchet was then ordered to besiege Tortosa or Lerida, the eighth corps, forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the seventh corps was to advance to the lower Ebro and support the siege. But neither was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth corps towards Castille, and at that moment Joseph's letter calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.

A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, constituted Aragon a particular government, and rendered Suchet entirely independent of the king's orders. This decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had been intercepted, and Suchet doubtful of Napoleon's real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia; yet wishing first to intimidate the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, who was defeated on the side of Cuenca and his troops dispersed. After this success he fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base of operations, and drew there twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry, and some field artillery; at the same time he caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled

at Alcanitz, under Habert. His remaining troops were distributed on the line of the Cinca, and the right bank of the Ebro; the castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four thousand men, newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca to link the active columns to those left in Aragon: these arrangements occupied the whole of February. On the 1st of March a duplicate of the intercepted order to commence the siege of Lerida reached Terruel, but as Habert's column, which had already marched by the road of Morella, was actually in the province of Valencia, the operation went on.

INCURSION TO VALENCIA.

Suchet was soon in presence of the Valencian army. Ventura Caro, captain-general of the province, was in march to attack him at Terruel, and the Spanish advanced guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares. The bed of this torrent was a deep ravine, so suddenly sunk as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventosa situated somewhat in advance of Caro's centre were occupied, and he commanded one bridge; his right rested on the village, and another bridge called the Puen-seca; his left was on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was more practicable. The French general judging Caro would not fight so far from Valencia while Habert's column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight to turn the left of the position also, and so cut off the retreat of the van-guard. The French crossed the ravine after a skirmish, but the Spaniards fell back with little loss upon their main body, and then the whole retired to the city of Valencia. Suchet entered Segorbe, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, also arrived at Villa Real on the sea-coast; and though the country between these lines of march was mountainous and impracticable after passing Saguntum, the columns united in the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain.

Suchet coming before the city the 5th of March, seized the Seranos suburb, and the harbour, called the Grao. His spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, baron Pozzo Blanco, was publicly executed, and the archbishop and many others imprisoned; the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days Suchet remained before the city vainly negotiating; then, intrigue failing, and his army inadequate to force the defences, he retreated in the night of the 10th by Segorbe and Terruel. But the Spanish partisans had gathered on his rear, and at Liria and Castellon de la Plana, there were combats; Villa Campa, also, who had re-assembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns with their ammunition and escort between Terruel and Daroca. He cut off another detachment of a hundred men left at Alventosa, and nearly won the castle of Terruel by a bold and ready-witted attempt; but on the 12th, the head of Suchet's column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza. During his absence Pereña had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida entered the latter town and destroyed the bridge and entrenchments. Mina, also, was again formidable, and though several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, if an accident had not thrown him into their hands, a prisoner.

Suchet's failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble, and, as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. The principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded; and although Suchet laboured, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon's avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was

only at certain conjunctures any progress could be made, and one of the most favourable of those conjunctures was thus lost for want of the co-operation of the third corps: but to understand this the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered.

That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which with some interruption run to the Atlantic shores; for the sierras separating Valencia Murcia and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain are but continuations. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia; the hills thus broken by the river push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona from Tortoza and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia; that is to say, the districts containing Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described, and it only remains to notice the western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the principal spine. This is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and like the eastern region it is an assemblage of small plains and rugged valleys, each the bed of a river descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, Cervera; and near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia. Now the mountain ridge, separating the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain ways for the most part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon walled towns at both ends of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardona, and Montserrat, are on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and Taragona stands Momb Blanch, and between Taragona and Tortoza the Fort St. Felipe blocks the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points for the warlike *somatenes* of the higher valleys when pressed by moveable

columns, and from thence they sallied to harass the flanks and rear of both the French corps.

In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps was between the mountains and the sea-coast, parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications across, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could descend upon the rear and flanks of the French; while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. Upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted. Detachments, and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains or by sea from Taragona, continually harassed the French flanks; when defeated they retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, Cervera, and Taragona. From this last place the generals communicated with Tortosa, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, drawing succours of all kinds from those places, while the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief periods of lassitude in the Spanish army, occasioned by great defeats, that the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Taragona; seeing that the migueletes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, passing by the hills and by sea, could join the garrisons, interrupt the communication and force the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.

But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land; and to insure their arrival the whole army was compelled to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected. This being often renewed furnished the Catalans opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers; when the place fell he

retired again to Taragona. Augereau then attacked the miguelites and somatenes in the high valleys, but in the midst of this operation Baudin's squadron of succour for Barcelona was intercepted, and the insatiable craving of that city forced Augereau to re-assemble his army and conduct a convoy there by land: and he was compelled to return immediately, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the place. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated, and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the third corps, which he supposed would, following the emperor's design, be before Lerida or Tortosa. But at this time Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O'Donnell, who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommencing the warfare on the French communications, forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida. Thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other's movements.

The events touched upon above shall now be briefly described.

OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

When Gerona fell, Souham scoured the high valleys and defeated the miguelites of Claros and Rovira at Besalu, Olot, Plan 8,
p. 230. Ribas, and Campredon. At Ripoll he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and being afterwards reinforced with Pino's division, marched from Olot, by the road of Manlieu, forced the defiles, and took possession of Vich. Blake had been called to Andalusia, and the provincial junta, rejecting del Parque, gave the command to Henry O'Donnell, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation: he was with the remains of Blake's army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham's advanced guard pursued, and at Tona captured some baggage; but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers assailed the heights of Sespina charged with a shock that sent them headlong down again. Souham rallied his beaten troops in the

plain and the next day offered battle again, but O'Donnel continued his retreat and the French returned to Vich.

During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona by the road of Cardadeu. He had previously ordered Duhesme to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers with some guns, near the junction of the roads of Cardadeu and Manresa, to watch O'Donnel; the commander, colonel Guery, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, occupied Mollet, and took no military precautions. O'Donnel sent Campo Verde to fall upon these French posts, and he put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; those at Granollers threw themselves into a large building and defended it for three days, at the end of which Augereau succoured them. Finding the streets of Mollet strewed with French carcasses, the marshal ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona, and while there, affecting to be convinced how oppressive Duhesme's conduct had been, sent him to France in disgrace. After this act of justice, or of personal malice, for it has been called both names, Augereau, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, resumed his former position at Gerona and Souham returned to Vich.

All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued, but the retreat of Augereau, and Campo Verde's success produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia; the prisoners were marched from town to town, the action everywhere exaggerated; the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was then enforced, and the execution entrusted to the baron d'Eroles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced, the confidence of the people increased, and a local junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organize the somatenes on the coast, and direct the application of succours from the sea; the partisans also, re-assembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdam and incommoded the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich. O'Donnel went to Manresa, called the migue-

letes from the Lerida side to his assistance, and with twelve thousand fighting-men, took post at Moya in the beginning of February: from this point he harassed the French in front of Vich, while Rovira occupied the heights above Roda in rear of that town. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies and having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose them, demanded reinforcements; Augereau paid no attention to him, and O'Donnell descending the mountain of Centellas on the 20th, so suddenly entered the plains that the French general had only time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the Spaniards.

COMBAT OF VICH.

Rovira commenced the action by driving the French posts from the side of Roda. O'Donnell then came close up to the French line, opened all his guns, and throwing out skirmishers along the adverse front filed his cavalry under cover of their fire to the right, intending to outflank Souham's left. That general, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who were at the first charge driven back in confusion. The Spanish foot fell in on the French centre but failed to make any serious impression, whereupon O'Donnell, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time; Souham was then hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and he was severely wounded in the head; but O'Donnell having rallied his cavalry and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left. At this critical period the French infantry, firmly closing their ranks, sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, and the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all, for there was no retreat, hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, when the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was also driven away

from the rear, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded twelve hundred of the enemy.

O'Donnel's advance had been the signal for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were however with the exception of a slight succour thrown into Hostalrich unsuccessful, and being closely pursued by the moveable columns dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O'Donnel, quitting the upper Llobregat, retired to the camp of Taragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Ordal. It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish general, that the emperor directed the seventh corps upon the lower Ebro, to support Suchet's operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier in the Ampurdam, and two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and Mazzuchelli, who had taken the command of Souham's and Pino's divisions, to march upon Manresa, while with the Westphalians he went once more to Barcelona and from thence directed all the subsequent movements. His brother passing by Col de Sespina entered Manresa the 16th of March, and was there joined by Mazzuchelli; all the inhabitants abandoned the place, and Swartz was sent with a brigade from Moncada to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement by Montserrat upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, whereupon the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Taragona. The French, acting under orders from Barcelona, then left a thousand men in Villa Franca, and after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina and established their quarters about Reus; by which the Spanish army at Taragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca.

O'Donnel, whose energy and military talents were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, Juan Caro marched with six thousand men against the French in Villa Franca, and on the

28th killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores, but being wounded himself resigned the command to Gasca. Augereau, alarmed for Manresa, detached columns both by Olesa and Montserrat to reinforce Swartz, and the first reached its destination; but the other, twelve hundred strong, was intercepted by Gasca and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3rd of April. Campo Verde coming down from the side of Cervera then took the command, and proceeded against Manresa by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch and Rovira hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz, thus menaced, evacuated the town in the night, thinking to baffle the Spaniards by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, but being followed closely by Rovira and Milans, was so pressed the 5th of April, that with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage he reached Barcelona.

These operations having isolated the French divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched by sea with orders to recal them to Barcelona. Severoli, who had taken the command there, and whose instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, had feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore on the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte at the head of two battalions and some cavalry across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix on the lower Ebro. Villatte accomplished his object and returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the somatenes who were gathering round the defiles in his rear, and regained Reus just as Severoli, having received the order of recal, was commencing his march for Barcelona. In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion that O'Donnel perceived the disorder from

Taragona, and sending a detachment under colonel Orry to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli's rear-guard covered the retreat success-

Vacani.
Istoria Militare degli Italiani in Ispagna.

fully until a position was attained near Villa Franca, where Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. Campo Verde then fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements.

The situation in which he had voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such as a great general would avoid. For Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains to be passed only at certain defiles; Reus and Manresa were beyond those defiles and several days' march from each other. Rovira and Milans, lying about San Cugat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona. O'Donnel at Taragona was nearer to the defiles of Cristina than the French divisions at Reus; his communications were open with Campo Verde by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Querault, and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca San Sadurni and Igualada. The French marshal had, indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, yet this only rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion at Villa Franca was put to the sword, Swartz saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight, and the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat. O'Donnel, who one month before had retired from the battle of Vich, discomfited by only five thousand French, now, with that very beaten army baffled Augereau, and forced him, although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon Lower Catalonia and retire to Gerona with disgrace: a surprising change, yet one in which fortune had no share.

Augereau's talents for handling small corps in a battle have been recorded by a master hand.

Napoleon's
Memoirs.

There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign. But the truth is, Catalonia had, like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, who was afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona affecting the state of a viceroy when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other

hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man and excited by a sudden celebrity was vigilant indefatigable and eager; he merited the success he obtained, and with better and more experienced troops that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O'Donnel, distracted by a double attack, must have remained at Taragona, and neither the action of Vich nor the disasters at Mollet Villa Franca and Esparaguera, would have taken place. Napoleon, discontented as he well might be with these operations, sent M'Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau, who was then at Gerona and had disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command.

FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.

This citadel had been invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable. The French at first endeavoured to reduce it by a simple blockade, but towards the middle of February commenced the erection of mortar batteries, and Severoli pressed the place vigorously. O'Donnel, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the miguelotes, but every attempt to introduce supplies failed; the garrison was thus reduced to extremity, and honourable terms were offered; the governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them and prepared to break through the enemy's line, an exploit always expected from a good garrison in

May. Turenne's days, and generally successful. O'Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, sent vessels to Arenys de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence and from the side of St. Celoni to favour the enterprise. On the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving his sick behind, came forth with fourteen hundred resolute men; he first made as if for St. Celoni, but turning to his right broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich. The French pursued closely, Estrada was wounded and taken with three hundred men; many were

killed, the rest dispersed and eight hundred reached Vich. Thus, after four months' blockade and ten weeks' bombardment, the castle fell, the communication with Barcelona was completed, and Duhesme's errors were partly remedied; but at the cost of two years' field operations, many battles, and four sieges.

Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter and affording a safe anchorage were next seized. This event, which facilitated the passage of the French vessels stealing from port to port with provisions or despatches, finished Augereau's career; it had been the reverse of St. Cyr's. The latter, victorious in the field was humane afterwards; Augereau seeking to frighten the people into submission whom he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse. The Catalans, more animated by their successes than daunted by this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage in revenge, all human feeling disappeared, and both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes.

CHAPTER III.

WHILE these things happened in Catalonia, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, diligently repaired that error. Reinforcements from France raised his fighting men to twenty-three thousand; he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder were required for the forts of Aragon, and to check the partisans; principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees, though Villa Campa, with three or four thousand men, still infested the lordship of Molina and the mountains of Albaracin. Two lines of operation were open, the one short and direct by the high road leading through Fraga to Lerida; the other, circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre to Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, because the Spaniards when they took Fraga destroyed the bridge over the Cinca; moreover Mequinenza, the Octogesa of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, was close on the right flank and might seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza. The second route, longer but safer, was less exhausted of forage and provisions.

Monzon was a considerable military establishment, and the battering train, consisting of forty pieces with seven hundred rounds of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, escorted by Habert's division which occupied the line of the Cinca. Leval, leaving Chlopiski's brigade at Daroca to observe Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza. Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, whither his second brigade had been conducted from Terruel across the Sierra de Gudar. The castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by detachments. The right bank of that river was guarded by Leval; the country on the left bank was secured by a number

of fortified posts: there remained two divisions of infantry and nine hundred cavalry disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with O'Donnell at Manresa; Garcia Novaro was at Taragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to cover Tortosa; Pereña with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the upper Segre. In this state of affairs Musnier, towards the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove Novarro's detachments into Tortosa, remounted the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated, as before related, with colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns; one moved straight upon Balaguer; the other passed the Segre at Camarasa, and Pereña fearing to be attacked on both sides of that river, retired down the left bank, passed at Lerida, re-ascended the right bank to Corbins, and took post behind the Noguerra at its confluence with the Segre. Suchet then repaired to Monzon, placed a detachment at Candanos to protect his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, and advanced with a brigade of infantry and all his cavalry against Lerida. Habert descending the right bank of the Segre forced the passage of the Noguerra and drove Pereña into the place, while Musnier came up from Flix, and Lerida was encompassed. The operations of Suchet and Augereau were thus connected; but the line from Aragon was short and supplies abundant, because the produce of the province exceeded the consumption; from Catalonia it was long and unsafe, and Catalonia could never feed its own population.

Lerida contained eighteen thousand inhabitants. Being on the high road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, having a stone bridge over the Segre, and at no great distance from the Ebro and Cinca rivers, its strategic importance was great; and the more so, that it in a manner commanded the plain of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. Gonsalez was governor, but Garcia Conde was appointed chief commandant to appease his discontent at O'Donnell's elevation, and the troops he brought increased the garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants.

The Segre covered the town on the south-east; the bridge

was protected on the left bank by a rampart and ditch enclosing a square stone building; the body of the place on the north was defended by a wall, without ditch or covered way, but strengthened by bastions and towers. This wall joined on the east a rocky hill two hundred and fifty feet high, which sustained the citadel, an assemblage of solid edifices clustering about a castle of great height, and surrounded by an irregular work with good bastions, and ramparts from forty to fifty feet high.

From the citadel the descent into the town was gentle, and the works strengthened by ditches; in other parts the walls could be seen to their base, but from the height of the rock not to be breached, and the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was squeezed out two or three hundred yards, the salient part being secured by an entrenchment, with two bastions called the Carmen and the Magdalen. To the westward at seven or eight hundred yards, the hill where Afranius and Petreius encamped to oppose Cæsar, was, on the end next to Lerida, occupied by Fort Garden, which was itself covered by a large horn-work with ditches twenty feet deep. At the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill were two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, which secured all the flat summit. The works of Lerida were good and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery; the magazines were full, and a local junta having been formed to excite public feeling, two officers of artillery were immediately murdered and their heads nailed to the gates of the town.

This siege was to have been made by the third and seventh corps in conjunction; but colonel Villatte's report, and the appearance of bands on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect the seventh corps had already retired and cast the whole burthen on him. Wherefore he retained his battering train at Monzon, intending to wait until O'Donnell's plans should be more clearly indicated; yet he established a rope ferry across the Segre, one league above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared materials for the construction of batteries.

Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Mon-

zon and Balaguer, the remainder were thus distributed. On the left of the Segre four thousand men, including a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, were stationed at Alcoteletge in observation, and Harispe with three battalions invested the bridge-head of Lerida: the ferry-boat was thus protected, and danger from the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops occupied points on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and Corbins, but being too few to carry the investment round Fort Garden that part was scoured by patrols.

Scarcely was this completed when a Spanish officer, pretending to treat for an exchange of prisoners, appeared at the outposts and was detained. Suchet judged his real object was to gain information; for there were rumours that O'Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch, that Campo Verde was doing the same at Cervera, and that the somatenes were in arms on the upper Segre. To ascertain the truth, Harispe was reinforced and the corps of observation was pushed to Balaguer; the governor of Lerida immediately sallied, but was repulsed with loss, and on the 21st Suchet broke the bridge of Camarasa above Balaguer, and advanced to Tarrega, forty miles on the road to Barcelona. He was still uncertain of Augereau's movements, and like every other general, French and English, found it difficult to obtain authentic information. By an accident he ascertained that O'Donnel was at Momblanch with two divisions preparing to succour Lerida, wherefore returning to Balaguer in one march, he made Musnier resume his former position at Alcoteletge. This rapidity was well timed, for O'Donnel having already passed the defiles of Momblanch with eight thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry, had encamped at Vinaxa, twenty-five miles from Lerida the 22nd. There a note from Garcia Conde informed him the French reserve was drawn off the investing force weak, and he immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o'clock in the morning of the 23rd, made a halt of two hours, and then resuming his march with the cavalry and one division of infantry left the other to follow more leisurely.

COMBAT OF MARGALEF.

Four miles from Juneda stood the ruined village of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida, was an open country in which O'Donnel could perceive no covering force. Trusting however implicitly to Conde's information, already falsified by Suchet's activity, the Spanish general descended the hills and crossed the plain in three columns, one following the high road, the other two marching on the right and left. The centre outstripping the flankers drove back Harispe's posts, but that general charged with his three hundred hussars upon the centre Spanish column so suddenly that it was thrown into confusion and fled towards Margalef, to which place the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During this skirmish the garrison sallied over the bridge, but as the French infantry stood firm, and the rout of O'Donnel's people was complete, they soon returned to the town. Musnier, hearing the firing and guessing the state of affairs, had marched with his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, hoping to cut off the Spaniards' retreat; yet ere he got up O'Donnel was again in line of battle, having his artillery on the right and his cavalry on the left. His second division was still in the rear, the French cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and the Spanish cavalry rode forward; but the French cuirassiers, under general Boussard, drove them back on the line of battle so rudely that the latter also wavered, and the cuirassiers fell upon the flank of the infantry. Vainly the Walloon guards endeavoured to form square, the disorder became extreme, and finally the Spaniards threw down their arms or were sabred. Boussard, elated with success, then overthrew a Swiss regiment forming the advanced guard of the second Spanish division, yet the main body checked his fury, and O'Donnel retreated in good order without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. This action, although not discreditable to O'Donnel, was very unfortunate, the plain was strewed with carcasses, and three Spanish guns, one general, eight colonels, and five thousand men were captured. Next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had been detained

on the 19th, after which he was dismissed, by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of the defeat.

Suchet, to profit from the effect of this victory, on the night after the battle assaulted the redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He carried the latter, and gained the ditch of San Fernando, from whence the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with hand grenades, could not drive them. A parley ensued, and it was agreed the French should retire without being molested; thus the Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando it was necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, the city had been summoned with an offer to let commissioners count the dead on the field of Margalef and review the prisoners, but Garcia Conde replied, '*that Lerida had never looked for external succour in her defences.*'

SIEGE OF LERIDA.

Although Augereau's retreat was now ascertained, the victory of Margalef and the apathy of the Valencians encouraged Suchet to commence the siege. The prisoners were sent to France, the battering train was brought up from Monzon, the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th and 27th, and in the night ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen and Magdalen. The besieged threw fire-balls and opened a few guns, but when day broke the besiegers were well covered in the trenches.

In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed, and breaching and counter batteries were commenced: six sixteen-pounders to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long twelve-pounders to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, four mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy, the labour heavy, yet on the 2nd of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. The Spanish musketeers incommoded the trenches from the left bank of the Segre, and the French contracted the circle of investment on that side; but in the evening of the 4th, six hundred Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the battery there and all the left of the trenches, while another body,

coming from the Magdalen, menaced the right of the French works. The guards held the latter in check, and the reserves drove the former back into the town; and to meet such dangerous irruptions a ditch and rampart, serving as a place of arms, were carried from the fourth battery down to the river. As the light troops continued to vex the trenches from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six Spanish field-pieces posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main attack was also extended on the right to embrace a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at this extremity.

All the French batteries opened at daybreak on the 7th, the mortars played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted in the Carmen. The counter fire silenced three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three hundred men, stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the right of the parallels, took the two mortars and penetrated to the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed, yet the French suffered from the Spanish guns in the pursuit, and at night a violent rain damaged the batteries and overflowed the trenches.

From the 8th to the 11th the besiegers laboured to open a second parallel, one hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, designing to construct fresh batteries closer under the citadel-rock and less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted, three new batteries were constructed, marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers, and on the 12th the fire recommenced from eight batteries containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged replied at first sharply, but soon stammered in their answers, the French artillery took the ascendant, the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable magazine exploded in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in the Carmen and one in the Magdalen appeared practicable, but after dark, some Swiss deserters brought intelligence, that the streets of the town behind the breaches were retrenched and defended by batteries.

Suchet's hopes of an early success then rose high. He

judged that the vehemence of the citizens and armed peasantry in the place would force the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs are easily excited and easily discouraged; and he designed therefore to carry the breaches, and with one sweep force all the inhabitants into the citadel, assured they would hamper, if not entirely mar the defence of that formidable fortress. First however, he resolved to carry the forts of San Fernando and the Pilar, and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the breaches should take refuge on that side. To effect this, three columns provided with ladders simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius that night; one marched against the redoubts, the others were to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden fell in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in the Fort, and though the people in Fernando resisted desperately, that redoubt was also taken and two-thirds of the defendants put to the sword: the French effected their object with the loss of a hundred men.

During this operation the great batteries played into the citadel only, but at daybreak renewed their fire on the breaches; steps were cut in the parallel to facilitate the advance of the troops to the assault, and the materials to effect a solid lodgment on the walls were conveyed into the trenches. At seven o'clock in the evening of the 13th, the signal being made, four storming parties jumped out of the trenches, two made for the Carmen, one for the Magdalen, and one moved close by the river. The Spaniards were preparing a sally to retake the horn-work of Fort Garden, and did so little expect this assault that the French mounted the breaches without opposition. Soon however the garrison rallied, and poured so terrible a fire on the heads of the stormers, that they staggered, and would have yielded if Habert had not revived their courage. Led by him they forced their way, and at that

moment the troops on the right and left turned all the retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river Harispe won the bridge, and Suchet himself, following close upon the steps of the storming parties with the reserve, forced the regular troops to retreat into the citadel. Then he put his design in execution. Harispe's brigade passed the bridge, and making for the gate of St. Anthony, which looked towards Fort Garden, entirely cut off egress from the town; that done, the columns advanced from every side in a concentric direction upon the citadel, driving with shouts and stabs and musketry, men, women, and children before them, while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Flying up the ascent the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded the summit of the rock; but all that night the French shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and at daylight the fire being redoubled, the carnage swelled until Garcia Conde, unable to bear the cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. At twelve o'clock the horrible scene terminated. The capitulation which followed was honourable in terms to the besieged, but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida with its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, the garrison having lost only twelve hundred men.

Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced by a proceeding, politic indeed, yet scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. For though a town taken by assault is considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless people into a situation, where they must perish from the fire of the enemy unless the governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it on the ground that it prevented a great effusion of blood, which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege. The fact is true, yet it was sparing soldiers' blood at the expense of women's and children's: had Garcia Conde's nature been stern, he also might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers.

Suchet's
Memoirs.

CHAPTER IV.

LERIDA being taken, Conde was, as a matter of course, accused of treachery. There seems no foundation for the charge, the cause stated by Suchet sufficed, yet the defence was unskilful. The walls of the town scarcely offered an impediment to the French general, wherefore the citadel should have been better prepared: and as the besiegers' force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled Suchet's utmost efforts. Engineers require the relative strength of besiegers and besieged to be not less than four to one; here the French invested a force equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the midst of succouring armies. For Lerida had communications, 1°. With the armed population of the high valleys; 2°. With O'Donnel's corps of fourteen thousand; 3°. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was posted with four thousand men; 4°. With Tortoza, where the marquis of Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six thousand; 5°. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable army of fifteen thousand regular, and more than thirty thousand irregular soldiers.

If all these forces had been directed with skill, and in concert, upon Lerida, the siege would have been raised and the safety of the third corps perilled. It was to obviate this danger Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take such a position on the lower Ebro as would keep both O'Donnel and the Valencians in check. Augereau failed to do this. St. Cyr says the seventh corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains and enter the valley of the Ebro, but Suchet says Napoleon's instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr under somewhat similar circumstances blockaded Taragona for a month; Augereau with more troops and fewer

enemies might have done the same, and yet have spared six thousand men to pass the mountains. Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O'Donnel, would have had a covering army to protect the siege, and the men sent from Catalonia could have been fed from the resources of Aragon.

Augereau has been justified on the ground that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. This danger could not have escaped the emperor; yet his military judgment, unerring in principle, was often false in application; because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon's standard only suited the heroic proportions. Catalonia presented extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the *migueletes* and *somatenes*,—the well-arranged system of fortresses,—the ruggedness and sterility of the country,—the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work, and the aid of an English fleet rendered the conquest of that province a gigantic task: nevertheless the French made progress, each step planted slowly indeed and with pain but firmly, and insuring the power of making another.

Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; the second gave Suchet large magazines, stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the midst of the Catalonian strongholds; and he had taken or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers: yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles, for the *migueletes* furnished O'Donnel abundance of men, and he had courage and abilities. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Taragona, San Felipe Balaguer, and Tortosa the link of connexion between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be subdued; and during every great operation, the partisans, being unmolested, recovered strength. Thus during the siege, Lazan entered Alcanitz with five thousand men, and would have carried the castle if Laval had not despatched two thousand men from Zaragoza to its succour. Villa Campa at the same time intercepted a convoy going from Calatayud to Zaragoza, escorted by four hun-

dred men under colonel Petit, who fought his way for ten miles, and one hundred and eighty wounded men actually passed the Xalon, and finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, was while sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers basely murdered the evening after the action; Villa Campa put the assassin to death indeed, but suffered his men to burn alive an old man, the Alcalde of Frasnó, who was taken among the French.

This action happened the day Lerida fell, and Chlopiski, following Villa Campa's march from Daroca, reached Frasnó the next day, but the Spaniards were no longer there. Chlopiski, dividing his forces, pursued them by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory of arms, and so pressed Villa Campa that his troops disbanded, and for the most part retired to their homes. An attack, made from the side of Navarre by some bands, was vigorously repulsed from Ayerbe; and these events proved the stability of Suchet's power in Aragon, for his system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that province. In Lerida his conduct was gentle and moderate as the nature of the war would permit, but his situation required decided measures. The retreat of the seventh corps had set free O'Donnel's and Campo Verde's armies, and all the irregular bands. The somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force on the upper Segre the very day of the assault, and eight hundred migueletes attacked Venasque three days after; while Campo Verde, marching from Cervera to the mountains of Lliniana above Talarn and Trep, assembled great bodies of the somatenes. All their plans were however disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida, the migueletes were repulsed from Venasque, the somatenes were defeated at Trep, and Habert cutting Campo Verde off from Cervera, forced him to retreat upon Cardona. If the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O'Donnel had combined his march at a later period with these somatenes and with Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped disaster; but now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures to secure them, turned his arms against

Mequinenza. This place, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. Suchet could not assail Tortoza, nor use water-carriage until Mequinenza should fall. One detachment, sent the day after the assault of Lerida by the left bank of the Segre, was already before the place, and Musnier descending the right bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and invested the place the 20th of May.

Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified with a Moorish wall, and strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space between the rivers, narrowing as it approached their banks until it ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high, overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water. On this rock was a castle with a rampart, inaccessible on two sides from the crags, covered on a third by the town, and only to be assailed on the fourth along a high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, which joined the rock to the parent hills: but the rampart on that side was bastioned, lined with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way with palisades. No guns could be brought against the castle until the country people employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente over the hills, and this occupied the engineers until the first of June. Before that period the brigade which had defeated Lazan at Alcanitz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro and completed the investment. The 30th of May, general Rogniat, coming from France with a reinforcement of engineer-officers and several companies of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, and taking the direction of the works contracted the circle of investment.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.

An ineffectual sally was made the 31st of May. The
Plan 7. 2nd of June, the French artillery, consisting of
. 221. eighteen pieces, six being twenty-four pounders,
were brought over the hills and the Spanish advanced posts

were driven into the castle. In the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place under a destructive fire of grape; approaches were opened against the town on the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock; some posts were also entrenched close to the water edge, on the right bank of that river to stop the navigation, but of eleven boats, freighted with inhabitants and their property, nine effected their escape.

In the night of the 3rd the parallels on the rock were perfected, the breaching batteries commenced, and parapets of sand-bags raised, from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the castle with musketry. The works against the town were also advanced, but in both places the nature of the ground impeded the operations. The trenches above were opened chiefly by blasting the rock; those below were in a space too narrow for batteries, and were searched by a plunging fire from the castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower on the town wall. The troops on the right bank of the Ebro plied this wall with musketry so sharply, that the garrison abandoned it; wall and tower were then escaladed without difficulty, and the Spaniards retired to the castle. The French placed a battalion in the houses next the rock, whereupon the garrison rolled down stones from above but killed more of the inhabitants than of the French.

The 6th the batteries on the rock were completed, and in the night forty grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th, Suchet, who had been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp. The 8th, sixteen pieces of artillery, four being mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards replied with vigour, and three French guns were dismounted; yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and at nine o'clock in the morning the fire of the place was silenced, and the rampart broken in two places. The defence was prolonged awhile with musketry, but the interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment that at ten o'clock the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men became prisoners of war; forty-five guns and large stores of powder and of cast-iron were captured, and provisions for three months were found in the magazines.

Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched against Morella in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, had left that important fort, commanding one of the principal entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. When it was lost, O'Donoju advanced with a division of the Valencian army to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him: the works were then repaired and Morella became a strong and important place of arms.

By these rapid operations, Suchet secured, 1°. A fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2°. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance to those provinces; 3°. The command of several fertile tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4°. The co-operation of the seventh corps, which after the fall of Lerida could safely engage itself beyond the Llobregat: but to effect the complete subjugation of Catalonia it was necessary to cut off its communications by land with Valencia, and to destroy O'Donnel's base. The first could only be done by taking Tortoza, the second by capturing Taragona: hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the emperor. Suchet was ready, but great obstacles arose. The difficulty of obtaining provisions in the eastern region of Catalonia was increased by O'Donnel's measures, who had still twenty thousand men, and was neither daunted by past defeats nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His harsh manners and stern sway rendered him hateful to the people; yet he was watchful to confirm the courage and excite the enthusiasm of his troops, conferring rewards and honours on the field of battle, and being of singular intrepidity himself his exhortations had great effect. Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good officers, and the full strength and importance of every position and town were by dint of experience becoming known. With these helps O'Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortoza, and found employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year; but the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified

places fell one after another, each serving by its fall to strengthen the hold of the French in the same proportion that it had before impeded their progress.

The foundations of resistance were however deeply cast in Catalonia; and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to land behind the French or join the Catalans in an action, could at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralyzed the operations of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortosa, Taragona, and even Lerida. But while those places were in the hands of the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily were reducing the Ionian isles, or loitering on the coast of Italy. And when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular armies were nearly destroyed and the people worn out with suffering, a British army, which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, appeared as if in scorn of common sense on the eastern coast of Spain. Notwithstanding their many years of hostility with France, the English ministers were still ignorant of every military principle, and yet too arrogant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until after the death of Mr. Perceval and when the decisive victory of Salamanca showed the giant in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgment. Before that he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

CHAPTER V.

SUCHET's preparations equally menaced Valencia and Catalonia; and the former province, finding at last that an exclusive selfish policy would finally be dangerous, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians. The Murcians also, under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Grenada against the fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads back to Catalonia, those of the Murcian army belong to the

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

During February, Victor was before Cadiz; Sebastiani in Grenada; Dessolles at Cordoba Jaen and Ubeda; Mortier, having left six battalions and some horse at Seville, was in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry to different points, and received from all the great towns assurances of their adhesion to his cause. But the necessities of the army demanded heavy contributions of money and provisions, and moveable columns were employed to collect them, especially for the fourth corps; and with so little attention to discipline, as soon to verify the observation of St. Cyr, that they were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. The people exasperated by disorders and violence, and excited by the agents of their own and the British government, suddenly rose in arms, and Andalusia became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare.

Joseph's Correspondence,
MSS

The Grenadans of the Alpujarras were the first to resist; their insurrection spread on one side to Murcia, on the other to Gibraltar; they obtained supplies from the latter place, and Blake aided them with troops. The communication

of the first and fourth corps was maintained across the Sierra de Ronda, by a division at Medina Sidonia and by some infantry and hussars quartered in the town of Ronda; but the insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French from the latter, and Blake, marching from Almeira, took Ardra and Motril while the mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba interrupted Dessolles' communications with La Mancha. The king was then in the city of Grenada. He sent a column across the mountains, by Orgivia, to fall upon Blake at Motril, while another column, moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off his retreat; this forced the Murcians to disperse, and Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda. The garrison of Malaga marched to restore the communication with the first corps, and having rallied the troops beaten at Ronda, retook that post on the 21st of March. During their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered Malaga, killed some inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, and would have killed more if a column from Grenada had not come down on them. The insurrection was thus strangled in its birth, but it stopped the march of troops to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, caused the fifth corps to be recalled from Estremadura, and the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison and a part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha. The capital was meantime left in charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader's service! The king, now fearing the Valencian and Murcian armies would invade La Mancha repaired thither, and after a time returned to Madrid. Soult remained in Andalusia and proceeded to organize a military and civil administration, so efficient that neither the Spanish government nor the allied army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of Spanish troops, issuing from Portugal and supported by British corps on that frontier, could shake his hold.

BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

Victor having spread his troops round the margin of the bay commenced works of contravallation twenty-five miles in length; the towns, the islands, castles,

February.

harbours, and rivers thus enclosed are too numerous, and in their relative bearings too intricate, for minute description, but, looking from the French camps, the leading features shall be noticed.

The blockade comprised three grand divisions, separately entrenched, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, resting its left on the sea-coast, was carried across the Almanza and Chiclana rivers to the Zuraque, being traced for eight miles along a range of thickly-wooded hills bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad: both the line and marsh were traversed by those rivers and by many navigable water-courses and creeks, all falling into the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea.

This channel, nine miles long, two or three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the bridge of Zuazo, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island in the harbour mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable save by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and served as an advanced post. On the left hand, the castle of Santi Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel.

Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, a vast triangular salt-marsh, but having one high strong ridge in the centre, about four miles long, on which the town of Isla stands: this ridge, within cannon shot of the Santi Petri, offered the second line of defence.

At the apex of the Isla stood the Torre Gardo, from whence a low narrow isthmus, five miles long, connected it with the rocks upon which Cadiz is built. Across the centre of the isthmus, a cut, called the Cortadura and defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of defence. The fourth and final line was the land front of Cadiz, regularly fortified.

On the Chiclana line the hostile forces were only separated by the marsh. The Spaniards possessed the Santi Petri, but

the French, having their chief depôts in the town of Chiclana, could always command the marsh, and might force the passage of the channel. For the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza creeks, were navigable beyond the lines of contravallation, the thick woods behind furnished means of constructing an armed flotilla, and the Santi Petri itself, on both sides, could only be approached by water off the high road; or at best, by narrow foot-paths leading between the salt-pans of the marsh.

The French centre, called the Puerto Real division, extended from the Zuraque on the left to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete on the right, a distance of seven miles. This line ending at the town of Puerto Real, was traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. Puerto Real was entrenched; but a tongue of land four miles long projected from thence perpendicularly towards the isthmus of Cadiz, being cloven in its whole length by the creek or canal of Trocadero. It separated the inner from the outward harbour, and at its extreme points stood the village of Trocadero and the fort of Matagorda; opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz, a powerful battery called the Puntales.

From Matagorda to Cadiz was above four thousand yards; but from Puntales it was only twelve hundred, and was therefore the nearest point to Cadiz and to the isthmus, and the most important post of offence. From thence the French could search the upper harbour with their fire, or throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando; while their flotilla, safely moored in the Trocadero creek, could quickly reach the isthmus, and turn the Isla, with all the works between it and the city: nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned Matagorda.

The third or Santa Maria division of blockade followed the sweep of the bay. Reckoning from the San Pedro on the left, to the castle of Santa Catalina, the extreme point of the outer harbour on the right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the mouth of the Guadalete in the centre of this line, was entrenched, and the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged.

Beyond these lines, which were connected by a covered way, concealed by thick woods, and finally armed with three hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were occupied; the first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead; the second commanded the mouth of the Guadalquivir. Behind these lines of blockade, Latour Maubourg occupied Medina Sidonia with a covering division, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, his advanced posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda.

The fall of the central junta, the appointment of a regency and the convoking of the Cortes, have been already touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, commander in chief, and president of the local junta, appeared to have unlimited power, but really possessed no authority, nor did he meddle with the administration. The regency, constituted provisionally, and of men without personal energy or local influence, was compelled to bend and truckle to the junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body, without honour,

Albuquerque's
Manifesto.

Private Cor-
respondence
of officers
from Cadiz,
1810, MSS.

talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes. Privately trafficking with the public stores, the members neglected Albuquerque's troops, who had been long without pay, the greater part also were without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes, and when he demanded supplies the junta declared they could not furnish him. The duke impugning their truth, addressed a memorial to the regency, and the latter wishing to render the junta odious, though fearing openly to attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The junta replied by an exposition false as to facts, base and ridiculous in reasoning; for though they had elected the duke president of their own body, they accused him amongst other things with retreating from Carmona too quickly; and finished with a menacing intimation, that, supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies.

In this crisis the junta triumphed. Albuquerque was sent to London as ambassador, where he died a few months after in a frenzy, occasioned it is said by grief and anger at the

unworthy treatment he had received. He was considered a brave and generous man, but weak and hasty, easy to be duped. Meanwhile the misery of the troops, the extent of the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the junta, the apathy of the people, the feebleness of the regency, the scarcity of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many favourers amongst the men in power, placed Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy, and would have led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish storehouses; and if the regents, their arrogance and pride abated by necessity, had not now asked for those British troops they before so haughtily rejected. But at this time general Colin Campbell, Cradock's successor at Gibraltar, showed what could have been effected before by able negotiation; for he obtained leave to put an English garrison into Ceuta, and to destroy the lines of San Roque and all the Spanish forts round the bay of Algeiras. Neither measure was agreeable to Spain, but both essential to English interests; the last especially so, as it made Gibraltar a secure harbour, and cleared its neighbourhood of dangerous works at a critical time; for the fortress was then crowded with a mixed and disaffected population exceeding twelve thousand persons, and was filled with merchandize to the value of two millions which could have been easily destroyed by bombardment. Ceuta, chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops and filled with galley-slaves and prisoners had only six days' provisions, and was at the mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the straits.

General William Stewart reached Cadiz with two thousand men the 11th of February; one thousand more joined him from Gibraltar; and all were received with an enthusiasm showing that sir George Smith's perception of the real feelings of the people had been just: Mr. Frere's unskilful management of the central junta had alone prevented a similar measure the year before. The Portuguese troops were equally well received, and soon four thousand Anglo-Portuguese and fourteen thousand Spanish regulars were behind the Santi Petri. The ships recovered at Ferrol had been transferred to Cadiz,

Appendix 19,
§ 2.

General
Campbell's
Correspondence,
MSS.

French official
Abstract of
Operations at
Cadiz, 1810,
MSS.

and there were in the bay twenty-three men of war, four of the line and three frigates being British. The *Euthalion* and *Undaunted* also arrived from Mexico with six millions of dollars, and thus money troops and a fleet were suddenly collected at Cadiz. Yet to little purpose. Procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a thousand absurdities, the invariable attendants of Spanish armies and governments, marred every useful measure; and there was so little enthusiasm amongst the people, that no citizen was enrolled, or armed, or volunteered either to labour or to fight.

Stewart's first measure was to recover Matagorda, the error of abandoning which was to be attributed as much to admiral Purvis as to the Spaniards. In the night of the 22nd, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen and marines, twenty-five artillery-men and sixty-seven of the ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of captain M'Lean of the ninety-fourth, pushed across the channel during a storm, took possession of the dismantled fort and effected a solid lodgment: the French cannonaded the work with field-artillery all the next day, yet the garrison, supported by the fire of *Puntales*, was immovable, and the remainder of February passed without any event of importance. Early in March the city wanted provisions, especially fresh meat, and a tempest, beating on the coast from the 7th to the 10th of March, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary's. One ship of the line was taken, the others were burned and part of the crews brought off by boats from the fleet; but many men, amongst others a part of the fourth English regiment, fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an immense booty.

On the 15th the enemy's outposts at *Santi Petri* were driven in by major Sullivan of the seventy-ninth, to cover an attack meditated against the *Troccadero*, but the design was baffled by the surf in one quarter and the difficulty of crossing a shoal in another. In the same month Mr. H. Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary, arrived; and on the 24th, general Graham, coming from England, assumed the chief command of the British troops and immediately caused an exact military sur-

vey of the Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence was quite inadequate. Twenty thousand soldiers, with redoubts and batteries, requiring the labour of four thousand men for three months, were absolutely necessary; the Spaniards had only Appendix 19, § 1. worked beyond the Santi Petri, and there without judgment. Their batteries in the marsh were ill-placed, their entrenchments at the sea-mouth were contemptible; the Caraccas, though armed with one hundred and fifty guns, was full of dry timber and could be easily burned by carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected. Matagorda and the Trocadero had been abandoned, but the batteries beyond the Santi Petri had been pushed to the junction of the Chiclana road with the royal causeway; that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and consequently exposed without support to flank attacks both by water and land.

It was in vain the English engineers presented plans and offered to construct the works, the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a house or destroy a garden; their procrastination paralysed their allies, and would have lost the place, had the French been prepared to press it vigorously. They were so indifferent to the progress of the enemy, that to use Graham's expression, they wished the English would drive away the French, *merely that they might go and eat strawberries at Chiclana*. Nor were the British works, when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed, well or rapidly completed, because there was a paucity of engineers, the junta furnished bad material, and, with habitual negligence, the English ministerial offices had not sent out the proper stores and implements. But an exact history, drawn from the private journals of British commanders during the war with France, would be necessary to expose the incredible carelessness of preparation common to all the cabinets, from Mr. Pitt downwards: the generals were expected to make bricks without straw, and the laurels of the army were continually blighted before gathering:—in Egypt the success of the venerable hero Abercrombie was more owing to his indomitable energy in repairing ministerial neglect before, than to his daring operations after landing.

Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st, and both sides continued to labour at their lines; but the allies worked slowly and without harmony, the people's supplies were interrupted, scarcity prevailed, many persons were forced to quit the city, and two thousand Spanish troops were detached by sea to Ayamonte to collect provisions on the Guadiana. Notwithstanding this, so strange and wayward a people and so false are Spaniards in authority, that the junta, assuring Mr. Wellesley their magazines were full, induced him to send wheat and flour away from Cadiz in the midst of the scarcity.

General Graham's Correspondence, MSS.

Matagorda was small, of a square form, without a ditch, without sufficient bomb-proofs, and having one angle projecting towards the land; it could only bring seven guns to bear, yet, though frequently cannonaded, it had been held fifty-five days, and now impeded the completion of the French works. A Spanish seventy-four, supported with an armed flotilla moored on the flanks, co-operated in the defence; but at day-break on the 21st heavy batteries hitherto masked by some houses on the Trocadero, sent a hissing shower of hot shot upon the ships, and drove them for shelter to Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted hearts of the garrison remained: yet the men fell fast, and the enemy shot so quick and close, that a staff bearing the Spanish flag was broken six times in an hour. The colours were then fastened on the angle of the work itself, to the discontent of both soldiers and sailors who besought their officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours this tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty had fallen, when general Graham, finding a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. A bastion was then blown up under the direction of major Lefebre, an engineer of great promise, but he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned. And here must be recorded an action of which it is difficult to say whether it were most

feminine or heroic. A sergeant's wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and though a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hold, she recovered it and fulfilled her mission.

Matagorda point was soon covered with batteries by the French, but the war languished in front of Cadiz. In other parts it was brisk. Sebastiani's cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and in person he drove Blake from the city of Murcia back to Alicant and Carthagena. Meanwhile the troops blockading Cadiz were pressed by scarcity, and general Campbell augmented their difficulties by throwing a detachment into Tarifa, and driving the foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle. The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, yet their usual tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred foot and some cavalry, who were not repulsed until they had driven off several herds of cattle. Campbell then increased his detachment to five hundred men, with some guns, and placed the whole under the command of major Brown of the 28th.

General
Campbell's
Correspondence, MSS.

In May some French prisoners cut the cables of two hulks at Cadiz and drifted in a heavy gale to the French side; they beat off two of the craft sent after them by throwing cold shot from the decks, and about fifteen hundred saved themselves in despite of a fire from the boats of the allied fleet, and from the batteries. This fire was shamefully and mercilessly continued after the vessels had grounded, although the miserable creatures thus struggling for life and liberty had been treated with horrible cruelty, and being all of Dupont's or Vedel's corps, were prisoners only by a dishonourable breach of faith. Cadiz was now a scene of great disorder. The regency recalled Cuesta to the military councils, and he immediately published an attack on the central junta; but he was answered so as to convince the world, that the course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. Thus fresh troubles were excited, the

Appendix 19,
§ 1.

English general was hampered by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily getting more inefficient from neglect. Blake was then called to command in the Isla, and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and discipline of the troops; at his instance the municipal junta consented, yet reluctantly, that the British engineers should commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla. English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand Spaniards from Murcia joined the garrison, or rather army, now within the lines; but such was the state of the native troops, such the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy's works. It was however necessary to do something, and after some ill-judged plans of the regency had been rejected by Graham, general Lacy embarked with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to aid the serranos or peasants of the Ronda.

General
Graham's
Despatches,
MSS.

These people had been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed by captain Cowley and lieutenant Michel, two British artillery officers sent from Gibraltar. Campbell also offered to reinforce Lacy from Gibraltar if he would attack Malaga; for in that city were twenty thousand males fit to carry arms, and the French were only two thousand, cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle having but twelve guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only supplied by aqueducts from without. This enterprise Lacy rejected. He demanded instead, that eight hundred men should be detached from Gibraltar to make a diversion to the eastward, while he should land at Algeiras, and move against the town of Ronda: this was assented to, and the English armament sailed under the command of general Bowes. Lacy then made his movement upon Ronda the 18th of June, but the French having fortified it were too strong at that point, and he, a man of no enterprise, was afraid to act; and when he was joined by the wild and fierce serranos, he arrested the leaders for some offence, which caused their followers to disperse. The French being alarmed by these operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia by Blake and by an

insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; the Baeza disturbance was then quickly crushed, and general Rey, marching from Seville, entirely defeated Lacy, cut him off from Gibraltar, and forced him to embark with a few men at Estipona: he returned to Cadiz in July.

Here it is fitting to point out the little use made of the naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength of the allies in the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, thirty thousand; the British in Gibraltar five thousand; in Sicily sixteen thousand; forming a total of more than fifty thousand effective troops aided by a great navy; and favourably placed for harassing that immense, and except on the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted line of French operations, extending from the south of Italy to Cadiz: for even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble under Murat in Calabria, and from fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to paralyze this mighty power! It is true that vigilance, temper, good arrangement and favourable localities, are required in the combined operations of a fleet and army; and soldiers disembarking also want time to equip for service. But Minorca offered a central station, a place of arms for the troops, a spacious port for the fleet, and the coast of Catalonia and Valencia is safe; seldom or never, does a gale blow home on shore; the operations would have been short and independent of the Spanish authorities, and lord Collingwood was in every way fitted successfully to direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege undertaken by the seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, the very appearance of a ship of war would have stopped a siege and made the enemy concentrate; whereas the slight expeditions of this period were generally disconcerted by the presence of a few French companies.

In July, the British force in Cadiz was increased to eight thousand five hundred men, and sir Richard Keats took command of the fleet; the French, intent upon completing their

lines and constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de Barameda, made no attacks, and their works have been censured as ostentatiously extended and leading to nothing. This seems a rash criticism. The Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade the Isla; and as the true point for offensive operations was the Trocadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria were necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which in ordinary times was fetched from Puerto Maria, and to enable the flotilla constructed at San Lucar to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid the labour; and it is to be considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with a single corps generally weaker than the blockaded troops, but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula first impeded and finally frustrated this intention, yet the lines were in this view not unnecessary or ostentatious; nor was it a slight political advantage, that Soult should hold sway in Seville for the usurper's government, while the national Cortes and regency were shut up in a narrow corner of the province. The preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily kept there; for the English generals were well assured, that some fatal disaster would otherwise befall the Spaniards; but if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the French works, no mischief could have been apprehended; and Graham's division would have been set free, instead of being cooped up without any counterbalance in the number of French troops employed to blockade. The latter aided indirectly, and at times directly, in securing Andalusia, and if not at Chiclana, must have been covering Seville as long as there was an army in the Isla; but Graham merely defended Cadiz.

CHAPTER VI.

WHILE the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville was tranquil. A few thousand men, left by Mortier when he moved against Badajos, sufficed to control the city and spare a detachment of eight hundred men under general Remond, to attack the viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, vainly imploring a refuge in Portugal. He had four thousand men, but fearing a battle passed by Gibrleon to the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado de Niebla; and Remond, instead of following him, occupied Moguer and Huelva at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, to cut off the supplies which Cadiz drew from thence. De Gand seized the occasion to return to Ayamonte and embark his troops for Cadiz; but he was soon replaced by Copons, who came with two thousand men from the Isla, to gather provisions on the lower Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.

On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia; great part of that fine province, visited by insurrectional war, was ravaged and laid waste. In the northern parts, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles had reduced the struggle to a slight partida warfare; yet in La Mancha it was so onerous, and the bands so many, that one of Joseph's ministers described that province as being peopled with beggars and brigands. In Estremadura there were many combats, petty in themselves important as being connected with the defence of Portugal, but difficult to comprehend without reference to the military topography.

South of the Tagus the line separating Spain from Portugal may be divided into three parts. 1°. From the Tagus to

Badajos. 2°. From Badajos to the Morena. 3°. From the Morena to the sea. Each of these divisions is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is mountainous one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double chain of fortresses guarded the respective frontiers. Alcantara, Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos were Spanish; Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, Portuguese places. The three first, on both sides, are in the mountains, the others in the open country which spreads from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point from whence roads lead to all the above-named fortresses. From Badajos to the Morena, the country is rugged and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese side, by Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish side by Olivenza, formerly Portuguese, Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche. From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, presented the fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The Portuguese frontier furnished Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin. The greater number of these places were dismantled, but the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of Portugal generally garrisoned by militia and ordenança.

Romana was near Truxillo when Mortier attempted Bajados on the 12th of February, and the place was so ill provided that a fortnight's blockade would have reduced it; but the French marshal, who had only brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. In this position he remained until the 19th, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde by the Spaniards, and the commander Beauregard slain. Romana then returned to Badajos, and Mortier, leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida to connect himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo on the right of the Guadiana. This corps, now under general Mermet, had occupied the valley of the Tagus during the invasion of Andalusia, communicating with the sixth corps

Mr. Stuart's
Correspondence,
MSS.

by the pass of Baños, and forming the link between Mortier and Kellerman, who had withdrawn to Salamanca when the British army arrived on the Mondego. Then del Parque leaving Martin Carrera with a division in the Sierra de Gata, marched with thirteen thousand men through the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete, and the 12th of February, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque, his left on the Guadiana.

Mermet, whose advanced guard was then at Plasencia hearing of this movement, detached three thousand men across the Tagus by Seradillo, to observe del Parque; and soon afterwards Soult's brother, coming with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed by the bridge of Arzobispo, and moving through Caceres surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del Rey, and pushed patrols close to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps reached Caceres by degrees, Reynier took the command, and was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions and fascines as if to besiege Badajos. These demonstrations attracted the notice of general Hill, who advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre; and Romana, finding himself by the junction of del Parque at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act against the communications of the French. His first division, under Charles O'Donnell, brother to the Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque; the second, under Mendizabel, was posted near Castello de Vide in Portugal; the third, consisting of five thousand Asturians under Ballesteros was sent to Olivenza; the fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier's communication with Seville.

Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballesteros with the fourth at Olivenza. Mortier, disquieted by Contreras' movements, repaired to Zafra, yet left the second corps at Merida. The 10th, Romana moved towards Albuquerque and pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river,

where it was surprised by general Foy: O'Donnell endeavoured to surprise Foy in return, but the latter fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards occupied Caceres. At this period the insurrection in Grenada, the movements of the Murcian army, and the general excitement in Valencia caused by Suchet's retreat, made Joseph recall Mortier to Andalusia. The marshal therefore destroyed the works of Merida and marched for Seville, leaving Gazan's division at Monasterio to form a connecting post with Reynier. The latter sent his stores to Truxillo, and taking the field drove the Spaniards out of Caceres, but instead of following them over the Salor, took post at Torremocha and O'Donnell returned to Caceres.

Two routes run from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1°. The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2°. A shorter and more difficult road, running westward of the causeway and over the mountains, by Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel routes have no cross communications in the Morena; but on the Estremaduran side a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra; and on the Andalusian side there is one from Araceña to Ronquillo. Hence when Mortier retired, Ballesteros, designing to surprise Gazan, marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros where he was joined by Contreras; their united forces, ten thousand strong, gaining the royal road of Zafra, fell on the French in the evening of the 29th, but the action was undecided and being renewed next morning the Spaniards had the worst. Contreras then retired to the mountains above Ronquillo, and Ballesteros, marching by Araceña, went to Huerva within a few leagues of Seville; Girard, who commanded in that city, drove him back to Araceña, yet he returned again by the Condado de Niebla, and finally established himself at Zalamea de Real on the Tinto. Meantime Romana detached troops to seize Merida and cut Gazan's communication with Reynier, but the latter having eight thousand men reached Medellin before the Spaniards arrived. His design was to take Contreras, who was still at Ronquillo, in rear, while Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened

if O'Donnel, advancing from Caceres, had not menaced Merida and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless Contreras was attacked by Gazan at Pedroche, and so completely defeated that he regained Zafra in the night of the 14th with only two thousand men. Ballesteros, also being assailed by a detachment from Seville, was driven from the Tinto back to Araceña. Reynier, freed by the defeat of Contreras, then marched to Montijo, and O'Donnel retired from Caceres; but his rear-guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and he would have been lost if Mendizabel and Hill had not come to his aid, whereupon Reynier, declining a general action, retired to Merida.

At this time Soult, having assumed command in Andalusia, sent Mortier back to Estremadura. Imas who had superseded Contreras immediately re-occupied Ronquillo on the French marshal's rear, while Ballesteros took post at Aroche on his flank, and Hill returned to Portalegre. Romana encamped with twelve thousand men near Badajos, where a Spanish plot to murder him was discovered, but the hired assassin escaped; and notwithstanding the presence of his army, Reynier and the younger Soult passed the Guadiana below Badajos with only four hundred horsemen and closely examined the works of the place. Mortier also advanced, and four thousand men from Toledo reinforced Reynier. Want of provisions however would not let the French remain concentrated, and Mortier returned to the Morena. In May a French detachment again menaced Badajos, and then suddenly moving by the Olivenza road would have cut off Ballesteros, if Hill had not by a march on Elvas arrested the movement. Ballesteros, ignorant of his danger, menaced Seville but was driven back again to Aroche with a loss of three hundred men.

Mr. Stuart's
Correspondence,
MSS.

To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the frontier of Portugal by the lower Guadiana; sometimes appearing at Gibraleon and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession of which would have lamed Ballesteros' movements. Yet the advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted at the mouth of the Guadiana a convoy of provisions going to the first corps; and O'Donnel

having failed to surprise Truxillo, regained Albuquerque with difficulty. It would be perplexing to continue this detail of movements on the line from Badajoz to Ayamonte, yet two circumstances there were of sufficient importance to demand notice. In the beginning of July, Lacy being in the Sierra de Ronda the French marched against him, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph's service. And while this submission to the enemy was exhibited, the Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one of inhospitality the other of robbery and violence, would but for the mediation of the British authorities have waged war, and this mutual hatred was extended to their governments.

Hitherto Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save when Romana was hardly pressed; for though the latter's demands for aid were continual, most of his projects were ill-judged and contrary to lord Wellington's advice. But more important affairs were now at hand. On the 26th of June, Reynier passed the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo Mayor, and then returned by Montijo to Merida. It was before known that he belonged to an army assembling in Castille for the invasion of Portugal, and that he had collected mules and other means of transport in Estremadura, all the spies now said he was going to cross the Tagus. Hill therefore gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to cross that river, and by parallel operations guard the frontier of Beira from Reynier, whose operations were however postponed, and the great combinations in which he was afterwards involved belong to another place.

OBSERVATIONS.

1°. Although apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana, as far as Badajoz, is separated from the valley of the Tagus by a range of heights connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque. The country between those hills and the Tagus contained fertile valleys, with considerable towns, such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres;

and to profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier whose base was at Truxillo could easily make incursions as far as Caceres; beyond that town, the Salor presented a barrier behind which the Spaniards, supported by the fort of Albuquerque, could observe whether the incursion was made in force and act accordingly: hence O'Donnell's frequent advances and retreats.

2°. Reynier could only operate seriously in unison with Mortier by the valley of the Guadiana; and Merida, on account of its stone bridge, was the pivot of his movements. But Mortier's base was in Andalusia, and his front was necessarily spread from Zafra to Merida, both to cover his communications and to draw provisions from the fertile district of Llerena. The road of Xeres de los Cavalleros was however always open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances of Ballesteros and Contreras on that line, were to harass Mortier's communications with Andalusia. This gives the clue. Romana, holding Badajos and being supported by Hill, opposed the enemy in front with the Spanish centre, whilst his moveable wings under O'Donnell, Contreras, and Ballesteros, acted against the French flanks; each having Portugal to retire upon as a place of refuge. This general plan was well considered, but Romana's projects were ordinarily so vague and injudicious, that lord Wellington forbid Hill to assist him unless for definite and approved objects. Hence the latter's apparent activity.

3°. To stop Romana's movements, Mortier had only to unite the 2nd and 5th corps and give battle; or, if that was refused, to besiege Badajos, which from its influence, situation, and the advantage of its stone bridge was the key to the Alemtejo. This he ardently desired; Appendix 21, § 1. yet Soult would not permit him to undertake any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections, and descents from Cadiz; and to say that either marshal was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier and Reynier united could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana, after garrisoning Badajos Olivenza and Albuquerque, could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must have

joined Hill. But the latter with a mixed force and divided command could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre:—a defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, unless Wellington detached largely from the north, and then the king and Soult would have instantly reinforced Mortier.

On the other hand, Soult, judging that Andalusia should be rendered a stronghold independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention to that object. His exact and economical arrangements provided for the current consumption of his troops;—he formed vast reserve magazines without overwhelming the people;—the native municipal authorities, recognised and supported in matters of police and supply, acted zealously;—and without imputation upon their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries flowing from disorderly and wasting armies may honestly assist an enemy desirous to preserve regularity. Soult also felt, that while fixing a solid foundation for further military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able administrator and pacificator; but the marshals under his orders having only military objects, naturally desired great field operations, because thus only could they be distinguished. The final result would seem to favour Mortier's views. Andalusia proved more of a burthen than an advantage to the French; yet only because Soult was not permitted by Joseph to execute the great projects for which he had laid the foundation.

4°. The duke of Dalmatia's views clashed with the wishes of the king, whose poverty forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia; and having led the army in person across the Morena, he claimed both as monarch and conqueror. He who wields the sword will always be first served. Guided by Napoleon's orders, Soult resisted Joseph's demands, and thus excited his anger in an extraordinary manner; yet the confidence of the emperor he retained; and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. It was gradually tranquillized, the military resources were drawn forth, large bodies of native troops were raised and successfully employed to repress the efforts of the partidas. The arsenal of construction at Seville was rendered

available, the mines of lead at Linares were worked, the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the foundries, and every provision for the use of a large army was collected. Privateers were fitted out, commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada; and a secret but considerable traffic, carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain.

5°. If twenty-five thousand additional troops had been sent to Estremadura in June and July, Portugal could not have been defended. Napoleon did not fail to judge thus, for we shall find him directing Suchet to co-operate in the invasion of that country with fifteen thousand men when Tortosa should fall; and the king's Madrid force was in June augmented to twenty thousand; but the emperor did not enforce the execution. It was a fatal error which will be better understood as the narrative advances.

CHAPTER VII.

At this time the French, stretched on one great line from Cadiz to Gihon in the bay of Biscay were eagerly discussing the remnants of the Spanish armies previous to the third invasion of Portugal; which was now contemplated by Napoleon as in the natural progress of the war. It is therefore necessary to relate the events which occurred north of the Tagus, simultaneously with those treated of in the foregoing chapter which were of the same desultory, complicated, and feeble character. Martin Carrera, posted in the Gata passes, intercepted the French communication between Salamanca and the valley of the Tagus; Julian Sanchez issued from time to time from Ciudad Rodrigo to cut off the foragers in the country between the Agueda, the Tormes and the Douro. Beyond the Douro the Gallician army, ten thousand strong, occupied Puebla de Senabria Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca and Astorga, menacing the right flank and rear of the sixth corps. Mahy was organizing a second army at Lugo, and in the Asturias; D'Arco commanded seven thousand men, three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under general Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence six hundred miles long, was offered to the invaders; but without depth or substance, save at Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which places the British and Portuguese troops were lying.

In opposition, the French, holding the interior line, kept their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by moveable columns, and thus menaced all the important points without scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castille, where Ney, having resumed the command, was

supported by Kellerman with the forces of his government, and by the eighth corps under the duke of Abrantes.

Joseph's invasion of Andalusia had been the signal for a general movement of all the French in Spain. While Victor and Mortier menaced Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonnet from the Asturias threatened Galicia by the Concija d'Ibas. At the same time, Loison occupied Leon and Medina del Campo with eight thousand men newly arrived from France, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Galicia by Puebla de Senabria, and on the 15th of February his cavalry cut to pieces five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas; but he finally marched against Astorga, while Bonnet, having destroyed Ponte's force at Potes de Sierra, menaced Galicia by the pass of Nava de Suarna. These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, threatened at once by Bonnet and by Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of his army into the former town and carried the remainder to Villa Franca to cover Mahi. Ney however only made a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, Loison was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the eighth corps to besiege that place, but was suddenly called towards Madrid lest disorders should arise in the capital during the king's absence in Andalusia. Mahi and Garcia then brought up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, thinking to relieve the Asturias by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon; yet, as Loison still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, and after drawing off the five thousand men left in Astorga by Garcia retired to Villa Franca.

Bonnet did not pass Nava de Suarna, general D'Arco rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, and Garcia, leaving Mahi to command in Galicia, marched with the remnant of the old army of the left to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and Ney's force repeatedly chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. It is however unnecessary, and difficult, to trace all these movements, because the French,

while preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false reports, and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead the allies and to cover their own projects.

These were at first obscure. The invasion of Portugal by the northern line was not finally arranged until a later period; and it seems probable, that while Bonnet drew the attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, Junot thought to penetrate by Puebla Senabria; not, as Loison announced, for the invasion of Galicia, but to turn the *Tras os Montes* and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo. But their projects, whatever they might have been, were frustrated, partly by the insurrection in Grenada and the failure of Suchet against Valencia; partly by disunion amongst the generals; for here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally; and everywhere it was shown that the French corps d'armée, however formidable in themselves, would not in the absence of Napoleon act cordially on a general system.

When the commotion in Andalusia subsided, Junot returned to Old Castille, Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes, Kellerman retired to Valladolid, and his detachments placed on the Douro maintained the communications between Ney and Junot. The latter, drawing a reinforcement from Bonnet, then invested Astorga with ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four pounders and two mortars; his covering divisions took post at Puente Ferrada and Puebla de Senabria, to watch that line and observe Benevente and the Mombuey road. Mahi immediately concentrated the Gallician army at Villa Franca and Foncebadon, and detached fifteen hundred men under Echevarria to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing army. The Gallician authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington that Mahi had twenty thousand well organized troops, but it now appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill provided and prone to desertion.

Mr. Stuart's
Correspondence,
MSS.

SIEGE OF ASTORGA.

Santocildes commanded the place; he was brave, his garrison mustered two thousand five hundred infantry besides cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition, scarcely twenty days' rations, and nothing outside the walls capable of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain and had three suburbs. Puerto de Hierro to the north, St. Andreas to the east, Retebia to the west. On the two last Junot made false attacks, conducting his real approaches against the front between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia; and in eight days the Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies were repulsed, and the trenches opened. A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns became unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry: however, the town suffered from shells, the wall was broken on the 20th of April, and the assault was ordered. A previous attack on Retebia had failed, yet Santocildes was so distressed for ammunition that he offered to capitulate on terms which Junot refused. In the evening of the 21st, some picked troops run up to the breach, which was well retrenched, stockaded and defended with great obstinacy; a flank fire from the Retebia stopped the supporting columns, and the storming-party, thus abandoned, was held at bay on the summit of the breach; where, being plied on both flanks and front with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia, it would have been totally destroyed but for the scarcity of ammunition, which paralyzed the Spanish defence. Three hundred French are said to have fallen on the breach itself, yet the remainder finally effected a lodgment in the ruins; and during the night, a second attack on the Retebia proving successful, a communication was opened from the parallels to the lodgment: strong working-parties then cut through the stockade, and the governor surrendered.

Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains as if he would have succoured the place, hearing of this event,

retired to Bembibre, where his rear was overtaken and defeated by general Clausel on the 24th. He fell back to Lugo and recalled his detachment from Mombuey, but the French from Benevente overtook and defeated it at Castro Contrijo. Junot placing garrisons in Astorga and Leon, restored Bonnet his division; and that general, who had retired to Santander during the siege, re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and once more menaced Galicia by the roads of Concija and Sales: several slight actions ensued, yet the French penetrated no farther, and the junta of Galicia reinforced the Asturians with three thousand men.

During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at Salamanca, and a strong detachment of Kellerman's troops seized the pass of Baños. Whereupon Carrera quitted the hills and joined the English light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations for subduing Portugal were commencing, and the line of communication with France was encumbered with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering-train, collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, had arrived at Salamanca, and general La Martiniere reached Valladolid with a reinforcement of ten thousand men for the eighth corps. General Drouet passed the Pyrenees with a ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in Spain, and he was followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial guards, whose presence gave force to the current rumour that the emperor himself was coming. Fortunately for the allies, this rumour, although rife amongst all parties, and credited both by Joseph's ministers and the French ambassador at Madrid, was not realized, and a leader for the projected operations was still to be named. I have been told that Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps thinking he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal;—that the intrigues of Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated his hopes;—that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes of his lieutenants, had really resolved to repair in person to the Peninsula, but his marriage and some important political affairs diverted him from that object,—finally that Massena was chosen, partly for his military fame, partly because he was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a

stranger to their previous quarrels. His arrival was known in May amongst the allies, and Wellington had no longer to dread the formidable presence of the French emperor.

That Massena's base of operations might not be exposed to the interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military governments of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and Santander were placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in the northern provinces; yet previous to taking the command he conferred with the king at Madrid, and it would seem some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed in the French councils. In the imperial muster-rolls, the head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres in Estremadura, as if the southern line were to be followed; and for the month of April the imperial guards are returned as part of that army; a circumstance strongly indicating that Napoleon at one time really designed to assume command himself. The northern line was, however, definitively adopted, and while the prince of Esling was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed the Tormes, and Ney commenced the

FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

In the beginning of the year lord Wellington was so suspicious of the governor's intention that he had him removed. He was replaced by Andreas Herrasti, a veteran of fifty years' service, whose silver hair dignified countenance and benign manners excited respect, and his courage and honour accorded with his venerable appearance. His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men besides the citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds. The works however consisted merely of an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, flanked with a few projections containing some light guns. A second wall, about twelve feet high, called a '*fausse braie*,' with ditch and covered way, surrounded the first, yet it was placed so low on the hill as scarcely to offer any cover to the upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs even for the magazine, and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church and

secure it as he could. Beyond the walls and totally severed from the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by an earthen entrenchment and strengthened by two large convents, formed an outwork on the north-east. The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser, at the distance of six hundred yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts and saw to the bottom of the ditch. The surrounding country was open, especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the castle-gate. The Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel deepens into one continued and frightful chasm many hundred feet deep and overhung with huge desolate crags.

During February and March the French had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo, but departed lightly as they came, and their intentions appeared doubtful until the 25th of April, when a camp was pitched on a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city. In a few days a second and then a third arose; and these portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress. This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps invested the place, the eighth occupied San Felices Grande and other points, the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river. The battering-train with a great escort was still two days' march in the rear; for the rains, inundating the flat country between the Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable.

Trestle bridges were established on the 2nd and 7th of June, at Caridad above, and at Carboneras below the town. On the 13th ground was broken at the Greater Teson. The 22nd, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to

contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, which had hitherto been but slightly watched. That night Julian Sanchez, issuing silently out of the castle gate with two hundred horsemen, crossed the river and piercing the line of French posts on the left bank, reached the British light division, which was then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This caused Ney to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against general Craufurd the 25th, on which day also the French batteries opened.

Ney's plan was to breach the body of the place without silencing the Spanish fire, and salvos, from forty-six guns, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts. The besieged however could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, and shot so well in return, that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches and killed above a hundred of the assailants.

On the 27th, Massena arrived in the camp and summoned the governor to surrender. Herrasti answered like a good soldier. The fire was then resumed until the 1st of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to raise counter-batteries, push their parallels to the Lesser Teson, and work regularly forward to blow in the counterscarp and pass the ditch in form. To facilitate the progress of the works, the convent of Santa Cruz was stormed on the right flank, and on the left the suburb was won; yet with great loss and several changes of fortune, for Herrasti made a vigorous sally.

Intercepted
French Cor-
respondence,
MSS.

During the cessation of fire consequent upon the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and strengthened his flank defences; but on the 9th of July, the batteries established on the Lesser Teson re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours the fire of the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, and a reserve magazine exploded on the walls; the counterscarp was also blown in by a mine on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch was filled by the ruins and a broad way made into the place. Three French soldiers of

heroic courage then rushed out of the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having thus in broad daylight ascertained the state of affairs, discharged their muskets in token of success, and with matchless fortune retired unhurt to their comrades. The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the signal, and a few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of the city, when the white flag suddenly waved on the rampart. The venerable governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, signifying by his gestures that he desired to capitulate: he had stricken manfully while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his white hairs that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre and devastation. Thus Ciudad Rodrigo fell.

Six months had now elapsed since the French, resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the Spanish forces broken and scattered to seek for refuge in the most obscure parts: solid resistance there was none, and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related in the foregoing chapters, were contemporaneous, and that he has been led, as it were, round the margin of a lake whose turbulent waters were foaming and dashing on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the circumstances must appear, yet the whole forms what has been called the Spanish military policy: and without accurate notions on that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the man who like Milton's crowned phantom paved a broad way through their chaotic warfare.

I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and, most unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it is for history to record foolish as well as glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all; and neither will I

mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country's arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people. In their constancy, in the unexampled patience with which they bore the ills inflicted by a ruthless enemy and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles, or faithful in their compacts—that they treated their prisoners with humanity—that their juntas were honest or wise—their generals skilful, their soldiers firm? It is but the bare truth, to say they were incapable of defending their country. Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years which the war lasted, rise up in support of this truth; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or could, baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon is a mental illusion. Spain baffle him! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished indeed the opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans;—the English, with a fleet for grandeur and real force never matched; with an army and a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to arrest the conqueror's progress; the snows of Russia destroyed three hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe in one vast combination could only tear the Peninsula from him by tearing France along with it. What weakness then, what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies and her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious. She was invaded because she adhered to the great European aristocracy. She was delivered, because England enabled that aristocracy to triumph for a moment over the principles of the French revolution.

BOOK THE ELEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

PORTUGAL was now the only real obstacle to the subjection of the Peninsula, and lord Wellington had from the moment he abandoned Spain meditated upon the defence of that country. Neither the Portuguese government nor the English cabinet nor the English people, nor the French emperor imagined it could be permanently defended; Wellington alone saw his way clearly, and when he divorced his operations from the folly of Spanish rulers he formed his plan; not moved thereto by any vain ambition, but with fixed hope founded on a cautious and laborious estimate of difficulties and resources. Wherefore, reverting to the period of his retreat from Spain, his political and military proceedings shall be traced up to the moment when, confident in his views, unmoved by the force of his enemy, the timidity of the government he served, and unshaken by the intrigues of malcontents who secretly and openly with malignant perseverance thwarted his designs, he commenced his glorious task.

After the retreat to Badajos in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the central junta upon matters touching the war, principally to confer with his brother ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley's departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration was about to take place; a change, sudden indeed but not unexpected, because the ineptitude of the government was in private acknowledged by many of its members. The failure of the Walcheren expedition was only the signal for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, which had rendered the cabinet of St.

James's the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, secretly denouncing lord Castlereagh to his colleagues as a man incapable of conducting the public affairs, exacted from them a promise to dismiss him. Nevertheless he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his abilities, to plan and conduct the fitting out of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England: but when loss and ruin waited on the unhappy Walcheren expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise. The intrigue thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterized as '*a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private.*' This was followed by a duel, and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool being then empowered to form another cabinet, after a fruitless negotiation with lord Grey and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves and offered the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley; and contrary to the general expectation that statesman accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal which he afterwards so gloriously realized; but which he could never have undertaken with confidence unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, imbued with the same sentiments, bound by a common interest, and resolute to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise and commendable that lord Wellesley should sacrifice something of his personal pretensions, to forward projects promising so much glory to his country and to his own family: the first proceedings in parliament justified his policy.

Lord Castle-
reagh's State-
ment.

Mr. Canning's
Statement.

Previous to the change in the cabinet, sir Arthur had been created baron Douro and viscount Wellington; but those honours, although well deserved, were conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling; and the anger of the opposition members being thereby excited, they with few exceptions assailed the general personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought, his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his cam-

Parliamen-
tary Debates.

paign one deserving not reward but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Galicia and Estremadura, and forced one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid! Lord Grey, opposing his own crude military notions to the practised skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter's dispositions at Talavera. Others denied that he was successful in that action; and some, forgetting they were amenable to history, proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so sternly fought so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators! The passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, seeming rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgment, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth!

This spirit of faction was however not confined to one side: there was a ministerial person, who, in his dread of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington, complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation: '*anything provided blood were spilt!*' A severe rebuke, and cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general's abhorrence of this detestable policy: but when such passions were abroad, lord Wellesley's accession to the government was essential to the success of lord Wellington's projects. Those projects delivered the Peninsula, changed the fate of Europe, and every step made towards their accomplishment merits attention from intrinsic interest, and because his success has been attributed to good fortune and the strenuous support he received from the cabinet. The great influence of fortune in war cannot be denied, and the duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favourites; but it shall clearly appear, that if he met with great success he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid grounds; that the cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him; that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced.

While the cabinet was yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh,

brought by continual reverses to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded lord Wellington's opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached him the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; and at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal was necessarily to be modified according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that he replied to lord Liverpool, who during the interval had succeeded Castlereagh in the war department.

Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster the former *could not then make an attack upon Portugal*; and if events should enable them to do so, the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it. 'But the peace in Germany,' he said, 'might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, when the means of invading Portugal would be increased; not only in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, *until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive*, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, *provided England employed her armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organized to the full extent of which it was capable*. But the number of British forces employed should not be less than thirty thousand effective men; although the Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry three thousand artillery and three thousand cavalry, and the militia amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanças.'

Letter to
Lord Liver-
pool, 14 Nov.
1809, MSS.

As to the expense—'The actual yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport-vessels, was about 1,800,000*l.*, being only half a million sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence the most im-

portant consideration was the expense of renovating and supporting the Portuguese military and civil services. The British government had already subsidized the Portuguese regency at the rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of twenty thousand men which the latter were bound by treaty to place at the service of the English commander-in-chief. But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of the civil and military demands had been paid and the public debt and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; and it was obvious the administration would, when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food.

‘It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the regency, and yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished the country that it was impossible to raise the revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and therefore justice as well as policy required that England should afford pecuniary assistance to the regency. Without it nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The officers of that army had for many years done no duty, partly that their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons and lived with their families; and to these advantages added

others arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary discipline introduced by marshal Beresford had placed the Portuguese officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the pay of the English Spanish and French officers, with whom or against whom they were to fight.

‘If therefore the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly to enable the regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of about three hundred thousand pounds to supply the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance the difficulties of the moment might be overcome; but without it, he, lord Wellington, felt assured that the whole financial and military system of the Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense hitherto incurred would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide. There remained two other points to consider—the re-embarkation of the British army in the event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he could carry off everything safely except the horses of the cavalry and artillery, those could not be carried off if the embarkation took place after a lost battle; and if the embarkation took place under other circumstances, the expense of horse-transports would be more than the worth of the animals.

‘As to the second point, if the British army evacuated Portugal under any circumstances he could not give hopes that the contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although I,’ he said, ‘*consider the Portuguese government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that their success or failure must depend principally*

upon their own exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in my expectations of both when excited by the example of British officers and troops, I have no hope of either if his majesty should now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the state of the war not only in Portugal but in Spain. If therefore it should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if eventually the British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than continue by their means the contest in this country.'

Such were Wellington's views, but it must be observed that though Peniché and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, neither were likely to come within the scope of his operations. And his hope of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral Berkeley's assurance that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours; during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d'Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian's for an embarkation. But the admiral's views, as shall be shown hereafter, were erroneous, the fleet could not remain in the Tagus for the purpose of an embarkation if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

On the receipt of this memoir the ministers assented to the trial, although startled by the number of troops required; a number which they truly observed, would, after the loss at Walcheren, endanger England in case of disaster. They undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; and being thus pledged to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese regency should keep the military establishment which remained under its own direction in a state of efficiency.

Thus supported, Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. He expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England, and smaller detachments had already reached him. His army was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand, for nine thousand were in hospital, and many in the ranks still tottered from the effects of past illness. Head-quarters and the artillery park were established at Viseu; the cavalry occupied Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celorico, and Santarem; Hill with five thousand British, and a like number of Portuguese, remained at Abrantes; the rest of the infantry, one regiment forming the garrison of Lisbon excepted, was distributed along the valley of the Mondego.

When lord Wellington wrote his memoir he expected the French would follow the northern line of invasion in preference to the southern; that they would invade Portugal from Castille rather than Andalusia from La Mancha. He was mistaken. Napoleon again directed the operations, and they were gigantic; every part of the Peninsula was destined to feel the weight of his arms simultaneously. Fresh troops flushed with their recent German victories were crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of the old bands as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence the conquest of Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question, whether *Portugal should be defended at all*. But he transmitted also as a guide, one of those powerful statements which he invariably made to the ministers previous to undertaking any great enterprise: statements showing the bearings of past and present events, and indicating the future with wonderful accuracy.

‘The enemy,’ he said, ‘aimed at conquering the south, he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources; and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action, in which either their imprudence or neces-

Letter to
lord Liver-
pool, 31st
Jan. 1810,
MSS.

sity or even expediency might engage them. The armies might however be lost and the authorities dispersed, yet the war of partisans would continue; Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the central junta even exist within its walls, but it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs left Portugal untouched, yet it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers' attention. They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men regularly organized could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within the last nine months for the enrolment, organization, and equipment of this great force; yet much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men composing the militia could possibly contend with the enemy: and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers which is only to be acquired by military experience.

‘When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass *that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather than an advantage to the French government.* Thence arose this question, ‘Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy or of benefit to the allies?’ It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars everything that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to their prince, detested the French government, and were individually determined to do everything for the cause. Still they were

not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs.' Wherefore, *adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain*, he demanded to know whether, '*the enemy bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found.*' Under any circumstances, the British army could be embarked in despite of the enemy.'

Lord Wellington's views as here expressed furnish occasion to notice an argument which has with equal ignorance and malice been used to disparage sir John Moore, namely, that he said Portugal could not be defended, whereas Wellington said it could be defended, and it was so. The opinions of both were given in reply to lord Castlereagh. Moore, premising that he was not then prepared to answer in detail a question of such magnitude, observed generally, 'that the frontier though rugged was an open one and could not be defended against a superior force; that Almeida, Guarda, Belmont, Baracal, Celorico, and Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy and cover the embarkation of stores, &c., which could only be made at Lisbon;—that the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and he hoped they could alone defend the *Tras os Montes*;—that, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal, '*because the latter was without a military force*, and if it were otherwise, from the experience of *Rorica* and *Vimiero*, no reliance was to be placed on their troops.' This opinion, hastily given in the midst of field operations, had reference only to the *state of affairs existing at that moment*, being expressly founded on the *miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military, Spain also being supposed conquered*.

Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country;—after the termination of the anarchy which prevailed during sir John Cradock's time;—after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force re-organized, and her regular troops disciplined paid and officered by England;—

after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more;—in fine, after mature consideration and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Galicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, important posts with reference to this

Letter to
lord Liver-
pool, Nov. 14,
1809, MSS.

question, were still in possession of the Spaniards and prepared for defence—lord Wellington came to the conclusion, that Portugal *might* be defended against the enemy then in the Peninsula, provided *an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation.*

Ibid. Jan. 31,
1810, MSS.

And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, *although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted.* Lisbon also he considered as the only secure point of resistance; and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celorico, the very places recommended by sir J. Moore, as temporary posts.

But in all things concerning this war, there was between those generals a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action.

‘*The French,*’ said sir John Moore, ‘*will find the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little more than a march to subdue the country.*’

‘*The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be,*’ said lord Wellington, ‘*the probable consequence of any action in which either imprudence necessity or even expediency may lead them to engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the war of partisans will probably continue.*’

And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of Andalusia, Wellington, at the first indication of Joseph’s march, designed to make a

Appendix 18,
§ 3.

movement similar in principle to that executed by Moore on a like occasion; that is, by an irruption into Castille to threaten the enemy’s rear in such sort, that he should return from Andalusia or suffer his forces

in Castille to be beaten. Nor was he deterred from this project by knowing that fresh troops were entering Spain. The junta, indeed, assured him only eight thousand men had reinforced the French, but while incredulous of this assertion, he hoped to effect his purpose before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into line. He had even matured his plan, as to the direction of the march, when other considerations induced him to relinquish it. And these shall be examined, because French and Spanish writers then and since, have accused him of looking on with indifference, if not with satisfaction at the ruin of the central junta's operations.

His project was abandoned, 1°. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not arrived, his hospitals were full, and he could not, including Hill's division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the field. Hill, however, could not be moved without leaving the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,—a danger, which success in Castille would, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, only increase. 2°. The Portuguese troops had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result of the money scarcity; to bring them into line was to risk a total disorganization, destructive alike of present and future advantages.

Wellington's
Correspondence,
MSS.

The French in Castille, consisting of the sixth corps and the troops of Kellerman's government, were at least thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; and though the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to give battle, and would have proved too powerful. How sound this reasoning was shall now be shown.

The invasion of Andalusia was only part of a general movement. When the king forced the Morena, Kellerman marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar with the sixth corps, thus securing the defiles leading into the valley of the Tagus; at the same time, the second corps, coming down that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Baños, and with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence three *corps d'armée*, amounting to fifty thousand men, could be concentrated to oppose Wellington's advance. Mortier's movement

from Seville would not have stopped at Badajos, if Hill's force had been employed in Castille instead of supporting the Spaniards in Estremadura. But the French combinations were even stronger than they appeared to Wellington. Not
 Imperial
 Muster rolls, eight thousand, as the central junta asserted, but
 MSS. one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing or to cross the western Pyrenees. The first detachments reinforced all the divisions in the field, the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth corps; the former, under the duke of Abrantes was in the plains of Valladolid when Andalusia was invaded, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman's troops, have overwhelmed the British army but for that sagacity, which the French with derisive but natural anger, the Spaniards with ingratitude, have termed '*The selfish caution of the English system.*' Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use a British army, with all its national reputation to support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, dispersed in an hour, re-assembled again without difficulty, incapable of attaining, and consequently incapable of losing any military reputation.

CHAPTER II.

WELLINGTON'S idea of renewing offensive operations being dispelled by the greatness of the French reinforcements, and the other circumstances mentioned in the foregoing chapter, he looked only to the defence of Portugal, and he was still supported by the ministers; the majority yielding however to lord Wellesley's influence more than conviction, and throwing the responsibility entirely on the general. The deep design, the vast combinations, by which he proposed to work, were beyond the compass of their policy; and even now it is easier to admire than to comprehend his moral intrepidity and sagacity; for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and fears of weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled politicians to guard against, and public opinion to oppose: failure was everywhere anticipated, and few persons even thought he seriously designed to persevere. He however pitted England against France in the Peninsula, and a survey of their relative powers will show with what prodigious force they rushed to the shock of arms.

State of the French.—France, victorious abroad, and internally prosperous, could with ease furnish the number of men required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. The utmost strength of the Spaniards had been proved, and if the French could expel the British armies, disorder and confusion might continue for a few years, but no effectual resistance could be expected; the people, as in the war of succession, would finally accept the change of dynasty; the more easily that Ferdinand's worthlessness was now openly demonstrated. For Baron Kollı, an agent employed to communicate with him, being detected, his place was supplied by the French police with a view to ascertain the real intentions of the captive monarch, who, influenced entirely

by personal fear, refused to make the attempt, and basely denounced the supposed baron to the French government. Cadiz and Portugal were indeed obstacles, but the strength of the former was precarious, and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared sufficient. In war there are however always circumstances, which, though extraneous to the military movements influence them as much as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst these must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive king.

Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards accused him of nothing worse than fondness for social enjoyment. But he mistook his true situation, when, resisting Napoleon's policy, he claimed the treatment of an independent king; he was a tool, and in Spain could only be a tool of the emperor's. To have refused a crown like his brother Lucien, would have been great. To accept one like his brother Louis, and then resist the hand that kept it on his head, was a folly which, without ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in Napoleon's path. Joseph desired to create a Spanish party for himself by just measures; but the scales were cast aside when the French first entered the Peninsula; and it was absurd to expect even a sullen submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused: neither was it possible to recast public feeling until the people had passed through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his throne.

Joseph's Spanish ministers were men who joined him upon principle, and had no renegado zeal in favour of the French; they were as ardently attached to their own country as any of those who shouted for Ferdinand. When Spanish interests

clashed with those of the French armies, and that

Appendix 20,
§ 1.

was constantly, they and the king supported the former: and so strenuously, that in Paris it was thought they would fall on the emperor's troops; thus civil contention weakened the military operations, and left Napoleon only the alternative of commanding in person, or adapting his system to circumstances. A wise policy does not consist in pushing any one point to perfection, but in regu-

lating and balancing opposing interests that the greatest benefit shall accrue from the working of all: hence to form a sound judgment of Napoleon's measures, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, and there are not sufficient materials yet before the world to do this correctly: yet we may be certain that his situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy required extraordinary management. He was not merely a conqueror, he was also the founder of a political structure, too much exposed to storms from without to bear any tampering with its internal supports. Money is called the sinew of war, it is also the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon's policy than the care with which he handled financial matters: he avoided as he would the plague, that factitious system of public credit so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not without hurting France transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and therefore made '*the war maintain the war.*' But Joseph's desire for popularity, and the feelings of his ministers were alike opposed to this system, and the proceeds of the contributions were not always applied for the benefit of the troops; this demanded a remedy; yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been impolitic. The emperor took an intermediate course. He formed '*particular military governments,*' such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia, in which the marshal or general named governor, possessed both the civil and military power. In short, he created viceroys as he had threatened to do when at Madrid; and though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise, and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon's measures.

Many persons, principally French, eager to lower a great man to their own level, have said he fomented quarrels between his marshals to prevent danger to his throne, and these military governments were adopted with that view. This is absurd. Their quarrels were sure to hurt him, their combinations could not do so, and the military governments defined their separate powers and tended to prevent disputes. The disadvantages were, that they offended

the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party—that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, or attentive only to their own situation without regarding the general objects of the war—that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro. Indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the emperor. On the other hand, Joseph was no general, and Napoleon admitted that the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the guerilla warfare, had relaxed discipline and introduced a horrible licence while the military movements were feebly pushed. Hence the most effectual means to obtain resources for the troops with least devastation, was to make the success of each '*corps d'armée*,' and the reputation of its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it was fighting. Some commanders indeed, had neither sense nor justice to fulfil this expectation, but others, such as Soult and Suchet, did both tranquillize the people, and provide for their troops; results which could not have been attained under the king, because he knew little of war, loved pleasure, was too easy and obliging of disposition, and had a court to form and maintain. Soult and Suchet, especially the former, were indeed included by Joseph amongst those who oppressed the people and extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result of personal enmity. Facts derived from less interested quarters, and the final results, prove that those officers had a longer reach in their policy than the king could understand.

There is yet another view. Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy might be broken, when he judged time ripe to re-form one great kingdom. The same policy may be traced in the military governments of Spain. The marshal's sway, being the offspring of war and violence, was of necessity offensive; the Peninsula once subdued, their rule would have been replaced by the gentler government of the king, who would thus have been regarded as a benefactor. Something also was necessary to sweep away the peculiar pri-

Appendix 20,
§§ 2, 3.

Mémoires de
St. Hélène.

vilages which many provinces possessed, and of which they were extremely tenacious, and the iron hand of war only could enforce that equality which was aimed at by the constitution of Bayonne. Nevertheless, the first effects were injurious to the French cause. Fresh contributions were exacted to supply the deficiency of succours from France; and to avoid these, men who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly fled from the military governments. The treatment of the *partidas* also presented a difficulty. Regardless of the laws of war themselves, they claimed the rights of soldiers from their adversaries, and were supported by the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands in Andalusia as assassins, the regency answered by a retaliatory declaration. The junta did this because its folly had nearly reduced the defence of the country to the *partidas*; Joseph because the latter claimed without acting on the usages of war, and were by their government encouraged to assassinate. Mina and all the chiefs put their prisoners to death when it became inconvenient to keep them; Saraza even publicly announced his hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he might murder the mother and infant together! The difficulties occurring in argument were however overcome in practice, quarter was seldom granted on either side.

Joseph's
Correspondence, MSS.

Suchet's
Memoirs.

Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the military governments, sent the marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate, and to complain of the French generals, especially Ney and Kellerman; and he severely and justly denounced one act of the latter, namely, seizing the national archives at Simancas, by which infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, without the slightest benefit political or military. Another object of Almenara's mission was to ascertain if there was an intention to annex the provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence being intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, who, in concert with Romana and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulating the style of Napoleon's state-papers,

Appendix 20,
§ 1.

composed a counterfeit senatus consultum and decree for the annexation: it was transmitted to Joseph, who believed it real, and his fears and discontent were greatly increased. Meanwhile his distress for money was so extreme that his ministers were at times actually destitute of food.

These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable. Reckoning the king's French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less than *three hundred and seventy thousand men and eighty thousand horses*. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four thousand prisoners, Appendix 17, §1. twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men under arms, ready for battle or siege: and there was a fresh reserve, eighteen thousand strong, in march to enter Spain. In July this prodigious force was organized and distributed in the following manner:—

Armies in the 1st Line.

<i>Army of the South</i> , composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult	72,769
<i>Army of the Centre</i> , composed of the Royal Guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the king	24,187
<i>Army of Portugal</i> , composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena	86,896
The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, distributed by divisions along the great line of communication from Vitoria to Valladolid	23,815
A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal	10,605
	218,272

Governments or Armies in the 2nd Line.

	Total strength.
1. Catalonia	55,647
2. Aragon	33,007
3. Navarre	21,887
4. Biscay	6,570
5. Old Castille, comprising Burgos, Aranda, and Soria	10,303
6. Valladolid, &c.	6,474
7. Asturias	9,898
Total for the governments	143,786

The scheme of operations embraced three distinct organizations. The third and seventh corps were to invade by the south until they were connected with Soult in Andalusia. The army of Portugal was to invade by the north until it also was connected with Soult; but the armies of the south and centre were only to maintain their actual conquests, and as occasion offered to aid the active invasion on the north and south.

State of Spain.—On the right, the armies of Valencia and Catalonia were opposed to the southern invasion. In the centre, the Murcian troops and those assembled at Cadiz opposed Soult, but they were only formidable by the assistance of the British force under general Graham. On the left, Romana, supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partisan warfare from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, yet looked to Hill for succour and to Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Galicia and Asturia were only fifteen thousand, and Mahi declared he would retire to Coruña if Bonnet advanced beyond the frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward, that at a later period Contreras was used to send through the country moveable columns attended by an executioner, to obtain recruits. And with all this severity, and money and arms continually furnished by England, Galicia never was of any signal service to the British operations. But as livid spots and blotches in the human body mark the decay of vital strength, so in Spain, the partidas suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many joined them to avoid starvation, others to revenge peculiar wrongs, and the regency formed secret guerilla juntas to collect stores and provisions for the partidas in secure places. District pay inspectors and paymasters, selected by regular general officers, superintended the discipline and payment of the bands; particular districts were charged with the supplies, and every province was divided in three portions, each to find its quota of men and horses separately, but all to act in mass when circumstances demanded their union; in fine, all the internal organization of a regular army was secretly arrayed, while the external form was irregular and insurgent.

Memoirs of
Contreras,
published
by himself.

Mr. Stuart's
Papers, MSS.

At first, the burst of hostility produced by these measures inflicted considerable loss of men, impeded the French communications, and created great alarm: it seemed a second uprising of the nation. The Murcians, the Grenadan peasants and those of Jaen, waged war from the eastern mountains of Andalusia. Franquisetto and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad Real and Toledo in La Mancha; El Principe, Saornil, Temprano, and Juan Abril, keeping the circuit of the Carpentino mountains from the Somosierra to Avila, descended sometimes on the side of New, sometimes on the side of Old Castille, sometimes in Estremadura; they carried off small French posts even close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia at the very gates of that town. Duran with two thousand men, and the Empecinado with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara as far as Cuenca, and ventured sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was always formidable in Navarre; Longa and Campillo, having more than two thousand men, harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vitoria; and the communication between these great bands and the Empecinado, was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia, the two first acting about Burgos, the third in the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escaidron hung upon the flanks and rear of Bonnet, between Santander and Oviedo, acting in concert with Campillo on one side and Porlier on the other: and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains bordering Galicia sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. But though all these bands were vexatious, few were really formidable. To curb them, the French fortified their posts of communication and correspondence, and slew numbers, most of them robbers who pillaged their own countrymen: enough however has been said upon this subject.

Although reduced to this irregular warfare in Old Spain, the regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies and provoking civil war, as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. National independence was with them subordinate to the continuance of oppression in South America, and money, arms, and troops, were withdrawn

from the Peninsula to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists. Nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of expecting Napoleon's hosts to be beaten close to their own doors by guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few divisions, to crush whole nations acting in the same manner at three thousand miles' distance.

England.—The ministers' policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1°. Fostering public inclination for the war; 2°. Furnishing money for the expenses; 3°. Recruiting the army. For the last an act passed in the early part of 1809, offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas to recruits for the militia: this furnished about twenty-four thousand men in the year. The other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition in parliament was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous; the desperate shifts of the ministers were indeed justly attacked, but touching the contest in Portugal, faction was apparent. Beresford's report as to the numbers and efficiency of the native forces was unjustly questioned; the notion of successful resistance was assailed by argument and by ridicule, whereby doubt was widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was this evil the smallest sustained by the English general. On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully and like men expecting that fortune would befriend them they knew not why or wherefore. They dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper spoke of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, victories gained where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese, while cowardice, weakness, treachery, violence, were the only attributes of the enemy: if a battle was expected his numbers were contemptible, if a victory was gained his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing that intrigue could bring to aid party spirit and stifle reason was neglected.

But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money.

The country inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold. Napoleon's continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which, sooner or later, result from a factitious currency were too perceptible to be longer disregarded. A committee appointed to investigate the matter in the session of 1810, made a report in which the evils of the existing system and the causes of the depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced: the authors did not perceive, or at least did not notice, the injustice and ruin attending full payment in coin of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views. At first the government tried to stave off the bullion question, but soon finding they must abandon the war, or deny the facts adduced by the committee, they adopted the latter. On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, the house voted in substance that a pound note and a shilling were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, although light guineas were then openly sold at twenty-eight shillings each. Lord King, by demanding gold from his tenants whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, exposed this insolent absurdity; and the vote of the Commons, although well calculated to convince opponents that no proposition could be too base or absurd to meet with support in parliament, did not remove the difficulty of raising money. No resource remained except that of the desperate spendthrift, who never intending to pay cares not on what terms he supplies his immediate necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war had given England a monopoly of the world's commerce by sea, and the ministers declaring her prosperity to be unexampled, began a career of military expense the like of which no age or nation had ever beheld before: yet without one reasonable hope of ultimate success save the genius of their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might extinguish for ever.

State of Portugal.—In this country three parties were apparent. That of the *people* ready to peril body and goods for independence. That of the *fidalgos*, who thought to profit

from the nation's energy, without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the *disaffected*, who desired the success of the French, some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness: this party looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire as chiefs, if the enemy triumphed. In common with many others, those noblemen had entered the French service under the authority of their prince's edict, issued when Junot took possession of Portugal; but when Massena's invasion was projected, Freire, more honourable than his companions, refused to bear arms against his country. The others had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of operations which is at this day in the French military archives.

Most of the people, despising their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but the *fidalgos*, working in unison with and supported by the regency, were a powerful body whose political proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock demand notice. The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the marquis de Olhão called the Monteiro Mor, and the marquis of Das Minas, composed the regency; and they, and every member of the government were jealous of each other, afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and with exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses. The military organization carried on by Beresford being a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, was hateful to the regency and to the *fidalgos*, because both profited from their degeneracy; and this discontent, joined to unavoidable difficulties in finance and other matters, greatly retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia and ordenança nearly nugatory. However, the energetic efforts of Wellington and Beresford, aided by Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few nor inactive, gathered. The times necessarily permitted an unusual freedom in discussing public affairs at Lisbon; the views of designing men were of course most obtruded; and those opinions, repeated in the English parliament and pub-

lished in the English newspapers, were re-echoed in Lisbon as new: thus a picture of affairs, painted in the most glaring colours of misrepresentation, was continually exposed when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people.

In the latter end of 1809, Mr. Villiers had been, fortunately for the cause, replaced by Mr. Stuart, who, disdaining the petty jealousies which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the diplomatists with the generals, devoted his powerful understanding and resolute temper to forward the views of lord Wellington; and it is undoubted, that the dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival could not have been sustained, if an envoy less firm, less able, or less willing to support the commander-in-chief had been employed. When Das Minas resigned, Mr. Stuart, against his own wishes, was, by an intrigue to be hereafter noticed, added to the regency; and with him three Portuguese, namely, Antonio, called the Principal Souza, the conde de Redondo, and doctor Nogueira. The last was a man of talent and discretion, but Souza, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder; always seeking to thwart the proceedings of the British generals, he was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable. A powerful cabal was thus formed, whose object was to obtain the supreme direction of the civil and military affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The conde Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime minister in the Brazils, the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon, the chevalier Souza was envoy at the British court; and a fourth of the family, don Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency. Playing into each other's hands under the guidance of the subtle Principal, they concocted very dangerous intrigues, and their proceedings were supported with a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro: lord Wellesley's energetic interference curbed the latter indeed, yet the cabal continued their machinations, and what they dared not attempt by force they sought to attain by artifice.

Two of the parties in the country desired to keep out the French, but with the *fidalgos* it was a question of interest not of patriotism. Less sagacious than the clergy, the great body of which perceiving they must stand or fall with the English army heartily aided the cause, the *fidalgos* clung to the regency; and the *caballeros* in that body, being the same people that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, desired not only to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces, of which they themselves were the lords, in the administration of the country, and would consent to no operations militating against this design. To this obstacle was added the natural indolence of the people, which, fostered by the negligence and fears of the regency, rendered it most difficult to obtain the execution of any works, or the fulfilment of any agreement in which the Portuguese government or the civil authorities were concerned.

Another spring of political action was Portuguese hatred of Spain. It created difficulties during the military operations, yet had one advantage. When the Spaniards showed distrust of the English, the Portuguese were more minded to rely on the latter, to show they had no feeling in common with their neighbours. Notwithstanding this dislike, the princess Carlotta, wife to the prince regent and sister to Ferdinand, claimed the succession to the throne of Spain, in the event of her brother's death or perpetual captivity, and the immediate government of the whole Peninsula as hereditary regent. To forward her claim was the object of Pedro Souza's mission to Cadiz; and the great council of Castille, anxious to overthrow the Spanish regency, readily recognised her pretensions in virtue of the decision of the secret Cortes of 1789, which abolished the *salique* law of Philip the Fifth. The regents would pay no attention to them; but Souza renewed his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, and was by corruption obtaining from a majority of the members a secret acknowledgment of the princess's claim, when his progress was arrested by Wellington; who judged that the scheme would affect the military operations in Portugal, and finally the policy of England, if all authority in the Peninsula should centre in one family. At first he thought to admit Carlotta's rights might be beneficial


if the French succeeded, but soon discovered the affair was concocted at Rio Janeiro to embarrass himself and Beresford; for the British cabinet was not informed of it, and the princess was to reside at Madeira, where surrounded by the contrivers she could only act under their directions. In fine, arrogance, deceit, negligence of business, and personal intrigues, were common to the Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the same fatal effects in the one as in the other country will be shown in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III.

WHEN Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to defend Portugal, he had reference to the number he could feed and manage with an experienced staff and civil administration, rather than to what was necessary to fight the enemy; hence he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet, knowing from recent experience in Spain, what passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the enthusiasm of the people, nor the promises of their governors. He insisted that his authority as *marshal-general of Portugal* should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning Appendix 21, § 9. the forces, whether regulars, militia, or 'ordenanças;' for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means. Armed with this power, and the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first forced the regency to revive and enforce the ancient military law, by which all men were to serve in arms. Then he required that the people should be commanded to destroy their mills, remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry their property away from the line of invasion; while he used the regular troops in such sort, that avoiding decisive battles, he should compel the enemy to keep in mass, and let the armed population cut off all resources not carried in the midst of the troops: it was a design of terrible energy. Yet, if the French could carry or obtain supplies, to last until the British were beaten and driven to embark, the miserable ruined people must submit without further struggles; and to fend off that calamity, he sought for a position covering Lisbon, neither to be forced nor turned; and from which

he could communicate freely with, and direct the irregular warfare. The mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the positions made under the directions of sir Charles Stuart in 1799, were, together with the French colonel Vincent's, at hand, and from those documents the original notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras was derived; but they only contemplated a defence to be made by an army in movement opposing an equal or somewhat greater force. It was Wellington who first conceived the design of turning those vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula. Hereafter the lines shall be described minutely; here it must suffice to say that entrenchments, inundations, and redoubts, secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the undertaking. Wellington was a foreigner, ill-supported by his own government, and holding power under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure; and he was vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility. Yet he undertook to reform the abuses engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and make a slothful people arise in arms, devastate their lands, and follow him to battle against the most formidable power of modern times!

First he revived the ancient military laws, and this, notwithstanding the secret opposition of the regency and the *fidalgos*, so effectually, that the returns in May gave four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, fifty thousand being regular troops, fifty-five thousand militia, and the remainder *ordenanças*. This multitude was however subject to deductions. The '*capitans mor*,' or chiefs of districts, were remiss in their duty, and the *fidalgos* evaded service by the connivance of the government; the *ordenanças* really assembled, fell far short of the returns, and all were ill-armed. Thus also it was with the militia. Only thirty-two thousand had muskets and bayonets, deserters were numerous, and the authorities connived at absence under false pretences to such an extent, that scarcely twenty-six thousand ever remained



with their colours. The regular troops were more efficient. Thirty thousand were paid equipped and clothed by England, and for the most part commanded by British officers; but, deduction made for sick men and recruits, those under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. The disposable force was therefore only fifty-six thousand men, one-half of which were militia.

At this period, the British troops, excluding the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, of which six thousand were in hospital or detached, and above seven thousand in Cadiz; for that city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty thousand men, while the army on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British! This was the ministers' arrangement, and hence, the ordenanças being set aside, Wellington's actual force did not exceed eighty thousand men, with four hundred miles of frontier to defend;—a long line and presenting four great divisions which shall now be described.

1°. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the *Tras os Montes*, extending from the mouth of the Minho to Miranda on the Douro.

2°. The eastern line of the *Tras os Montes*, following the course of the Douro, from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo.

3°. The frontier of Beira, from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the Tagus.

4°. The Alemtejo and Algarve frontier, stretching from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana.

These divisions may be simplified with respect to their military aspect. Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast furnished the main body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces considered as wings, were subservient to the defence of the whole; yet each had a separate system for itself, based on the one general principle, that the country should be wasted, and the best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a

decisive action, while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the invaders.

The northern and southern provinces have been already described, Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, until one or both of those provinces is subdued; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus, the frontier touches upon Spain, and to describe the conformation of the country it will be best to enter the camp of the enemy.

An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo or at Coria, or at both those places. In the latter case their communication could be maintained directly across the Gata mountains by the pass of Perales, or circuitously by Plasencia and the pass of Baños; the distance by Perales is however not more than two marches, and the invading corps would therefore advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way at one point only. The frontier of Beira between the Douro and the Tagus, would offer an extent of ninety miles against which to operate; but in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds, and stretching out its gigantic arms, seems to grasp and claim the whole space. The summit is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the progress of an army: nevertheless, the invaders could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following directions:—

From Ciudad Rodrigo.—1°. By the valley of the Douro.—2°. By the valley of the Mondego.—3°. By the valley of the Zezere.

From Coria.—1°. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus.—2°. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa.

By the valley of the Douro would be a flank movement through an extremely difficult country; and would belong rather to an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh base must be established at Lamego or Oporto before an advance could be made against Lisbon.

To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The first passing by Almeida and Celorico, the second by

Trancoso and Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of the Estrella.

To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, these routes although rugged are practicable for artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high tableland offers a position where a large army, for a small one it would be dangerous, could seal the passage on either side of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. The position of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.

On the side of Coria, an invading army must force or turn the passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers to reach Castello Branco; and then proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus, or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery,—even in summer the ways are broken and tormented by the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, the positions nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable for artillery of any calibre. The Sobreira Formosa may however be turned on its own left by the Estrada Nova, which running by Enchabarda joins the Castello Branco road near Cortiçado.

Such and so difficult being the lines of invasion through Beira, it would seem that an enemy might be met and fought with on the threshold of the kingdom, yet it is not so. The defending army would have to occupy all this line of ninety miles, while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could in two marches unite, to attack the centre or either extremity with an overwhelming force. And the Beira frontier has another weakness. *The Tagus is, from June to December, fordable along its whole course as low down as Salvatierra, not far from Lisbon.* A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of that river at any place below Abrantes would render the frontier positions useless; and though no enemy were menacing the Alemtejo, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in the river, is little longer than the

route by the valley of the Mondego, or that of the Zezere. For these reasons *the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers.*

At this time the French positions indicated that the lines of invasion would be by the north of Beira and the Alemtejo, while a connecting corps would move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes: the following dispositions were therefore made by Wellington.

Elvas, Almeida, and Valença on the first line of fortresses, Peniché, Abrantes, and Setuval, on the second line, were garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.

General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British colonels, Trant and Miller, under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond the Douro with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the garrison of Valença on the Minho. The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, were guarded by the Portuguese colonels Lecor and John Wilson, with ten regiments of militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of militia, which were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval.

The regular Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida Elvas and Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes. The British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as follows:—

1st Division.....	Spencer.....	Men. 6,000	Viseu.
2nd Division, including the 13th Dragoons.....	Hill	5,000	{ Abrantes and Portalegre.
3rd Division.....	Picton	3,000	
4th Division.....	Cole	4,000	Guarda.
Light Division.....	Robert Craufurd,	2,400	Pinhel.
The Cavalry.....	Cotton	3,000	{ Valley of Mondego.
Total.....		23,400	under arms.

Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and ordenança, and the whole of the regular force

was in the centre. The Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celorico, formed a body of thirty-eight thousand, the greater part of which could in two marches be united, either at Guarda or between that position and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could in as short a period unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on the line of the Tagus. If the enemy attempted the passage of the Elga, direct from Coria, or by a flank movement from Estremadura across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco: Hill also could reach that place sooner than Reynier, in consequence of an arrangement which merits particular attention.

From Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains, and to repair the roads would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. Wellington, therefore, after throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere and fortifying Abrantes, opened a communication between the latter place and Castello Branco by the left bank of the Tagus; it passed through Niza to the defile of Vilha Velha, where by a flying bridge the river was re-crossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Vilha Velha was prodigiously strong for defence; and though the march by Niza was nearly the same distance as by the other bank of the Tagus, time was gained, because the engineers had re-constructed the road. Thus all the obstacles to invasion on the north bank remained, and yet Hill could reach Castello Branco before Reynier. The Vilha Velha way subsequently supplied the loss of a lateral communication by Alcantara and Perales, which would have been adopted if Trajan's bridge had not been destroyed. The French also, in default of that direct line between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were thrown upon the circuitous road of Almaraz and Baños; and it was in allusion to this inconvenience on both sides, that each were said to lament over the ruins of Alcantara.

Notwithstanding this facility of concentration, Wellington

could not accept battle on the Beira frontier, because the French might suddenly unite superior numbers in the Alemtejo against Hill, before the troops in the north could reach that province; and a defeat there would in the dry season decide the fate of Lisbon. To concentrate the army south of the Tagus was to resign half the kingdom, and all its resources; but to secure those resources, or to destroy them, was the basis of the defence; hence the dispositions were designed to make *the French move in masses and to gain time*: time to secure the harvest and complete the lines: time to discipline the regulars, to effect the arming and organization of the ordenança, and to consolidate a moral ascendancy over the nation.

1°. The enemy could only advance with *concentrated masses*, because on the weakest line of resistance he was sure to encounter above twenty thousand men.

2°. If he suddenly dispersed Romana's troops, and even forced back Hill in the Alemtejo, the latter, passing the Tagus at Abrantes and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage of that river until the army came down from the north; but no sustained French effort could be made on that side without first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms.

3°. A formidable attack on the central line of invasion could not be made, without giving sufficient warning by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the previous passage of the Elga and Ponçul rivers; when, the Estrada Nova being destroyed, Beresford and Hill could safely occupy the Sobreira Formosa. If the enemy menaced the line of the Tagus at the same time, those generals could line the Zezere; but an invasion by the centre, save with a light corps in connexion with other attacks, was not to be expected. For though the Sobriera were passed, Abrantes could not be besieged in default of heavy artillery; the Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river with rugged banks well lined with troops would be in front, the Tagus on the left, the mountains of Sobreira in the rear; and the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego would thus have time to fall back.

4°. An attack on Guarda could be resisted long enough to gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida

to the valley of the Mondego; and to insure this, the road from Belmonte towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken, besides being watched by troops; while that from Thomar by Espinal to the Ponte de Murcella, called the military road, was repaired and widened. Thus the inner and shorter line was rendered easy for the allies, the outward and longer line difficult for the enemy; and to secure quick reports, telegraphs were established from Lisbon to Elvas, to Abrantes, and to Almeida.

A space between Guarda and the Douro, about thirty miles, opening into the valley of the Mondego remains to be examined. Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, Coa, and Pinel, run in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella into the Douro; and all with this peculiarity, that in approaching the Douro their channels deepen into profound and gloomy chasms, with few bridges. But the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, both to be taken before an invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. After their fall the lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open. If the French adopted the second, three roads led by Guarda, Alverca, and Trancoso, upon Celorico, where they would have to choose between the right and the left bank of the river for further advance. By the left bank they must march between the Mondego river and the Estrella mountain to the Alva, which falls into the Mondego, and behind which the allied army had a position of surprising strength. If they marched by the right of the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles, to be hereafter noticed; but, in either case Wellington having *interior lines of communication*, could, as long as the Belmonte road was sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva or in front of Coimbra. The Alentejo was therefore the weak point, and it behoved Hill to watch vigilantly and act decisively in opposition to the movements of Reynier. The latter, having the lead, might by rapid marches join the sixth and eighth corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the forces on the Mondego; or by drawing him across the Tagus, furnish opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the southern bank of that river.

These dispositions had reference only to the enemy's actual situation, and to a summer invasion; in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full and the roads deteriorated, the defence would have been different. Fewer troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus; and as the Zezere river and the Sobreira Formosa mountain would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the allied troops could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn resistance made on the northern line. Every probable movement being thus previously considered, Wellington trusted to his own quickness and the valour of the British soldiers to baffle unforeseen strokes during the retreat; and once within the Lines, the Portuguese people and the government doing their part, he looked confidently to the final result. He judged that in a wasted country, with thirty regiments of militia in the mountains on his flank and rear, the enemy could not long remain before the Lines, and his retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were however many hazards. The English general, sanguine and confident as he was, knew how many counter-combinations were to be expected; how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent commander. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the British forces: measures were also taken to procure a like quantity for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens as might wish to emigrate.

How to feed remained a question.

In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were a source of infinite trouble on both sides; not as some have supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies, there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country; but it was unevenly distributed, difficult to get at, and the people, even when friendly, not to be depended upon for contracts. Some places were exhausted, others overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and there the allies had a great advantage; their convoys could pass unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards, first to

collect food and then to bring it up. In Portugal there was however real deficiency, even for the consumption of the people. As the time advanced, scarcely any food for man or beast, some cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted, was to be obtained in that country: the whole nation was at last in a manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable war, yet there was often a painful doubtful struggle against famine. At a distance from the sea, that nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated the extent of the supply; and as wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in Portugal, and the roads generally forbade its use, the only resource was water-carriage to a certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.

Lisbon Abrantes and Belem Castle on the Tagus, Figueiras and Raiva de Pena Cova on the Mondego, Oporto and Lamego on the Douro, were the principal depôts. The magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celorico, Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points, four hundred miserable bullock-cars and about twelve thousand hired mules, organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores and provisions to the troops; when additional succour could be obtained it was eagerly seized; but this was the ordinary amount of transport, and all the magazines in advance of Lisbon were so limited and arranged, as to be easily carried off or destroyed in retreating before the enemy could seize them. Amidst so many difficulties, such intricate combinations, Wellington's situation was not one in which a general could sleep.

From this military and political exposition it appears that the unfavourable circumstances for France were, the absence of the emperor,—the erroneous views of the king,—the rivalry of the marshals,—the impediments to correspondence,—the necessity of frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,—the iniquity of the cause,—the disgust of the French officers, who, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could not patiently endure a service, replete with personal dangers above the ordinary mishaps of war, and promising little ultimate reward. For the English, the quick-

sands were—the memory of former failures on the continent,—the financial drain,—a powerful opposition, pressing ministers so timid and selfish, that the general dared not risk a single brigade lest a disaster should cause a cabinet panic which lord Wellesley's vigour would be unable to stem,—the intrigues of the Souza party, and the compelling the Portuguese to devastate their country for the sake of defending a *European cause*. Finally, the babbling of the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew the most certain information of the strength and situation of the army.

France had also possession of nearly all the fortified towns of the Peninsula; and while her enormous army threatened to crush every opponent in the field, she offered a constitution, and called to the people that it was but a change of one French dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the educated classes did not shrink less from the British government's known hostility to all free institutions. What then remained for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the armies,—the chances of another continental war,—the complete dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,—the recruiting through the militia, which was in fact a conscription with two links in the chain instead of one; lastly, the ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of Europe and raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as general Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of the British troops, shall be set down what many years' experience gives the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams.

That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue and wet and the extremes of cold and heat with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are required to accomplish this, his port is lofty and his movements free, the whole

world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing: nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not indeed possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril. It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy. No honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, overthrow with incredible energy every opponent, and at all times prove, that while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him! The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations have given the first place amongst the European infantry to the British: but in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world.

CHAPTER IV.

RESUMING the thread of military events, it is necessary to go back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted in actual concert, with those of the Spaniards; and here it is right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave generous and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up. Attached to the British head-quarters as the military correspondent of the junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity of zealously seconding the English general, but in the manner of doing it he never forgot the dignity of his own country; and as he was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations.

It will be remembered that while Ney menaced Ciudad Rodrigo in February, Mortier threatened Badajos and Hill advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre. Wellington immediately reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent his light division across the Coa to watch the enemy's motions. The

Portuguese regency was alarmed and demanded more British troops. Wellington replied that the numbers fixed by the treaty were as much as he could feed; and he took the occasion to point out that the measures agreed to touching the native troops were not executed with vigour or impartiality—that the wheel transport and other assistance required by the British already in the country had not been supplied. These matters he urgently advised them to amend before they asked for larger armies. The regency then hoping to render him unpopular said he might punish the defaulters himself; but he replied that he advised severe measures, yet would not be made a despotic chastiser of the people; when the actual laws were sufficient to enforce

obedience. He had other matters to attend to; for Ney being then near Ciudad Rodrigo, Mermet at Plasencia, his position was embarrassing. They might push between Hill and himself, or even between him and Lisbon, because the regency had neglected the works on the military road, and thus made the distance to the Tagus nine marches instead of four. He had no sure information, and could only watch Mermet, and be ready to withdraw from the frontier; but when del Parque's movement from Gata to Badajos occupied Mermet, when Junot commenced the siege of Astorga, and the military road was improved, his position amended. He then brought up the Portuguese army to Coa and Viseu, and ordered the militia and ordenança of the northern provinces to concentrate at Braga in defence of the *Tras os Montes*. Ciudad Rodrigo being however seriously menaced in April, a brigade of heavy cavalry was sent to Belmonte, and head-quarters transferred to Celorico, in the design of striking suddenly with the whole army at the French park and magazines in Salamanca;—a daring project, but relinquished when it was discovered that as Kellerman and Junot could reinforce the troops on the Tormes the whole would be too strong: hence in May, to succour Ciudad Rodrigo if occasion offered, became the only object extraneous to the defence of Portugal.

But always Wellington had to struggle with the folly of his government; he was stinted of money from England, and the resources of Portugal were not brought forward; scarcely could he maintain his actual position, and the regency treated his remonstrances lightly, exactly imitating the conduct of the supreme junta of Spain during the Talavera campaign. Wherefore, writing sharply he told them 'their proceedings were evasive and frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for private interests; that the resources were in the country, could be drawn forth, and must be so, if the assistance of England was desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and to be effectual must begin with the higher classes.' Then, issuing a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and


Appendix 21,
§ 1.

the omissions of magistrates and people, and by this vigorous interference procured some immediate relief for his troops.


Before this Craufurd had commenced some remarkable operations beyond the Coa with the light division, composed of three regiments singularly fitted for difficult service. Long and carefully disciplined by sir John Moore, they came to the field with such a knowledge of arms, that six years of warfare could not detect a flaw in their system, nor were they ever overmatched in courage or skill. With these soldiers much might be dared, but while the French were on the Agueda Craufurd might pass, yet could not keep beyond the Coa without cavalry; wherefore he invited Cole to take the line of that river in support while he advanced to the Agueda. Cole refused to quit Guarda, the key of all the positions, and Wellington approved of his decision; but the line of the Coa was essential to the succouring of Ciudad Rodrigo, and therefore Craufurd was reinforced with the German hussars, two battalions of Portuguese caçadores, and Ross's troop of horse artillery. Picton also was moved up to Pinhel, and he and Cole were to support the light division if called upon.

Craufurd having now four thousand men and six guns, about the middle of March lined the Agueda with his hussars from Escalhon on his own left, to Navas Frias on his right, a distance of twenty-five miles. His infantry occupied the villages between Almeida and the lower Agueda; the artillery entered Fort Conception, and the caçadores were held in reserve. The French were then extended from San Felices back to Salamanca and Ledesma, and as they thus left the pass of Perales open, Carrera who was at Coria could also act in concert with Craufurd. The line of the Agueda was long, but from Navas Frias to the Douro it was rendered unfordable by heavy rains; and only four bridges crossed it on that extent. One was at Navas Frias, another a league below at Villar, one at Ciudad Rodrigo, and one at San Felices, called the Barba del Puerco. The two first were distant, and, the hussars being alert, the infantry were sure of time to concentrate around Almeida before an enemy could from thence reach them. Ciudad Rodrigo commanded its own bridge. That of San Felices was near, and the French troops close to it, but





Craufurds
OPERATIONS
 1810



the channel of the river was so profound that a few rifle companies seemed sufficient to bar the passage. This disposition was good while the Agueda was flooded, but that river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without apparent cause. When fordable Craufurd concentrated his division, yet to do so safely required from the troops a promptitude and intelligence the like of which have seldom been known. Seven minutes sufficed to get under arms in the night, a quarter of an hour, night or day, to gather them in order of battle at the alarm posts, with baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear: and this not upon a concerted signal and as a trial, but all times certain, and for many months consecutively.

Scarcely had the line of the Agueda been taken, when general Ferey, a bold officer, desiring to create a fear of French enterprise, and thinking to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close to the bridge of Barba de Puerco, where he waited until the moon rising behind him cast long shadows from the rocks, deepening the darkness in the chasm. Then silently he passed the narrow bridge, and with incredible speed ascending the opposite side, bayoneted the sentries, and fell upon the piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies went fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, so great the confusion, that the British companies could not form, and each soldier encountered the nearest enemy, fighting hand to hand, while their colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, exhorting, shouting, urged all forward until the enemy was pushed over the edge of the ravine in retreat. This combat, fought on the 19th, showed that the French might be bearded while the Agueda was flooded; but the whole army was sorely straitened for money, and Craufurd, unable to feed his division, gave the reins to his fiery temper and seized some church plate to purchase corn, a rash act which he was forced to redress; yet it convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned, and they procured some supplies.

Ney as we have seen approached Ciudad Rodrigo a second

time in April, and Wellington moved to Celorico. Carrera who had come to Perales, being menaced by Kellerman then descended to Ituero on the Azava, and connected his left with Craufurd's right,—the line of retreat for both being by the bridge of Seceira on the Coa to Guarda. In this state the deserters for the first time ceased to speak of the emperor's commanding in person, and mentioned Massena as general in chief. They all said serious operations would soon commence, but no sure information was obtained, and as the Agueda continued in flood, Craufurd maintained his position until the end of May. Then came advice from Andreas Herrasti that the French battery train was in motion; and on the 1st of June, Ney, as we before said, descended from the hills with fifty thousand men, and threw his bridges over the Agueda. This concentration of the French on the Agueda enabled Wellington to draw down sixteen militia regiments from Braganza to the lower Douro, and he could now bring provisions up that river as far as Lamego.

On the 8th, four thousand French cavalry crossed the Agueda, and Craufurd concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja. Carrera then occupied a wood behind the last-named village; and, so extraordinary was his presumption and absurdity, that he chose this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and the eye could scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate front, to invite Ney to desert! Nothing could be more critical however than Carrera's and Craufurd's position. From the Agueda to the Coa the country, although studded with woods and scooped into hollows, was quite open for cavalry and artillery, and there were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour's march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods in front rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close upon the village, while wide plains behind almost precluded a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered indeed some security to his left, because the channel of the former river there became a chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, as the enemy's bank was highest, it was necessary to keep posts

beyond the Azava to obtain a good prospect, and the bridge of Marialva could be turned by a ford below the confluence of the streams.

On the 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but Craufurd seeing the enemy was raising redoubts to secure his lower bridge, and making other preparations for the siege, still maintained his dangerous position. He thus encouraged the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and protected the villages between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy's foraging parties.

The 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices and other points, and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to the Douro, were occupied by the French; the 23rd, Julian Sanchez broke out of Ciudad and galloped into Gallegos; the 25th, the French batteries opened, their cavalry closed upon the Azava, and Craufurd withdrew his outposts.

The 26th, it was known that the garrison had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and five hundred wounded.

The 29th, a Spaniard, passing the French posts, brought Carrera a note from the governor containing these words: '*O venir luego! luego! luego! a secorrer esta plaza.*' 'Oh! come now! now! now! to the succour of this place.'

On the 1st of July, Herrasti repeated his *luego! luego! luego!* adding '*por ultimo vez!*' for the last time.

Wellington still watching for an opportunity to relieve the place now reinforced Craufurd with the 14th and 16th light dragoons, and transferred his own quarters to Alverca, a village half way between Almeida and Celorico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack, and Romana came from Badajos to propose a combined movement for carrying off the garrison. It was a trying moment. The English general had come from the Guadiana avowedly to secure Rodrigo, and had thus in a manner pledged himself to include its succour in his scheme of operations. The garrison was brave and distressed, the governor firm and honourable. To let the place fall without an effort would be a grievous thing and a dishonour. The Spaniards and Portuguese, alike demanded that an attempt should be made to raise the siege; the first as a proof of good faith, the last to keep the war

longer from their country: the English troops also were eager for the enterprise, and policy seemed to call for it, lest the world should deem the promise to defend Portugal a hollow boast. Nevertheless Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade, and thus proved himself a truly great commander and of a steadfast mind. It was not a single campaign but a terrible war he had undertaken. If he lost five thousand men, his government would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it himself. His disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand men. Twelve thousand were with Hill, one-half of the remainder were untried and raw; but this included even the Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. Reynier acting in concert with Massena, had collected boats to pass the Tagus, and was pointing towards Coria; a French column, designed for Estremadura, was passing the Morena, and eight thousand Portuguese were of necessity detached to Thomar as a reserve for Hill. Thus not quite twenty-five thousand combatants were available to carry off a garrison in the face of sixty thousand French veterans.

But from Guarda, the key of the English positions, to the Agueda was two marches; and from Coria to Guarda was scarcely more; hence a division must have remained at the last place, lest Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first: the remaining twenty thousand could only be used for an open battle, or for a surprise. The last might be effected by filing in the night over the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo to seize the battering train, or to draw off the garrison; that movement however, could scarcely have been made unobserved,

and Massena's information was sure; he knew of Romana's visit and its object two days after it occurred. Open battle a madman only would

Appendix 2,
§1, Vol. III.

have ventured. The army, passing over a plain in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, must have exposed its flanks to the enemy's bridges on the Agueda, because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of the river and the French were on the convex side. What hope then to withstand the eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns which would have come pouring over the bridges on the flanks, and the fifty thousand infantry which would have

followed them to the attack. What would even a momentary success have availed? Five thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the battle; and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual state of affairs in that country?—The militia deserting in crowds to the harvest, the regency in full opposition to the general, the measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and advanced to retrieve his honour: and how could he have been opposed? Massena, a sagacious general, desired the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, saying he was afraid!—that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared to carry him off,—that he was insensible to military honour, and would suffer the place to fall without a shot, to redeem his plighted word! All this subtlety failed, lord Wellington abided his own time. ‘If thou art a great captain, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a great captain, Silo, make me come down and fight!’

Ciudad Rodrigo still resisted, and the French pushed their infantry on to the Azava. Carrera then retired to the Duas Casas river, and Craufurd, placing his cavalry at Gallegos, concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear. From thence he could fall back to the bridge of Almeida by San Pedro, or to the bridge of Castello Bóm by Villa Formosa. Obstinate resolute however not to yield a foot of ground he could keep by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks on the rising grounds in the evening of the 2nd, and using some horsemen to raise dust in the rear, made the infantry pass the heights slowly, as if a great army was advancing to succour the place. The artifice was successful, he gained two days; but then the French assembled
See Plan.
infantry at Marialva on the Azava, and a squadron of horse crossing by that ford, galloped into Gallegos and drove back the piquets; whereupon Craufurd retired to Alameda, leaving a troop of the 16th and one of German hussars, with two guns, covered in occupation of a hill behind a streamlet with

marshy banks. Soon a body of French horsemen came on at a charging pace, diminishing its front in approaching a small bridge, but resolute to pass under the fire of the guns. The German captain, Kraüchenberg, proposed to charge those who first came over; the English captain refused, and the gallant German riding with his single troop against the head of the advancing columns killed the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole back; the French then crossed the stream at other points, and a squadron came close up to Alameda but was driven off by a volley from the Portuguese caçadores, and the pursuit ceased. Craufurd took a fresh post with his infantry and guns, in a wood near Fort Conception; his cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera's divisions, were disposed higher up on the Duas Casas, and the French withdrew behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos.

Their marauding parties however entered the villages of Barquillos and Villa de Puerco three consecutive nights, and Craufurd planted an ambuscade of nine squadrons, supporting it with artillery, five companies of riflemen, and a battalion of caçadores. At daybreak on the 11th, French infantry were seen at the Quinta Burlada near Villa de Puerco, cavalry near Barquillos; the country was open and the English horsemen could have got behind the former; but Craufurd, always hot-tempered, pushed straight through a stone enclosure difficult to clear, and thus disordering his men, gave the enemy, two hundred strong, time to form square behind a rather steep rise of ground, and so far from the edge as to be unseen until the ascent was gained. Two squadrons first reached the summit and galloped in upon this square, but though the charge was pushed home it failed; the troopers received the fire of three sides, and in passing heard the French captain Guache, and his sergeant-major, exhorting the men to stand firm and shoot carefully. Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy's cavalry came out of Barquillos, and the two British squadrons having re-formed, rode against it and made twenty-nine men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile colonel Talbot, coming up with four squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon captain Guache; but the latter again opened such a fire, that

Talbot himself and fourteen men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made good his retreat. Craufurd then returned to the camp, having had thirty-two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair.

That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light division and marched by the pass of Perales to rejoin Romana. Craufurd now assumed a fresh position a mile and a half from Almeida, and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Wellington replied that he would give him two divisions if he could hold his ground, but that he could not do so; and knowing the temper of the man repeated his former orders '*not to fight beyond the Coa.*'

On the 21st, the enemy's cavalry again advanced, Fort Conception was blown up, and Craufurd fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to cross the Coa, yet nothing was further from his thoughts. He had kept a weak division for three months within two hours' march of sixty thousand men, appropriating the resources of the plains entirely to himself; but this exploit, only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction; he had safely affronted a superior power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of sufferance not real strength, he with headstrong ambition resolved, in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to fight on the right bank. He had four thousand British infantry eleven hundred cavalry and six guns in position, on a line oblique to the Coa; the right was on some broken ground, the left, resting on an unfinished tower eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of that fortress, his cavalry was on the plain in front; but his back was on the edge of a ravine forming the channel of the Coa, and the bridge, more than a mile distant, was in the bottom of the chasm.

COMBAT OF THE COA.

A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before daylight, expecting to retire, when some pistol shots in front, followed by an

order for the cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy's approach. The morning cleared and twenty-four thousand French infantry five thousand cavalry and thirty pieces of artillery were observed in march beyond the Turones. The British line was immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine, but Ney, observing Craufurd's false disposition, came down with the stoop of an eagle;—four thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain, the allied cavalry gave back, and Loison's infantry, running up at a charging pace, made towards the centre and left of the position.

While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes were made on the English side. Part of the troops were advanced, others drawn back; and the forty-third regiment was placed within an enclosure of solid masonry, ten feet high, situated on the left of the road, half-musket shot down the ravine and having but one narrow outlet. The firing in front soon became heavy, the cavalry, the artillery and the *caçadores*, passed the enclosure in retreat and the sharp clang of the rifles was heard along the edge of the plain above; a few moments later and the imprisoned regiment would have been surrounded without a hope of escape; but here, as in every other part of the field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the general: some large stones were loosened, one sudden simultaneous effort of the whole regiment burst the wall, and the forty-third was the next instant up with the riflemen. There was no room for a line, no time for anything but battle. Every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and joining as he could with the riflemen and fifty-second, the whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no regular command, yet each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and left, and all keeping together with surprising vigour.

It is needless to describe the first burst of French soldiers, it is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment, having advantage of ground and numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, while their guns ranged along the

summit poured down grape shot, and their hussars galloping over the glacis of Almeida drove down the road sabring everything in their way. Ney sent five officers in succession to desire the whole of the French cavalry should follow the hussars and cut off the English from the bridge; and, so mixed were friends and enemies, that only a few guns from the fortress dared open; no courage could have availed against such overwhelming numbers; but Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and as the attack was made without Massena's knowledge he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous situation. Falling back slowly, stopping and fighting when opportunity offered, they made their way down the ravine tangled as it was with vineyards, in despite of their enemies, who were yet so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks.

As the retreating troops approached the river, the ground became more open; and the left wing, hardest pressed, and having the shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was quite crowded with artillery and cavalry, and the right wing was still distant. Major M'Leod of the forty-third, perceiving the danger, then rallied four companies of his regiment on a hill covering the line of passage; he was joined by some of the riflemen, and at the same time the brigade-major Rowan posted two companies on another hill to the left, flanking the road. These posts were maintained to cover the filing of the right wing over the bridge, yet the French, gathering in great numbers, made a serious rush and forced the companies back before the bridge could be cleared, and while a part of the fifty-second was still a considerable distance from it. The crisis was imminent, but M'Leod, a young man endowed with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse round, called on the troops to follow, and waving his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing and the animating action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs; the enemy's skirmishers, astonished at this unexpected movement,

stopped short, and before they could recover from their surprise the fifty-second had passed the river: M'Leod followed at a run and gained the other side without a disaster. It was a fine exploit!

As the infantry passed the bridge they planted themselves in loose order on the side of the mountain, the artillery drew up on the summit. The cavalry was disposed on all the roads to the right, to watch some fords two miles above, and to observe the bridge of Castello Bóm; for it was to be apprehended, that while Ney attacked in front, Junot would pass at those places with the eighth corps, and so get between the light division and Celorico: the river was however rising fast, and it was impossible to retreat farther until nightfall. Soon the French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opened a biting fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense arch spanning the whole chasm and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. Fast and thickly the French gathered behind the high rocks and a dragoon was seen to try the depth of the stream above bridge, but two shots from the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcasses floating down between the hostile bands showed that the river was unfordable. The monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, the head of a noble column darkened the long narrow bridge, a drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform leaped together to the front, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. At first the depth of the ravine deceived the English soldiers' aim, and two-thirds of the passage was won ere a shot had brought down an enemy; but a few paces onwards the line of death was traced and the whole of the leading French section fell as one man! The column still pressed forward, yet could not pass that terrible line, the killed and wounded rolled together until the heap rose nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than gave back.

Then loudly rose the British shout, but it was confidently answered, and in half an hour, a second column more numerous than the first again crowded the bridge. This time however the range was better judged, and ere half the distance was

won the French mass was torn, shattered, dispersed or slain: ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was then renewed, and a French surgeon, coming down to the very foot of the bridge, waved his handkerchief once and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire: nor was this brave man's touching appeal unheeded, every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. And this last effort was soon made, but with fewer numbers and less energy, for the impossibility of forcing the passage was now quite apparent. Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French, as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed the bridge; by the English, from ignorance of their object. One of the enemy's guns was dismantled, a field-magazine exploded, and many continued to fall on both sides until about four o'clock, when a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire, the men amongst the rocks returned unmolested to their own side, and the fight ceased. Craufurd retired in the night behind the Pinhel river.

Forty-four Portuguese, two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers, were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, which had been posted in the unfinished tower were also captured; but with great intelligence he passed all the enemy's posts in the night, crossed the Coa at a distant ford, and rejoined his regiment. Ney lost a thousand men, and the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold. Massena claimed to have taken two pieces of artillery, which was true, for the iron guns intended to arm the unfinished tower near Almeida were lying at the foot of the building, and thus fell into his hands; they belonged however to the garrison, not to the light division, and that they were not mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence. Had it been otherwise, the French cavalry could not have charged the left of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida itself would have been retarded.

During the fight general Picton came up from Pinhel alone; Craufurd asked him for the support of the third division, he refused and they separated after a sharp alterca-

tion. Picton was wrong. Craufurd's situation was one of extreme danger; he could not retire, and Massena might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello Bóm, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it between the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Craufurd were, however, not formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanour of the first, promised little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements and fiery temper of the second: nor did they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command; both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from inferiors. They were alike ambitious and craving of glory. Both possessed military talents, were enterprising and intrepid; yet neither were remarkable for skill in handling troops under fire. This also they had in common, that after distinguished services, they perished in arms, fighting gallantly; and being celebrated as generals of division while living, have since their death been injudiciously spoken of as rivalling their great leader in war.

That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable. Craufurd more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; but to compare either to Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended the profound military and political combinations he was then conducting, the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa; the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support.

JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.

[Letter to the Author since the publication of the First Volume.]

Major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier.

AFTER the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve.

The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson's brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other respecting myself.

The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under captain Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general attack on our line.

You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the

accuracy of your description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the twenty-third.

Believe me, very sincerely yours,
Malta, Dec. 30, 1829. F. PONSONBY.

[Obtained after publication of First Volume.]

Note sur la Situation actuelle de l'Espagne.

Rochefort, le Août, 1808.

1°. Les évènements inattendus du général Dupont sont une preuve de plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne conduite, et de l'expérience du général.

2°. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d'Affry, on avoit diviné tous les évènements; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de concentrer l'armée et d'évacuer Madrid.

En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu'ils se sont passés, on est convaincu: premièrement, que le général Castaños n'avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général Dupont les eut attaqués, ou se fut battû avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complètement défaits.

3°. On pense qu'on aura tout le tems d'évacuer les blessés de Madrid qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi long-tems qu'il sera possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au maréchal Bessières, de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu'il faut reorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province de Navarre; elles comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine d'être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre.

4°. On pense que l'armée doit être divisée en trois corps, *le corps principal*, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu'on porteroit à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du maréchal Bessières, d'environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit arriver de Gallice ou d'Estremadure, occupant Valladolid par une division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les circonstances; enfin le *corps de gauche*,

ou d'Arragon, destiné à maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logroño et Tudela, et liant sa droite en corps du centre, par une division qui au besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps volant.

Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s'appuyer sur Burgos, et le corps d'Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune.

5°. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce but, on croit qu'on doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14^{m^e} et 44^{m^e} de ligne, 200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu'on tireroit du corps devant Saragosse; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4^{m^e} légère, 15^{m^e} légère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon; de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43^{m^e}, et du 51^{m^e} de ligne, du 26^{m^e} de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin de 4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d'une régiment Polonais de la garde; on réuniroit le 3^{m^e} bataillon aux deux premiers, de tous les régimens d'infanterie, et on mêleroit les jeunes soldats aux anciens.

- On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevrait le corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des 18,000 qui le forment à present 18,000

Du renfort évalué à 10,000

Le détachement du dépôt du 4^{m^e} légère, 15^{m^e} légère.

14^{m^e}, 44^{m^e}, 43^{m^e}, et 51^{m^e} de ligne, le 2^{m^e} et 12^{m^e} légère rejoindront insensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000 hommes.

Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleures mains, que sous les ordres du maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général Saligny, ou avec le général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire.

Le corps du centre se tiendrait à la hauteur d'Aranda, ses communications bien assurées avec le maréchal Bessières à Valladolid, des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se nourrira par Burgos, et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logroño.

Le corps du maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d'Estremadure et de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échellons, et se nourrissant de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon.

On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du général Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de la Biscaye et de tous les derrières.

On estime qu'on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit être formé en trois divisions, et destiné à maintenir la Navarre. La position de Logroño est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu'à Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans l'ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée sur l'armée.

6°. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun rassemblement armé à deux marches d'aucun corps d'armée. Si l'ennemi s'approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s'est passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre. L'ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte : il y sera réduit du moment qu'il aura eu quelque exemple.

Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu'on seroit sérieusement attaqué par l'ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du maréchal Bessières. Ce maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre, et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi, pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes.

7°. Il faut débiter par des coups d'éclât, qui relèvent le moral du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l'habitant qu'il doit rester tranquille ; un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui seroit utile pour reléver l'opinion et compenser l'évacuation de Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} qu'on rappelle de Saragosse, aidée d'un détachement du corps du centre, soumette Soria, le désarme, et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter tout ce qui se présentera doit être l'instruction générale, donnée au maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de sorte qu'à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps François, il n'y ait aucun rassemblement d'insurgés ; on est d'opinion que si l'avant garde du général Castaños s'avance sur l'Aranda et dépasse les montagnes de Buitrago, il faut, avec tout ce qu'on réunira dans un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s'y établir sérieusement, le culbuter, le jeter au delà des montagnes, et si l'affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L'ennemi doit essayer de déloger l'armée Française de cette

position, par trois points, par la Gallice et l'Estremadure, par la droite d'Aranda, et enfin par les rassemblemens des provinces d'Arragon, de Valence, et autres de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l'ennemi, et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu'ils se formeront sur tous les points et qu'on les tienne à distance d'une ou deux marches du cantonnement François; si alternativement les François prennent l'offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le maréchal Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position derrière la rivière, et à l'abri de toute attaque; tantôt au centre avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers du corps de gauche, l'ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande circonspection.

8°. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui s'y trouve, du 14^me et 44^me de ligne, de la brigade du général Mouton, de celle du général Le Febvre, qui en dernier lieu a été renvoyée au maréchal Bessières, et enfin du renfort qu'amène le maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de 14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l'ennemi eut voulu se mesurer avec des forces aussi considérables et s'exposer à une perte certaine.

9°. Si de fortes raisons obligeoient d'évacuer Aranda, on perdrait l'espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le cas où un événement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le maréchal Bessières, le corps du général Verdier peut communiquer par l'Ebre, et avoir toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir l'Arragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route principale. Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers arriveront à l'armée, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin les divisions de la grande armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrénées.

On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est nécessaire de l'occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne de l'Ebre, c'est une vedette d'autant plus utile qu'elle domine la plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l'ennemi s'en emparoit.*

10°. La troisième position que se présente à l'armée, c'est la gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement être de quelque utilité, les événemens

* [Note in Napoleon's own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu'en approchant de France tout favorise la desertion.

modifient nécessairement les dispositions, tout dépend d'ailleurs de saisir un moment.

11°. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est possible.

Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en occupant le ligne du Duero.

Le troisième, de conserver l'Ebre.

Le quatrième, de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune et St. Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés.

LE GEN. BERTRAND.

Rochefort, 6 Août, 1808.

Note on the Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.

DUPONT's proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled, '*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.*'

Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, calls it '*a gratuitous atrocity,*' and '*an inhuman butchery,*' and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that, *capacity and cruelty are rarely united; that Dupont was a fool, and that Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon, but that he must have 'dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and hatred.'*

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of '*the Annals,*' as *the era of good government in France.*

I rejected Foy's authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye-witness, and his relation, at variance with the *official journal of Dupont's operations,* was also contradicted by the testimony of a *British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event.*

'Some time after the victory, order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police.'—Journal of Operations.

Cordoba was not pillaged, being one of the few places where

the *French were well received*.—Letter from a British general to colonel Napier.

On this point therefore I am clear; but the author of the '*Annals*,' after contrasting my account with Foy's, thus proceeds, 'It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by colonel Napier *without any quotation of authority*.'

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, *six months* previous to the publication of the '*Annals*,' colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, *because there was no quotation of authority*, transmitted through a common friend, an assurance that he had authority for every statement and would willingly *furnish the author with any or all of them*: no notice was taken of this offer.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK'S CORRESPONDENCE, MSS.

SECTION I.—STATE OF PORTUGAL.

Sir J. Cradock to sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808.

'I press this measure' (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa Real) 'upon your adoption, for many reasons, &c. &c.; but the more especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation in general, and tend to eradicate *the notion that, since the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war is at an end.*'

Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore, December 9, 1808.

'I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most likely *to revive some notion of danger, and the necessity of activity and energy.*'

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 14, 1808, Lisbon.

'The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable degree; and, though I saw general Bernadim Freire, I could not gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong expression, '*That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the nation had thought all war at an end.*'

Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore, December 28, 1808.

'Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the *absolute necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of their situation.*'

Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 30, 1808.

'*The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed. Their general, Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, and, like his countrymen, supine.*'

Extract from the Report of lieutenant Brotherton, (an officer employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal,) February 11, 1809. Head-quarters of Romana's army.

'From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak from authority) to prepare anything like adequate means of defence.'

SECTION II.—LUSITANIAN LEGION.

Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 27, 1808.

'Its formation was proposed by the chevalier de Souza.—The pay, allowances, and clothing were settled by the chevalier de Souza. The former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale of *increased pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all the troops they were in progress of levying.*'

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.

'I have considerable doubt if ever they' (the legion) 'can be incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the Portuguese army.'—'They are viewed with *extreme jealousy by the regency; and the commanding officers of the Portuguese battalion resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers from their regiments to enter into the legion.*'

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 19, 1809.

'The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, from its peculiar state, under present circumstances.'

Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to sir J. Cradock, January 19, 1809.

'Should a retreat be adopted, sir Robert would not retire to Oporto. *It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too much experience.*'

SECTION III.—PORTUGUESE ARMY.

Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 9, 1808.

'I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, *in the worst possible state.*'

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 18, 1809.

'I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite misunderstood in England; *and that a reliance is placed upon it for the defence of the country that is entirely without foundation.* Their' (Portuguese) 'ministers will avow this to you after ten minutes' conversation.'—'Even of the reduced numbers of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty thousand, at the very

highest computation,) to make anything out of them, it is necessary to recur to first principles, and give them *officers, arms, clothing, accoutrements, horses, &c.*; and I need not say that money is wanting to effect this; and the ministers positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier, without a supply.—‘M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in answer to a strong question from me, stated that *their army have not in possession ten thousand firelocks fit for use.*’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.

‘I am exerting myself to bring to account ‘the *supposed Portuguese army.*’—‘Your lordship will perceive that *I talk of the regulars as if it were a regular force*; but I should be guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did not fairly state that *I conceive them to be of no moment at this time.*’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 8, 1809.

‘I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but *Mr. Frere, when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really (as I believe you will allow) fait bâtir les châteaux.*’

Major-general Cotton to sir J. Cradock, April 7, 1809.

‘I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry.’—‘This cavalry is unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service.’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 12.

‘It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a conscription for horses in this country had been attended with great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected. It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such *serious misrepresentations* should be transmitted; for it is a well-known fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry *are without horses*; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their *battalions of infantry are one-half without arms or clothing!* But the total want of all means of regulations for subsistence forms so deplorable a view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion, cannot be attended with success. *It is, however, but justice to say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery may be formed under more favourable circumstances.*’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, February 27, 1809.

‘I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape, it is entitled to. In short, my opinion is that they want everything that constitutes a respectable force, except about ten thousand English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their *cavalry regiments are without horses, without swords,*

pistols, &c. Their battalions are not clothed; and, as to subsistence, they live at free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed. To take the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has been impossible. It is a matter of serious lamentation that such misrepresentations of the Portuguese force should go home, or reach your excellency.'

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3.

'No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops in their present state. *If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford's sentiments. They will not be commanded by their own officers, and they do just as they please.'*

SECTION IV.—CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY—TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS.

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 26, 1809.

'I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are *in a most deplorable state, and really are a disgrace to all concerned.'*

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 5, 1809.

'It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorized heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the case; and, added to this, *their situation is a reflection upon humanity.'*

SECTION V.—NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY.

Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 17.

'Lalyppe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has not been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect.'

Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 25.

'The great importance of this fort' (Lalyppe) 'is well known to the Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend the fort, if attacked.'

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 26, 1808.

'The promises and apparently satisfactory language of the Portuguese government are, in my opinion, by no means sufficient to meet the case. *I want to see some steps actually taken before my mind is decided that the nation will defend itself.*'—'Indeed, I am told, on good authority, that *the government are afraid to*

allow the people to arm.—‘The moment I see any materials to work upon, it will be my most anxious duty to give every effect, &c.’—‘But, under the present *inactivity and indifference*, it is, &c.’

Reports of colonel Donkin (quarter-master-general) to sir John Cradock, March 21.

‘I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check this irregularity’ (forcing quarters) ‘*when it originates solely in the neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates*; for troops will not obey orders, which expose them wantonly to great privations.’

Sir John Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 25.

‘I have repeatedly urged this subject’ (quarters of troops) ‘to the regency, in the strongest manner, but, as you perceive, without effect.’

Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 17.

‘Whatever suits the momentary purpose, upon the most superficial view, seems to be the guide in the Portuguese councils. Ultimate objects, which, in the course of things, must arrive, are never brought into the calculation.’

Cradock to Berkeley, January 17.

‘The regency seems to decline giving any specific directions relative to the guns in fort St. Julian and the river batteries, and, *above all, not to write anything*; but they are very willing to acquiesce in anything we shall do, only anxious that, on a future day, *it shall appear to be our act, not theirs.*’

Admiral Berkeley to sir J. Cradock, February 19, 1809.

‘I imagine Mr. Villiers has transmitted a copy of the extraordinary note sent him by the regency; in which they complain of the conduct of the artillery officer who dismantled the Bugio fort, and intimate their intention of sending for all the guns and powder from fort St. Julian; and add many particulars, as novel as they are suspicious.’—‘Whether the language of this note arises from duplicity, or any other cause, it is equally to be resisted; and, therefore, I have stated some facts which may be retorted upon them, and which will not place their conduct in the *most favourable point of view towards either their own sovereign or Great Britain.*’

Extract from an official note, drawn up by sir John Cradock, Lisbon, February 20, 1809.

‘It was told me two or three times, by Mr. Villiers, that M. Forjas, or some other member of the regency, had expressed extreme solicitude about the forts on the Tagus, &c.’—‘I always urged Mr. Villiers to get from M. Forjas, or any other member, a declaration of what they wished, that we might exactly conform

to it; for they seemed to be anxious to go beyond what we should venture to propose. Mr. Villiers, after some time, told me that the Portuguese government were *unwilling to put down anything upon paper*, or give any specific instruction; but they would willingly leave all the arrangement to us.—‘After the above statement, which I declare, upon my honour, to be the accurate description of what has passed, I must express my surprise, and even indignation, at the protest now made by the regency: and when it is considered that the Bugio fort is often inaccessible for a week together, this part of their complaint is shameful to the highest degree. *Their general object is, however, to be distinguished.*’

SECTION VI.—ANARCHY IN PORTUGAL.

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 20, 1809.

‘*Northern parts.*—It may be difficult to manage any money-transactions in Oporto, for the populace in that town have been suffered to become the masters; and it was only by an exchange of public and private property that the commissariat money has been lately secured.’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February, 1809.

‘To gratify a mob, the other day, at Oporto, a guard of the sixtieth regiment was given up, and disarmed by baron Eben.’

*Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March 17, 1809,
Lamego.*

Considering the tumults, and the state of effervescence of the public mind, and the blind fury of the populace—it will neither be so useful nor safe to remain amongst them.’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26, 1809.

‘The disposition is good, but the proceedings are those of an ungovernable mob, *exposed to the evil effects of designing persons.*’—‘I confine myself to the north of Portugal and Oporto, for the same excesses have not taken place at this side the Douro; but the principles of insubordination, I should fear, would prevail.’—‘If the confusion and anarchy that prevail at Oporto will permit a defence, some exertion may be expected.’—‘Am-munition has been abundantly supplied, *but no quantity would meet the consumption expended in the manner it has been in the Tras os Montes*; an attempt to save which was, I believe, the occasion of Bernadim Freire’s death.’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 30, 1809.

‘The anarchy that prevails at Oporto must, I fear, render every exertion unavailable for defence; and such is the ungovernable spirit of the populace, *that it is very difficult to say what part they might take if the proceedings of the British did not suit their views.*’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.

‘Oporto and all its concerns, with the bishop, nominally, at its head, is in the hands of a wild ungovernable populace, *that has already committed the most cruel excesses.* I fear the same spirit exists in what is called the Portuguese army.’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29, Lisbon.

‘Without a British force in Lisbon, the authority of the regency would pass away, and the scenes of Oporto would take place here.’

Report of captain Lawson, January 30, Lisbon.

‘Last night, my servant returning from the post-office was attacked by a party of Portuguese pike-men, headed by one of their own officers, who severely wounded the horse in two places, and slightly in several places, and obliged him, the servant, to put himself under the protection of the guard at the town-major’s office, to save his own life; the outrage was committed without the slightest provocation.’

General Langwerth to sir J. Cradock, February 1, Lisbon.

‘The orderly with the general orders, on his way to St. Julian’s, was stopped by a Portuguese serjeant and twenty men with pikes; the serjeant forced the orderly to deliver the letter containing the orders, broke it open, read the contents, and returned the enclosed receipt; the same guard stopped captain Clives, Royal Grenadiers, and lieutenants Beurman and Liners; these officers were in full uniform.’

General Sontag’s Official Report, February 3.

‘Mr. Usher, deputy-purveyor, and Mr. M’Carty, interpreter, both British subjects, arrived this day from Oporto, went to Moore’s hotel, where they were arrested and brought to the minister of police. Mr. Usher was in his British uniform.’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 30.

‘Some unpleasant incidents have lately occurred on the part of the Portuguese armed inhabitants of Lisbon towards British individuals, but I cannot persuade myself that they have proceeded from any fixed evil disposition.’—‘The British army has not, in any instance, departed from the most regular discipline, and continues to manifest the greatest temper and moderation.’—‘The excesses on the part of the Portuguese commence by an *uncontrolled pursuit, without any authority from the police, after all persons whom they please to call Frenchmen, and, in their indiscriminate career, they often attack every foreigner, and will not even abstain from those in our service. Those persons seek refuge in our guard-room, and though the guards and patrols have positive orders not to interfere under any pretext with the police, yet it is very difficult to smother the feelings of*

humanity when the wretched persons are flying from a furious and unauthorized rabble. *Mr. Villiers has exerted himself much with the regency to check this disorder, and prevent the assembly of armed persons in the streets at night, who beat drums and discharge their pieces at all hours; but as yet his remonstrances have not had the desired effect.*

Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, January 30.

‘Finding the people beat to arms, and paraded about the streets after dark, on the very evening after the regency had settled that these irregularities should be restrained, I addressed the ministers of the home department upon the subject; and as other excesses came to my knowledge, I followed up my complaint.’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 30

‘I have, this morning, been taking such steps as appear necessary to secure our general situation from insult; and, at the same time, if practicable, not to manifest a distrust in the Portuguese nation, which, if sanctioned from head-quarters, would destroy any reason for our being here. I can assure you, every officer and soldier has received impressions that it is most difficult to act against, but I am determined to persevere in keeping the army from aggression to the last moment.’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February.

‘When I reflect upon the frequent declarations of individual members of the regency, that they cannot control the populace; that there are at least seventy thousand armed inhabitants in Lisbon; that the regency dare not let them parade (their exercise has been at an end for some time, and the regency, at this moment, say they cannot look upon themselves as responsible,) it appears impossible that I should depart from the reasoning of my own mind, to meet a sensation of *I do not know whom*, and lessen the proper military appearance of our only guard. We are now beyond the power of surprise or insult, and I cannot, as my own individual act, alter the state of things. However, I never am devoted to my own way of thinking, and if you recommend the measure (the political reasoning, when the enemy is at a distance, may always be weighed against military regulation), or see any good consequences, I will immediately *order back the guns* to their former station in the artillery barracks.’

Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock, April 7, Santarem.

‘I, this morning, met no less than *three expresses*, communicating to me the *horrible state of mutiny*, for I can call it no less, in which the troops everywhere are, and the inhabitants are in equal insubordination, and they encourage each other. I find two or three regiments have marched away (to what they call to oppose the enemy) where they pleased, in despite of their officers and generals, who are entirely commanded by them.

This you will say is a pleasing state to be in; however, we must face it, and I hope for the best result, and I am sanguine enough to look for such. Colonel Trant will shortly have a pretty strong corps, if the regiments continue thus to volunteer for him.'

Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, February 15.

'I should almost doubt whether the British subjects *could be left in safety in Lisbon.*'

SECTION VII.—FALSE INTELLIGENCE.

Sir J. Cradock to colonel Donkin.

'I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the activity of the Portuguese government upon this head,' (intelligence,) 'either as to promptitude or security.'

Colonel Donkin to sir J. Cradock, January 1, Lisbon.

'Experience has *shown how utterly impossible it is to get correct intelligence here; an enemy may be within four or five days' march of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on the very line our troops occupy.*'

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.

'It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of such important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two days, any account from Oporto.'

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26.

'Yesterday the chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a movement on the part of the French, quite different from a *direct report from the junta of Badajos.*'

No. II.

SECTION I.—EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK'S INSTRUCTIONS.

Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, December 24, 1808.

'Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon in such strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you will take care that measures may be taken in due time, for withdrawing both the British army and *such Portuguese as may be desirous of accompanying it.*'—'The British admiral will be directed to take effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the enemy of all the resources, more especially those of a naval description, which the Tagus contains. Everything of a naval and military description, that cannot be brought away, must, in the last extremity, be destroyed.'

Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 25, 1808.

‘I am to signify his majesty’s pleasure that, in the event of any application being made to you from the regency of Portugal, on the subject of the occupation of the fortresses with his majesty’s troops, you do *refer the subject to Mr. Villiers*, who has received instruction, &c., and you will not make any alteration as to the mode prescribed for garrisoning the fortresses *without directions from Mr. Villiers.*’

Extracts from certain queries put to lord Castlereagh by sir J. Cradock, with the answers thereto.

QUERY.

ANSWER.

‘What may be the situation of my command?’

‘The relations with the government of Portugal will be arranged when Mr. Villiers arrives.’

‘In what light is the force under my command to be considered?’ &c. &c.

‘Ditto.’

‘May any Portuguese battalions be levied for English pay?’

‘The taking Portuguese battalions into English pay will, if adopted, be managed *through Mr. Villiers.*’

‘If any want of provisions should appear in Portugal, may I be allowed to adopt measures in conjunction with the regency, for obtaining a supply?’

‘The general measures of supplying Portugal with provisions will be *referred to Mr. Villiers.*’

‘If any Portuguese corps can be got into such forwardness as to be fit to enter Spain, and they should be willing to join sir J. Moore, are they to be put on British pay?’

‘*Mr. Villiers will be authorized to enter upon the discussion of this subject with the regency, availing himself of your assistance,*’ &c.

No. III.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’S PAPERS.

WANT OF SUPPLIES.

Commissary Rawlings, deputy-commissary-general, to Cradock, December 22.

‘Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country. The difficulties encountered by sir J. Moore were of the most serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much drained as they now are.’

WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES.

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 17.

‘I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and commissariat department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of horses from the Barbary coast; and such is our actual want, that the proper movement of even the force we have is nearly impracticable.’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26.

‘The means of transport are so confined that I must not expose anything to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with the greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter being of a very inferior description.’

Commissary Rawlings to sir John Cradock, March.

‘The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an advantageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases, might necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from hand to mouth.’

Colonel Robe to sir J. Cradock, March 20.

‘It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the deputy-commissary-general; from the exhausted state of the country, and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more than two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these are much too slight for the general service of the artillery.’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 20.

‘From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them’ (horses and mules) ‘at any price or by any means, but the adequate supply for even the former small number of the British army could not be obtained. I have also made repeated representations to England.’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.

‘I want eight hundred horses and mules for the common conveyance of provision and the equipment of the artillery.’

Commissary Rawlings to sir J. Cradock, April 9.

‘Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops have returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment must be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the north, from whence our supply has hitherto been obtained.’

Sir J. Cradock to marshal Beresford, Caldas, April 18.

‘You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single day. The country appears to be without the ability to furnish straw.’— ‘In short, the supply is just for the day and barely sufficient.’— ‘I have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the regency would send a person, in special authority, to this district to furnish supplies, if they are to be found. I shall act like the French, and make requisition, with this difference, that we are ready to pay for everything to the utmost.’

Cradock to Berkeley, Caldas, April 17.

‘Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers are sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We cannot advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to Lisbon; and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed.’— ‘If there is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to Peniché, I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in that case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to be fed from thence.’

Cradock to Villiers, April 17.

‘This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are sent, even at a risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position, and must retreat.’— ‘If the articles are in the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be dispensed with. The enemy would have them without paying for them: we must equally exact and pay.’

Cradock to Beresford, April 20.

‘All the recommendations you point out upon the assistance to be derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the utmost of my exertion; but the difficulties started by the admiral and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much dependence upon immediate aid.’

General Cotton to Cradock, April 21.

‘I wish I could once see the cavalry together; but I much fear that before that happens they will be very much out of condition. The fourteenth have already fallen off very much, owing to the frequent want of straw and their being supplied with Indian corn, which they will not eat: added to these circumstances, the commissary obliges the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three days’ forage.’

G. Harrison to Mr. Rawlings, Treasury-chambers, February 25.

‘It having been represented to the lords commissioners of his majesty’s treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their lordships’ commands,’ &c. &c.

Sir J. Cradock to colonel Willoughby Gordon, military secretary, February 11.

‘I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state of the clothing and the great coats in particular of his majesty’s troops serving in this country.’

Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12.

‘Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you make for horses for your guns, or any other species of supply the service may, from time to time, require.’

No. IV.

SECTION I.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to sir J. Cradock, Lisbon, January 19, 1809.

‘I left sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been advised by colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information, he imagines that sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through Gallicia. On the other hand, he has received *positive orders from you** to defend the frontiers, and pressing letters to that effect from the bishop of Oporto.’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 30.

‘The regency and the bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his (sir R. Wilson) ‘quitting the bounds of Portugal.’

Ditto to Ditto, March 6.

‘I had a letter from sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo, (24th February,) wherein he says, that many French prisoners state their expectations that the French army will retire behind the Ebro. Sir Robert’s own persuasion is *that the French will retire altogether from Spain.*’

SECTION II.

General Cameron to Sir J. Cradock, Lamego, January 16.

‘I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging to sir J. Moore’s army, whom I found scattered in all directions, without necessaries, and some of them committing every possible excess that could render the name of a British soldier odious to the nation.’

* Note by Sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but quite the contrary; it must have been the bishop.

Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkeley, March 16.

‘There are about one hundred and twenty persons confined on board the *Rosina*, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to the army.’

SECTION III.

Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, Oimbra, Head-Quarters of Romana, February 21

‘The marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious intention of the enemy is to retreat from Gallicia altogether; and even that he will find much difficulty in extricating himself. I must confess that *I am not so sanguine*; and I judge that the present retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an intent to advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction.

Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March.

‘I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and join himself to the Portuguese army. *His troops had been much vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese*, and a cordial co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should separate altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive. He suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. He had just received a letter from Silveira, which he also answered to that effect and which created no small surprise, as a plan of operations had already been settled between them.’

Major Victor Arentschild to sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16.

‘General Silveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your excellency as the opinion of the public. . . . The marquis of Romana’s army is retreating to Orres, in Gallicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good.’

Mr. commissary Boys to Mr. commissary Rawlings, Almeida, January 13.

‘Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten thousand men had deserted from the marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the country.’

Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23.

‘No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour.’

Lord Castlereagh to marshal Beresford, February 15.

‘The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general officer should be appointed to command and organize their army, his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this important trust.’

No. V.

EXTRACTS FROM MR. FRERE'S CORRESPONDENCE.

(N.B. The Italics are not in the original.)

Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14.

'Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt whether any reinforcement, such as we could now send there, would enable us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at home.'—'On the other hand, there seems reason to apprehend, that general Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance he has experienced, *desist from his unaccountable project of entering Portugal and occupying Galicia.* His return would, of course, add largely to the disposable and moveable force of the enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that description.'—'In this view of the subject there are two points for the employment of a British force; one, *by making a push to drive the enemy from Salamanca and the neighbouring towns,* while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communication between the northern and southern province. The other, by moving from the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in concert with general Cuesta, to attack and *drive the enemy from Toledo, and consequently from Madrid.* In the latter alternative, the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start of any reinforcement from the army of general Soult, supposing him to abandon Galicia for the sake of moving southward; and these movements would not tend in the same degree to draw him from his present position, in which, for so many reasons, *it is desirable he should continue.* It would, I should imagine, at the same time, cover Andalusia, and the points of the greatest interest and importance in this province, more effectually than the same force employed in any other manner.'

Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, March 22.

'The fortieth remains here: under the present circumstances I could not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force from Elvas.'

Mr. Frere to sir A. Wellesley, Seville, May 4.

Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

'As it was my object to obtain *a diversion in La Mancha as the price of co-operation* on your part, and the impression which

they (the junta) received from colonel Alava's report was that your intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Galicia, to come down upon Estremadura to attack general Victor, I was under some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined that the point which I wanted to make a condition was already conceded.'

No. VI.

EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ.

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16.

'The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. The orders from England are to send it if the supreme junta shall make the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate the demand or not?'

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29.

'This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its adoption, Mr. Villiers, admiral Berkeley, and myself, could not well hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us, as addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavourable termination of the campaign in the north of Spain.'—'The force in Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British regiments, that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to the arrival of the force of five thousand men, announced to be on their way; and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be but fair to replace the present detachment from them.'

Sir J. Cradock to general Mackenzie, March 9.

'I yesterday received orders from his majesty's government to press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of the forces under your command to the Tagus.'

Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 9.

'Your lordship will find, by the present communication, that major-general Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of Mr. Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force, (the fortieth regiment, from Seville, will be united,) and proceeded to Tarragona, unless your lordship's orders may have overtaken major-general Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago (without

any communication). It may be presumed that he will follow the same course, upon the same motives that influenced general Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered upon in that part of Spain.'

No. VII.

NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL
MACKENZIE'S DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ.

The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2nd February, 1809, and arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on sir George Smith, on shore, where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but sir George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started. Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who was acting under a diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with him and sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders, and it was determined to wait on the marquis Villel. Mr. Stuart explained to the marquis that the object of my coming was to offer our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act from this side against the common enemy. The marquis hesitated, and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central government; and, in the mean time, said he could permit our landing at port St. Mary's. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for the decision of the central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from sir J. Cradock.

The decision of the junta was received on the 8th: and I received a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the junta was of the most flimsy nature, viz. 'That they had ordered two of their own battalions to occupy Cadiz;' a measure which was evidently the thought of the moment, and a mere pretext.

Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded to by Mr. Frere, yet I had every reason to believe, as well from the opinion of sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and occupying the

place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere's letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the cantonments offered to us. On consulting with sir G. Smith and Mr. Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere, whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England, the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in the harbour under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere proposed by a landing.

I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, without reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary's, I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national honour. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain, and thus have involved our country in its support, without having obtained the object for which it was detached,—the possession of Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial approbation of sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavourable appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would be carried. I therefore wrote to sir J. Cradock, by the Hope brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. Frere's approbation) until we received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same conveyance, to the same purport, to lord Castlereagh.

On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose sir G. Smith, who died that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere, in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with the rest to join Cuesta's army; that, as a force was expected from England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I left behind might follow me on their arrival.

I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered

it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty's ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure until the arrival of troops from England, which might be looked for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance, in some point, respectably, towards the enemy. If, however, Mr. Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately, I further informed him, that I was ready to move on as soon as we could obtain the necessary equipments.

Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the *Ambuscade*, on a secret mission. On the 22nd, and before I received any further communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town, as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to by the governor, for the interference of some British officers as mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for it was frequently called for during the tumult.

As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (captain Kelly, assistant quarter-master-general) with a detail. The *Fisguard* sailed on the 24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed sir J. Cradock, as well as lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since my last; and just at that time colonel Roche arrived from Seville. He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr. Stuart's mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere's decision, on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable to the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state of things, I had a full conversation with colonel Roche on the subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not having accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment. I asked his opinion as to the practicability of general Stuart's being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment, thus making an equal division of my force.

Colonel Roche was of opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr. Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops, and the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I thought it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival of general Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution of the orders he might bring from home.

This proposition certainly exceeded anything authorized by my instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to warrant it.

After colonel Roche's departure for Seville, captain Kelly returned from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from Mr. Frere, stating that marshal Soult was marching from Galicia into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th I received this promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz.

Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that nothing else than succours from home could enable sir John Cradock to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation succeeded, I had arranged with admiral Purvis to send a frigate with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, everything was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for, although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken, yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome addition.

On the morning of the 2nd of March I received a letter from colonel Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French interest.

The morning of the 3rd having passed without any letter from Mr. Frere or colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed (although he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received shortly afterwards from colonel Roche confirmed this failure. Mr. Frere's letter entered very minutely into the state of the Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult's attempt to

penetrate into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army, assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms, the essential use my detachment could be of at Taragona, in giving spirit and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in need of support.

As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance; and the proceeding to Taragona would so evidently show our determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish government without any excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr. Frere's solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn, without committing any other British force for its support; and the motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely thought myself vindicable in hesitating to comply.

I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3rd March to this effect to Mr. Frere, sir J. Cradock, and lord Castlereagh. But on the 4th, in the evening, captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards, arrived from England with despatches for general Sherbrooke, who had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the *Eclair* brig of war, and had stopped at Lisbon, which he again left on the evening of the 2nd, and brought me a message to the following purport from sir J. Cradock, viz., 'That he was determined to defend Portugal to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea, prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon.'

This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The idea of proceeding to Taragona was abandoned. I wrote to this effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary winds detained us in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th, but on the 6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th.

I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the inclinations of the people at Cadiz.

(Signed)

J. R. MACKENZIE,
Major-general.

Lisbon, March 13, 1809.

No. VIII.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS—NEGLECT
OF PORTUGAL.

SECTION I.

Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809.

‘You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December, enclosing copies, &c. &c. *that, in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, by the force under sir J. Cradock’s command, an event rendered the more probable by the transactions in Galicia.*’

Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, February 6.

‘*Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal,*’ &c.

Admiral Berkeley to sir J. Cradock, February 6.

‘The period of the British army’s stay in this place *appearing to draw near to its conclusion.*’

SECTION II.

Sir J. Cradock to colonel Guard, January 3.

‘The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most serious thoughts.’—‘But, as they were occupied by the command of his majesty’s ministers, and *we remain without any fresh instructions under the present critical circumstances.*’

Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 10.

‘I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, but *I obey the original orders of government.*’

Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 12.

‘*We are still without any instructions whatever from England.*’

Sir J. Cradock to captain Halket, January 13.

‘Though we cannot say *when it may take place, and it shall be deferred to the last moment, in hopes of hearing from England,* yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare everything for the event of an embarkation.’

Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkeley, January 17.

‘I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the resolution to *remain in Portugal to the last proper moment, awaiting orders from England.*’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 19.

‘With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, *we are determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of receiving orders from England.*’

Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkeley, February 9.

‘The orders we daily expect may be either for *immediate embarkation, or to maintain Portugal.*’—‘I am persuaded we have but this one wish, which is to act for the credit of our country, and endeavour, under the *want of all information, to discover what may be the object of the government we serve.*’

Sir J. Cradock to general Mackenzie, February 26.

‘Since the 14th of January we are without instructions from *England.*’

SECTION III.

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 15.

‘What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the *army in Portugal should remain to the last moment.*’

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 15.

‘I am just favoured with your communication about the dangerous effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing the troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oycras, Passo d’Arcos, &c. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position in question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders from England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such a proceeding.’—‘What I must object to is to take up a false position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach and seek another bearing the appearance of flight and yet not securing our retreat. The whole having announced the intention to defend Lisbon, but giving up that idea upon the appearance of the enemy: for positions liable to be turned on every side cannot be persevered in by an inferior force.’—‘My political reasoning upon this subject was contained in the letter I wrote the admiral, and, I must repeat, it continues unweakened,’ &c.—‘After your strong representations of this morning, I shall certainly not persevere; and, as there is no instant necessity for the measure, will await the progress of events.’

No. IX.

STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER
SIR J. CRADOCK, JANUARY 6, 1809,

EXTRACTED FROM THE HEAD-QUARTER STATES.

Disposable for the Field.

Garrisons.	Artillery.			Cavalry.			Infantry.		
	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	
Santarem	68	199	2,492	General Richard Stewart.					
Saccavem	97	169	1,450	General M'Kenzie.					
Lisbon	...	519	...	General Cotton.					
	236	attached to different battalions.					
	<u>165</u>	<u>887</u>	<u>4,178</u>						

Total, 5,232

Garrisons.	Artillery.			Cavalry.			Infantry.		
	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	
Almeida	38	...	1,440						
Elvas	33	...	679						
Oporto	379						
Lisbon & Forts	315	...	2,682						
Total,	<u>386</u>	<u>...</u>	<u>5,566</u>						

General total, 10,798

Note.—Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this state.

ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL 6, 1809, CALDAS.

Sir J. Cradock, commander-in-chief.

Major-general Sherbrooke, second in command.

Artillery.—Major-general Howarth. Cavalry.—Major-general Cotton

	Under arms.	
	Men.	Men.
First line, five brigades	10,418	
Second line, three brigades	3,810	
Reserve, one brigade	1,858	
Cavalry	800	
Total	<u>16,886</u>	

STATE OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR A. WELLESLEY, APRIL 22

Head-quarters, Leyria.

	Under arms.		Sick.	Command.	Effective.
	Men.	Men.			
Artillery	441	88	408	937	
Cavalry	1,439	13	418	1,870	
Infantry	16,539	1,937	314	18,790	
Total,	<u>18,419</u>	<u>2,038</u>	<u>1,140</u>	<u>21,597</u>	

Number of guns,	6lb.		3lb.	Howitzers.	Total,
	20	6			
	20	6	4		30

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, MAY 1, 1809.

Head-quarters, Coimbra.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,413	3,074	19,510	230	24,227
			Deduct	{ Hospital 2,357
				{ Absent 1,217
				<hr/>
			Total present under arms,	20,653
				<hr/>

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, JUNE 25, 1809.

Head-quarters, Abrantes.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,586	3,736	21,267	406	26,995
			Deduct	{ Hospital 3,246
				{ Commands 1,396
				<hr/>
30 Pieces of Artillery.			Total present under arms,	22,353
				<hr/>

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, JULY 25, 1809.

Head-quarters, Talavera.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,584	3,734	29,694	398	35,410
			Deduct	{ Hospital 4,827
				{ Commands 1,596
				<hr/>
			Total present under arms	28,987
			Deduct regiments on march	9,141
				<hr/>
30 Pieces of Artillery.			Real present under arms,	19,846
				<hr/>

STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY'S ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1809.

Head-quarters, Badajos.

Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Waggon train.	Total rank and file.
Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.
1,947	4,273	28,409	389	35,018
In hospital		8,827	Deduct total absent	11,353
Command and missing		2,526		<hr/>
			Total present under arms,	23,665
				<hr/>

No. X.

MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK.

March 29, 1809.

SIR,—I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions, from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army, whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town.

I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the general commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of which has been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and melancholy.

The corps of brigadier-general Victoria, consisting of two battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, part of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia; but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed population, which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten thousand men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at Oporto, as far as I can get information, that your excellency may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add that there prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and insubordination,—and that, in short, by the latest accounts, the populace entirely govern the law, civil and military.

Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency's consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one, before the other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able, to do this, would be merely a matter of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our

arrival at Leyria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army, pushing from Leyria to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principal object, and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either the destruction of Cuesta's army, to enter more securely into Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that Soult does not think that of his army from Galicia and that from Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected co-operation,—whilst the army from Salamanca will, probably, satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating.

It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by my instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies; and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts they can make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate projects will cause each falling separately, and without advantage to the common cause.

I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army, between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future occasion, with such support may weigh in the scale; and indeed, the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just received a second report and complaint, from general Miranda, would render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question to your excellency, &c.

I have the honour, &c.

W. C. BERESFORD.

SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD.

Lisbon, March 29, 1809.

DEAR SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your excellency's letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British troops to the succour of Oporto, at this moment menaced, &c.

Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all my reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the government in England, and the part I am now called upon to act is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved state of affairs seems to confirm and give no reason to alter in any part.

It has always appeared, to my judgment, that the enemy has but two objects to attain in this kingdom; the possession of Lisbon and Oporto. I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior value of the former above the latter. There are such positive local disadvantages attached to Oporto, independent of its remote position, that no military disposition, in which a small English army is to bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline obedience to an application from so high an authority as the governors of the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request, though I much doubt if their judgment goes along with it; but it appears to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under my command, (totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the defence of this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succour of a place two hundred miles distant, and by a movement to the north with this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a general invasion.

I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual situation, leaving to your judgment, how far it may be necessary to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army, and lay before the governors and your excellency the best ideas I can form for the employment of the British auxiliary force, in conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances.

It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is

moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place, or to act in conjunction with general Soult, by an advance into the upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state, with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing general Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal, from whence, to the heights of Almada, opposite to Lisbon, through the whole of the Alemtejo, except the weak garrison of Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt their immediate passage.

Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from the contingency of general Cuesta's army; for, besides the general disinclination he had so strongly marked to the British character, he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the present hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at twelve thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain possession of the maritime forts, is left. It may be increased to fourteen thousand, if these points are risked; but even to gain the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded, than the presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not more than two and a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I confess that the best reasoning of my judgment, upon every public and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation, is, that the British troops should never make one retrograde step: from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid, military as well as civil. The British army, from its description, may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded, in the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be

vain, and that it would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the whole future conflict.

I have now only to state what my inferior judgment points out; and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force, and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation. They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise, a rapid discipline will ensue from their connexion with us, and the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether our general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attend the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly embraced, and always leave some part exposed.

Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude, determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful diversion in favour of Spain.

It will give me the sincerest pleasure, &c.

JOHN CRADOCK.

No. XI.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT
OF MARSHAL SOULT, MSS.

*Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,)
Lamego, March 17, 1809.*

‘The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts which Frenchmen are so expert in—circulating proclamations and insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror, plunder, and desolation, *treating the inhabitants with feigned moderation and kindness.*’

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas.

‘It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate himself with the populace of Oporto, *by even feeding them*

and granting other indulgences.'—'It is also said that a Portuguese legion, to consist of *six thousand* men, has been instituted.'

Extract from Soult's Official Report of the expedition to Portugal.

'Dans quinze jours, les villes de *Braga, Oporto, Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Pova de Barcim, Feira, et Ovar*, eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations se rendirent à Oporto pour les remettre au maréchal Soult et le prier de la faire parvenir à l'empereur. Des adresses qui renfermaient l'expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de trente mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians, et du peuple.—'Pendant son séjour à Oporto. Le M. Soult fit des proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l'administration et la police de la province *Entre Minho e Douro*. Il nomma au nom de l'empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans, et après avoir reçu la manifestation politique des habitans, il organisa le garde national ainsi qu'une légion de cinq battalions.—'Aucune contribution ne fût frappée; les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales suffirent pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, et même pour donner de secours aux Portugais.'

Intercepted letter of the duke of Dalmatia's to general La Martiniere, Orense, March 2, 1809.

'J'ai reçu votre lettre du 27 Jan. J'approuve toutes les dispositions que vous avez faites. Je vous ai déjà dit que vous pouviez disposer pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse royale de Tuy. Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que vous pourriez. Si de Valence on vous tiroit de coups de canon envoyez leurs des bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert, mais faites les garder. Dans les equipages qui sont à Tuy, il y a douze cent pair de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre, et un peu de drap; vous pouvez en disposer pour votre troupe. Ralliez au dépôt général tout ce qui appartient au corps d'armée et qui étoit resté en arrière, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée qui se soutiendra d'elle-même et faire la police dans le province dont vous devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hôpitaux et n'envoiez personne sur Ribidavia. J'espère que sous peu je vous aurai ouvert une autre communication, le province d'Orense est en très grande partie pacifié; je marche sur les débris du corps de Romana pour en finir avec eux; ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si après cette expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles, je reviendrai avec tout mon armée pour les appaiser, et alors malheur à ceux qui les auroient occasionné: *je veux la paix et la tranquillité, que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la campagne, qu'ils soient protégés et que la troupe se conduise bien. Les mutins et les malintentionés François et Espagnols doivent être sévèrement punis.* Il faut de tems en tems des exemples. Je crois que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays. Mais il faut bien leur payer ou

leur promettre, qu'en arrivant près de moi ils le seront généreusement, et prendre de gages pour repondre de leur fidelité; donnez de vos nouvelles au général Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au colonel l'Abbeville de bien mettre en état son artillerie.

'MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.'

No. XII.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK, MSS.

Lisbon, April 23.

Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor; how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British will be to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country.

All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I fear, in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them over with you.

In order to consider of some of them, and to make various arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to let you know whether he will come or not.

It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case, it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet you here. I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however, choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will bring with you the adjutant-general and quarter-master-general, the chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the commissary.

Ever yours, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

N.B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted.

No. XIII.

Extracts of a letter from sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castle-reagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809.

‘I arrived here on Saturday, and found that Sir John Cradock and general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, with the troops under their command respectively; the former to Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should hear that Victor’s movements were decided, and, therefore, I consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king’s minister that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to assume it as soon as I shall communicate with sir John Cradock. I have written to him, and to general Beresford, to apprise him that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has done nothing in Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been most probably apprised; but he has some posts on the river Tamega, which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General Silveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General Lapisse, who commands the French corps which, it was supposed, when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal, has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with, indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he is either fortifying that post, or making an entrenched camp there. Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is said, will soon be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the marquis de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede or delay Victor’s progress, in case he should come in while I am absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which it is most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon

Victor, connected with Cuesta's movements, did not require time to concert it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable, for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, to act upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire the officer commanding them to endeavour to get intelligence, as he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in operations to the northward, and if he should not already have received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third dragoons might also receive directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude, have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here; now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward constant convoys will be necessary, and the admiral does not appear to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of him. The twenty-fourth regiment arrived this day, &c. &c.

(Signed)

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

No. XIV.

LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Abrantes, June 22, 1809.

MY LORD,—When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has also fallen back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources for the transport of our own supplies either by land or by water. Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and shoes, and to be furnished up in different ways; and I was well aware that, if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French

were retiring, (as appears by my letters to your lordship,) and that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them, even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I repeat, that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include £40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty thousand men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, debts of sir John Moore's army still due in Spain, which I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c. &c.

(Signed) 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

No. XV.

LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

Badajos, October 30, 1809.

MY LORD,—I have had the honour of receiving your excellency's despatch, (marked L.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in answer to your excellency, of the 3rd of October.

I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to their exertions for the scanty supplies it received.

From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay's note it would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies; particularly the quotation of a letter from general Cuesta, of the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed to have made, that the Spanish troops and *their prisoners* were better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could not have been occasioned, by the inexperience or irregularity of the English commissariat.

I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide provisions and means of transport for the British army on its passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such orders were sent, it was obvious that the central junta, as a government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay's account of these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even for one day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to general Venegas by general Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to a general action with the enemy's concentrated force. The effect of their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:—

As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour to procure mules to attend the army, in concert with don Lozano des Torres, that city and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded by the late sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M. de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government that the British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding this expression of astonishment, he informs your excellency, in the name of the government, that they had given orders to the provincial juntas of Badajoz and Castille (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport; and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want at that moment.

The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, drawn by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and there were none to carry provisions.

Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote

to general O'Donoghue, on the 16th of July, a letter in which after stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them, I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue my co-operation with general Cuesta, after I should have performed my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz., the removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat across the Tagus on the 4th of August, but even previous to the commencement of the operations of the campaign.

Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was communicated to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and general Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance of this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2nd of September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of forty each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades of carts which were intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day on which, after five weeks' notice, I was obliged to separate from the Spanish army.

It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from Spain, as then carried into execution, was 'sudden,' or ought to have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain.

I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with general Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by the armies under the command of general Venegas, general Cuesta, and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint general Cuesta. I believed that general Venegas would have carried into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience than that general Venegas' corps should be exposed alone to the attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I should be supplied.

Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, the soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on which day a junction was formed with general Cuesta's army; and, from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their

horses did not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency, both in quality and quantity, were so great that I considered it a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations.

The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that, exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost, in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand five hundred horses.

I have no knowledge of what passed between general Cuesta and don Lozano des Torres and the intendent of provisions of the Spanish army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first time on the 22nd of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which had been brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example of the preference which was given to the British troops while they were in Spain.

The orders stated to have been given by the central to the provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the different villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on different days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty thousand rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French army have since subsisted on these resources.

The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, nor was the supposed magazine of four hundred thousand pounds of biscuit ever formed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed, of the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that not only have the supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for whenever the bills

for them could be got in, but the old debts due to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army under the command of the late sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated, to let the people know that all demands upon the British government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged.

I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and provisions at that period, lieutenant-colonel Waters had, by my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,) but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement made by lieutenant-colonel Waters, was to be the sole source of the supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a sufficiency to supply one day's demand upon it.

But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an order from him, (of which your excellency has a copy,) addressed to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by lieutenant-colonel Waters.

As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause (as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not mistaken in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed, general Eguia's army suffered the greatest distress in the neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the British army.

In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the

Spanish general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve; some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive agreements.

M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the marquis de Romana were framed in conformity with suggestions from marshal Beresford; and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were approved of by me.

The marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estremadura retired across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates shows that there was, and could have been no connexion in the operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of the marquis of Romana's operations; and till I heard, on the 3rd of August, that marshal Ney's corps had passed through the mountains of Estremadura at Baños, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe that that part of the enemy's army had quitted Astorga, or that the marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Galicia.

Marshal Beresford's corps was collected upon the frontiers of Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy's corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on the left of the British army; and I particularly requested marshal Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps under marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an operation in which that corps was to be concerned.

In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded.

I expected, from the communications I had with general Cuesta, through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, that the Puerto de Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.

It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July, that general Venegas, who was under his command, should march by Tembleque, Ocaña, Puerte Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid; where he was to be on the 22nd and 23rd of July, when the combined armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had been foreseen) occurred; viz., that the

combined armies were engaged with the enemy's concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta had countermanded the orders which general Venegas had received from general Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I shall make no observation upon this proceeding, except that the plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into execution, by general Venegas, in this instance.

It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2nd of August, that when I marched against Soult on the 3rd, he would remain at Talavera. That agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that if general Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if general Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.

When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the hospital from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22nd and 23rd of August, M. de Calvo and don Lozano de Torres being in the town.

In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I am of opinion that if general Bassecourt had been detached towards Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement, and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here again the hospital would have been saved.

He was not detached, however, till the 2nd; and then I understood, from M. de Garay's note, that it was general Cuesta's opinion that the movement was useless.

It could not have been considered as useless by general Cuesta on the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could not have been considered as useless even on the

morning of the 2nd, as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of the period at which the general considered this detachment as useless would have been desirable.

I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by general Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the morning of the 3rd, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3rd, of the enemy's position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and of general Cuesta's intended march on that evening, leaving my hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight on the 4th; shortly after which time, general Cuesta arrived at Oropesa.

Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that every moment's delay must expose them to the risk of being cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, showed that they were not equal to any great contest.

M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.

When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy's corps which had passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered only when I heard of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found that, by general Cuesta's movement from Talavera, the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, to join or to attack us in separate bodies.

It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier intelligence of their approach.

The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castille, if they knew of the collection of the enemy's troops at Salamanca,

sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central junta will find it difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of our march.

But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from the offensive to the defensive: the march was retrograde; and if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were forwarded, untouched, to their destination.

I have sent to marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de Garay's note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, therefore, only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.

Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to show the fallacy of M. de Garay's calculations of the relative numerical strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in a state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those blessings for which they are contending. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WELLINGTON.

No. XVI.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*Camp, August 17, 1809.*

SIR,—I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of repeating them for your excellency's information.

My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads, a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The assistant-commissary of my division likewise states to me, that the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) R. HILL, major-general.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUT.-GEN.
SHERBROOKE.*Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809.*

SIR,—I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses.

(Signed) E. STOPFORD, second brigade of guards.

No. XVII.

SECTION I.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY
IN THE PENINSULA,

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

King Joseph commanding, 1st Oct. 1809.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Prisoners.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
180,814	28,091	10,407	3,165	46,109	4,124	237,330	23,196	8,060
						Deduct for the governments...	10,407	3,165
						Real total	226,923	28,091

15th July, 1810.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Prisoners.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught
273,403	52,336	29,462	7,846	47,107	4,915	349,972	41,848	18,334
In march to join								
6,121	736	636	...	6,757	736	
<u>279,524</u>	<u>53,072</u>	<u>29,462</u>	<u>7,846</u>	<u>47,743</u>	<u>4,915</u>	<u>356,729</u>	<u>60,918</u>	

15th August, 1810.

279,639	52,063	25,340	6,017	46,982	5,995	351,961	41,446	16,634
In march to join						1,957	681	511
Total Effective in Spain...						353,918	42,127	17,145
Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the frontier.....						16,006	1,447	...
Grand total						369,924	43,574	17,145

Note.—By this state it appears that allowance being made for casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men.

15th Jan. 1811.

<i>Present under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Absent.</i>	<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospital.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.
295,227	52,462	17,780	4,714	48,831	361,838	41,189	15,987

15th April, 1811.

276,575	46,990	15,121	2,166	40,079	331,776	37,855	11,301
---------	--------	--------	-------	--------	---------	--------	--------

These states show a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barosa, and Fuentes Onoro took place. Hence, if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of its greatest activity, the guerilla system was more harassing than destructive to the French army.

SECTION II.—STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

April, 1810.—Head-quarter, Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling, commanding.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hosp. Prisnrs.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Draught
2nd corps d'armée	18,372	4,449	1,119	132	1,628	7	21,126	3,520	1,061
6th ditto	33,759	10,159	496	110	5,086	349	39,690	7,140	3,129
8th ditto	28,045	7,070	25	..	5,976	99	34,145	5,312	1,758
Total active army	80,176	21,678	1,640	242	12,690	455	94,961	15,972	5,948
Imperial guards..	17,380	3,800	174	15	733	..	18,287	2,831	984
Province of St. Ander	13,464	752	276	..	1,774	377	15,891	752	..
Province of Valladolid ..	4,509	124	123	..	859	145	6,136	..	124
Total under Massena's command.	115,529	26,354	2,213	257	16,056	977	135,275	19,555	7,056

15th May, 1810.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hosp. Prisonrs.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Draught.	
Etat major et gens-d'arme.	229	241	229	241	..	
2nd corps Reynier	16,903	2,921	992	231	1,337	42	19,232	2,186	966	
6th do. Ney.	28,883	5,421	1,224	964	4,940	357	35,067	2,152	4,233	
8th do. Junot.	20,782	4,228	7	30	5,642	75	26,431	2,142	2,116	
Reserve of cavalry, Montbrun.	4,776	4,851	246	189	95	..	5,117	5,040	..	
Total active army	71,573	17,662	2,469	1,414	12,014	474	86,847	11,761	7,315	

15th August, 1810.

Etat major, &c.	199	222	3	..	202	222	..
2nd corps.	16,418	2,894	2,494	397	3,006	..	21,918	1,969	1,304
6th corps.	23,456	2,496	1,865	577	5,541	193	30,862	1,701	1,372
8th corps.	18,803	2,959	436	169	4,996	98	24,235	2,016	1,112
Reserve of cavalry	4,146	4,322	1,138	831	157	31	5,441	4,907	246
Artillerie et genie et du siege }	2,724	2,969	206	159	409	..	3,339	..	3,128
Total active army	65,746	15,862	6,139	2,119	14,112	302	85,997	10,815	7,162
6th Government, Valladolid. Division Serras.	12,693	3,045	639	20	1,775	641	15,107	2,931	134
Asturias et St. Ander. Bonnet }	12,913	..	1,394	15	1,578	107	14,885	434	..
Total under Massena	91,352	18,907	8,172	2,154	17,465	1,050	115,989	14,180	7,296
9th corps, Drouet, Comte D'Erlon }	19,144	2,436	24	..	3,147	..	22,315	2,436	..
General total	110,496	21,343	8,196	2,154	20,612	1,050	138,304	16,616	7,296

Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th October.

The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st September only.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cav.	Draught.	
Etat major.	192	219	4	..	196	219	..	
2nd corps	16,575	2,921	2,397	287	2,214	..	21,186	1,872	1,336	
6th ditto.	23,224	2,478	1,708	600	5,418	..	30,350	1,730	1,348	
8th ditto.	18,807	2,958	663	140	4,656	..	24,126	2,027	1,071	
Reserve of cavalry	4,146	4,322	1,138	831	157	..	5,441	4,907	246	
Artilleries of siege	3,022	3,115	206	159	409	..	3,637	146	3,128	
Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 22nd of October	474	16	474	16	..	
Total	65,966	16,013	6,586	2,033	12,858	..	85,410	10,917	7,129	
9th corps	19,062	2,072	413	..	3,516	..	22,991	1,755	317	
Division Serras	8,586	1,015	269	35	1,750	..	10,605	1,050	..	
Grand total	93,614	19,100	7,268	2,068	18,124	..	119,006	13,722	7,446	

Army of Portugal—1st January, 1811.

Head-quarters, Torres Novas.

Second corps, Head-quarters, Santarem.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Drught.
Merle's division 9 battalions	4,368	..	150	..	1,549	6,067
Heudelet's do. 12 do.	5,718	..	451	..	2,646	8,815
Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons	1,146	993	523	537	231	1,900	1,530	..
Artillery and engineers	1,284	1,121	52	9	89	1,425	112	1,018
Total	12,516	2,114	1,176	546	4,515	18,207	1,642	1,018

Sixth corps, Thomar.

Marchand, 11 battalions	4,987	28	529	..	1,121	6,637	28	..
Mermet's, 11 do.	6,252	..	743	..	1,077	8,104
Loison, 12 do.	4,589	..	1,037	..	3,291	8,917
Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons	652	651	663	663	117	1,432	1,314	..
Artillery and engineers, 28 companies	1,769	1,372	47	78	165	1,981	52	1,398
Total	18,249	2,051	3,019	741	5,771	27,071	1,394	1,398

Eighth corps, Pernes.

Clausel, 11 battalions.	4,007	18	484	..	3,989	8,627	18	..
Solignac, 14 do.	4,997	..	1,953	..	3,337	10,346
St. Croix's dragoons, 12 squadrons.	981	1,024	698	698	238	1,917	1,722	..
Artillery and engineers	1,106	859	24	4	392	1,522	151	712
On leave.	206
Total	11,091	1,901	3,159	702	7,956	22,618	1,891	712

Montbrun, Ourem.

Reserve of cavalry 24 squadrons with artillery	2,729	2,871	1,486	1,466	178	4,533	4,337	
Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army	1,546	614	283	2,090	614	

Ninth corps, Leiria.

Claparedo, 15 battalions, Almeida ..	7,863	11	369	..	482	8,714	..	
Conroux, 12 battalions, Leiria	7,592	27	447	..	1,299	9,338	27	
Fournier's cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro.	1,698	1,591	60	67	114	1,872	1,658	
Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo	670	464	..	72	742	..	464	
Total	17,823	2,093	876	139	2,637	19,924	2,149	

Note.—Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal. The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses.

	Present under arms,	
	Men.	Horses.
General total of the army of Portugal in the position of Santarem.....	46,171	9,551
Ninth corps	17,823	2,093
	63,994	11,644
Deduct troops of the ninth corps not in Portugal	10,231	2,066
Real number under Massena,	53,763	9,578

Army of Portugal—1st April, 1811.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effectives.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.		
8th corps, Junot.....	13,448	..	992	..	5,719	20,159	..	
6th do. Marmont	13,984	..	1,374	..	1,576	16,934	..	
2nd corps, Reynier	10,837	..	1,350	..	4,318	16,505	..	
Montbrun. {	Dragoon, 23 squadrons..	4,173	4,404	4,173	4,404
	Light cavalry, 14 squadrons.....	3,636	3,906	38	3,636	3,906
	1 squadron of gend'arme.....	190	72	5	102	72
	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	Horses.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.		
Artillery and Engineers.	Foot ar- tillery. { Almeida & Rodrigo..}	936	88	1,055	..
	Horse artillery	410	425	23	453	425
	Artillery of the train ..	2,181	2,378	237	2,448	2,378
	Workmen	259	25	295	..
	Engineers	1,448	60	140	1,623	..
	Military equipage	596	897	60	668	897
Total artilleries, engineers, &c.	5,969	3,335	573	6,542	2,760	
Total of infantry	37,269	..	3,716	..	11,613	53,598	..	
Total of cavalry.....	7,999	8,382	43	7,911	8,382	
General total	51,237	11,717	3,716	..	12,229	68,051	11,142	

Note.—In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of Portugal for May. Two divisions of the ninth corps, directed to be added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, and the prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry as he pleased, provided the brigade of general Fournier, from the ninth corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses, and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, engineers, &c. are deducted.

Note.—Since the above was published, Massena's letters in Belmas' Journals of Sieges, have appeared; he calls his army only 35,000 of all arms; because Clauzel's division was detached to keep up the communication between Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca; the whole present must however have been stronger, if Bessières' troops be reckoned; yet I have certainly set the cavalry too high—there could not have been more than four thousand in the field.

SECTION III.—ARMY OF THE SOUTH—SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Draught.		
1st of January	55,602	12,092	5,744	1,999	6,412	67,758	10,868	3,223		
15th of May.....	75,133	13,124	3,915	1,336	11,420	90,468	12,156	2,304		
Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north	11,917	1,619	13,310	1,220	399		
Real total of the army of the south }	63,216	11,505	3,915	1,336	11,420	77,158	10,936	1,905		

SECTION IV.

Fifth corps, 15th January.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
	18,766	6,158	3,035	640

16 Decembre, 1810, le duc de Dalmatie va faire le siège de Badajos, avec tout le 5^{me} corps d'armée, 8 régiments de cavalerie, formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les 1^{ere} et 5^{me} corps d'armée sous les ordres de général Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63^{me} régiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d'artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de sapeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie Espagnol.

SECTION V.

First corps before Cadiz.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Train.		
15th February, 1811 ..	20,572	1,886	1,331	681	1,254	23,457	1,495	1,072		
Reinforcement in march from the Governments	5,209	775	743	5,952	712	63		
Total	25,781	2,661	1,331	681	1,997	29,409	2,207	1,035		
4th corps, 15th Feb. ..	16,703	4,007	741	397	1,699	19,143	3,612	792		
Reinforcement in march from the Governments	6,020	1,457	878	6,890	1,457	..		
Total	22,723	5,464	741	397	2,577	26,033	5,069	792		

Note.—A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise joined the fifth corps while in front of Badajos.

SECTION VI.—ARMY OF THE NORTH—BESSIÈRES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING.

	<i>Under arms.</i>		<i>Detached.</i>		<i>Hospital.</i>		<i>Effective.</i>		<i>Horses.</i>	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Men.	Cavalry.	Train.		
1st February, 1811	58,515	8,874	1,992	6,860	67,767	7,979	1,073			
15th April, 1811.....	53,148	6,930	2,221	5,350	60,719	6,065	879			

SECTION VII.—ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L'ESPAGNE 1^{re} CORPS.

Situation des présens sous les armes à l'époque du 22nd Mars, 1811.

Division.	Designation des Régimens.	Etat des présens sous les armes.	Dans les Forts et Redoutes.	Emplacement des Troupes dans les Forts et Redoutes.	Disponibles.
1	24 ^{me} do. do.	800	400	1,000 Sta Maria.
	96 ^{me} do. do.	1,100		Depuis et compris le Fort St. Catherine jusqu'au Rio St. Petro	400 Do.
	16 ^{me} do. do.	350	350	1,100 Do. San Lucar, Est, Chicona la Viala Atta.
	8 ^{me} do. do.	713		Xeres et la Cartuxa.....	... 713 Port Reale au Trocadero.
	45 ^{me} do. do.	1,072	744	Depuis et compris le Fort Napoleon jusqu'à Chiese fe.....	328 Port Reale. 820 Chicliana. 236 Do. 1,400 Do. 845 Port Reale.
2	54 ^{me} do. do.	820		850 Chicliana.
	Bataillon d'Elite.....	236		942 Do.
	27 ^{me} Infanterie ligne.....	1,400		
	63 ^{me} do. do.	845		Depuis et compris la Redoute jusqu'à cette de Vellati.....	
	94 ^{me} do. do.	1,500	650	Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et Conil.....	
3	95 ^{me} do. do.	1,414	472	Au Trocadero	
	43 ^{me} Bataillons de Marine	900	900	Do.....	
	2 ^e do. d'Ouvriers do...	615	615	
	5 ^e Chasseurs.....	320		De Montesa, Alcazar de Xeres.....	320 Vejer et Conil.
	1 ^e de Dragons.....	230	50	Do. et à la Cartuxa.....	180 Xeres. 146 Arcos.
Régiment de Marine.	2 ^e do. do.	218	72	Sur la ligne du Blocus.....	178 Santa Maria, Puerto [Reale, et Chicliana.
	à pied à Cheval	678	500	Au Trocadero	
	Sapeurs.....	323	323	Do.....	
	Mineurs.....	77	77		
			14,611	5,153	

By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but was found amongst colonel Lejeune's intercepted papers, it appears that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days after the battle of Barrosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne's detachment being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle.

SECTION VIII.—STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S RETURNS.

	<i>Under arms.</i>	<i>Sick.</i>	<i>Detached.</i>
	Men.	Men.	Men.
Cavalry 4 regiments	1,525	274	542
Infantry 41 battalions	20,700	8,880	3,214
Artillery	1,378	144	1,156
Total of all arms.....	23,603	9,298	4,912
Guns.....24 British, 18 Portuguese.....	Total	42	

Note.—There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese and the partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms.

No. XVIII.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

SECTION I.

November 30, 1809.

‘I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the duke of Albuquerque and the duke del Parque in this plan of diversion.

‘Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty’s ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

‘The first official information which I had from the government of the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which I now enclose a copy.

‘I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the Spanish ministers and members of the junta, I communicated to them my conviction that general Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated, and accordingly your lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of general

Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general's own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.'—'I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castille, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the duke d'Albuquerque's corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move.'

SECTION II.

'December 7, 1809.

'———— I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the duke d'Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the duke d'Albuquerque which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the duke del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government have given orders to the duke d'Albuquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it.'

SECTION III.

'January 31, 1810.

'———— There is no doubt, that, if the enemy's reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances will permit.'

SECTION IV.

'January 12, 1811.

'My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry.'

SECTION V.

'January 19, 1811.

'At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville general Ballesteros received an order from the regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condado de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza.'

'The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with corps so ill-organized, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabel received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the regency, to detach general Ballesteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st of December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville.'

SECTION VI.

'February 2, 1811.

'The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, (the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on this service.'

SECTION VII.

February 9, 1811.

'General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late marquis de la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don't believe that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajoz, and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year.'

SECTION VIII.

February 23, 1811.

'Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajoz, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, if the misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-general Madden did everything in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain.'—'The operations of the guerilla continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one.'

SECTION IX.

March 21, 1811.

'It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that marshal Bessières has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castille. He thus threatens an attack upon Galicia, in which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under general Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that general will make no defence, and that Galicia will fall into the hands of the enemy.'

SECTION X.

‘ May 7, 1811.

‘ Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don't know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to everything proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged.’

‘ I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence.’

‘ Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies.’

SECTION XI.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Stuart to lord Wellesley, relative to Disputes with the Patriarch and Souza.

‘ Sept. 8, 1810.

‘ I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, that the regency should send an order to marshal Beresford to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary, followed by a reflection on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purpose respecting the Portuguese who are attached to lord Wellington.’

SECTION XII.

Letter from sir J. Moore to major-general M' Kenzie, commanding in Portugal.

‘ Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

SIR,—The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castaños and Blake, the one in Biscay and the other in Aragon, have

been beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David Baird's corps impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head against it.

I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, and proceed to the Tagus: I myself, with the corps which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by taking up such positions as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now with you and that which I am bringing.

We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday, that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celorico, Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the *Tras os Montes*. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this, together with colonel Murray's letter to colonel Donkin, will be sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from England, to join us through Portugal: this will do at first, but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. MOORE.

P.S. Elvas should be provisioned.

No. XIX.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF VARIOUS
PERSONS RELATIVE TO CADIZ, MSS.

SECTION I.

*Extract of a Letter from Mr. C. B. Vaughan, Secretary of
Legation at Cadiz, to Mr. C. Stuart.*

March 6, 1810.

'I received your letter of 22nd February. It was indeed time that a little common sense should be substituted in that country (Portugal) for that supreme humbug with which the Portuguese have hitherto been treated.*'

'When the French passed the *Morena*, 20th January, the supreme junta gave orders for the provincial juntas to provide for the defence of the provinces, and permitted the demolition of the forts commanding the bay of Cadiz; at the same time the junta stole away from Seville for Isla de Leon. Romana and Bartholomew Frere remained till 24th January, Seville being in commotion, demanding that the supreme junta should be abolished. Montijo and Palafox released from prison, and the former sent an order to Romana to appear before the revolutionary junta. He was desired to take the command of Seville; according to B. Frere's account a most perilous post, as the people had no arms. Why was this fact not known after the defeat of Ocaña? And why also were the immense stores of cannon, ammunition, &c. &c., accumulated at Seville, not moved to Cadiz? Romana, to avoid the defence of Seville, got appointed to bring down del Parque's army to the defence of the city, and the people appointed a military junta, namely, Castaños, Montijo, Palafox, and Romana.

'Frere set off for Cadiz, and at Xeres found the *president*, *vice-president*, and Cornel, imprisoned by order of the people of Seville. January 26th, the authority of the supreme junta of Seville was disavowed at Cadiz, and a junta of defence elected, and on the 30th the supreme junta assembled to nominate a regency, namely, Castaños, Escano, Savaedra, bishop of Orense, and Lardizabal, a deputy to the Cortes recently arrived from Mexico. 3rd. Cadiz saved from being surprised by the French by the arrival of Albuquerque. 4th. The French appeared at the bridge of Zuazo.'—'I never felt so little hope of Spanish independence as at this moment. It is not the rapid advance of the French into Andalusia that makes me despair, but the manner in which they have been received by the people. Seville, Cordoba, Jaen, Grenada, and Malaga surrendered to them without firing a shot, by the inhabitants, Joseph Buonaparte

* This refers to Mr. Canning's system of diplomacy.

studiously endeavouring to profit from this dispirited state of the people to conciliate them. Three thousand Spaniards, well paid, well clothed, and well fed, *at this moment doing duty at Seville in his service*; while upon this last spot of ground that remains, a government has been established professing indeed to act upon very different principles to the last, but without having yet accomplished one single act that can tend to procure them the confidence of the people; protected by a Spanish force, wretchedly clothed, their pay in arrear to an immense amount, and by no means well fed. We now hear of disciplining an army, but very little has been done towards it since the arrival of the troops in the Sota. Depend upon it *Cadiz must be defended by the English.*'

SECTION II.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

'Cadiz, March 28, 1810.

'The quarrel between the duke of Albuquerque and the junta has ended. The duke is going to England on a special mission, and Whittingham proposes to go with him. Depend upon it they will do their best to get out to South America. But the duke is so weak a man, so hasty, and so much the dupe of others, that I cannot think it prudent to give him any assistance in such views.'

SECTION III.

Mr. C. B. Vaughan to Mr. C. Stuart.

'The pontoon ran upon the French coast with 34 staff-officers, 337 officers, and 348 soldiers, French prisoners of war. The boats were under the *bestly* necessity of firing into her, while the poor devils were attempting to escape, and at last she was set fire to before all the prisoners had been able to get ashore. To me this is a most disgusting event in war; there were also eleven officers' wives on board!'

General Graham to Mr. Stuart.

'May 18, 1810.

'You will hear of the escape of a great number of French officers by the pontoon, they were confined in going adrift in a gale the other night.'—'The Spaniards are very angry, and regret that *this hulk was not set on fire before the prisoners got on shore*. I am afraid our gun-boats fired into her, but I was glad to hear that our officer of artillery at Puntales, who had the care of the upper batteries, (where the only two guns of the fort that could be brought to bear on the hulk were,) refused to fire on the poor devils, *many of them most unjustly confined since the battle of Baylen!*'

Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart.

'June 2, 1810.

'Another pontoon went on shore a few days ago, on the French side of the bay. It was the hospital-ship, and so severe

a fire was kept up on it *by our boats* that few of the prisoners escaped, and many were burnt to death when the hulk took fire. I like not such scenes, but we always continue to get the greatest possible share of odium for the least possible good!

SECTION IV.

Extract from the Correspondence of an Officer of Engineers employed at Cadiz.

‘*May 7, 1810.*

‘We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning works that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute either stores or workmen to the general cause, have kept us so long inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools.’

SECTION V.

‘*Isla, June 1, 1810.*

‘We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence if all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we have only British troops at work on this important position, and our numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs requires.’—‘We have in our respected general (Graham) a confidence which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted to encounter difficulties which less favoured dispositions could not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and kept an enterprising enemy off with very inadequate means, should be rewarded by his country’s good opinion, although none but those who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not security: to animate resistance, though not to promise victory.’

SECTION VI.

‘*June 29, 1810.*

‘I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery-officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this would be lost and carried, by small

parties coming in on the flanks and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose, although we offer to perform the labour for them. On a barren spot they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is not attended to? We have now been here three months, and although they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of.—‘We have now one thousand three hundred labourers of the line and eighty carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with from our ally is so bad that these artificers produce not more than one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials were good. To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself.’—‘Of our seven subalterns of engineers, two are generally ill; we are obliged, therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and with lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army.’

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY
REPORTS FROM THE BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ.

SECTION VII.

General William Stewart, March 13, 1810.

‘The enemy’s force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the Spanish troops.’

General Graham, March 26, 1810.

‘The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, very precarious.’

May, 1810.

‘General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards had been very deficient.’

October, 1810.

‘The progress made by the enemy at Trocadero assumed a very formidable character, while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line.’

January 2, 1811.

‘——— As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry into execution the plan for the entrenchment of the left part of the Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant contests.’

No. XX.

EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH'S CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTION I.

The duke of Santa Fé to the king, Paris, June 20, 1810.

[Translation from the Spanish.]

‘Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have arrived at saying, that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let your majesty consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgment, and that it will soon subside, being void of probability.’

SECTION II.

Ministerial letter from the king to the marquis of Almenara.

[Translation from the Spanish.]

‘September 21, 1810.

‘The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid; the governor, Kellerman, has taken possession of them.’— ‘Those archives, from the time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the treaties of the kings since they were known in Castille; also, ancient manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, and privately to individuals.’

SECTION III.

The Spanish secretary of state to the duke of Santa Fé.

Madrid, September 12, 1812.

‘—— Si l’Andalusie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte de Cadiz existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, et aux trames ourdies* par la junta et l’Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Février, qui établit des gouvernemens militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l’Arragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques gouverneurs Françaises ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie.’

‘—— Mais combien n’est il pas dementi par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent s’obstiner à prolonger l’insurrection d’Espagne plutôt qu’a la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du roi, en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur, mais ce qui est pire, on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia pretassent serment de fidélité et d’obéissance à sa majesté imperiale comme si la nation Espagnole n’avoit pas de roi.’

SECTION IV.

Memorial from the duke of Santa Fé and marquis of Almenara to the prince of Wagram.

[Translation from the Spanish.]

Paris, September 16, 1810.

‘—— The decrees of his majesty the emperor are the same for all the generals. The prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; and this speaks in favour of the Spanish people, for the prince of Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless vexations.’

SECTION V.

Intercepted letter of comte de Casa Valencia, counsellor of state, written to his wife, June 18, 1810.

‘Il y a six mois que l’on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons.’

‘—— Avant hier j’écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le priant de m’accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures dans son antichambre espérant un réponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut qu’il n’avait rien.’

‘—— Rien que la faim m’attend aujourd’hui.’

No. XXI.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON, MSS.

SECTION I.

Celorico, May 11, 1810.

‘——— I observe that the minister don Miguel Forjas considers the inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and the ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have no doubt of the ability or the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. They must be forced to perform their duty, and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his majesty's government, which I have communicated to them, that the continuance of his majesty's assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to

mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head-quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:—1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2ndly, refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3rdly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrate to proceed to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th, desertion from the service either with or without carriages, &c.; 5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:—1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; 2nd, inactivity in the execution of them; 3rd, receiving bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them.'

SECTION II.

Lord Wellington to M. Forjas.

'Gouvea, September 6, 1810.

'MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,—I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am

highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end.

(Signed) 'WELLINGTON.'

SECTION III.

'Gouvea, September 7, 1810.

'—— In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that *I will not stay* in the country, and that I will advise the king's government to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I propose, also, to report to his majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, lying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of the enemy's force in the country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong: they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the central junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the sense-

less suggestions of the Portuguese government. I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the regency.

(Signed) 'WELLINGTON.'

SECTION IV.

'Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810.

'—— You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained his majesty's leave to resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will; and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3rd, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavouring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure.

'WELLINGTON.

'P.S.—All I ask from the Portuguese regency is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number

of battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands.'

SECTION V.

'*Pero Negro, October 28, 1810.*

The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, don M. Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature; first, they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon information that they are absent from their corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bonâ fide* upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but if we are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military

persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the prince regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there was no law for the government of the army than that the existing laws should continue without being executed.—

‘WELLINGTON.’

SECTION VI.

‘October 29, 1810.

‘—— In answer to lord Wellesley’s queries respecting the Portuguese regency, my opinion is that the regency ought to be appointed by the prince regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal not recommended by the regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the regency the better; but my opinion is that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing the principal (which *must* be done), I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the regency or anybody else. If there is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to interfere them-

selves, or that the prince regent should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the regency or anybody else. I should like to see principal Souza's detailed instructions for his 'embuscados' on the left bank of the Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in the wrong direction given to the deliberation of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost, because the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, everything which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. In answer to M. de Forjas' note of the 22nd, enclosed in yours, (without date,) I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c., many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above-mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point.

'WELLINGTON.'

SECTION VII.

'*Pero Negro, October 31, 1810.*

'—— I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of the militia. The *ordenança* artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care of in the same manner as our

own troops. Your note, No. —, of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts, the French could not have stayed here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places from which there existed means of removing everything, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!

‘WELLINGTON.’

SECTION VIII.

‘*Pero Negro, November 1, 1810.*’

‘I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after the appointment of principal Souza to be a member of the regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz., that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present situation long before the order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that I was the author of that measure, and the government

might have sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the secretary of state that the measure should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service; not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks, the inhabitants have fled from their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have left behind them everything that could be useful to the enemy, and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity of the existing Portuguese regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz., the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security, has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus; they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ———, to which I propose to draw the attention of his royal highness the prince regent and of his majesty's government. His royal highness and his majesty's government will

then see in what manner the existing regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures from M. Forjas, show the sense, which the regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal Souza and other members of the regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will show what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and I regret that his royal highness the prince regent should have been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the ordenança would disperse. The truth is that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different descriptions of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable if the government would leave, exclusively, to marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment, which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenança as usual dispersed,

and the government will lose their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus.'

SECTION IX.

'December 5, 1810.

'All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: First,—That by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in the late duc de la Foëns, I hold the command of the army independent of the local government of Portugal. Secondly,—That, by the arrangements made by the governors of the kingdom with the king's government, when sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force. Thirdly,—That, supposing that my appointment of marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly,—It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, undoubtedly, his majesty's government never intended to give over the British army to the government of the kingdom to make ducks and drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

'WELLINGTON.'

SECTION X.

'Cartaxo, January 18, 1811.

'It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the patriarch, in recent discussions at the meeting of the regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, 'which were evidently for no other purpose than

to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom his royal highness the prince regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his eminence the patriarch is one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and, I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the prince regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of his royal highness's armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence of the marquis of Olhao, of don M. Forjas, and of don Joa Antonio Salzar de Mendoza, and marshal sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his eminence the patriarch, and they called upon his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty has answered the call, or enumerate

the services rendered to this nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on 'the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' The patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions which have principally involved his country in the contest when he talks of discontinuing it, because it has again, for the third time, been brought into 'the heart of the kingdom.' Although the patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war, which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's position in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have been alleviated, and I observe that it is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object the deliverance of the whole. The patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure, all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be able to

carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds of the British army. It may likewise occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in any manner. By desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds, to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the regency, and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the prince regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the independence of his country.

‘WELLINGTON.’

END OF VOL. II.

