alert 2004

Report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building

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Summary

«Alert 2004: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building» is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the School of Peace Culture at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. 36 indicators have been used in the preparation of this report, divided into 9 large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, militarisation and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development, and conduct in relation to the international community. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout this year, based on these indicators, helps to provide a greater knowledge of the advances, reverses and dynamics of various kinds that affect the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others. Comparing this data with the information gathered during the previous year means that the report can act as a preventive warning of certain general tendencies or a particular situation in individual countries, something that may be useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfers, as well as for the development of policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

Sumario

«Alerta 2004: informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz» es un estudio que anualmente realiza la Unidad de Alerta de la *Escola de Cultura de Pau* de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, y que sintetiza el estado del mundo al finalizar el año a partir del análisis de varios indicadores. Para hacer el informe se han utilizado 36 indicadores, agrupados en 9 grandes apartados, a saber: conflictos armados, situaciones de tensión y disputas de alto riesgo, rehabilitación posbélica (acompañamiento internacional), crisis humanitarias, militarización y desarme, derechos humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, desarrollo, y comportamiento ante la sociedad internacional. La descripción y el análisis de lo que ha ocurrido en el mundo a lo largo del año a través de estos indicadores, puede ayudarnos a conocer mejor los avances, los retrocesos y las dinámicas de diversa índole que afectan al conjunto de la humanidad. La mayoría de estos indicadores, una vez entrecruzados, pueden ayudarnos también a comprender las influencias de unos factores sobre otros. La comparación de estos datos con los del año anterior da al informe un carácter de alerta preventiva sobre algunas tendencias generales o sobre la situación de determinados países, lo que puede resultar útil, entre otras cosas, para el rediseño de las políticas exteriores, de cooperación al desarrollo y de transferencias de armas, así como para elaborar políticas de prevención de conflictos armados y que permitan consolidar procesos de paz y de rehabilitación posbélica en el mundo.

Sumari

«Alerta 2004: informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz» és un estudi que anualment realitza la Unitat d'Alerta de l'Escola de Cultura de Pau de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, i que sintetitza l'estat del món al finalitzar l'any a partir de l'anàlisi de diversos indicadors. Per a fer l'informe s'han utilitzat 36 indicadors, agrupats en 9 grans apartats, a saber: conflictes armats, situacions de tensió i disputes d'alt risc, rehabilitació postbèl.lica (acompanyament internacional), crisis humanitàries, militarització i desarmament, drets humans i Dret Internacional Humanitari, desenvolupament, i comportament davant la societat internacional. La descripció i l'anàlisi del que ha ocorregut en el món al llarg de l'any a través d'aquests indicadors, pot ajudar-nos a conèixer millor els avanços, els retrocessos i les dinàmiques de diversa índole que afecten al conjunt de la humanitat. La majoria d'aquests indicadors, una vegada entrecreuats, poden ajudar-nos també a comprendre les influències d'uns factors sobre uns altres. La comparació d'aquestes dades amb les de l'any anterior dóna a l'informe un caràcter d'alerta preventiva sobre algunes tendències generals o sobre la situació de determinats països, la qual cosa pot resultar útil, entre d'altres, per a redissenyar polítiques exteriors, de cooperació al desenvolupament i de transferències d'armes, així com per a elaborar polítiques en termes de prevenció de conflictes armats i que permetin consolidar processos de pau i de rehabilitació postbèl·lica arreu del món.

Sommaire

«Alerta 2004: informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz» («Alerte 2004: rapport sur les conflits, les droits de l'homme et la construction de la paix») est une recherche effectuée annuellement par le Programme de l'Unité d'Alerte de l'École de Culture de la Paix de l'Université Autonome de Barcelone qui synthétise l'état du monde durant la dernière année à partir de l'analyse de plusieurs indicateurs. Concrètement, 36 indicateurs, regroupés en 9 grands chapitres, ont été utilisés pour réaliser ce rapport, à savoir, les conflits armés, les situations de tension et les disputes de haut-risque, la reconstruction d'après-querre (accompagnement international), les processus de paix, les crises humanitaires, la militarisation et le désarmement, les droits de l'homme et le Droit International Humanitaire, le développement, et le comportement des pays face à la communauté internationale. Grâce à ces indicateurs, la description et l'analyse des évènements qui se sont produits dans le monde tout au long de l'année peuvent nous aider à mieux connaître les progressions, les reculs et toute autre tendance touchant l'ensemble de l'humanité. La plupart de ces indicateurs, une fois entrecoupés, peuvent aussi nous aider à comprendre les influences de certains facteurs sur les autres. La comparaison de ces données avec celles de l'année précédente renforce le caractère d'alerte préventive sur certaines tendances générales ou sur la situation de certains pays. Cet instrument peut donc être utile, entre autres, à la redéfinition des politiques extérieures, de coopération au développement et de transfert d'armes, ainsi qu'à l'élaboration de politiques de prévention des conflits armés qui assurent la consolidation de processus de paix et de reconstruction de l'après-guerre dans le monde.

ACP: Africa, Caribbean, Pacific **AIG:** Armed Islamic Group

AIG: Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA)

AMIB: African Mission in Burundi **APHC:** All Parties Hurriyat Conference

AU: African Union

AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-

Defence Forces of Colombia)

BICC: Bonn International Conversion Centre

BONUCA: United Nations Peace-building Office in the

Central African Republic

BRA: Bougainville Revolutionary Army

CAEMC: Central African Economic and Monetary

Community

CAP: United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal

Process

CAR: Central African Republic

CASA: Coordinating Action on Small Arms

CFA: Ceasefire Agreement

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CIS: Community of Independent States
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
CPI: Corruption Perception Index
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal

DAC: Development Assistance Committee

ECHO: European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States

Monitoring Group

ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council **ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States

EEBC: Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission **EFTA:** European Free Trade Association

ELN: *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation

ESCR: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights **ESDP:** European Security and Defense Policy

EU: European Union

EZLN: Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional

FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation **FARC:** Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia)

FATF: Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering **FDD:** Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)

FIFA: Fédération Internationale de Football Association **FKM**: Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Maluku Sovereignty Front)

FLEC-FAC: Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda - Forças Armadas de Cabinda (Cabinda Enclave Liberation

Front - Cabinda Armed Forces)

FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation Force)

GAFI: Financial Action Group

GAM: Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Movement for Free Aceh)

GDI: Gender-Related Development Index

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat

(Salafist Group of Call and Combat) **HDI:** Human Development Index **HIPC:** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

HIV-AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus - Acquired

Immunodeficiency Syndrome

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

ICC: International Criminal Court ICD: Inter-Congolese Dialogue

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross and the

Red Crescent

IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons

IEMF: Interim Emergency Multinational Force **IGAD:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IHL: International Humanitarian Law

IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies

ILO: International Labour Organization **IMF:** International Monetary Fund

IOM: International Organisation for Migration **IRIN:** United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network

IRIS: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques

(International and Strategic Relations Institute)
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
KANU: Kenya African National Union

KFOR: Kosovo Force

LDC: Least Developed Countries **LRA:** Lord's Resistance Army

LTTE: Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam (Tigers for the Liberation

of the Sacred Land of the Tamils)

LURD: Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change **MDG**: Millennium Development Goals

MDJT: Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad)

MERCOSUR: Mercado Común del Sur

MFDC: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)

MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MINUCI: United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire **MINUGUA:** United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala

MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MJP: *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (Peace and Justice Movement)

MLC: Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Congo Liberation Movement)

MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia **MONUC:** United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MPCI: Mouvement Patriotique de Ivory Coast (Ivory Coast

Patriotic Movement)

MSF: Mediciens Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation **NCCT:** Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories

NDC: National Democratic Congress

NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland

NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for African Development

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation **NLA:** National Liberation Army

NLD: National Ligue for the Democracy **NLFT:** National Liberation Front of Tripura

NPA: New People's Army **NPP:** New Patriotic Party

NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council

NSCN (IM): National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak -

Muivah

OAS: Organisation of American States

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs

ODA: Official Development Aid

OECD: Organisation for Economic Trade and Development **OHR:** Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and

Herzegovina

OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference

OPM: *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement) **OSCE:** Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe **PAC:** *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil* (Civil Defence Patrols)

PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PIOOM: Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations

PNA: Palestinian National Authority

POLISARIO: Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía El

Hamrà y Río del Oro (Front for the Liberation of

Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) **PRIO:** Peace Research Institute, Oslo

RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands **RCD-Goma:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*

- Goma (Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma)

RCD-ML: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération (Congolese Rally for

Democracy - Movement of Liberation)

RCD-N: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National (Congolese Rally for Democracy - National)

RRI: Reproductive Risk Index

RSM: Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas)

RUF: Revolutionary United Front

SADC: South African Development Community

SFOR: Stabilisation Force

SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLMA: Sudan's Liberation Movement/Army SPLA: Sudanese People's Liberation Army TNG: Transitional National Government UAB: *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam

UN: United Nations

UNAIDS: United Nations HIV-AIDS Programme

UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone **UNCTAD:** United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development

UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force **UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme **UNESCO:** United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus **UNHCHR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees **UNHRC:** United Nations Human Rights Commission

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNIFEM: United Nations Development Found for Women UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission UNITA: União para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

UNMA: United Nations Mission in Angola

UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea **UNMIBH:** United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina **UNMIK:** United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMISET: United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor **UNMOGIP:** United Nations Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan

UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka **UNMOVIC:** United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNOGBIS: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

UNOB: United Nations Office in Burundi

UNOL: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia

UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia **UNPOB:** United Nations Political Office in Bougainville **UNPOS:** United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace Building Mission **UNRWA:** United Nations Relief and Works Agency for

Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSCO: United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories

UNTOP: United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building **UNTSO:** United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

US\$: US dollars

USA: United States of America

WB: World Bank

WFP: World Food Programme **WHO:** World Health Organisation **WTO:** World Trade Organisation

ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic


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ZFM: Zimbabwe Freedom Movement

Introduction

«Alert 2004: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building» is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the School of Peace Culture at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. The Alert Unit also publishes a weekly newsletter, *Semáforo* containing information on the current international situation. This information is compiled in turn in the quarterly publication *Barometer*.¹

36 indicators have been used in the preparation of this «Alert 2004» report, divided into 9 large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high-risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, militarization and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and conduct in relation to the international community. A summary and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout the year, using these indicators as a base, helps to provide greater insight into the many different advances, reverses and dynamics affecting the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others, as may be seen in Figure 1. Comparing this data with the information gathered during previous years means that the report can act as a preventive warning of certain general trends or particular situations in individual countries, something which is undoubtedly useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfers, as well as for the development of policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.



^{1.} Both the weekly newsletter *Semáforo*, and the quarterly publication *Barometer*, can be consulted at the following web site: http://www.pangea.org/unescopau

As regards **armed conflicts**, a total of 23 were active at the end of 2003, three fewer than at the end of the previous year. Special mention should be made of the fact that the conflicts in the Central African Republic, Congo, Senegal (Casamance) and the Moluccan Islands (Indonesia) have all ended, though on a more negative note the conflicts in Indonesia (Aceh), Nepal, Iraq, Sudan (Darfur) and Uganda have worsened considerably, aggravated further by the fact that the first two tried unsuccessfully to arrive at a peace process during the first six months of the year. Almost half of these armed conflicts are taking place in Africa, and the majority of them have been seen to have a strong regional impact and a significant capacity to destabilise neighbouring countries. Unfortunately, the attention of the press has been concentrated on the conflict in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Of the 23 conflicts mentioned, only 5 have seen any improvement in comparison with the previous year, while the situation has clearly worsened in at least 10 of them.

During 2003 there were **situations of tension and high-risk disputes** in 52 regions, as compared with 42 the year before. There were 18 cases in Africa, 13 in Asia, 10 in Europe and Central Asia, 9 in Latin America and 2 in the Middle East. The most common reasons for these situations of tension were democratic fragility (institutional and political instability), demands for autonomy and independence, problems of governance, political exclusion, economic inequality, territorial disputes, religious differences and struggles for political power.

Turning to **peace processes**, this year has been particularly intense, ending with 20 on-going processes (an increase of four on the previous year), of which 13 relate to armed conflicts and seven to conflicts which, while not in an armed phase, remain unresolved. In any case, significant grounds for optimism are offered by the fact that formal negotiations seeking resolution are now underway in more than half of all armed conflicts. Although negotiations were completely interrupted this year in Indonesia (Aceh) and Nepal, special mention should be made of the new peace processes in Colombia (with the AUC), Congo, India-Pakistan, the Philippines (with the MILF) and Sudan (with the SLMA). The negotiations with the SPLA in Sudan continue to make good progress, while there are more difficulties in Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Somalia and Sri Lanka. In Côte d'Ivoire and Israel-Palestine, the difficulties were rather more obvious. This chapter includes a table summarising the most frequent crisis or deterioration factors affecting current peace negotiations, i.e. problems with the bodies or people acting as mediators, the inability to overcome a lack of trust between the parties involved, problems of security during negotiations, ceasefire violations, disagreements over the format of the negotiating process, differences on the agenda to be discussed and disputes over the status that Government Armed Forces should enjoy.

This report also analyses 19 countries currently in a phase of **post-war rehabilitation**. A little over half of them are in Africa. An analysis of all the indicators confirms the fragility of these contexts, as in only a few cases (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Bougainville and Timor-Leste) are there any indicators showing favourable trends. In all, 13% of the indicators point to a good situation, while 82% give an average score and the remaining 38% a bad one. The most difficult factors are humanitarian issues and the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees, issues of security and demilitarisation and the human rights situation, given that there are problems in combating impunity and achieving reconciliation. However, more progress can be seen in the process relating to the physical reconstruction of infrastructure elements destroyed during the years of conflict. It has also been observed that processes work better when inter-regional links are taken into account, in such a way that aid is managed with a view to regional rapprochement. Multi-lateral efforts also gave better results than when involvement was dependent on just one country, particularly when the country in question was the USA (the case in Iraq and Afghanistan).

The 37 **humanitarian crises** in 2003 also represented an increase over the previous year (33). 38 countries suffered food emergencies (39 in 2002), with particular emphasis on Africa. 50 countries were affected by internal displacement (48 during the previous year) and 59 were affected by the movement of refugees (57 in 2002). In general, the worst affected regions were West Africa, Sudan (Darfur) and Zimbabwe. This section reports that the amount being spent by donor countries is not only insufficient, it is politicised, since donors allocate more money to the areas in which they have political and/or economic interests. 64% of the money collected to confront these crises has gone to Iraq, which has received more than double the amount collected for the 16 African crises.

In the section on **militarisation and disarmament**, particular mention should be made of the existence of arms embargoes on 19 countries or armed groups (20 during the previous year) and the lifting of sanctions on Libya. A total of 17 countries showed very high militarisation indices, with military spending in excess of 6% of GDP (18 countries in 2002). Russia has become the largest world exporter of major conventional weapons, overtaking the USA, and four countries (Eritrea, Jordan, Pakistan and Yemen) have purchased significant amounts of armaments, to a value in excess of 1% of their respective GDPs. Furthermore, the number of soldiers as a percentage of total population exceeded 1.5% in 16 countries. As regards the issue of security policy, debate this year has once again been marked by confrontations between those who maintain a unilateralist stance, with pre-emptive offensive doctrines (such as the USA and the UK), and those countries that have defended multilateralist policies based on conflict prevention and the decisions of the Security Council. 2003 was also notable for the decision of the United Nations to give priority to nuclear disarmament and the control of light weapons, NATO's experience in taking command of an operation outside Europe for the first time (commanding 5,000 peace-keeping troops in Kabul), and the EU's assumption, also for the first time, of the peace-keeping mandate in Macedonia and DR Congo.

As regards the **human rights** situation in the world, this was once again marked by the international agenda imposed following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The different anti-terrorist laws, practices and policies implemented in many countries involve a severe violation not only of civil and political rights but also of social, economic and cultural rights. The trends seen during the previous year are still apparent, such as the infringement of fundamental freedoms, an increase in the use of torture, a deterioration in living conditions at detention centres, a lack of procedural guarantees and a hardening of policies relating to the grant of refugee and asylum-seeker status. There has also been greater harassment and persecution of the media, ethnic minorities and supporters of human rights. In particular, the report indicates 71 countries that are abusing the right to life and security, 89 that have committed serious infringements of fundamental freedoms and 43 that combine serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The death penalty has been applied in 31 countries, resulting in 1,526 executions, 1,060 of which occurred in China, the country which in 2008 is due to organise the Olympic Games. Also worthy of mention is the situation of conflict or tension in 71 countries, which has resulted in more than 100 people from these countries seeking asylum in others.

The section dealing with **development** mentions 22 countries in which military spending exceeds the amounts spent on health and education. The World Bank has indicated another 23 countries with poor governance. The report emphasises that 21 countries now have a Human Development Index that is lower than it was a decade ago, either because they are involved in a war, or because they suffer from poor governance or corruption, among other reasons. There are also 50 countries that show high levels of inequality in terms of earnings, and another seven in which this level is exceptionally high, to the extent that, as the UNDP pointed out, the richest 1% of the world's population receive the same as the poorest 57%, in a process in which wealth is gradually being concentrated. At the same time, 12 countries have foreign debts in excess of their respective GDPs (29 in 2002), while 61 pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA, which in some countries has led to the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources in order to service this debt. The report also indicates the negative trends in respect of access to water, given that while this currently affects 40% of the world's population, it is estimated that this figure may rise to 75% by 2050. 2.2 million people already die every year due to the lack of clean drinking water. Finally, mention should be made of the breakdown of the WTO's 5th Ministerial Conference in Cancun, an event which led to a serious questioning of the organisation itself, the denunciation of the arguments of the neo-liberal model, the strengthening of the G-22 and the popularisation of issues as important as access to essential medicines, a subject that has seen considerable advances during the course of the year.

As regards the section on **conduct in relation to the international society**, it should be pointed out that the USA and Somalia are the only countries that have ratified only one of the seven international legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration, 36 countries have failed to ratify at least half of the six main UN legal instruments on human rights, 39 states or territories are still considered to be tax havens, and 50 countries have not ratified any of the three main non-proliferation treaties. Finally, and paradoxical though it may seem, it was once again the USA (11 times) and Israel (six times) that most frequently voted against the 13 resolutions on disarmament presented at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The cross-referencing between the indicators used in this report allows us to confirm, for example, the fragility of the processes of post-war rehabilitation, given that in 75% of the countries undergoing this process there have been food emergencies and requests for asylum, while 66% still have large numbers of displaced people. 55% of the countries with poor governance and two out of every three countries that are not cooperating with the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering have seen serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. On a positive note, peace negotiations are proceeding in 65% of armed conflicts. Another significant point is that 63% of the countries in which the situation has given rise to displacements of people during the year are countries that are suffering tensions or high-risk disputes without yet having gone to war. The data also point to the fact that the death penalty is applied in the majority of countries that have spent large amounts on buying arms from abroad (though this has not been an obstacle to authorisations for arms sale), while 55% of the countries that have merited reports or condemnatory statements from the UN Commission on Human Rights have also been cited by the World Bank as suffering from poor governance. Almost half of the countries that have seen their Human Development Index fall during the last decade show gender inequalities, while half of the countries that have not signed the non-proliferation treaties have also failed to ratify the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).

In a year that was so marked in the mass media by the war in Iraq, the data presented in this «Alert 2004!» report show that global security will not be achieved by intensifying interventionist military policies and spreading feelings of hatred and suspicion, but instead by concentrating the policies of individual states and the strategies of both regional and international bodies on the structural resolution of the points set out here in the form of indicators, achieving a broad consensus that will divert the many tendencies that are currently marginalising, impoverishing and destroying. For the School of Peace Culture, this commitment to advance towards proper compliance with standards that are within universal reach, to return to the principles of demilitarisation and the creation of trust, to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights, to reduce gender inequalities, to fight against corruption and social injustice, to achieve sustainable growth and firmly support the diplomacy of peace, these are the paths that could really offer the capacity to deactivate the destructive forces and dynamics of confrontation, imbalance and inequality that exist in our world, as clearly shown in this report.

Table 1. Connections between indicators

1 2 1 Armed conflicts X 10 1 2 Tension 10 X 1 3 Peace processes 13 11 X 4 Post-war rehabilitat 5 7 7 5 Food emergency 10 17 1 6 CAP 9 12 7 7 Refugees 6 8 8 8 IDP 11 19 1 9 UN arms embarg 4 3 3 10 Other embargoes 3 3 6 11 Military spending 3 6 1 12 Weapons imports 1 3 13 Soldiers 1 2 14 BIC3D 4 4	Sesses blooms and sesses are settled and sesses are settle and sesses and ses	5	6 CAP	Refugees		So.	ner Embargoes	Military :	Weapons	Soldiers	BIC3D	15 HR - AI/HRW	16 HR - EU	17 HR - UNCHR	Death penalty	Asylum	Protocol II	Child soldiers	Mllenium Goals	and LDC	i coefficient		A	MS-educ/health	Governance	Foreign debt	Milenium Declaration	HR instruments	Tax havens	Money- laundering	Non-proliferation	
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15 HR - AI/HRW 19 25 1	4 2	6	6	3	7	2	2	3	1	1	Χ	6	3	3	3	7	6	6	3	4	2	8	3	6	3	1	-	2	1	1	1	18
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16 HR - EU 8 8	8 2	6	5	2	5	3	4	4	1	1	3	18	Χ	9	10	9	10	7	3	3	-	5	2	5	8	2	3	3	-	2	4	18
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19 Asylum 10 15 1	13 9	17	12	10	16	6	7	7	2	-	7	20	9	10	8	Χ	14	15	12	7	1	11	5	12	13	5	3	2	1	1	4	29
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21 Child soldiers 14 15 1	11 7	11	9	9	11	4	3	3	2	-	6	17	7	8	4	15	12	Χ	7	3	1	7	3	8	10	4	2	4	1	3	4	21
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26 ODA 3 10	2 1	12	6	3	4	-	-	2	-	-	3	6	2	3	2	5	2	3	8	4	2	8	Χ	3	6	1	-	-	-	-	2	18
27 MS - educ/health 1 11	5 4	5	6	4	7	1	2	8	4	4	6	11	5	4	7	12	7	8	4	1	1	6	3	Χ	3	2	3	6	1	1	3	22
28 Governance 9 19 1	10 7	17	11	9	15	6	6	5	1	1	3	18	8	11	10	13	12	10	14	9	2	12	6	3	Χ	4	3	2	1	3	7	33
29 Foreign debt 3 5	3 4	6	5	5	4	2	3	1	-	-	1	3	2	4	1	5	2	4	5	2	1	5	1	2	4	Χ	-	2	1	-	1	12
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Example for reading the table: 9 out of 12 cases in post-war rehabilitation stage are facing food emergency.

Cross-referencing and comparing a selection of the indicators used in this report shows the close connection and interdependence between them, while also offering an insight into the individual characteristics of each context. Thus, for example, the situations referred to as displaying high levels of tension are characterised by the fact that they are frequently very poor countries (41% are LDCs) with high levels of military spending (45% of cases) which in turn exceeds spending on health or education (55%). They are frequently the subject of negative reports from the EU regarding human rights (79%), suffering from food emergencies (52%) and giving rise to the movement of refugees (62%) or displaced people (62%). Contrary to what is generally thought, these situations of tension which have not yet reached the stage of armed conflict also represent almost half of the situations classified as humanitarian crises. They are also the areas where it is most necessary to implement preventive policies at a diplomatic, political and economic level, and where humanitarian action ought to open up the possibility of correcting some of the standards indicated.

As one would expect, the contexts indicated as situations of armed conflict are the ones with the worst human rights situation (90% of cases). Some 90% of these conflicts lead to internal displacements, and in more than half of cases people have to seek refuge or asylum in another country. It is also significant that half of these countries suffer from poor governance, while the use of child soldiers is recorded in 62% of cases.

The indicators relating to countries in a phase of post-war rehabilitation are also very powerful, to the extent that they demonstrate the extreme fragility of many of these processes and the existence of highly negative dynamics in the countries belonging to this group. Thus, for example, 55% of the cases analysed still show very high military spending (in half of them military spending continued to exceed spending on education or health), 64% show serious human rights violations, 45% have foreign debt levels in excess of GDP, 64% are experiencing food emergencies and all of them continue to have a refugee population. What is most significant is that 64% of these countries are also classified as situations of raised tension, a fact that shows that many of the basic reasons which originally gave rise to armed conflict have not been resolved, thus underlining the affirmation that the mere fact that a country enters a post-war phase does not automatically mean it will eventually achieve peace. The information set out here indicates a need to pay more attention to these post-war contexts, not only as regards development aid but also, and particularly, in the field of political and social reconstruction.

As we indicated at the beginning of this report, a deeper knowledge of the contexts indicated here would allow us to improve our policies aimed at the prevention of violent conflict, as well as our strategies for development cooperation. In this regard, both the European Union and its individual member states have a broad capacity to make it possible for promises made in one particular field (humanitarian aid, for example) to be linked to strategies aimed at improving the human rights situation, governance, disarmament or post-war rehabilitation. Thus, for example, 59% of the countries to which the EU gave humanitarian aid during 2002 through the offices of ECHO show serious deficiencies in the areas of human rights and governance. This European aid has also been directed towards 21 countries which, according to Alert 2004, show significant levels of militarisation, meaning that this aid may indirectly be perpetuating situations of injustice and internal inequality as a result of the military priorities shown by these governments when it comes to allocating resources. In short, as a final conclusion to this report, the data we have compiled points to the need for both individual States and regional or international non-governmental organisations with the capacity for foreign action to increase the coherence of their policies by making a cross-referenced reading of the contexts in which they operate and to attempt to make certain of their targets compatible with one another (especially as regards improving governance and the human rights situation), thus increasing their preventive actions in areas of crisis and strengthening their presence in situations of post-war rehabilitation.

For the School of Peace Culture, these undertakings to advance towards real compliance with universally attainable norms, to return to the principles of demilitarisation and create trust-building measures, to strengthen the human rights system, to combat corruption, nepotism and injustice, to achieve sustainable development and to support the diplomacy of peace with conviction, these are the values that could have a very real capacity to dismantle the destructive inertia and confrontational dynamics that currently exist in the world, as clearly shown in this report.

Chart 2. List of indicators

A. CONFLICT

1. Countries engaged in armed conflict

B. SITUATIONS OF TENSION AND HIGH-RISK DISPUTES

2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

C. PEACE PROCESSES

3. Countries engaging in peace processes or formal negotiations or in exploratory phase

D. POST-WAR REHABILITATION (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT)

4. Countries which receive international aid in terms of post-war rehabilitation

E. HUMANITARIAN CRISES

- 5. Countries facing food emergencies
- 6. Countries included in the UN's Interagency Consolidated Appeal 2004
- 7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is a refugee
- 8. Countries in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is internally displaced people

F. MILITARISATION AND DISARMAMENT

- 9. Countries with arms embargoes from the United Nations Security Council
- 10. Countries with arms embargoes from regional bodies (EU and OSCE)
- 11. Countries with military spending in excess of 4% of GDP
- 12. Countries with imports of heavy conventional weapons exceeding 0.5% of GDP
- 13. Countries where the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population
- 14 Militarised countries according to the BIC3D Index

G. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

- 15. Countries with serious and systematic violations of human rights according to non-governmental sources
- 16. Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to the EU
- 17 Countries with serious violations of human rights according to the reports and resolutions of the UNHCHR
- 18. Countries that apply or maintain the death penalty
- 19. Countries of origin of people who have obtained asylum
- 20. Countries that have not ratified the 2nd Protocol of 1977 on armed conflicts between states in relation to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
- 21 Countries that recruit both boys and girls for their armies and have not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict

H. DEVELOPMENT

- 22. Maximum and high priority countries in the meeting of the Millenium Development Goals, according to the UNDP
- 23. Countries with a high Human Development Index (HDI) lower than it was in 1990 and Countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (LDC)
- 24. Countries with high levels of inequality in internal income on the basis of the Gini coefficient
- 25. Countries with great gender inequalities, on the basis of the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)
- 26.Countries whose amounts received in official development aid (ODA) exceed the 25% of the public spending
- 27. Countries that spend less on public health and/or education than on military spending
- 28. Countries with poor governance according to the World Bank
- 29. Countries with a total amount of foreign debt in excess of their GNP, countries whose foreign debt repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

I. CONDUCT IN RELATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

I.1. Conduct in relation to the Millennium Declaration

30. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration

I.2. Conduct in relation to the protection of human rights

31. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments on human rights

I.3. Conduct in terms of financial transparency

- 32. Countries acting as tax havens
- 33. Countries which do not cooperate with the Financial Action Group (GAFI) on money-laundering

I.4. Conduct in terms of military security

- 34. Countries which have not signed the non-proliferation agreements
- 35. Countries which have not given information to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons
- 36. Countries which have not given information to the UN Instrument to Report Military Expenditures


Section by section analysis

A. Armed conflicts

This section contains an analysis of the armed conflicts that arose or continued during 2003 (indicator no. 1). The definition and typology of the armed conflicts currently in course and their evolution throughout the year is discussed below, with special emphasis on the status of each conflict at the end of the year.

A1. Armed conflicts: definition and typology

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving groups of various kinds, such as regular or irregular military forces, guerrillas, armed opposition groups, paramilitary groups or ethnic or religious communities which, using arms and other destructive methods, claims more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths is just an indicator and should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country. Figure 1 shows the sequence usually followed by armed conflicts, as summarised by the first four paragraphs of the report.



The armed conflicts currently in course are characterised by the fact that most of them are internal, happening within a particular individual state. Very few are actually being fought between different states. However, the majority of these armed conflicts involve a significant regional or international dimension and influence, due among other things to the flows of refugees that they provoke, the arms trading that results, the financial interests (such as the illegal exploitation of resources) or political interests that neighbouring countries have in the conflict, or the fact that armed opposition groups seek refuge or establish bases in neighbouring countries.

In the majority of these armed conflicts, the opposing parties tend to be, on the one side, the country's Government or its Armed Forces, and on the other, one or more armed opposition groups. However, there

are other cases in which confrontations may arise between clans, various armed opposition groups or ethnic or religious communities. Although conventional weapons are the most commonly used in the majority of conflicts, particularly small arms (which cause 90% of the deaths in conflicts, the victims being mainly women and children), other weapons are used on many occasions, such as suicide attacks, terrorism and sexual violence. In this regard, the preparation of this report took account of attacks which, while not carried out using conventional weapons, involved the deaths of a number of people as part of a deliberate and systematic strategy of destruction.

The most common **causes** of the main armed conflicts can be arranged into the three following groups: 1) relating to **political power** (where difficulties are observed in the handover of power, the fragility of the democratic system and, in short, the struggle for political power); 2) relating to the dual issues of **autonomy and independence**, which involve the existence of minority groups (or in some cases, majority groups) with

The causes of armed conflicts are related to political power, dual issues such as autonomy and independence as well as territory and population.

claims on and aspirations towards political power based on individual affirmations that have not been satisfied; and 3) relating to **land and population** (inter-community confrontations, fights for the control of natural resources, conflicts resulting from regional marginalisation or the demographic colonialisation of one community by another). It should be said, however, that these causes do not arise in isolation in the majority of cases but are instead inter-related.

At the end of 2003 there were 23 armed conflicts around the world.

Table A1. Armed conflicts in 2003* USA/UK-Iraq Afghanistan Russia (Chechnya) Indonesia (Irian Jaya) The Philippines (Abu Sayyaf) Algeria Indonesia (Moluccas) Senegal (Casamance) Burundi The Philippines (MILF) Israel-Palestine Somalia Colombia (FARC and ELN) The Philippines (NPA) Liberia Sudan (Darfur) India (Assam) Nepal Sudan (SPLA) DR Congo (Kivus and Ituri) India (Jammu and Kashmir) Nigeria (Niger Delta) Uganda Côte d'Ivoire Indonesia (Aceh) Central African Republic

It is worth underlining that during the course of the year the conflicts in the Central African Republic, Congo, Senegal and the Moluccan Islands (Indonesia) have all ended. The cessation of hostilities which began in Sri Lanka in 2002 remains in place. There have also been positive developments in DR Congo and Sudan (in relation to the armed conflict between the Government and the SPLA armed opposition group, though not in respect of the situation in Darfur). However, tensions in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) have increased, and this is now classified as an armed conflict. The cessation of hostilities has broken down in Indo-

The conflicts that have deteriorated the most during 2003 are Indonesia (Aceh), Nepal, Sudan (Darfur) and Uganda. nesia (Aceh) and Nepal, and fighting has recommenced. The processes in both Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire are also still fragile, and the possibility of setbacks has not been discounted due to the tension and sporadic outbreaks of fighting occurring in both countries. The conflicts that have deteriorated the most during 2003 are Indonesia (Aceh), Nepal, Sudan (Darfur) and Uganda.

^{*}The conflicts shown in italics ceased to be classified as armed conflicts during 2003.

A2. Evolution of armed conflicts

Africa

All most half of all the current armed conflicts occurred on the continent of Africa. It was observed that the majority of these conflicts included a significant regional dimension. In this connection, the year saw a continuation of the trend towards greater involvement by certain African countries (South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, among others) in order to resolve the conflicts blighting the continent, along with greater participation by organisations such as the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and CEMAC.

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)	Armed participants	Main causes	Evolution during the 4th quarter of 2003	Situation compared with January 2003
Algelia (1992-)	Government, GIA, GSPC	Political and economic control (natural resources) by the army against the Islamic opposition, religious and ethnic confrontation	Stalemate in hostilities	No change
Burundi (1993-)	GNT, FDD, FNL	Political control by an ethnic minority and difficulties in the handover of power	Reduction in hostilities	Better
Central African Republic (2002-2003)	Government mercenaries led by General F. Bozizé	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power	Reduction in tensions	End of conflict
Congo (1998-2003)	Government, Ninjas	Political control by different ethnic groups and democratic fragility	Stalemate in tensions	Worse
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Government, MPCI, MJP, MPIGO	Marginalisation of certain regions, democratic fragility, political exclusion religious confrontations	Reduction in hostilities	Better
RD Congo (1998-)	Government, RCD-Goma, RCD-K-ML, MLC, Mayi-Mayi militias, RCD-N	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power and control of natural resources	Reduction in hostilities	Better
Liberia (1989-)	Government, LURD, MODEL	Control over natural resources, ethnic confrontations and struggle for political power	Stalemate in conflict	Better
Nigeria (Niger Delta) (2003-)	Government, militias from the Ijaw, Itsereki and Urhobo communities	Control of political power and natural resources, social and political exclusion	Reduction in hostilities	Worse
Senegal (Casamance) (1982 - 2003)	Government, MFDC	Autonomy v. independence	No hostilities	End of conflict
Somalia (1988-)	Various	Absence of practical democracy, struggle for regional political power, confederation v. federation	Increase in hostilities	No change
Sudan (1983-)	Government, SPLA	Autonomy v. independence, religious differences	Temporary suspension of hostilities	Better
Sudán (Darfur) (2003-)	Government, pro- Government militias, SLMA, JEM SLMA, JEM	Regional and political marginalisation	Increase in hostilities	Worse
Uganda (1986-)	Government, LRA	Religious messianism and regional marginalisation	Increase in hostilities	Worse

a) West Africa

In West Africa, special mention should be made of the positive progress of events in the Senegalese region of **Casamance**. This conflict, which began in 1982, has resulted in more than 1,200 deaths and thousands of people have been displaced. In October, the MFDC armed opposition group announced the end of its armed conflict with the Government. In spite of this, some MFDC factions did not agree with the decision, which has raised doubts about the possibility of opening up negotiations aimed at finding a lasting peace.

A peace agreement was reached in **Liberia** in August, aimed at putting an end to 14 years of conflict, and this has opened the way to a fragile improvement of the situation. The increasing confrontations between the armed forces led by C. Taylor and the LURD and MODEL armed opposition groups (the latter created in 2003), along with both regional and international pressures, forced Taylor to resign prior to the signing of a peace agreement. These confrontations resulted in thousands of victims, mainly among the civilian population, and serious human rights violations were committed during this period. Sporadic outbreaks of fighting persisted in certain parts of the country during the last few months of the year, while the difficult process of forming a transitional government progressed with continuing distrust among the parties involved. Attempts were made to begin the process for disarming and demobilising some 40,000 combatants, while the deployment of the UNMIL peace-keeping mission throughout the country will be completed at the end of February 2004.

In the same region, mention should be made of the situation in **Côte d'Ivoire**, which could see a reverse in the fragile peace process intended to put an end to the armed conflict that began in 2002. In spite of the formation of a transitional government, as established in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreements reached in January, the failure to implement important aspects of the agreements has generated a climate of tension which, combined with the arguments relating to the appointment of several ministers, caused a temporary walk-out by representatives of the armed groups forming part of the transitional Government and the threat of a return to hostilities. The process for the demobilisation and disarmament of the armed groups began towards the end of the year. The ceasefire established in May and supervised by French forces and the ECO-WAS peace-keeping mission was violated on several occasions. There was also a proliferation of violent demonstrations by supporters of the Government of L. Gbagbo, while the persecution and expulsion of immigrants in the west of the country continued as a result of inter-community tensions.

In the Niger Delta region in **Nigeria**, the Ijaw and Itsereki communities have maintained a long struggle for political and economic control of the region, along with a fight against the transnational oil companies, a circumstance that has seriously affected the country's oil production, given the fact that the Ijaw community is demanding an increased share in oil revenues. The confrontations between the two communities, which began in 2002, saw an increase in 2003 that resulted in more than 200 deaths. A ceasefire was established at the end of August, though sporadic outbreaks and attacks on the transnational oil companies present in the region continued. The Governor of the Delta state, J. Ibori, has led various diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the situation.

b) Horn of Africa

Somalia, a country which has been wracked by no governmental control, violence and a lack of security since 1988, a situation that intensified in 1991 with the fall of S. Barre, continued to wait for news of the peace process that has been unfolding in Kenya since September 2002. Confrontations between the different armed groups, clan militias and warlords persisted intermittently throughout the year, mainly in the centre and south of the country, in clear violation of the Eldoret Declaration of a Cessation of Hostilities in October 2002.

Two armed conflicts are currently being fought in **Sudan**. The first one involves the Government and the **SPLA** armed opposition group, a conflict that has been going on for 20 years and is currently the subject of a peace process. The sporadic violations of the ceasefire gradually abated during the course of the year. In the second of these two conflicts, in the region of **Darfur**, an armed conflict broke out in February 2003 that has already claimed more than 3,000 lives among the forces of the Government of O. al-Bashir and the (basically Muslim) SMLA armed opposition group, whose aim is to halt the marginalisation of the Darfur region and participate in the peace negotiations between the Government and the SPLA. In September, the armed forces, together with the pro-Government militias and the SMLA, agreed a fragile ceasefire which, though violated by both sides, has been extended, though no international body has been allowed to monitor the situation. The situation worsened in October with the appearance of a new armed opposition group, the JEM, whose aims coincide with those of the SLMA. The UN warned in November that the Darfur region could suffer the worst humanitarian emergency seen in Sudan since 1998.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

During 2003, the situation in **Burundi** has seen great changes which have given rise to the hope that this armed conflict (which began in 1991 and has claimed more than 300,000 lives) is coming to an end. At the end of 2002, two armed opposition groups² reached various agreements with the Transitional National Government (TNG),³ and these led in 2003 to the inclusion of both groups in the TNG and the beginning of a process for the standing down of troops, led by the UA's AMIB mission. In addition, the TNG and the FDD armed opposition group, led by P. Nkurunziza, formalised a multi-stage agreement in October,⁴ which in turn led to a ceasefire between the parties. The confrontations between the TNG, P. Nkurunziza's FDD and A. Rwasa's FNL have claimed hundreds of lives (mainly among the civilian population) and caused the displacement of tens of thousands of people throughout the country. The situation deteriorated during the third quarter with an outbreak of fighting between the two armed groups, something which had not occurred since 1996 and which, following the signing of agreements, has led to a new scenario in which Government Armed Forces and the FDD are now fighting the FNL. In November, regional leaders issued a three-month ultimatum to the FNL (which has boycotted the FDD's peace agreement), demanding that it begin negotiations with the TNG or face the consequences of action on a regional scale.

In DR Congo, progress has been made during the course of the year both in the political arena and in peace building, with the conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) and the establishment of a Transitional National Government (made up of the different armed opposition groups in the country and the former Government of J. Kabila, who have been fighting since 1998).⁵ In addition, the confrontations in the provinces of North and South Kivu were considerably reduced during the second half of the year, as was the fighting in the district of Ituri (in Orientale province, in the east of the country), where serious confrontations had occurred during May and July, accompanied by genocide against the civilian population (leading to the deployment of the IEMF).6 In spite of this, a lack of security has persisted and sporadic fighting has broken out among the different Ituri militias and between these militias and MONUC. The situation remains tense due to the presence of a number of armed groups in this region. In addition, several organisations have warned of the continuing presence of Rwandan Armed Forces in the region. The recruitment of child soldiers has continued, and sexual violence is still used as a weapon of war. The UN Security Council has condemned the persistent illegal exploitation of the country's resources, as set out in the most recent report by the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in DR Congo.7 Elsewhere, a peace agreement was reached in Congo during March 2003, putting an end to the conflict between the Ninja militias and the Government, though the situation remains fragile in the Pool region.8 The coup d'État begun by General F. Bozizé in the Central African Republic in October 2002 ended successfully in March, though the new Government has not been able to guarantee security throughout the whole country, and instability continues in the north.9

Since 1986, the north of **Uganda** has been suffering one of the most serious and forgotten conflicts of recent times, a conflict which intensified still further during 2003. The Sudanese and Ugandan Governments agreed that Ugandan Armed Forces could cross over into Sudanese territory in order to track down the LRA armed opposition group with the aim of destroying its bases. Far from resulting in the annihilation of the armed group, this caused an increase in attacks on the civilian population due to the return of the LRA to

- 2. The FDD, led by D. Ndayikengurukiye and the FNL, led by A. Mugabarabona.
- 3. Created out of the Arusha agreements of 2000.
- 4. See the section on peace processes.
- 5. See the section on peace processes.
- 6. Interim Emergency Multinational Force, the EU's first peace-keeping mission outside European borders. It was replaced in September by the Ituri Brigade from MONUC, the peace-keeping mission in this country.
- 7. S/2003/1027, 23 October 2003.
- 8. See the section on tensions.
- 9. Ibid.

Uganda. Uganda has also repeatedly accused the Sudanese Armed Forces of supplying the LRA with weapons. The conflict has moved from its epicentre in the Gulu district towards the east, and the Ugandan armed group has intensified its actions in rural areas in the districts of Lira, Kitgum and Soroti, with the result that the number of internally displaced people has doubled in one year, reaching figures of 1.3 million. Attempts by the local Acholi religious community to explore the possibility of initiating contacts that could lead to formal negotiations have been frustrated due to a lack of trust between the parties.

d) Maghreb

In **Algeria**, violence has persisted as a result of the armed conflict that has affected the country since 1992 (when parliamentary elections won by the FIS Islamist party were annulled), though the level of confrontations has fallen considerably. In spite of this, around 100 people die every month due to violence between armed opposition groups (mainly the GSPC) on one side and Government Armed Forces and pro-Government militias on the other. Impunity continued in spite of the grave violations of human rights, the war crimes committed during previous regimes and the systematic use of torture. There have been no preliminary

Almost half of the current armed conflicts are taking place in Africa.

moves to initiate a peace process, and the peace plan proposed by the leader of the FIS, A. Madani, put forward as a way of ending Islamist violence, has not resulted in any response from the Government. This suggestion included lifting the State of Emergency (in place since 1992), an amnesty for exiles and members of armed groups, the release of political prisoners and a clarification of the status of more than 4,000 disappeared people.

America

Armed conflicts (beginning-end)		Main causes	Evolution during 4 th quarter of 2003	Situation compared with January 2003
Colombia (1964-)	Government, FARC, ELN, AUC	Historic political exclusion, social injustice, control of natural resources and deterioration in the conflict resulting from drug-trafficking		No change

In **Colombia**, under its *democratic security* policy, the Government has attempted to increase military pressure against the various armed opposition groups, annulling their political status in order to treat the internal armed conflict as a terrorism issue. FARC guerrillas responded with ambushes, sabotage and terrorism, along with armed pressure on the local and regional civilian authorities and the use of kidnapping as a way of gaining financing and forcing prisoner exchanges. ELN guerrillas have continued to seek space for regional dialogue, while the level of its military activities has remained low. Both groups signed a military alliance in August. In spite of the ceasefire declared by the main paramilitary groups at the end of 2002, the harassment of supporters of human rights and popular leaders has continued. There has been widespread questioning of the current process for the demobilisation of the paramilitaries, based on the lack of transparency and climate of impunity that surrounds it.

Asia and the Pacific

Eight of the ten armed conflicts in the continent of Asia are to be found in the Philippines, India and Indonesia. These three countries have common problems of governance, which in turn have led to demands for increased self-government in some regions. The exploitation of natural resources, religion and the marginalisation of territory in the places in which these disputes have arisen are the elements fuelling these claims for greater autonomy, autonomy that the country's governments are not willing to grant in the fear that other regions may then aspire to the same status.

Armed conflict (begining-end)	Armed participants	Main causes	Evolution during the 4 th quarter of 2003	Situation compared with January 2003
Afganistan (2001-)*	Government, USA, Taliban militias and various groups	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic confrontations	Increase in hostilities	Worse
Philippines (1969-)	Government, NPA	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Stalemate	No change
Philippines (1969-)	Government, MILF	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Temporary suspension of hostilities	Better
Philippines (1991-)	Government, Abu Sayyaff	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Stalemate	No change
India (Assam) (1989-)	ULFA, BJF, NDFB	Autonomy v. independence, and control of economic resources	Increase in hostilities	Worse
India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989-)	JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	Autonomy v. independence and religious confrontation	Stalemate	No change
Indonesia (Irian Jaya) (1963-)	OPM	Autonomy v. independence, religious confrontation, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Stalemate	No change
Indonesia (Moluccan Islands) (1998-2003)	Laskar Yihad, Christian and Muslim communities	Autonomy v. independence, religious confrontation, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Reduction in tensions	End of the armed conflict
Indonesia (Aceh) (1976-)	Government, GAM	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Increase in hostilities	Worse
Nepal (1996-)	Government, CPN	Control of political power and democratic fragility	Increase in hostilities	Worse

^{*} The current phase of the armed conflict in this country began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has actually been in a situation of armed conflict since 1979.

a) Continental Asia

The situation in **Afghanistan** has been characterised by an increased lack of security due to a worsening of the confrontations between warlords in the north and between the Afghan Armed Forces and Taliban militias in the south. As a consequence, human rights violations continued, and the civilian population became a target for the different armed groups. Given this situation, in October the UN Security Council authorised NATO to begin the extension of its ISAF mandate beyond Kabul, something that had been called for repeatedly, both by the provisional Government (with the aim of consolidating its presence in the country and guaranteeing a certain level of security), and by humanitarian organisations, which had themselves suffered several attacks. UNAMA had to suspend its operations in some parts of the country due to the lack of security experienced.

Several areas of **India** continued to experience a constant climate of violence and insecurity. In connection with the state of **Jammu** and **Kashmir**, the Indian Government repeated its accusations regarding Pakistan's support for Kashmiri independence groups, and confrontations continued throughout the year in Indian-administered Kashmir with both countries exchanging fire along the Line of Control during October. Betwe-

en 250,000 and 350,000 people have had to move as a result of the confrontations in Indian-administered Kashmir, with 100,000 more being displaced as a result of the fighting along the Line of Control between the Indian and Pakistani armies, though the rapprochement between the Indian and Pakistani Governments has facilitated a negotiated end to the conflict. In the state of **Assam**, several armed groups have been fighting for independence and the defence of their local communities for decades. These organisations accuse the New Delhi Government of exploiting their natural resources and furthermore encouraging the settlement of immigrants, thus generating tensions among the local population. There are at least 250,000 displaced people in the northeast region, particularly in Assam. There were continuing confrontations between the NDFB group and Government Armed Forces during most of the year, combined with attacks on the civilian population. The year ended with a scaling-up of the violence following the offensive by the Bhutanese and Bangladeshi Armed Forces on the Assam armed groups' camps in these two countries, leading to the deaths of hundreds of people. November saw an increase in tensions and community confrontations between the population of the state of Assam and the Hindu community originating mainly from the neighbouring state of Bihar, in which more than 50 people died and a further 17,000 were displaced.

While still on the subject of Asia, special mention should also be made of the situation in **Nepal**, one of the worst crises at the end of 2003. In August, the CPN armed group broke off the peace process which had been marked by the political crisis in the country, putting an end to the eight-month ceasefire with the Government after its demands for elections to establish a constituent assembly had been rejected. At least 1,000 people have died as a result of this armed conflict and between 100,000 and 200,000 people have been internally displaced. Disappearances are commonplace as a result of the Armed Forces' counter-insurgency operation against members of the CPN, and the dangers to the civilian population as a result of the Government's plans to establish its «Voluntary Rural Security Groups and Peace Committees» have become apparent.

b) The Pacific

There are currently three armed conflicts in **Indonesia**. In the region of **Aceh** (in the north of the island of Sumatra), the peace process between the Government and the GAM armed opposition group came to a standstill, as the Government decided to carry out a large-scale military operation in May (with the deployment of 50,000 troops and police). This resulted in serious human rights violations, around 1,500 deaths among both the civilian population and the GAM, some 2,000 people detained or handed over to the Government, and more than 120,000 people displaced, according to official figures. The Government also extended the State of martial law it had imposed in May (due to expire in November) for a further six months, in order to guarantee the holding of general elections in April 2004. At the other end of Indonesia, in **Western Papua (Irian Jaya)**, there were sporadic confrontations between the Indonesian Armed Forces and the OPM armed opposition group. The National Human Rights Commission reported that the Armed Forces were committing massive human rights violations in several military operations. There were demonstrations in September and October to protest against the Government's attempts to divide the region into three new provinces and against the progressive deployment of soldiers and elite troops in the region (who were accused of committing serious abuses). Finally, in the **Moluccan Islands**, the situation stabilised during 2003.¹⁰

In the **Philippines**, the Government and the **MILF** armed opposition group established a ceasefire and began peace talks at the beginning of July, following a military offensive that had been waged since February against the MILF, causing the enforced displacement of 250,000 people on the island of Mindanao. For its part, the USA threatened to halt the aid that it had allocated to the island if the MILF did not break its links with the Jamaa Islamiya organisation, which operates in Indonesia and has been accused of carrying out various attacks and maintaining links with al-Qaida. As regards the other two armed groups operating on the archipelago, sporadic confrontations between Government Armed Forces and the **NPA** armed opposition group continued throughout the year. There was also little change in the situation relating to the **Abu Sayyaf** armed opposition group, which continued to commit serious abuses against the civilian population. In addition, the USA stepped up its military cooperation with the Philippines Armed Forces as part of the fight against terrorism, increasing the number of troops in the country.

Europe and the Middle East

Armed conflict (begining-end)	Armed participants	Main causes	Evolution during the 4 th quarter of 2003	Situation compared with January 2003
USA/United Kingdom - Iraq (2003-)	USA/United Kingdom, various	Iraqi militarism v. Access to oil resources and US military strategy	Increase in hostilities	Worse
Israel- Palestine (2000, 2 nd Intifada)	Israeli Government, settlement militias, Hamas, Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP	Religious confrontation, colonisation and control of land, problems of security and political recognition	Increase in hostilities	No change
Russian Fed. (Chechnya) (1991-)	Various, Russian Government	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate	No change

Turning to Europe, the Transcaucasian Republic of Chechnya (Russia) continued to be immersed in the armed conflict it had been suffering since 1991. The repression of the civilian population by the country's security forces persisted, along with the guerrilla war and attacks carried out by Chechen armed groups against the Russian military presence in the region. The local human rights NGO, Memorial, denounced the constant climate of terror imposed by the Russian security forces, with more than 400 people disappearing during the year. The elections held at the beginning of October in the Republic were marked by violence and complaints of irregularities, along with the absence of guarantees for the process, as emphasised by the OSCE and the Council of Europe. These elections were held as part of an institutional process in which the Russian Government established a Parliament and Constitution for the Republic, with the intention of giving an appearance of normality. During 2003, the Chechen leader, A. Maskhadov, repeated his request for inter-

vention by the United Nations and the OSCE to sponsor possible peace negotiations, and he stated that independence was not his ultimate aim, since a high level of autonomy under international jurisdiction would guarantee the stability of this region of the Caucasus.

In the Middle East, the Second Intifada has entered its fourth year without any short-term expectations of positive developments in the armed conflict between **Israel and Palestine**. Around 3,000 Palestinians

The Second Intifada has entered its fourth year without any short-term expectations of positive developments in the armed conflict between Israel and Palestine.

and almost 1,000 Israelis have already died. The spiralling violence between Israel and armed Palestinian groups continued in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and the consequences continued to be felt by the civilian population, with constant human rights violations, an increase in poverty and a deterioration in living conditions. Special mention should be made of the persistent house demolitions by the Israelis, the continuing curfew, the use of all its military force to carry out punishment operations in the name of the fight against terror and the confiscation of land as a result of the construction of the dividing wall. On the Palestinian side, suicide attacks and killings of Israeli civilians continued. Israel pursued its policy of faits accomplis despite the condemnations and complaints voiced by a large number of organisations.

In **Iraq**, the military coalition led by the USA and the United Kingdom¹¹ brought down the Saddam Hussein regime between 19 March and 1 May, though military operations by the USA subsequently continued and attacks and guerrilla operations against the occupying forces by alleged members of the former regime and other armed groups were intensified. There were also attacks between the militias of the different religious groups and against the international organisations working in the country, and these organisations have drastically reduced their personnel as a result of the lack of security and the attacks suffered.¹² The occupying forces have failed in their promise to guarantee security, governance and the restoration of freedom in the country. The UN Security Council has legitimised the presence of the occupying powers in Iraq, though they have not granted substantial powers to the UN in respect of the reconstruction process.

^{11.} This coalition is formed among others by Bulgaria, Denmark, El Salvador, Spain, Honduras, Italy, Poland, the Dominican Republic and Likraine

^{12.} The UN Secretary General's Special Representative in the country, S. Vieira de Mello, died as a result of one of these attacks.

B. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

We shall now analyse the **situations of tension and disputes considered to be high-risk during 2003** (indicator no. 2), even though the great majority of them have their origins in previous years. Situations of tension and high-risk dispute are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'État, curfews and States of emergency or exception), ¹³ and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. In these areas there is a strong possibility that a situation of armed conflict will occur within a short time. These tensions may not occur within the geographical territory of the state in question, but we have borne in mind the extent to which the State's own interests or stability are directly affected, as well as the fact that they may involve specific attacks on the territory of another country. Finally, we have also included contexts in which a peace agreement has been signed at some time or another between opposing parties but which are experiencing serious difficulties in implementing them.

At the end of 2003, there were **52 areas** of tension, bearing in mind that some countries were involved in several of these situations, and that more than one situation of tension may exist within a single country, as is the case in India, Indonesia and Côte d'Ivoire for example. The intensity, nature and duration of the contexts analysed varies enormously, from scenarios in which human rights and basic freedoms are violated to those that result in low level confrontations. However, the common element in all these cases is the possibility that the tensions or disputes in question may increase in intensity and lead to armed conflict.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

Countries	Main causes
Angola (Cabinda)	Autonomy v. independence
Comoros	Struggle for political power
Zimbabwe	Democratic fragility (political and economic crisis)

The conflict in which the Angolan Government has been fighting the FLEC-FAC armed opposition group since 1975 over the Angolan enclave of **Cabinda** (the region that produces 60% of the country's oil) has seen an ostensible improvement during the course of the year. The handover of the group's main leaders during the month of July has allowed for demobilisation of the main FLEC factions to begin, along with the integration of important leaders and some 1,000 former combatants into the Angolan Armed Forces and Police. Nevertheless, certain factions continue to display reticence about handing in their weapons and ending the conflict. In addition, the reports coming from local human rights organisations continue to denounce serious abuses by the armed forces and the transnational ChevronTexaco (which operates in a large part of the region) against the civilian population.

In **Comoros**, the President of the Federation and the Presidents of the three autonomous islands (Anjouan, Mwali and Ngazidja) signed a peace agreement on 24 December in an attempt to put an end to disputes over the distribution of power between them. South African President T. Mbeki coordinated efforts to pro-

^{13.} For the purposes of this report, a State of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with a restriction on certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in the different legislatures, such as, for example: State of exception, interior disturbance, State of national disaster, etc.

mote this agreement. The islands have suffered several secessionist movements since their independence from France in 1975: in 1997, the island of Anjouan declared unilateral independence. In 2001, a peace agreement was signed, though it did not resolve existing internal problems.

The situation of maximum tension affecting **Zimbabwe** has continued to deteriorate throughout 2003. Added to the worrying humanitarian crisis is the country's financial bankruptcy (with inflation exceeding 600%) and the political conflict which has continued since March 2002 (the date of the presidential elections in which R. Mugabe proclaimed himself president) between the governing ZANU-PF party and the main opposition MDC party and the unions. In spite of repeated complaints from international bodies, which accuse R. Mugabe's Government of committing serious human rights abuses, the international isolation to which the country has been subjected (it withdrew from the Commonwealth in 2003) and the attempts at mediation made between the opposing parties, the tension in Zimbabwe is alarming. In this regard, special mention should be made of the appearance in London during November of an armed group (the Zimbabwe Freedom Movement, ZFM) which intends to overthrow the ZANU-PF Government through the use of armed force.

b) West Africa

Countries	Main causes
Côte d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso	Diplomatic tensions
Ghana (Dagbon)	Community confrontation, struggle for political power
Guinea	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, impact of regional crises
Guinea-Bissau	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)
Mauritania	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)
Nigeria	Democratic fragility (political instability)
Nigeria (north)	Religious confrontation
Mano River region (Liberia, Côte	Widespread destabilisation due to forced displacement caused by the armed conflicts in Liberia
d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea)	and Côte d'Ivoire
Sao Tome and Principe	Democratic fragility, disputes over control of resources
Senegal (Casamance)*	Autonomy v. independence.

^{*}This situation was classed as an armed conflict during 2003, becoming a situation of tension during the last three months of the year. It is analysed in the section dealing with armed conflicts.

The situation of tension suffered by the region of **Dagbon** (North **Ghana**) since March 2002 as a consequence of the confrontations between the Andani and Abudu communities, which cost the lives of 29 people and King Andani II (the traditional monarch of the region) has improved slightly. In this regard, the President of Ghana, J. Kufuor, has announced that he will not renew the State of emergency and curfew that have been in force in the region since the outbreak of the crisis. Nevertheless, the United Nations have called on all the parties involved to be more decisive and cooperative in bringing this situation to an end, and the Government has asked for a mediator to be brought in.

For its part, the **Mano River** region, which comprises Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea, runs the risk of a regionalisation of the violence currently affecting Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, provoking a humanitarian crisis of huge dimensions and endangering the advanced process of post-war rehabilitation underway in Sierra Leone. The constant movement of refugees and internally displaced people between these countries, the huge movements of mercenaries, combatants and light weapons, and the operational absence of any international organisations have led the United Nations to propose a coordinated joint action by all of its missions in the region.

Guinea has suffered a considerable deterioration due to the instability affecting the whole region, as well as its own internal political crisis. On the one hand, the fighting in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire has caused both the flight of tens of thousands of people into Guinea and the political destabilisation of the country (bearing in mind the support that the Government of L. Conté offered to the LURD armed opposition group

during its offensive against former leader C. Taylor), while on the other, the presidential elections at the end of December, which extended L. Conté's mandate for seven more years, were held without any democratic quarantees, in the absence of the main political opposition groups, a fact that has been explicitly condem-

ned by bodies such as the EU, among suspicions that certain important leaders of the armed forces may be preparing a coup d'état.

Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, and Central African Republic have had coups d'État during 2003.

In **Guinea-Bissau**, the climate of tension that existed throughout the year culminated in the middle of September in a successful and bloodless coup d'État, leading to the overthrow of the Government of K.

Yala and the formation of a National Government of Transition. The main task facing this Government, led by businessman H. Rosa, is the organisation of parliamentary elections for March 2004, along with presidential elections one year later. The international community has finally legitimised this whole process, in spite of the fact that bodies such as the UN Security Council had repeatedly warned of growing instability in the country. The presence of the United Nations in Guinea-Bissau has also been assured with the extension of the mandate of its office (UNOGBIS) for one more year.

The tense relations between **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Burkina Faso** passed through many phases during the course of the year. Both Governments took significant measures aimed at relieving tensions after the Ivorian executive accused Burkina Faso of having provided logistical and financial support to the armed groups that had initiated the uprising against the Government of L. Gbagbo in September 2002. Nevertheless, tensions rose once again in October when the Burkinese Government accused Côte d'Ivoire and Togo of supporting preparations for a coup d'état against the Government of B. Compaoré, in which important members of the armed forces and opposition leaders were arrested. In addition, the violence inflicted on Burkinese immigrants by the local population has persisted in the north of Côte d'Ivoire, causing more than 350,000 Burkinese to flee back to their own country.

In **Mauritania**, the general elections of 7 November left the country in a state of uncertainty following the re-election of President M. A. Ould Taya and accusations from the opposition of electoral fraud. The leading opposition candidate, M. K. Ould Haidalla, who was president of the country between 1980 and 1984, was detained on the day before the election was held and accused of planning another coup d'État, after an attempt to overthrow the Government in July had been led by the armed forces in an attempt to recover their influence in the eastern provinces and in protest against the Government's persecution of Islamist groups. These events caused an increase in the harassment carried out by the Government and the detention of dozens of Islamist leaders. Finally, M. K. Ould Haidalla and some of his followers were condemned to five years imprisonment at the beginning of 2004.

Nigeria is currently the scene of two different situations of tension. Firstly, there was climate of widespread violence that occurred during the parliamentary and presidential elections during April and May of last year, elections which ended among accusations of fraud and the murder of several political leaders. Then there was the general strike in protest against the rise in fuel prices during July, which also resulted in the deaths of several people. In this connection, many human rights organisations have accused the Government of President O. Obasanjo of committing serious human rights violations and murders during the last years of his presidency. Attention should also be paid to the tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities in the country's northern states. Although there have not been any significant acts of violence in recent months, in the middle of June the state of Adamawa was the scene of various confrontations that cost the lives of several people.

Finally, in **Sao Tome and Principe** there was another attempted coup d'État in the middle of July, ¹⁴ which didn't result in any deaths and which initially led to the formation of a Military Junta led by F. Pereira. However, international pressure resulted in the restoration of constitutional order, the return of the Government of F. Menezes, and the stabilisation of the situation.

c) Horn of Africa

Countries	Main causes
Eritrea-Ethiopia	Territorial disputes

In the Horn of Africa, existing tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia continued throughout the year as a result of Ethiopia's rejection of the border demarcation established by the Border Commission set up by both countries (EEBC), a circumstance that has brought the peace process to a standstill. The absence of political dialogue between the two countries has led to a further postponement of demarcation. Both the UN and the two countries themselves, particularly Eritrea, engaged in intense diplomatic efforts in order to seek support and reinforce the peace process. In the military arena, this year has seen some sporadic violations of the Temporary Security Zone which separates the two countries and is supervised by UNMEE, though the channels of dialogue have remained open between the heads of the armed forces, who continued to meet under the auspices of UNMEE, within the framework of the Military Coordination Commission.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Países	Causas de fondo
Congo	Political control over different ethnic groups and democratic fragility
Central African Republic	Democratic fragility and problems of governance
Rwanda-Uganda	Control of natural resources, desire for border security
Uganda-Kenya	Governance, regional marginalisation, inter-community confrontations over the control of natural
(Karamoja-Turkana) ¹⁵	resources

In Central Africa, **Congo** has seen positive developments following the signing of the peace agreement during March, which brought an end to the armed confrontations that began in March 2002, though this has not succeeded in reducing human rights violations. The slow movement of the demobilisation process has resulted in some situations of tension among members of the Ninja militias, which have not yet been disarmed, creating a particular climate of insecurity in the Pool region, where humanitarian organisations and the local population are having to deal with the presence of these militias and the Government Armed Forces.

In the **Central African Republic**, following the coup d'État in March, self-proclaimed President F. Bozizé has taken measures to stabilise the internal situation and achieve international recognition. A successful process of national dialogue was held in September, and at the end of October the curfew that had been in place since March was lifted. However, the climate of insecurity persists in certain regions of the country, due to the fact that governmental authority has not yet been restored, and the members of the UN peacekeeping mission (CEMAC), which is supported both logistically and militarily by France, the gendarmerie and a limited number of Government Armed Forces, are insufficient to guarantee security. In addition, the positive developments in neighbouring DR Congo, have led to improvements in the situation between **Uganda** and **Rwanda**. ¹⁶

The border zone that extends from the northeast of **Uganda** to the northwest of **Kenya** and the south of Sudan remained an area in which the presence of governmental authority was fragile. In this connection, inter-community confrontations persisted between the militias of both countries, mainly from the regions of **Karamoja** (Uganda) and **Turkana** (Kenya). These disputes were sporadic in nature and mainly resulted from acts of cattle rustling and struggles over land ownership.

^{15.} In the quarterly reports *Barometer*, this region has been treated separately, depending on the communities involved in confrontations, but from this point on we shall use this more generic name, which refers to the border region between Kenya, Uganda and Sudan. 16. See the section on Armed Conflicts.

America

In America, tensions centred around Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti and Mexico) and the Andes region (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). In the countries of the Central American isthmus, the high levels of violence and criminality were answered by the respective Governments with heavy military and police operations (particularly against the «maras» in the case of El Salvador), resulting in multiple detentions and frequent violations of human rights and basic freedoms.

a) Mesoamérica

Countries	Main causes
Guatemala	Political and historical exclusion, social injustice, failure to comply with peace agreements, impunity and organised crime
Haiti	Democratic fragility, political repression, deterioration in living conditions
Mexico	Exclusion and financial inequality
Mexico (Chiapas)	Discrimination against indigenous peoples

Guatemala experienced an increase in political violence prior to the elections of 9 November, linked with the presentation of former dictator E. Ríos Montt as a presidential candidate. Finally, because E. Ríos Montt did not move on to the second round (and thus lost his parliamentary immunity) he was exposed to numerous legal actions for genocide. In addition, there were massive demonstrations throughout the country during the course of the year, demanding agricultural reform and a solution to the many conflicts over land, and also protesting against the increasing lack of urban security, the famine affecting several regions of the country, the coffee crisis, the lack of recognition for indigenous peoples, the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the USA and the crisis in the educational sector. For their part, the former paramilitaries (PAC) intensified their acts of violence in the run-up to elections, in order to obtain the compensation promised by the Government for services to the state during the armed conflict. While MINUGUA warned that the democratic process was in danger, many human rights organisations denounced the increase in impunity, corruption, criminality and social exclusion, calling on the United Nations to establish a commission to investigate the high levels of political violence. In this connection, special mention should be made of the forthcoming opening of a UNHCHR Office to supervise the human rights situation.

In **Haiti**, the violence between supporters and opponents of President J. B. Aristide intensified during the last three months of the year, following the murder of the leader of one of the country's main armed groups, leaving dozens of dead and many wounded during successive confrontations. While the Government accused the opposition Democratic Convergence of attempting to provoke a coup d'État, both the

In Haiti both the opposition and the international community have repeatedly denounced the deterioration of the human rights situation, the proliferation of armed groups and organised crime allegedly linked to the Government, and the growing climate of insecurity.

opposition and the international community have repeatedly denounced the deterioration of the human rights situation, the proliferation of armed groups and organised crime allegedly linked to the Government, the politicisation of the police and the growing climate of insecurity. The United Nations specifically warned that the current situation of instability and impunity could degenerate into scenes of widespread violence. While the international community threatens to isolate the regime of J. B. Aristide until elections are held in accordance with the resolutions of the OAS, the opposition, which in the last months of the year called several general strikes and demonstrations, has indicated that it will boycott such elections until the Government disarms some civil groups and stops repressing any act that is critical of the Government.

In the state of **Chiapas (Mexico)**, both the EZLN and social and peasants organisations have denounced the increase in paramilitary activity, the mobilisation of more troops by the armed forces, the increasing human

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rights violations and the incessant harassment against certain indigenous populations, internally displaced peoples' camps and supporters of the Zapatista movement. In addition, while the EZLN announced the creation of Good Governance Councils in the Zapatista autonomous districts, the Government declared that it had met the EZLN's three conditions for restarting dialogue: the presentation of the COCOPA initiative, the release of prisoners connected with the EZLN and the relocation of seven military bases. In the rest of **Mexico**, there were massive demonstrations during the year demanding the reform of the agriculture chapter of the Free Trade Agreement with the USA and Canada, and protesting against the package of privatisations and structural reforms undertaken by the Government.

b) The Andes region

Countries	Main causes	
Bolivia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro)	Exclusion, economic inequality, control of the drug trade	
Ecuador	Governance (widespread protests and government weakness)	
Peru	Governance, reactivation of Sendero Luminoso	
Venezuela	Problems of governance	

There were two outbreaks of violence in **Bolivia**, as well as a large number of confrontations in the Chapare region between government troops and coca farmers, who engaged in various acts of violent protest against the anti-drugs policies of the Bolivian and US Governments. The first of the outbreaks of violence occurred in La Paz during February, ending with 34 dead and more than 200 injured. The second occurred in October and this ended with the resignation and exile of President G. Sánchez de Lozada, more than 80 dead and hundreds of people injured. These events culminated in more than a month of widespread protests throughout the country as a result of the Government's intention to export gas through a port in Chile, the country that had captured its access to the sea following the Pacific War of 1789. The new President, C. Mesa, confirmed a cabinet of independents (people who do not belong to any political party) and announced his intention to reform the law on fuel, implement a referendum on gas exports and convoke a Constituent Assembly to redesign some of the fundamental aspects of the political system. As a result, the protests in several parts of the country have dissipated, though the export of gas continues to cause confrontations between certain groups. It should be mentioned in this connection that this issue has acquired a regional dimension, as the Governments of Peru, Uruguay (which has offered Bolivia access to the sea), Venezuela and Chile have become directly involved.

In **Ecuador**, the huge demonstrations and strikes that occurred throughout the year in protest against the Government's economic policies culminated in the abandonment of the governing coalition by the indigenous Pachakutik movement, and the resulting successive resignation of a dozen ministers. In addition, the alleged cases of corruption affecting the president and the seizure by the military of several oil installations in order to break the strike in the sector and re-establish the supply of fuel increased the level of discontent and protest among the population.

The Government of **Peru** ordered a State of emergency in an attempt to contain the wave of strikes, protests, road-blocks and multiple confrontations between Government troops and peasant groups demanding an end to the enforced eradication of illegal crops, which had been undertaken by the Government with support and financing from the USA. The intensity and persistence of these demonstrations also caused the resignation en bloc of the Government. The State of Emergency was later extended in order to deal with the reactivation of the Sendero Luminoso armed opposition group in several regions in the south of the country. Elsewhere, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission indicated in its report that during the armed conflict (1980-2000), 69,000 people were murdered, the great majority of them Quecha speakers living in rural areas, and it established that political responsibility lay with several governments. In this connection, it should be mentioned that former President A. Fujimori, in exile in Japan, publicly announced the formation of a political movement that would contest the 2006 elections.

Venezuela, saw the intensification of social polarisation, massive demonstrations and daily confrontations between supporters and opponents of President H. Chavez, resulting in several dead and injured and causing the country to be brought to a standstill for more than two months during a general strike called by the opposition. Finally, the facilitating efforts of the OAS, the UNDP, the Carter Center and the Group of Friends of Venezuela crystallised in an agreement between the Government and the opposition aimed at disarming the population and finding a democratic and peaceful way out of the crisis through a referendum calling for the resignation of the President along with several pro-Government and opposition deputies. Following the collection of signatures under the supervision of international observers, it was forecast that this referendum could be held during the first three months of 2004. Elsewhere, the Venezuelan Government also became embroiled in diplomatic tensions with the USA (due to the CIA's alleged participation in the destabilisation of the country), Chile (due to H. Chavez's stance in favour of Bolivia's access to the sea, Colombia (due to the alleged financing by Venezuela of certain armed groups) and the Dominican Republic (accused of conspiring against H. Chavez).

Asia and the Pacific

The Asian continent saw the continued tracking by the **USA** of members of the **al-Qaida** organisation, mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in other countries such as the Philippines, where it actively collaborated with Government Armed Forces.

a) Continental Asia and Sri Lanka

Countries	Main causes	
Afghanistan-Pakistan	Incursions by Taliban from Pakistan, struggle for political power	
USA - al-Qaida	Fight against terrorism v. struggle against political and military domination by the USA, political and religious fundamentalism	
India (Bengal)	Struggle for political power	
India (Gujarat)	Religious confrontations	
India (Tripura)	Autonomy v. independence	
India-Pakistan	Territorial disputes	
Myanmar	Democratic fragility	
Sri Lanka	Autonomy v. independence, religious differences	

During the second half of the year there was an increase in tensions between **Afghanistan** and **Pakistan**, a situation which, despite suffering several violent episodes, was accompanied by a parallel process of dialogue between the two countries, facilitated by the USA. The high point of the tensions occurred in August with the closure of the Pakistani embassy in Kabul as a result of the attacks that had followed accusations that the Pakistani armed forces had made incursions into Afghan territory. During the third quarter of the year there were exchanges of fire between the two countries at several points along the border, though by the end of the year the process of rapprochement and cooperation in the fight against terrorism, along with the establishment of a tripartite commission with the involvement of the USA, seemed to indicate a reduction in tensions between them.

Several states in India experienced tensions throughout 2003. The tensions that began in the state of **Gujarat** during 2002 as the result of confrontations between Hindus and Muslims continued throughout the year, and were further fanned by the pro-Hindu campaign by the Gujarati Government. Only at the end of 2003 were various judgements beginning to be handed down against the Hindus responsible for the massacre, while the Muslims involved had already been sentenced and had repeatedly denounced the discrimination to which they had been subjected. Voices were also raised about the irregularities and threats that occurred during the trials of the Hindus responsible. Human rights organisations complained that the recommendations made by the National Human Rights Commission had not been implemented. Elsewhere, some violent episodes reoccurred during the year, and the Government even ordered a curfew. It is also necessary to underline the situation in the state of **Tripura**, in which attacks intensified, mainly during the second three months of the year, against members of the governing *Left Front* party, by the armed opposition group, the NLFT. This situation of insecurity has caused the enforced displacement of around

100,000 people in the region. In the state of **West Bengal**, the local elections in May were held in a climate of violence and confrontation between members of the Congress Party and members of the Marxist Party. Around 70 people died during the campaign period and the elections themselves. Special mention should also be made of the confron-

Three Indian states (West Bengal, Gujarat and Tripura) are facing serious internal disputes.

tations that arose in November between the members of two unions in the tea plantations, which resulted in the deaths of around twenty people.

As regards the situation between **India** and **Pakistan**, in spite of the fact that the year began with an increase in tensions between the two countries following the expulsion of senior diplomats by each country, rapprochement has been steadily consolidated throughout 2003, and significant advances have been seen, such as the agreement of a ceasefire.¹⁷

In **Myanmar**, a number of members of the NLD, the main opposition party, were arrested while travelling round the north of the country as part of their electoral campaign. Large protests arose calling for their release, in particular that of their leader A. S. Suu Kyi. In spite of the constant pressure from international organisations and heads of state in the region, she has not yet been released nor is there any news on her state of health. Elsewhere, the announcement by the new Prime Minister, K. Nyunt, of a road map for the country's democratisation (without any firm timetable), including the drawing up of a new constitution and the calling of general elections, led to the release of some NLD representatives, though the party's leaders remain in custody.

Sri Lanka experienced a serious political crisis during the last three months of 2003, which ran parallel to and affected the progress of the peace process. President C. Kumaratunga, acting in the absence of Prime Minister R. Wickremesinghe, ordered a State of emergency, suspended Parliament and dismissed three key ministers (Defence, Interior and Information). The President's decision was taken after the presentation by the LTTE armed opposition group of a series of proposals aimed at a possible resumption of negotiations between the Government and the LTTE. However, after the State of emergency (which had granted full powers to the armed forces) was lifted, the President and Prime Minister agreed to establish a committee charged with facilitating the resolution of the political crisis affecting the whole country, and designing a new model for co-existence between the two political forces. Up to the present this has not produced any results however. In the same connection, the President proposed the creation of a Government of national unity, while the Prime Minister suggested elections, ideas that have not been accepted by the relevant political opposition. It should also be mentioned that the tensions experienced throughout the island have resulted in Norway's decision to suspend its role as facilitator in the peace process until a way out of the political crisis is found. At the end of the year, the situation remained at a standstill, without any significant advances being made.

b) The Pacific

Countries	Main causes	
The Philippines	Democratic fragility	
IIndonesia (Moluccas)	Religious confrontations, demographic colonisation, autonomy v. independence	
Indonesia (Sulawesi)	Religious confrontations, demographic colonisation	
Solomon Islands	Governance, inter-community confrontations	
Maldives	Democratic fragility	

In the **Philippines**, the Government declared a State of emergency and detained some 350 people after around 300 troops mutinied. These troops had accused the Government of instigating attacks in order to ensure military assistance from the USA, selling weapons to the main armed opposition groups and wanting to declare martial law so that President G. M. Arroyo could remain in power without holding elections. On another occasion, government troops had to liberate Manila airport, which had been occupied by an

armed group who claimed to be complaining about government corruption. Elsewhere, thousands of people demonstrated at different times during the year, demanding the resignation of G. M. Arroyo and seeking the transfer of power to a transitional civilian government.

In **Indonesia (Sulawesi)**, there were attacks against Christian communities during the last three months of the year, resulting in several deaths and the displacement of hundreds of people. The Government announced that it was sending thousands of troops to the region, having withdrawn the troops deployed to control the fighting between Catholics and Muslims that had left 1,000 dead since 1999. The Jamaa Islamiya organisation was accused of being behind the most recent attacks. In the **Moluccas**, the Government declared an end to the State of emergency in the province of North Moluccas (in force since 2000), though acts of repression persist against the RSM and FKM armed opposition groups. In spite of the fact that tensions persist in several regions of the archipelago, several processes have begun for the return of displaced people and reconciliation between Christians and Muslims. Local elections were held in the sub-province of Southeast Moluccas in an atmosphere of extreme tension.

In the **Solomon Islands**, the increase in activity by various militias, along with the collapse in the economy and various institutions resulted in the deployment, at the request of the Solomon Islands Government, of a multinational peacekeeping force (RAMSI) led by Australia. Among the aims of this mission, the largest in the region since the Second World War, were the surrender of various armed groups, the decommissioning and subsequent destruction of thousands of illegal weapons, the restoration of order and governance in several parts of the country and the establishment of a commission entrusted with resolving the situation relating to land ownership in the Guadalcanal region, the basis for much of the tension and fighting. Mention should also be made of the control of arms-trafficking between the Solomon Islands and the island of Bougainville (Papua New Guinea). At the end of the year, RAMSI began the progressive withdrawal of some of its troops, stating that it had met the majority of the objectives established.

Special mention should also be made of the situation in the **Maldives**, where in September the capital, Male, was brought to a standstill during disturbances by thousands of demonstrators protesting about police repression during mutinies in several prisons, in which four people had died and several hundred were injured. The Government imposed a curfew in the capital and the opposition claimed that hundreds of people had been detained. Amnesty International complained that the basis for the protests was the existence of systematic human rights violations, while the Government declared that the rising tensions had nothing to do with the stated aim of President M. A. Gayoom, (in power since 1978) to stand for re-election. His re-election for a sixth term happened in October, after a referendum had been held in which the President appeared as the only candidate.

Europe and Central Asia

In Europe there has been an increase in political tension in relation to various electoral processes, particularly in Georgia and Serbia and Montenegro, while tensions have surfaced in the Central Asia region as a result of the growing instability in the region.

Countries	Main causes	
Azerbaijan	Inequality in the distribution of resources, democratic fragility	
Belarus	Democratic fragility (repression of political opposition)	
Georgia	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	
Kyrgyzstan	Independence of the Ferghana Valley, democratic fragility	
Moldova, Rep. of	Democratic fragility, independence of the region of Dniester	
Serbia and Montenegro	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power	
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)	d Montenegro (Kosovo) Autonomy v. Independence	
Turkmenistan	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	
Ukraine	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	
Uzbekistan	Independence of the Ferghana Valley, problems of governance	

In the Balkans, the Electoral Commission in **Serbia and Montenegro** awarded victory in the legislative elections held on 28 December to the ultra-nationalist SRS party, led by V. Seselj (accused of war crimes by the ICC for the former Yugoslavia), with more than 27% of the votes against a turn out of almost 60% (the three previous elections in 2003 had been annulled due to low turnout). The more moderate sections of the country along with the international community saw these results as a setback in the process for the consolidation of democracy in the country and the region, while a period of negotiations has begun for the consolidation of the new Government and the presence in parliament of other people accused by the ICC (S. Milosevic of the PSS and N. Pavkovic of the PSP) until a decision has been handed down as to their guilt or innocence. A situation of uncertainty prevails in the country following the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Z. Djindjic at the beginning of March, at the hands of organised crime, due to the lack of democratic reform and the serious economic crisis. In the meantime, direct talks have begun between Serbia and **Kosovo** in relation to the definitive status of the latter. The country following the assassination of the latter.

In the former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, criticism persisted from various intergovernmental organisations such as the OSCE and the EU in relation to the fragility of the democracy in these States. In Belarus there was also an increase in political repression and the infringement of basic freedoms, according to these organisations, following the announcement by President A. Lukashenko of a reform in the press law to prevent criticism of the Government, along with the closure of the most important NGOs defending and promoting human rights. In response, the opposition parties announced that they would form an electoral coalition in preparation for the parliamentary elections of October 2004. In the Republic of Moldova, President V. Voronin has put forward a federal plan for the regions of Transdniester (a region with a Russian majority that is claiming independence). This plan has the support of both the USA and the OSCE, and could be the subject of a referendum before April 2005. The Russian Government, which saw its peace plan for the region rejected, has also been criticised for not withdrawing its troops from the enclave, as the parties had agreed in 1999. Finally, the OSCE set out the need to deploy a peacekeeping force in the region. In Ukraine, criticism of President L. Kuchma has abated following the announcement of urgent measures to deal with the economic crisis facing the country as a result of the border dispute with Russia over the island of Tuzla, a subject that has occupied internal Ukrainian politics during recent months.

In the Caucasus, the situation has deteriorated due to the political crisis in Georgia and the influence that this could have on other countries in the region under authoritarian rule, as is the case in Azerbaijan. Both countries are undergoing serious economic crises, they are located in an area rich in oil, they are both experiencing unresolved conflicts and have an important international presence, particularly from the USA and Russia. In Azerbaijan, the announcement by President H. Aliev that he would stand down in favour of his son, I. Aliev (who had previously been appointed Prime Minister) caused an increase in political instability in the country, along with demonstrations from broad sections of the opposition that were brutally put down by the police during the month of October. Five Special Rapporteurs from the United Nations Human Rights Commission and different bodies such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe denounced the lack of quarantees for the electoral process, which made I. Aliev the winner by absolute majority. I. Aliev announced a plan to end the economic crisis in the country, and this received support from both Russia and the USA. Finally, the new President expressed his concern about the effect that the political crisis in Georgia might have on stability in the region. In Georgia itself, there was an increase in political and social tension during the month of November which ended with the annulment of the presidential elections, the resignation of President E. Shervardnadze, and the establishment of an interim Government led by N. Burjanadze. The new electoral process of 4 January 2004 awarded the presidency to the main candidate and former leader of the opposition M. Saakashvili, with more than 96% of the vote and a turnout of 83%. The uncertainty of the new situation is marked by the role that will be played by the three regions claiming independence (Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and particularly by the Ajari leader, A. Abashidze, who is close to E. Shervardnadze and who has ordered a State of emergency in the region. In the meantime, the current cabinet is seeking international assistance to fight the economic crisis.

Finally, the entire Central Asia region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are suffering an increase in tensions due to problems of water, drug-trafficking, corruption, the emergence of

The entire Central Asia region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) is suffering an increase in tensions due to problems of water, drugtrafficking, corruption, the emergence of new armed Islamist groups, political repression and the infringement of fundamental human rights.

new armed Islamist groups, political repression and the infringement of fundamental human rights. In **Kyrgyzstan** there were attacks by different armed Islamist groups (Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), a circumstance that led Uzbeki President I. Karimov to establish a security force along his border with the country as a result of Kyrgyz protests. In addition, **Uzbekistan** laid more anti-personnel mines along its own border in order to prevent the entry from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan of members of the MIU armed opposition group. Finally, in **Turkmenistan** there was increased control over opposition (particularly religious organisations), and a number of members of the political opposition have had to flee the country as a result of the wave of repression that followed the failed coup attempt against President S. Nizayov in November 2002.

Middle East

Countries	Main causes
Iran	Struggle for political power and democratic fragility
Israel-Lebanon/Syria	Territorial disputes, impact of the armed conflict between Israel and Palestine

In Iran, the pressure brought to bear from the second quarter of the year onwards by the USA and the IAEA as a result of the Government's alleged development of a military nuclear programme contributed to a heightening of social tensions. Thousands of demonstrators called for greater openness in the regime over a period of more than ten days, events that were classified by the Government and some sections of the population as being pro-USA. The Government has not taken any substantial steps to open up the political system.

An attack in Beirut that cost the life of a former guerrilla from the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah at the beginning of August marked the beginning of a heightening of tensions between **Israel** and **Lebanon**. Hezbollah and the Israeli army increased their hostile actions, with missiles being launched into Israeli territory and Lebanese air space being invaded. On the other hand, negotiations for a prisoner exchange have continued between the parties, though no agreement has yet been reached.

Finally, as a positive development in terms of situations of tension, mention should be made of the contexts which ceased to be classified as such during 2003.

Countries (quarter in which they ceased to be classified as	
situations of tension)	Main causes
Chad-Central African Republic (2nd quarter)	Diplomatic tensions, impact of the end of the armed conflict in Central African Republic
El Salvador (4th quarter)	Governance, insecurity of the civilian population
Jordan (3rd quarter)	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, repression of Islamists
Kenya (2nd quarter)	Democratic fragility, problems of governance
Nigeria-Cameroon (4th quarter)	Control of territory
Madagascar (3rd quarter)	Democratic fragility (political and economic crisis)

C. Peace Processes

2003 was especially intense as regards the evolution of **peace processes** (indicator no. 3), both in terms of the positive progress achieved and in respect of certain failures. Among the former, special mention should be made of the inclusion of six new processes during the course of the year (with the AUC in Colombia, the Ninjas in Congo and the Maoists in Nepal,

In something over half of the armed conflicts currently active, peace negotiations are underway.

the rapprochement between India and Pakistan, and the negotiations with the MILF in the Philippines and the SLMA in Sudan). On the negative side were the breakdown in negotiations and resumption of hostilities in Indonesia (Aceh) and Nepal. Nevertheless, the net effect was that in December 2003 there were **20 ongoing peace processes** (four more than at the end of 2002), of which 13 related to armed conflicts and 7 to conflicts that are not currently in an armed phase. This data indicates, therefore, that in something over half of the armed conflicts currently active, peace negotiations are underway, a percentage that has not often been achieved and which offers support for the use of diplomatic peace efforts that encourage the opening of dialogue.



At the end of the year, at least half of these negotiation processes were progressing with difficulty, with 30% of them in a delicate position and the remaining 20% working reasonably well. It should also be pointed out that negotiations were also being explored in three contexts: Angola (Cabinda), Mexico (Chiapas) and Senegal (Casamance), with good prospects in each case. Attempts at negotiation in Colombia (FARC and ELN) and Uganda (LRA) did not come to fruition during the course of the year.

Table C1. State of negotiations at the end of 2003				
Going well (3) Congo India-Pakistan Sudan (SPLA)	In difficulty (11) Burundi Colombia (AUC) Cyprus DPR Korea-USA DR Congo Georgia (Abkhazia) Liberia Myanmar Philippines (MILF) Somalia Sri Lanka	Going badly (6) Armenia-Azerbaijan Côte d'Ivoire China (Tibet) Israel - Palestine NA Sudan (SLMA) Western Sahara	At an exploraty stage (3) Angola (Cabinda) Mexico (Chiapas) Senegal (Casamance)	

Note: The processes shown in italics indicate conflicts which are not in an armed phase but are as yet unresolved.¹⁹

^{19.} In this chapter, the term «unresolved conflict» refers to situations in which, while high levels of tension, threats of a military nature or armed confrontations have existed in the past, this type of confrontation does not exist at the moment, though the parties have not yet reached a definitive peace agreement, meaning that negotiations are in progress or being explored.

Africa


a) Southern Africa

In **Angola** (**Cabinda**), the Government held a meeting in January with the leaders of the FLEC armed opposition group to discuss autonomy for the region. Although there were no formal negotiations, during subsequent months several leading members of the group handed in their weapons and officers from the FLEC-FAC joined the Angolan Armed Forces, meaning that only a residual part of the group remains active.

b) West Africa

In the region of West Africa, by contrast, the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire remained at stalemate one year after the Linas-Marcoussis Agreements were signed in Paris by the Government and the three armed opposition groups (MPCI, MPIGO and MJP). The initial issue in dispute was the rejection by various political groups of the idea that the Interior and Defence ministries would be placed in the hands of the armed opposition groups. ECOMOG began its deployment in the country in January, trying to mediate in the crisis on several occasions. In March the Government and the three armed groups reached an agreement to form a Government of National Reconciliation, though confrontations and insecurity continued during subsequent months. In the middle of the year, the UN brought its MINUCI mission into operation, with the mandate to facilitate the application of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreements, and the following month the Government and the three armed groups declared an end to the conflict, even creating an office to proceed with the disarmament of these groups and approving an amnesty for them. In September however, there was a severe crisis in the Government because of the ministerial appointments made by the President at the Interior and Defence ministries. This resulted in the resignation of nine ministers representing the armed groups, renamed the «Forces Nouvelles», who refused to renegotiate the agreements signed in January and sought consensus for a new «road map». At the end of the year, representatives of the «Forces Nouvelles» met in Abidjan with the Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire, S. Diarra, to negotiate their return to the Government of National Unity and agree a timetable that would permit the process of disarmament and the reintegration of combatants. This led to the nine ministers' return to the Government at the end of the year.

The peace process in **Liberia** has also experienced moments of crisis. A Peace Conference was held in Ghana in June, with mediation from ECOWAS. This permitted a ceasefire between the Government and the LURD and MODEL armed groups, though fighting continued on the outskirts of the capital. ECOWAS troops arrived in August, and President C. Taylor finally stood down, going into exile in Nigeria, a circumstance that



made it possible for a peace agreement to be signed and a new transitional president to be appointed. Weeks later, the UN created a new mission (UNMIL) with 15,000 troops to take charge of the disarmament process. The beginning of December saw the initiation of the handover of weapons by government forces, the LURD and the MODEL, though this took place in an atmosphere of uncertainty due to the insufficient deployment of peace-keeping forces and the continuing confrontations between forces loyal to C. Taylor and UNMIL, when the former demanded payment of the money that they had stipulated in order to hand in their weapons. The disarmament process is aimed at demobilising 40,000 combatants in three settlement areas, but the LURD has imposed the condition of obtaining a series of Government posts that were promised in the peace agreements signed in August. In the middle of December, the disarmament programme had to be temporarily suspended due to UNMIL's lack of resources. An International Donor Conference is planned for February 2004 to pay for the country's reconstruction. In Senegal (Casamance), there have been approaches throughout the year between the Government and the moderate wing of the MFDC group, which announced the end of the armed conflict in October, though the absence of some factions of the group led to doubts regarding the final end of the conflict.

c) Horn of Africa

In the Horn of Africa region, the process in Somalia continued to advance slowly, avoiding the various obstacles put in its way since the Reconciliation Conference held in Arta (Djibouti) in 2000 and the formation of a Transitional National Government, though this Government really only exercises control over the country's capital. The peace conference in Kenya, which began in October 2002 under the auspices of IGAD, continued throughout 2003 against a background of constant criticism regarding its efficacy and the pressures exerted by some IGAD member countries. The high number of delegates attending meetings was reduced, and several groups temporarily abandoned the process as a result of their disagreement with the decisions taken, misunderstandings with the TNG or the type of facilitation offered by IGAD. While this was going on, the capital was brought to a standstill on several occasions by demonstrations in support of peace, organised by women's groups. A peace agreement was signed in July establishing a Federal Government and a 351-member Parliament. A short time later, the country's President and the leaders of some armed groups abandoned the peace conference, which was temporarily suspended to give all of those absent time to return to the negotiations. In October, Djibouti (a member of IGAD) temporarily abandoned the peace conference and made a call for greater involvement by the international community. Shortly afterwards, in November, a contact group was formed by countries supporting the process, and Djibouti returned to the peace conference. Finally, in December, various leaders who were taking part in the Kenya peace conference announced that if these talks had not ended by the middle of January they would begin a new peace conference within Somalia itself.

Finally, the peace process in **Sudan** has been consolidated during the year, with seven rounds of negotiations being held in Kenya, also under the auspices of IGAD. The country's President and Vice president met with the leader of the SPLA group, who also had an interview at the end of the year with the UN Secretary General in New York. During the year, preliminary agreements were reached on various issues, such as the holding of a donor conference in the Netherlands in April, to raise funds for the country's reconstruction. An

important agreement on military and security issues was reached in September, under which it was accepted that two different Armed Forces would coexist with different command and control structures over an interim period of six years, with the withdrawal from the south of the country of 80% of the Sudanese army, the maintenance of 80% of the SPLA's forces and the formation of a joint unit of 10,000 soldiers from both sides. Issues concerning the sharing of political power and the status of the country's three southern regions remained pending. In December, the SPLA sent a «goodwill» delegation to Khartoum for the first time

The peace process in Sudan has been consolidated during the year, with seven rounds of negotiations being held in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD.

in 20 years to meet representatives of the Government, and a general amnesty was agreed once the peace agreement had been signed and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission formed to expose those guilty of war crimes. Agreement was also reached regarding the distribution of oil revenues and the formation of a unified army. Away from its negotiations with the SPLA, the Sudanese Government began talks with the

SLMA group which had emerged in the region of **Darfur** in February. A ceasefire was agreed on various occasions, along with the unrestricted access of humanitarian assistance to the region, and the end of the year saw an attempt to begin peace talks with mediation from Chad, though the SMLA accused the Chadian mediators of favouring the interests of the Sudanese Government, leading the President of Chad to withdraw from the mediation process and break off the talks. In December, the Presidents of Sudan and Chad agreed to organise a conference with the participation of all the tribal communities in the Darfur region, with the aim of ending the armed conflict.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In the Great Lakes region, the process in **Burundi** made great strides forward during the course of the year. In October 2002, after talks in Tanzania and South Africa, the first ceasefire was agreed with two of the four armed opposition groups (the FDD led by J. B. Ndayikengurukiye and A. Mugabarabona's FNL). This led to the return of their leaders (exiled in January 2003) and their appointment to ministerial posts in May, and the beginning of the demobilisation process, though slowly. However, as far as P. Nkurunziza's FDD were concerned, the ceasefire agreement signed in January was broken immediately and fighting began again. After holding various meetings in Tanzania and South Africa, this group finally signed a preliminary peace agreement in October, going on in November to sign a global peace agreement that included issues relating to the distribution of political and military power. All of this allowed for P. Nkurunziza's return to the country in December and the initiation of a process aimed at integrating this group into the Armed Forces, where they would hold 40% of the senior posts. After this agreement, the Burundi Government granted three months to A. Rwasa's FNL to begin negotiations, as it is the only armed group that is continuing to fight. A brief preliminary meeting was held with representatives of the group in Nairobi at the beginning of December, but this broke down because the group only wanted to negotiate with the Tutsi community and the Armed Forces, and not with representatives of the Government. Finally, in December, the Vice President of South Africa and facilitator in the Burundi peace process, called on the UN Security Council to take control of the AU's peace-keeping operation (AMIB), and a short time later the UN Security Council decided to send a peace-keeping mission to the country.

In **Congo**, the Government reached a cessation of hostilities agreement with the Ninja militias in March, with a gradual demobilisation process and the introduction of a reintegration programme through the UNDP. The militias were granted an amnesty in September, and the end of the year saw the beginning of a final disarmament programme with around a thousand former combatants joining the Armed Forces and the Police.

In **DR Congo**, following the Pretoria Agreement reached in December 2002 as part of the Inter-Congole-se Dialogue, which included ceasefire agreements, the creation of a two-year Transitional Government and the sharing of political power, the Sun City Peace Agreement was signed in April by all the parties involved in the conflict (the Government, the RCD-Goma and the MLC), agreeing to the creation of a Transitional Government and the holding of elections after two years. Nevertheless, fighting continued in several parts of the country bordering Uganda and Rwanda, where various armed groups and militias operate. In June, the UN authorised the deployment by the EU of an Emergency Multinational Provisional Force to promote security in these regions, and this was subsequently replaced by a UN mission (MONUC). December saw the beginning of the integration of armed opposition groups into the unified Armed Forces. It is hoped that in three months time, 3,700 soldiers will have been trained to work with MONUC to bring peace to the region of Ituri. Turning to the conflict in **Uganda** between the Government and the LRA armed opposition group, the EU and UN prepared a peace plan at the end of the year in an attempt to resolve the conflict.

e) Maghreb

In the case of **Western Sahara**, the UN Security Council has continued to renew MINURSO's mandate, and the Secretary General named a new Special Representative, A. de Soto, to assist in negotiations. Although the POLISARIO Front finally accepted the plan presented by J. Baker, Morocco rejected it, arguing that the solution should be found through direct talks between Morocco and Algeria, and purely on the basis of a

system of autonomy. At the end of the year, the POLISARIO Front and the UN Secretary General's Special Representative agreed on the final points aimed at implementing several trust-building measures.

America

In the Mexican region of **Chiapas**, particular mention should be made of the fact that the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights and Basic Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, R. Stavenhagen, called on the Mexican Government in June to reform the Indigenous Rights and Cultures Act approved in 2001. In August, the Government issued a communiqué inviting the EZLN to begin talks in order to bring peace to Chiapas, looking favourably on the demilitarisation of the Zapatista movement, which for its part had decided unilaterally to implement the San Andres Agreements. Subsequently, in October, the Government declared that it had met the conditions set out by the EZLN for a return to talks, but the reappearance of paramilitary groups in the region and the Armed Forces' complaints about access to the indigenous communities led to doubts concerning the potential for real rapprochement.

In **Colombia**, the demobilisation of the AUC forces has begun following the signing of the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement in July, which set out a timetable for this process to end in December 2005. It was not possible to begin negotiations with the ELN and the FARC during the course of the year, though the release of one of the leaders of the first of these two groups has opened up the possibility of better communications with the guerrillas, as demonstrated by the meeting between the same leader and the President of Colombia in November. For its part, the UNDP published a Human Development Report on Colombia in which it proposed open talks that would allow for negotiations and a negotiated settlement that would have great repercussions throughout the country.

Asia

a) Continental Asia and Sri Lanka

The tensions between **DPR Korea** and USA have gradually abated during the course of the year, with the acceptance by the former of trilateral talks with China, followed by six-sided talks with China, Russia, Japan, the Korean Republic and the USA. In October, US President G. W. Bush stated that he was willing to offer the North Koreans a written guarantee of non-aggression in return for the ending of its nuclear programme. At the end of the year, the Korean Republic, the USA and Japan signed a declaration for the relaun-

ching of negotiations with DPR Korea in coordinated stages that would guarantee security in this latter country. This agreement would include the abandonment of DPR Korea's nuclear programme in return for aid in the form of heavy fuel and electricity, while the USA would exclude the country from its list of countries sponsoring terrorism and lift its economic sanctions. By contrast, the talks on China's disputed claim on **Tibet** have not made any progress this year, in spite of the arrival in China during June of two emissaries from the Dalai Lama. The visit by this Nobel Peace laureate to the USA in September led to protests from the Chinese Government.

The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has progressed quite satisfactorily, particularly in view of the many trust-building measures introduced by both countries.

The dispute between **India** and **Pakistan** over Kashmir has progressed quite satisfactorily, particularly in view of the many trust-building measures introduced by both countries, such as the resumption of the bus service between their two capitals, invitations by both Prime Ministers to visit each others' countries, the mutual release of imprisoned fishermen, etc., and in spite of the missile tests carried out by both countries during the first months of the year. In May, both parties resumed diplomatic relations and appointed high commissioners to negotiate a solution to the conflict in Kashmir. In November they called a ceasefire along the border Line of Control, and the Pakistani President reiterated a peace proposal from which all the solutions found unacceptable by one or other of the parties would be removed. He also expressed his willingness to

agree to a mutual withdrawal of troops. At the end of the year, a visiting diplomatic team from the USA proposed that the Line of Control should not become a permanent international border and that Kashmir should become an autonomous region that included zones administered both by India and by Pakistan. It is also important to point out that the APHC, which combines various independence parties from Jammu and Kashmir, declared in November that it was drawing up a «road map» that would provide solutions for territorial disputes, in response to the offer made by the Indian Government. Finally, in December, Pakistan offered an opportunity to waive the holding of a referendum on the status of Kashmir, something that India had always rejected, and both parties agreed to resume border patrols and rail services.

In the region of **Nagaland (India)**, the end of the year saw the end of a round of negotiations that had been held since May in Bangkok between the Indian Government and the NSCN-IM armed opposition group. In spite of the fact that both parties confirmed that significant progress had been made on some issues, the question of the unification of the entire territory inhabited by the Nagas remains pending. The NSCN-IM has maintained a ceasefire with the Government since August 1997, the date on which they agreed to hold negotiations at the highest level in a neutral country. At the end of the year they agreed to hold a new round of negotiations in New Delhi.

In **Myanmar**, progress has been cautious in the process aimed at the country's reconciliation and democratisation. As occurred in the previous year, the Military Junta released prisoners each time the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy or the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the country paid a visit. In September, the Military Junta once again placed Nobel Peace laureate A. S. Suu Kyi under house arrest.

By contrast, the process in **Sri Lanka** has remained active throughout the year, though it experienced a serious crisis during the final months of 2003. Rounds of negotiations have been held in Thailand, Germany and Japan, with mediation from Norway. In February, the LTTE armed opposition group publicly renounced terrorism, and the following month saw agreement on a federal system based on internal self-determination within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. A significant crisis arose in April, when the USA prevented delegates from the LTTE from travelling to the US in order to attend preparations for the donor conference to be held in Japan in June. July saw the beginning of a long period in which delegates form the LTTE consulted constitutionalists in various countries to discuss their proposals for an interim administration based on the sharing of power for a period of six years, after which a new constitution would be discussed that would reinforce minority rights, with the calling of a referendum. At the end of the year, however, an internal crisis between the country's President and Prime Minister brought the negotiation process to a standstill, since the Prime Minister believed that without control over the Ministry of Defence he could not guarantee the continuation of the peace process. The Muslim SLMC group, which wants to participate in the peace process, delivered its proposals on the internal administration of the northeast of the country to both the Government and the LTTE.

b) The Pacific

Turning to the **Philippines**, exploratory meetings were held in Malaysia during the first three months of the year with a view to continuing negotiations with the MILF armed opposition group. This group renounced terrorism in June, which subsequently allowed the Government to withdraw its orders for the arrest of the group's leaders. In July, Malaysia expressed a willingness to lead a group to confirm the ceasefire, which would comprise countries from the OIC. For its part, the Government offered the MILF a degree of autonomy in the south of the country and the creation of a trust fund for the development of Mindanao. However, the MILF declared at the end of the year that it was probable that no definitive agreement would be reached until after the elections of May 2004. In December, the MILF demanded that the Government meet certain undertakings made in March, such as the withdrawal of the orders for the arrest of its leaders, the withdrawal of its Armed Forces from certain areas and the deployment of an international observer team. As regards the NPA armed opposition group, fighting has continued and it has not been possible for any negotiations to begin, even though both the Armed Forces and the NPA declared a temporary ceasefire during the Christmas festivities.

Europe

The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has remained at a stalemate and subject to the ups and downs of internal politics in both countries. The President of Azerbaijan continued to make his repeated criticisms of the OSCE's mediation. In August, given his serious illness, the President of Azerbaijan appointed his son, I. Aliyev, as Prime Minister, and the latter initially stated that he was very disinclined to maintain negotiations with Armenia. However, in December, after French, Russian and US mediators from the Minsk Group had visited the Azeri Government, the Presidents of both countries met in Geneva, agreeing to resume the direct talks that had been broken off in August 2002. At the end of the year, members of both the Armenian and Azeri parliaments met in Scotland and ratified their undertaking to continue talks aimed at achieving peace. As regards the semi-autonomous region of Abkhazia (Georgia), The Secretary General's Group of Friends met in Geneva at the beginning of the year with the aim of speeding up the return of displaced people, rehabilitating the area and improving security. Shortly afterwards, the Sochi Agreement was reached between Georgia and Russia for the return of displaced people, the resumption of the rail link between Abkhazia and Russia and an increase in trust-building measures. However, In September the President of Georgia was forced to resign as a result of the political tensions that arose following the elections. In December, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Abkhazia, H. Tagliavini, confirmed that the Abkhaz party was willing to continue the round of negotiations in February 2004 with the new Georgian Government after the presidential elections of January 2004, if the Government undertook not to return to hostilities.

In Cyprus, the year began with massive demonstrations by Turkish Cypriots demanding the resignation of their President, who was opposed to the UN peace plan. Faced with this situation, the UN proceeded with the withdrawal of its plan in March, ending the mediation of the Secretary General's Special Envoy. After this setback, however, the leaders of both communities began a process of rapprochement with the introduction of trust-building measures that allowed for the opening of the «green line» and the lifting of the many restrictions that had existed up to that point. At the end of the year, the UN once again insisted that the parties negotiate its peace plan, but the elections in the Turkish part of Cyprus in December, which ended the deadlock between government and opposition parties, initially impeded any progress in the unification process. However, as the year ended, Turkish Cypriot President R. Denktash appointed the leader of the RTP party (a pro-European who supports the UN plan) to form a new Government before 1 March 2004, acknowledging that the elections had shown that the electorate supported the island's reunification, though not at any price.

Middle East

After the failure of the application of the Road Map proposed by the Diplomatic Quartet in December 2002, the conflict between Israel and Palestine has continued to display the habitual levels of violence and spiralling action and reaction with which it has been characterised. The Israeli Government has rejected the Road Map from the outset, presenting an alternative plan. A temporary ceasefire was achieved in the middle of the year with various armed Palestinian groups, but a subsequent attack brought the peace process to a complete standstill. November saw the publication of a civilian alternative known as the "Geneva Pact", prepared jointly by Palestinian and Israeli groups, and this received the support of the US administration, the UN and a broad sector of public opinion on an international scale. Finally, the negotiations being held in Cairo ended in December without a ceasefire being reached between armed Palestinian groups and the Israeli Armed Forces.

By way of conclusion, it should be mentioned that the most frequent difficulties encountered in current peace process relate both to the form in which they are being held and the people and bodies intervening in the processes, as well as the fundamental problems that originally gave rise to the need for negotiations. A study of the points of crisis and the deterioration of negotiation processes carried out during 2003 indicates that the most usual reasons for crisis were problems with the people or bodies charged with mediating, the inability to overcome a lack of trust between the parties, the lack of secu-

The most frequent difficulties encountered in current peace process relate both to the form in which they are being held and the people and bodies intervening in the processes, as well as the fundamental problems that originally gave rise to the need for negotiations.

rity guarantees for negotiations, violations of ceasefires and disagreements regarding the form that peace negotiations should take, as shown in the following table. A better knowledge of these crises would have permitted the adoption of the adjustments and assistance necessary in order to restore trust in the continuation of the various processes.

Table C1. Some factors leading to crises, breakdowns or deterioration in peace negotiations

- 1. Problems with the **individuals** or **bodies charged with mediation**Armenia/Azerbaijan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, DPR Korea, Georgia, India/Pakistan, Israel/Palestine, Liberia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan
- 2. Inability to overcome a **lack of trust** between parties Armenia/Azerbaijan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, DPR Korea, Indonesia (Aceh), Israel/Palestine, Liberia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Uganda
- 3. Problems of **security** in order to engage in negotiations *Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Indonesia (Aceh), Israel/Palestine, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uganda*
- 4. Ceasefire violations

Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Indonesia (Aceh), India/Pakistan, Israel/Palestine, Liberia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan

- 5. Disagreements regarding the **format of the negotiating process**Cyprus, DPR Korea, DR Congo, India/Pakistan, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Uganda
- 6. Differences over the **agenda** to be discussed or its interpretation *Differences over the agenda to be discussed or its interpretation*
- 7. Problems in ensuring that the **Armed Forces** comply with the agreements made regarding their status *Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Indonesia (Aceh), Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan*
- 8. Refusal to give way on **substantial issues**Armenia/Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Indonesia (Aceh), Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan
- 9. Difficulties relating to **disarmament**, demobilisation or the standing down of troops Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Indonesia (Aceh), Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka
- 10. Presence or **negative support from third parties** *Côte d'Ivoire, DPR Korea, Georgia, India/Pakistan, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Somalia, Uganda*
- 11. Disagreements regarding the **sharing of political power** *Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan*
- 12. Problems within the **negotiating teams** *Burundi, DPR Korea, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Somalia, Uganda*
- 13. Lack of recognition for one of the parties as a valid interlocutor Armenia/Azerbaijan, Burundi, Georgia, Israel/Palestine, Nepal
- 14. Treatment of groups classified as **terrorists** *Philippines, India/Pakistan, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Sri Lanka*
- 15. **Arms-trading** and rearmament *DPR Korea, Georgia, India/Pakistan, Philippines, Uganda*

Other factors: Internal divisions, impunity, external military or financial pressure, lack of control over individual groups, the presence of new parties, changes to the initial agenda, failure to comply with earlier agreements, insufficient consultations, lack of financial support, etc.

D. Post-war rehabilitation (international involvement)

Post-war rehabilitation means the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling: 1) the maintenance of security, priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; 2) physical reconstruction and the reconstruction of basic institutions; 3) the resolution of basic incompatibilities (i.e. social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); 4) reconciliation, a respect for human rights, the fight against impunity; 5) the regional dimension, along with reintegration in international forums; and 6) the empowerment of local civilian society and the construction of good governance through international involvement.

Indicator number 4, which is used in the preparation of this section, analyses the **evolution of international aid and post-war rehabilitation** in three groups of countries or territories. The first group includes those countries or territories that can be considered to be in a phase of post-war rehabilitation and in which post-war rehabilitation (PWR) is progressing reasonably well. This includes only those cases in which the post-war phase is considered to have begun in 1994 or later.²⁰ The second group includes countries or territories in which the end of hostilities came about as the result of a clear victory by one of the parties or in which, in spite of the existence of a peace agreement, this agreement is not fulfilled, thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work. Finally, the third group of countries or territories analysed are those which, while still in a phase of post-war rehabilitation, are receiving a considerable level of international aid that can be classified as post-war, this aid being frequently used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit of an agreement that will lead to an end to hostilities. Table D.1 summarises the evolution of the different dimensions by which the post-war rehabilitation process can be measured.

Table D1. Evolution of post-	war reha	bilitatio	n				
	SD	HR	RBIS	Res	HRIR	Reg Int	CEGG
Afghanistan (2001)	В	В	F	В	F	F	F
Angola (2002)	F	В	F	F	F	F	F
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996)	G	F	G	F	F	G	F
Congo (2003)	F	F	В	F	F	F	F
DR Congo (2003)	В	В	F	F	В	F	F
Côte d'Ivoire (2003)	В	В	В	В	В	F	F
Eritrea (2000)	В	В	F	F	F	В	F
Guatemala (1996)	В	F	F	В	В	F	F
Guinea-Bissau (1999)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Iraq (2003)	В	В	F	В	В	В	В
Liberia (2003)	В	В	В	F	В	F	В
Macedonia, FRY(2001)	F	F	G	F	F	G	F
Papua New-Guinea (Bougainville) (2001)	G	G	G	F	G	G	G
Central African Republic (2003)	F	В	F	F	F	F	F
Rwanda (1994)	F	F	F	В	В	F	F
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1999)	В	F	F	В	В	F	F
Sierra Leone (2001)	F	В	F	F	F	В	F
Tajikistan (1997)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Timor-Leste (1999)	F	G	G	F	F	F	F

NOTE 1. SD: Security and demilitarisation; HR: Humanitarian and resettlement of population; RBIS: Physical reconstruction and reconstruction of basic institutional services; Res: Resolution of basic problems (social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); HRIR: Respect for human rights, fight against impunity and reconciliation; Reglnt: Regional dimension and (re)integration in international forums; CEGG: Civil empowerment and good governance (assignment of control from international to local authorities).

NOTE 2. The date shown in brackets alongside each country is the year taken as the starting point for analysing post-war aid.

NOTE 3. B: Bad - serious problems of implementation, F: Fair - displaying some significant difficulties; G: Good - evolving favourably.

^{20.} The reason for choosing this date is that this was when, at the initiative of the Danish Cooperation Agency (Danida), one of the most notable attempts at analysis and self-criticism occurred from an international aid perspective in respect of the atrocities that took place in Rwanda, in which between 500,000 and 800,000 people were murdered in the space of only three months.

The number of countries that received a notable amount of international aid for peace building or post-war rehabilitation during 2003 is calculated as being 19. In some cases, such as Afghanistan, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq and Liberia, this aid had to be provided against a background of extreme insecurity. Indeed, the tension that existed in certain areas of the countries mentioned clearly took the form of wartime aid, meaning that these contexts are also analysed in this report in the section dealing with armed conflicts.²¹

The number of countries that received a notable amount of international aid for peace building or post-war rehabilitation during 2003 is calculated as being 19.

Apart from the 19 cases analysed here, there are others in which an analysis of international aid for peace construction and post-war rehabilitation is also relevant, in spite of the fact they relate to contexts that are still in an armed phase or in which peace processes have reached stalemate. These cases, which include Burundi, Palestine, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan, are analysed in the sections dealing with armed conflicts and negotiations, and they are mentioned here only in response to the fact that they are cases in which aid for peace building

and post-war rehabilitation is being used as an incentive by international negotiators with a view to facilitating agreement between the parties in the conflict.

Otherwise, following the pattern used for other sections, we should point out the links between different processes in a single region, to the extent that the favourable progress of post-war peace depends in great measure on how tensions, conflicts and peace processes are evolving in neighbouring contexts.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

Africa is the continent with the most cases of post-war rehabilitation, and many of these are to be found in Central Africa and around the Great Lakes. One of the most recent is the case of **Angola**, where Peace Agreements were signed in Luena in 2002. The UN mission (UNMA), which had supervised implementation of the Agreements from 15 August 2002 onwards, completed its mandate and withdrew from the country in February. Since then, the UN has succeeded in contributing to the country's rehabilitation through the Office of the Resident Coordinator. The main obstacles to peace construction related to security issues, humanitarian needs and basic services, all of which are analysed in other sections of this report. To this should be added the existence of thousands of soldiers who have been demobilised and are awaiting reintegration. The implementation of political, economic and judicial reforms is progressing slowly, particularly in terms of improved transparency, accountability and control over the profits obtained from the sale of oil. However, positive developments include UNITA's gesture in apologising publicly for its involvement in and responsibility for the loss of thousands of lives during the 27-year war, which human rights groups interpreted as an important step forward in the reconciliation process in the country, calling on the Government follow suit.

b) West Africa

This is one of the regions in which the evolution of the different processes for peace building in the countries involved is clearly inter-related. Peace in **Sierra Leone**, which entered a post-war phase in 2001, was conditioned to a great extent by the problems in the implementation of the agreements signed in 2003 both in neighbouring **Liberia**, and in **Côte d'Ivoire**, while **Guinea-Bissau** experienced a situation of political tension and economic crisis following the end of the war in 1999. All of these inter-linked relationships led the UN Secretary General to urge that the international involvement in these peace building processes was also

^{21.} A case that warrants particular comment is that of the Indonesian province of Aceh, which at the beginning of the year was analysed as a post-war context, but during the course of the year began to be seen exclusively as a region of armed conflict, given the enormous difficulties involved in carrying out rehabilitation work.

regional, which should involve a more coordinated approach among the different international agencies operating in each of the countries involved. We will nevertheless now concentrate on some of the individual characteristics of each of these cases

In **Côte d'Ivoire**, the Government and the three opposition groups (MPCI, MPIGO and MJP), which had been fighting since 19 September 2002, officially declared an end to the war in summer 2003. The UN Security Council Mission was a determining factor in both sides reaching agreement. Since then, the priority has been to guarantee security as a prelude to hundreds of people returning to their places of origin. The Government's approval allowed for the establishment of a timetable for the demobilisation and integration of former combatants into the Armed Forces, though this issue was seen as particularly controversial.

For its part, **Guinea-Bissau** has been experiencing a situation of political tension and economic crisis since the war ended in 1999. A coup d'état in September (which many sources classified as bloodless) overthrew President, K. Yala, and a committee that included both civilian and military members was formed with the mandate of restoring constitutional order and holding elections in January 2004. As regards international involvement, the UN continued to lead international efforts through its mission for political support and peace building in the country (UNOGBIS).

In Liberia, the Government and the LURD and MODEL armed opposition groups signed a peace agreement in August in Accra (Ghana), after 14 years of hostilities. This agreement established that President C. Taylor must leave the country, while an interim Government comprising representatives from all the political groups and several civilian bodies would take charge of running the country from the middle of October until the elections planned for the end of 2005. As regards the post-war phase, the most notable occurrence was that the persisting high levels of instability in the area put pressure on the various international troops belon-

ging to ECOWAS and the United Nations, and seriously impeded the progress of the different phases.

Turning to **Sierra Leone**, troops from both UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Armed Forces organised joint patrols for the first time along the border with Guinea, and in the middle of the year 1,000 Armed Forces

Peace in Sierra Leone was conditioned to a great extent by the problems in the neighbouring Liberia.

troops were demobilised, though the lack of funds impeded other equally necessary programmes, such as the reintegration of child soldiers. The return of refugees is still very slow and the humanitarian situation is extremely bad. On the positive side, it should be mentioned that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission heard more than 450 witnesses and expected to be able to release its final report at the end of 2004.

c) Horn of Africa

The implementation of the Algeria Agreements of 2000 between **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia** continued against a background of tension between the two countries in relation to border demarcation, in spite of the fact that UNMEE stated that there had been no notable altercations and that the demobilisation of the Ethiopian Armed Forces was continuing. The risk of widespread famine continues to be high as a result of the drought and the low levels of international aid. Mines (some of them laid recently) restrict the movement of the civilian population and, in Eritrea in particular, economic and institutional recovery continues to be conditioned by high levels of illiteracy and unemployment and poor skills. The AU was unable to complete its report on the causes of the war (1998-2000), which meant that, in addition to other unresolved issues, the identity of the 220 corpses found in an area of Eritrea that had been occupied by Ethiopia has not yet been determined. Meanwhile, Eritrea continues to accuse Ethiopia of wanting to hide the number of Ethiopian victims which caused the war in the first place.

d)) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In March, the Government and the Ninja Militias led by Reverend Ntoumi signed an Agreement in **Congo**. The Ninja militias promised to arrange a weapons handover and to collaborate in the restoration of freedom

of movement and law and order in the Pool region, while the Government undertook to extend the amnesty law decreed four years previously to the Ninjas and to facilitate their reintegration when a large number of their factions demobilised. Prisoner exchanges had taken place by the end of 2003, along with the voluntary handover of weapons. The terms governing demobilisation had been discussed, and the UN Assembly established a National Human Rights Commission (as set out in the Constitution approved by referendum in January 2002).

The Sun City (South Africa) Agreement was also signed in April 2003, an agreement that affected neighbouring **DR Congo**. This represented a step forward in the so-called Inter-Congolese Dialogue and opened the way to the creation of a Transitional Government. However, in spite of the Agreements signed, tension continued to be high in the provinces of North and South Kivu, where there was even talk of genocide, and in the Ituri region, which resulted in the temporary presence of an Interim Multinational European Force (the Artemis mission) between June and September, the duties of which have since been taken over by the United Nations (MONUC).

The evolving situation in DR Congo also influenced the peace building process in neighbouring **Rwanda** (and vice versa), where the difficulties involved in democratic normalisation, respect for human rights and the handing down of justice to those accused of participating in the genocide of 1994 were still apparent. The referendum on the Constitution, approved by more than 90% of voters, along with the presidential elections in which P. Kagame was re-elected, were both processes in which international observers complained of irregularities and coercion on the part of the Government against the opposition. Nevertheless, at a regional level, the talks aimed at holding an international conference on peace, security and democracy in the Great Lakes region continue to make good progress, with participation from representatives from Burundi, Kenya, DR Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, under the auspices of the United Nations and the African Union. One of the aims of the conference must consist of developing a Marshall Plan for the region, as well as consolidating the peace processes in Burundi and DR Congo.

The Central African Republic is one of the places in which the post-war phase began in March, not with an agreement but with a coup d'état, led by F. Bozizé. Since then, the lack of security and serious violations of human rights have continued to impede the return of many displaced people and refugees, many of whom are former combatants. In the political arena, mention should be made of the establishment of a Transitional National Council, which includes all the country's political groups and is charged with preparing the 2004 elections, along with the wording of a new Constitution. The UN mission, BONUCA, was entrusted with the international supervision of the process, with support from the CEMAC peace-keeping mission.

America

On the American continent, interest centred above all on Central America, particularly **Guatemala**. In spite of the existence of Peace Agreements dating from 1996, their implementation continues to be complicated, particularly in relation to issues of democratic and institutional normalisation, and there has consequently been no response to matters such as impunity, corruption, security, the human rights situation, interference from the Army and discrimination against indigenous peoples. There was also much criticism of the excessive amount spent on the Armed Forces and the failure to dissolve the Presidential Chiefs of Staff (a military intelligence organisation).

Asia and the Pacific

In **Central Asia**, the construction of peace in Afghanistan, and particularly the difficulties that this process has been facing since the signing of the Bonn Agreements in 2001, had an effect in turn on the development of the situation in neighbouring Tajikistan, where a peace agreement was signed in 1997. More specifically, the situation in **Afghanistan** continued to be one of a complete lack of security, particularly outside

the capital,²² which led to several NGOs and international bodies choosing to withdraw their personnel and close their offices, while at the same time advising against the return of thousands of people who remain displaced or living as refugees in neighbouring countries. In the area of political reconstruction, special mention should be made of the establishment in December of a new constituent Loya Jirga, whose powers include the drawing up of a Constitution and the organisation of elections for March 2004. The mandate of the UN mission (UNAMA) was extended until March 2004, while the International Forces (ISAF) broadened their mandate outside the capital. Turning to Tajikistan, mine-clearing work continues at a good pace, particularly on the border with Uzbekistan. However, poor governance and corruption, along with poverty and high unemployment, led to the reappearance of mafia groups linked with drug-trafficking, along with armed opposition groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir. As regards international involvement, in spite of the fact that the country had recently been receiving a lot of international aid, particularly following the war in Afghanistan, this aid was not properly coordinated, and in many cases the agencies did not have any long-term programmes. In spite of this fact, many organisations (including the WFP) began to redirect their emergency aid in order to reinforce development programmes.

Turning to the Asia Pacific region, the peace building processes underway in both Bougainville and Timor-Leste showed clear links with the tensions being experienced both with and in neighbouring Indonesia. As regards Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea, the middle of the year saw an end to the second phase of weapons collections, which allowed implementation of other aspects of the Agreement signed in 2001 by armed opposition groups and the Port Moresby Government, such as the drawing up of a Constitution, the calling of elections and the establishment of an autonomous government. Nevertheless, the former leader of the BRA armed opposition group and current leader of Bougainville's pro-independence militias, F. Ona, expressed his intention to remain in the mountains until independence had been recognised, though he indicated that he was not thinking of boycotting the peace process. International involvement continues to be led by the UN mission offering political support and peace construction. As regards Timor-Leste, the problems of post-war peace building revolved above all around respect for human rights and the fight against impunity. In this regard, while the Crimes Unit (assisted by the United Nations) and the Special Panel for Serious Crime in Timor-Leste condemned various pro-Indonesian leaders and leading police officers for perpetrating or collaborating in crimes committed in 1999, the authorities and the Indonesian courts acquitted many of those who were alleged to be responsible. On the positive side, mention should be made of the growing number of people who have wanted to participate in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's hearings and reconciliation programmes since its establishment more than a year ago. Faced with these difficulties, the UN decided to halt the withdrawal of UNMISET's military troops, strengthening the mission's policing component and extending its mandate until May 2004.

Europe

In respect of the post-war situation in the former Yugoslav Republics, special mention should be made of the Salonica Summit, at which the EU offered the leaders of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania, membership in the medium term, on the condition that they halt

their ethnic quarrels, make progress on the path to peaceful coexistence and complete the democratisation of their countries. The EU also called EU offered the leaders of Croatia, on Balkan leaders to hand over those accused of war crimes to the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, calling also for the and Montenegro, Macedonia and return of all refugees and displaced people and for greater efforts to be made against organised crime, the trafficking of women and illegal immigration. Nevertheless, each of these countries has individual characteristics that warrant specific examination.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia Albania, membership in the medium term.

Seven years after the signing of the Dayton Agreements, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains relatively stable without notable violent episodes. However, among the problems still to be resolved is the fact that half the people who abandoned their homes during the war have not yet been able to return, and there is a growing lack of trust among the international community in relation to the country's institutions, the risk of economic crisis and the political status of the city of Brcko, which is temporarily under the administration of international agents. As regards the massacre in Srebrenica (a mainly Muslim town in Bosnia and Herzegovina where more than 7,000 people were killed in 1995 by Bosnian Serb forces), a Dutch parliamentary investigation criticised the actions of the Dutch troops involved in the UN peace-keeping mission for not preventing the massacre and not having informed the Ministry of Defence of the situation. It also denounced the lack of action by the United Nations itself. On the other hand, the presence of a delegation from Republika Srpska at the funeral for the victims of the Srebrenica massacre, and the inauguration of the first mosque in a mainly Serbian part of Bosnia were seen as positive signs in terms of reconciliation.

As regards the Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia**, the situation of relative stability experienced until now was complicated by the resumption in the autumn of fighting between the Armed Forces and members of the ELN and ENA guerrilla groups after a two-year ceasefire. This resulted in several people being killed and thousands fleeing the area of fighting. In spite of this, the EU decided to replace its military mission (Concordia) with a police mission (Proxima), while ECHO decided to end its humanitarian aid programmes in 2003. Both of these circumstances show that, for the EU, the country was clearly entering a phase of normalisation following the signing of the Ohrid Agreements in 2001.

Turning to Kosovo, in **Serbia** and **Montenegro**, the basic problems still relate to instability and inter-community tensions and the eventual status of Kosovo, an issue that was strongly conditioned by the political instability in Serbia and Montenegro. This instability became clear on issues such as the transformation of Yugoslavia into the Federal State of Serbia and Montenegro, the successive annulments of presidential elections due to insufficient turnout, the murder of Prime Minister Z. Djindjic and the sharp increase in support for the ultra-nationalists in the December elections. For its part, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) began to transfer certain powers to the Kosovo administration, such as the management of the integration of minority groups and the return of refugees and displaced people, though it retained control of defence and security, as well as the management of foreign aid and the reform of the justice system.

Middle East

In relation to the Middle East, the most relevant case from a post-war point of view is undoubtedly that of Iraq, though its evolution has also been dependent on how the conflicts affecting other parts of the region (Iran, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank) have developed. These are analysed in other parts of this report. Analysis of the post-war issue in Iraq begins with the declaration on the first of May by US President G.W. Bush in which he declared an end to the main combat operations that the US and British troops, among others, had been engaging in against the Government of S. Hussein. There was no agreement of any kind between the combatant parties, but instead a declaration of victory by one of them. Since then, there has been a proliferation of attacks against both military personnel and international aid organisations, and these have not abated, even following the detention in December of S. Hussein, which demonstrates the independent nature of the so-called Iraqi resistance in relation to the deposed regime. As regards the physical issue of reconstruction, the American-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established an Iragi Governing Council to decide on a new system of government and appoint its ministers. Among other duties, this government is charged with preparing the draft of a new Constitution. The CPA also assumed responsibility for distributing reconstruction contracts to a value of 18,000 dollars among the countries who had backed the military offensive against the Iraqi regime, while excluding companies from countries such as France and Germany which had opposed the said offensive. At the end of the year it had not yet been established whether S. Hussein, held up to that time by US forces, should be tried by an exclusively Iraqi court or a court composed of both Iraqi and international judges, as had been called for by several human rights NGOs.

	. Main internatior			iii post ii			
Country	Peace agreement, agreements for the cessation of hostilities (ACH) or victory by one of the sides involved Bonn Agreements (2001)	UN - Security Council 2003	Political support missions (UNDPA, UNDP or others)	International military/ police presence	Consolidated call from the UN 2003-2004	UN Secretary General / EU Envoy or Representative	ECHO office on the eground
Aighanistan	Borni Agreements (2001)	1510	UNDP	ISAF (military)	2003	EU	^
Angola	Memorandum of understanding (2002) and Lusaka Agreements (1994)	1459			2003		X
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dayton Agreements (1995)	1481 1491 1503 1504	OHR UNDP	SFOR (NATO) EUMP (EU, police)		EU EURg	
Burundi	In negotiation		UNOB Regional Office (Great Lakes) UNDP	AMIB (AU)	2003	UNRg EURg	X
Central African Republic	Coup d'état, March 2003		BONUCA UNDP		2003 (Rg)	UN	
Congo	ACH (March 2003)		UNDP		2003 (Rg)		
Congo, RD	ACH (April 2003, Pretoria; and December 2002, Sun City)	1457 1459 1468 1484 1489 1493 1499 1501	Regional Office (Great Lakes) UNDP	MONUC Artemis (EU, military, from June to September)	2003	UNRg EURg	X
Côte d'Ivoire	ACH (January 2003), Ceasefire (3/5/03)	1459 1464 1467 1479 1498 1514	MINUCI Regional Office (W. Africa) UNDP	MINUCI ECOWAS	2003	UNRg	X
Eritrea	ACH. Algeria Agreement (2000)	1466 1507	UNDP (Rg)	MINUEE		UN	
Ethiopia	ACH. Algeria Agreement (2000)	1466 1507	UNDP (Rg)	MINUEE		UN	
Gaza and West Bank	In negotiation	1488 1496	Regional Office (Middle East) UNDP		2003	UN EURg	
Guatemala	Agreement on a firm and lasting peace (1996)		MINUGUA UNDP			UN	
Guinea-Bissau	Coup d'État (1999). Further coup d'État (2003)	1467	UNOGBIS UNDP		2003 (Rg)	UNRg	
Iraq	Victory by the international coalition (led by the USA and the UK, among others)	1472 1476 1483 1490 1500 1511 1518	Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)	USA and allies (UK, Spain, Poland, et al.)	2003	UN	

Liberia	Accra Agreements (Ghana) (2003)	1458 1459 1467 1478 1497 1509 1521	Regional Office (W. Africa) UNDP (Rg)	UNMIL	2003	UN UNRg	
Macedonia, FRY	Ohrid Agreements (2001)	1481 1503 1504	UNDP (Rg)	Proxima (EU poli since December) Concordia (EU military from March to Decem		UN EU EURg	
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Port Moresby Agreements (2001)		UNPOB UNDP			UN	
Rwanda	End of the genocide and the assumption of power by the FPR (1994). Arusha Agreements (1993).		Regional Office (Great Lakes) UNDP		2003 (Rg)	UNRg EURg	
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)	UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)	1481 1503 1504	UNDP	UNMIK KFOR (NATO)		UN UERg	X
Sierra Leone	Abuja II Ceasefire Agreement (2001) and Lomé Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Revolutionary Front of Sierra Leone (1999)	1459 1467 1470 1492 1508	Regional office UNDP	UNAMSIL	2003	UNRg	X
Somalia	In negotiation	1474	UNPOS UNDP		2003	UN	Rg
Sri Lanka	ACH (February 2002)	1519	UNDP				
Sudan	In negotiation		UNDP		2003	UN	Χ
Tajikistan	Peace agreements (1997)		UNTOP UNDP		2003	UNEURg	Χ
Timor-Leste	'5 May Agreement' between Indonesia and Portugal for Timor-Leste to hold a referendum on self- determination and the establishment of UNAMET (1999)	1473 1480	UNDP	UNMISET		UN	

SC: UN Security Council UN: United Nations

UN Rg: UN Regional office / programme

EU: European Union

EU Rg: EU Regional office / programme

Several factors should be pointed out by way of conclusion. The diversity of issues and sub-indicators analysed in this section makes it difficult to establish whether there are any "model" cases, i.e. cases in which all aspects are progressing in a positive way. It is, however, possible to say that international involvement in post-war rehabilitation contributes, from a global perspective, to some of the peace building processes evolving reasonably well in certain aspects, though in each case they follow their own timetable. The cases in which examples of specific good practices can be found include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), Sierra Leone, Tajikistan and Timor-Leste. However, in other cases the high levels of tension and lack of security represent a serious obstacle to peace building. This is the case, for example, in DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Of all the aspects analysed, the one that seems to be working best is that of physical construction, probably

due to its greater visibility, which is very attractive for donors. By contrast, the empowerment of local agents and the transfer of power from international bodies to local authorities is the issue that generated the most uncertainty (in addition, many local and international organisations complained continually about the sharp reduction in aid budgets as the postwar phase in a particular context progressed and more media-friendly scenarios emerged), although there are some cases, such as Timor-Leste

Individual peace process progressed better when they were managed while taking internal regional links into account.

and Sierra Leone, where the handover of power from international bodies to local authorities occurred with notable success.


The existence of the Criminal Court, for its part, opened up new ways of ending the impunity of those who have committed genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity in many of these contexts. Nevertheless, the fact that many of the crimes were committed before the Court came into being, as is the case with the crimes attributed to S. Hussein for example, makes it impossible for such cases to be brought before this Court, a circumstance that has reawakened debate on the need to establish ad hoc courts with both local and international judges, of the kind that already exist in Sierra Leone.

Finally, it has also been observed that individual peace process progressed better when they were managed while taking internal regional links into account (see West Africa, Great Lakes, Balkans and Central Asia). In addition, multi-lateral efforts also produce better results, above all when the United Nations takes responsibility for leading international involvement in post-war rehabilitation, as compared with cases in which international involvement depends on a single country, particularly when this country was the USA, as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.

E. Humanitarian crises

In this report, the term «humanitarian crisis» is understood to mean any situation in which there is an exceptional and widespread threat to human life, health or subsistence. Such crises tend to occur in situations of poverty, fragile government and scarcity of food, in which a natural disaster or armed conflict lead to the appearance of a food crisis, disease and the enforced displacement of the population, either within or outside the country, along with an important mobilisation of international resources in the form of aid.

It should be pointed out that since the end of the Cold War, a certain type of humanitarian crisis known as a «complex emergency» has proliferated. Such phenomena, also known as «Complex Political Emergencies» are man-made situations in which victims arise due to the effect of armed conflict, displacements and famines, combined with a weakening or total collapse in economic and state structures, with the potential occurrence of a natural catastrophe. Complex Emergencies are different from crises because they last over long periods of time, they have fundamentally political origins and give rise to more serious humanitarian consequences. Although some of the contexts analysed in this report fall within the definition of complex emergencies, there are others that do not meet all the requirements, so we have opted for a broader concept that covers all the scenarios analysed below.



Source: the authors.

In this section we examine four indicators which point to the countries that have experienced humanitarian crises during 2003. Firstly, the reports issued by the FAO indicate that 39 countries experienced **food emergencies** during 2003 (indicator no. 5), 17 of which have displayed successive serious food shortage. Secondly, there is an examination of the evolution of **enforced population displacement** (indicators 7 and 8), both where they occur within a single country (internally displaced people, or IDPs) and where they involve refugees). In any case, it should be pointed out that, in the majority of contexts, situations involving internal displacement (50 countries) combine with the exodus of people fleeing as refugees to other countries (59). Finally, there is an analysis of the **UN's Consolidated Appeal Process** (CAP) (indicator no. 6). This indicates 28 countries (24 of which belong to Africa) that the organisation believes will need exceptional humanitarian aid during the coming year, which represents international recognition of a crisis situation. The

second part of this section contains an analysis of the evolution of international humanitarian aid during 2003.

Bearing in mind these four indicators, and weighing up the impact that each of them has had on the different contexts, it is considered that 37 countries suffered a humanitarian crisis during 2003. The criterion used was, on the one hand, that a country exhibits three or four of the indicators examined, i.e. there is a food emergency, there are enforced displacements among the population or the country is included in the UN CAP (this is the case in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Chechnya, Iraq and Tajikistan), or, on the other hand, that one of these indicators has a significant individual effect that leads to a situation of humanitarian crisis. By way of example, we could point to the cases of Colombia or Myanmar, due to the millions of people that have been displaced within the country or the food crisis suffered by some countries in southern Africa. It is also important to bear in mind that not all humanitarian crises are of the same intensity or virulence.

E1. Evolution of situations of humanitarian crisis

Africa has continued to be the continent that has experienced the majority of humanitarian crises (65%). This is a consequence of the persisting number of armed conflicts, the structural crisis being suffered by almost the entire continent and the fact that it has been largely forgotten by the international community, not only in terms of the media but also as regards aid. For its part, the population of Asia (16% of all crises) has continued to fall victim mainly to the effects of natural disasters and enforced population displacements. Europe (8%), America and the Caribbean (5%) and the Middle East (5%) complete the map of humanitarian crises recorded during 2003.

As regards their evolution, some situations of humanitarian crisis, such as the one affecting the countries in the Sahel region or those affecting some of the regions in southern Africa have shown ostensible improvements in comparison with the previous year. Nevertheless, there has also been a notable deterioration in contexts that should be paid particular attention, areas which we will now mention here. Firstly, the crisis sweeping across West Africa, mainly as a consequence of the armed conflicts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Secondly, the food emergency affecting 13 million people in Ethiopia and the humanitarian crisis that has erupted in the region of Darfur (western Sudan), both in the Horn of Africa. Thirdly, the continuing deterioration in the situation in Zimbabwe as a result of the drought, HIV/AIDS and the political and economic crisis. Fourthly, the political, social and economic disaster affecting the people of Haiti in the Caribbean. Finally, the humanitarian emergency in Iraq, which has been heightened as a result of the attacks perpetrated by the USA and the United Kingdom during the first three months of the year.

Africa

a) Southern Africa

Countries	Mains causes
Angola	Undergoing a process of post-war rehabilitation, return and resettlement
Lesotho	Impact of natural disasters and HIV/AIDS
Madagascar	Impact of natural disasters and HIV/AIDS
Malawi	Impact of drought and HIV/AIDS
Mozambique	Impact of natural disasters and HIV/AIDS
Swaziland	Impact of drought and HIV/AIDS
Zambia	Impact of drought and HIV/AIDS
Zimbabwe	Impact of drought and HIV/AIDS, impact of agricultural reform, political and economic crisis, international isolation

There are three main factors in the post-war rehabilitation phase currently underway in **Angola**. The first is the repatriation of 450,000 Angolans being organised by the UNHCR. This began in June and had resulted in the return of some 50,000 refugees (100,000 returned spontaneously) from DR Congo, Zambia and Namibia by the end of 2003. The second is the complex situation in which demobilised ex-combatants from UNITA and their families have found themselves while waiting for the reintegration process to begin, along with the lack of protection suffered by millions of internally displaced people. Finally, there is the food emergency that continues to affect almost 1.5 million people and the complaints about the lack of resources and access by humanitarian organisations trying to deal with this situation.

In spite of the fact that there has been a slight improvement in some of the countries forming the region of southern Africa (Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) as compared with 2002, the presence of humanitarian organisations continues to be essential for millions of people. The situation in Zimbabwe, where 5.5 million people are currently experiencing an extremely serious emergency, is particularly alarming. The impact of HIV/AIDS and the drought (common factors in the region) should be added to the political and economic crisis being suffered by the country, the collapse of public services, the international isolation to which the regime led by R. Mugabe has been subjected and the constant problems faced by humanitarian organisations. In this connection, as well as a lack of resources and access to basic food items, these organisations have complained about the Harare Government's use and manipulation of international aid. This whole situation, coupled with the existence of political and economic tensions, place Zimbabwe on the edge of famine.

b) West Africa

Countries	Main causes
Côte d'Ivoire	Armed conflict and the volume of internally displaced people
Guinea	Impact of conflicts in the region, volume of enforced displacements and internal political crisis
Liberia	Armed conflict and the volume of internally displaced people
Sierra Leone	Impact of conflicts in the region and volume of enforced displacements

The violence in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, where confrontations continue in spite of the peace agreements signed, has continued to destabilise the whole region and aggravate the humanitarian emergency that already exists. Both Guinea and Sierra Leone, countries which are experiencing a delicate situation, along with Mali, Ghana and Burkina Faso, which are enjoying relative calm, have been affected by the massive influx of displaced people, light arms and combatants. Although the humanitarian organisations had succeeded in restoring partial control over the humanitarian situation, the lack of access, scarcity of resources and insecurity have been the main problems faced by these organisations. This situation has led to an increase in the risk of a regional crisis of enormous dimensions.

One year on from the outbreak of armed confrontations in **Côte d'Ivoire**, and following the conclusion of a peace agreement at the end of January 2003, the civilian population continues to feel the effects of the violence, mainly in the west and the north of the country. Two groups remain highly vulnerable to the crisis: the more than 800,000 internally displaced people and the thousands of people (mainly originating from Mali or Burkina Faso) affected by the violence between the different ethnic communities. Elsewhere, 1.7 million people in **Liberia** require humanitarian aid following the end of the fighting that saw a million people trapped for several weeks in the capital, Monrovia. Finally, the humanitarian organisations have been able to resume their aid to people who were for a long time isolated by the war. **Sierra Leone**, which is currently in the middle of a process of post-war rehabilitation, and mainly **Guinea**, have accepted thousands of refugees fleeing from both regions. The latter of these two countries, which has been the main destination for all the refugees in the region over the past ten years, is also experiencing a delicate internal situation.

Finally, mention should be made of the considerable improvement experienced during recent months in the food crisis that had affected two million people for much of the year in the countries forming the Sahel region (Cape Verde, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) as a consequence of the drought.

c) Horn of África

Countries	Main causes
Eritrea	Impact of drought, volume of enforced displacements, process of return and border conflicts
Ethiopia	Impact of drought, volume of enforced displacements and border conflicts
Kenya	Impact of drought
Somalia	Impact of drought, volume of refugees and armed conflict
Sudan	Impact of drought, volume of enforced displacements and armed conflict
Uganda	Impact of drought, volume of enforced displacements and armed conflict

The serious drought affecting the majority of countries in this region and an endemic situation of extreme poverty, coupled with the impact of the tensions resulting from violence and armed conflict, have placed millions of people in a delicate situation. Although there was significant progress in some peace processes during 2003, as was the case in Sudan, this has not resulted in any improvement of the conditions suffered by the civilian population. In addition, the humanitarian organisations have repeatedly denounced the lack of funds available to deal with this structural emergency, which will presumably not see any improvement during 2004.

The tense relations between **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia**, the permanent food shortages and the effects of drought have meant that the number of people dependent upon international aid in these countries has risen to 1.7 million (almost half the population) and 13 million respectively. In **Somalia**, a similar situation is particularly affecting thousands of people on the Sool Plateau (in the north) and the autonomous region of Puntland. Finally, **Uganda** and **Sudan** are the two contexts that have experienced the worst deterioration during the year. Both have suffered the common circumstance that the civil population has become a deliberate target for the warring parties. In the first case, the constant attacks by the LRA armed opposition group in the north of the country have caused the enforced displacement of more than 1.3 million people, who are crowded together in several camps without the most basic services. For its

part, the region of Darfur (in the west of Sudan) has seen violent confrontations between the pro-Government Arab militias and the armed opposition groups operating in the area. Looting and the burning of villages have been the recurrent strategy of these groups. This situation has meant that over the course of a few months more than 600,000 people have been displaced (in a country that already has 4 million IDPs, the highest number in the world), while a further 75,000 have

In Uganda and Sudan the civil population has become a deliberate target for the warring parties.

sought refuge on the border with Chad. In addition, as regards 2004, it is necessary to bear in mind the probable process for the repatriation of some 400,000 Sudanese refugees currently being organised by humanitarian organisations with a view to an eventual peace agreement between the Khartoum Government and the SPLA.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Countries	Main causes
Burundi	Armed conflict and volume of internally displaced people
Central African Republic	In the process of post-war rehabilitation and volume of internally displaced people
Congo	Internal civil disputes and end of armed conflict
DR Congo	Armed conflict and volume of enforced displacements
Rwanda	Volume of enforced displacement, armed conflicts in the region and process of post-war rehabilitation
Tanzania	Impact of drought and volume of refugees

The humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region has continued to deteriorate as a consequence of the constant and repeated displacement of people caused by the armed confrontations in **Burundi** and the northeast of **DR Congo** (in the Ituri region and the provinces of North and South Kivu). One fifth of the

twenty-five million internally displaced people in the world are to be found in this region, according to the United Nations. The situation faced by these people, mostly women and children, is very serious due to the lack of attention given to them (many of them are packed into camps that lack the most basic services) and the lack of protection they suffer (attacks, enforced recruitment, sexual abuse, etc.). The impact on this situation of the drought, diseases such as Ebola and malaria, and particularly the HIV/AIDS pandemic is extraordinary. This region shows one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the entire continent: 4 million people are infected and more than 3 million children have been orphaned as a consequence of the disease. Elsewhere, the humanitarian crisis in the Pool region (in central **Congo**) has continued to worsen as a result of the widespread lack of security. The UN has warned of the existence of high levels of malnutrition and disease, along with the growing number of internally displaced people throughout the region.

As regards the return and repatriation processes that began in the region during the course of the year, special mention should be made of the campaign by UNHCR to repatriate the 80,000 Rwandans that still remain in Uganda and DR Congo. This population, along with those who remain in **Tanzania**, represent the last group of refugees from the two million that were displaced following the genocide in **Rwanda** in 1994. Turning to the **Central African Republic**, in spite of the relative political stability achieved in the country following the overthrow of the Government of A. F. Patassé in March, and the return of thousands of people to their original homes, some humanitarian organisations indicated that at the end of 2003 some 200,000 people remained displaced as a consequence of the violence. The UN has also warned of the possibility that a serious food crisis may erupt throughout the country during the first months of 2004.

Rwanda and Tanzania were not the only places that saw various return processes during 2003. The following table explains some of the most typical and significant cases from which lessons can be learned in order to design future return processes. These are areas in which the return process displays different characteristics but involves a large number of people.

Table E1.	Processes for the return of refugees in 2003
Afghanistan	 Process assisted by the UNHCR, begun in 2002 and marked by international pressure both from the host countries and from western nations. Return to a context that is very fragile in terms of democracy, security and access to basic services. Armed confrontations continued in several parts of the country, causing the UNHCR temporarily to suspend the return process. In October 2003, 2.5 million people had returned from Pakistan and Iran, and more than two million refugees remain. Some of the people who returned have had to move again within the country.
Angola	 Process assisted by the UNHCR following the signing of the peace agreement in 2002, which brought an end to 27 years of armed conflict. The spontaneous return of refugees began before the UNHCR-assisted process, which was delayed for several months following the signing of the peace agreement, given the conditions of destruction in the country. 200,000 people have returned since April 2002, 50,000 of them assisted by the UNHCR.
Burundi	 Process assisted by the UNHCR for people who have asked to return, and only in areas of the country considered relatively safe. Tanzania has put pressure on refugees to return. Armed confrontations have continued over half the country for the whole period. Since March 2002, the UNHCR has assisted in the return of 60,000 people, at the same time as tens of thousands of people have had to move within the country itself.
Sierra Leone	 Process assisted by the UNHCR since the end of 2000. Highly influenced by the instability of the regional situation, which has prevented return on various occasions-245,000 people have returned with assistance from the UNHCR, though 75,000 refugees remain in different countries in the region. The UNHCR plans a drastic reduction in its assistance to people in all the countries of exile during the second half of 2004.

America

Countries	Main causes
Colombia	Armed conflict and volume of internally displaced people
Haiti	Impact of drought and political and economic crisis

The humanitarian crises in Latin America and the Caribbean centre on two areas: Colombia and Haiti. In **Colombia**, the humanitarian situation continues to raise great concerns regarding the condition of millions of IDPs. In spite of the fact that the number of displaced people has fallen in comparison with previous years, the number of actions that are blocking the provision of food, health services and transport to a large number of rural communities has increased. The UN has also warned of the risk of malnutrition threatening almost 25% of the children displaced. For its part, **Haiti** is facing a serious food emergency, and the international community is not providing sufficient support or attention. In addition to the food crisis affecting a large part of the population, the UN has warned of the consequences of the political and economic crisis and the country's growing vulnerability to the impact of natural disasters.

Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras) has also been suffering a food emergency during the year as a consequence of the effects of the coffee crisis (the product on which these countries depend), floods and the effects of earlier natural catastrophes. Nevertheless, this context has ceased to display the conditions required in order to be classified as a humanitarian crisis.

Asia and the Pacific

Countries	Main causes
Afghanistan	Impact of drought, armed conflict, return processes
DPR Korea	Economic, food and health crises
Indonesia	Armed conflict and the volume of enforced displacements
Myanmar	Volume of internally displaced people
Sri Lanka	Armed conflict and the volume of enforced displacements
Tajikistan	Impact of natural disasters and the post-war rehabilitation process

The humanitarian crises being experienced in the Asia Pacific region are mainly the result of the impact of a number of natural catastrophes and the violence of the armed confrontation in some of these contexts. In this regard it is necessary to assess the extent of each of these elements and bear in mind their intensity or the number of people affected, given that countries such as Mongolia, China and India have been affected by similar circumstances but cannot be classified as humanitarian crises.

As regards **Afghanistan**, the process for the return and resettlement of millions of refugees and displaced people has progressed throughout the year, though at a much slower pace than in 2002. By the end of 2003, UNHCR had confirmed the return of some 2.5 million people to the country (600,000 from Iran and 1.9 million from Pakistan), meaning that some two million people are still waiting to return. However, this process is facing a number of challenges, such as the increasing violence being seen in some parts of the country and the lack of protection being experienced by humanitarian personnel, a circumstance that has forced some organisations, including UNHCR, temporarily to suspend their operations. For its part, the population of **Tajikistan** continued to suffer the effects of the armed conflict that ended a while ago, along with the effects of successive natural disasters and endemic poverty.

In the region of **Aceh (Indonesia)**, the situation worsened with the resumption of confrontations during the last months of the year. In this regard, the Norwegian Refugee Council reported that more than 120,000 people had been forcibly displaced as a result of the violence and the policy of enforced displacement introduced by the Government, aimed at isolating members of the armed opposition group that it is fighting.

More than 600,000 people remain displaced in other parts of the country. **Myanmar** is experiencing a similar situation, since between 600,000 and one million internally displaced people are suffering from the Government's policy of isolation and systematic human rights violations. In **DPR Korea**, almost 6.5 people continue to depend on food aid, though humanitarian organisations have had difficulties in supplying this aid due to a lack of resources and the tensions being felt in the region. Finally the situation in **Sri Lanka** is alarming for the more than 800,000 people displaced by the violence.

Europe

Countries	Main causes
Georgia	Political and economic crisis, volume of internally displaced people
Russia (Chechnya*)	Impact of the armed conflict and volume of internally displaced people
Serbia and Montenegro	Volume of internally displaced people, former armed conflict

^{*} Neighbouring republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia).

In Europe, special mention should be made of the situation being suffered in both **Georgia** and **Chechnya**, along with other neighbouring republics (Russia). These two countries have been respectively affected by political tensions and armed confrontation, both of which have given rise to large numbers of internally displaced people. The population is falling victim to serious violations of human rights, and their return is raising a number of questions, particularly in the case of the Chechens found in Ingushetia. As with these two contexts, the internally displaced people in **Serbia and Montenegro** continued to require food aid from international organisations.

Oriente Medio

Countries	Main causes
Iraq	Armed conflict and the impact of drought
Palestine	Humanitarian isolation of the population, armed conflict

Finally, turning to the Middle East, the war waged by the USA, the United Kingdom and their allies against Iraq in March 2003 did not provoke the massive wave of displacements that had originally been forecast. Nevertheless, the serious humanitarian crisis that the country was already undergoing as a consequence of other armed conflicts, the policies of the S. Hussein regime and the embargo imposed by the UN since 1990 was observed to deepen. In addition, the withdrawal of the UN's humanitarian personnel, the end of the Food for Oil Program (which was responsible for supplying the population with food aid) and the persistent instability did not augur well for any improvement in the situation. In this connection, the UNHCR has asked countries sheltering Iraqi refugees not to make forced repatriations, following the stated intention of several European countries to do just that. Finally, turning to Palestine, special mention should be made of the constant complaints by UNRWA (the UN agency charged with assisting Palestinian refugees) throughout the entire year. This organisation has warned that, in spite of the fact that 60% of the Palestinian population lives below the poverty line and 25% are suffering from malnutrition, it has been forced to cut its aid due to a lack of resources. UNRWA has also denounced the restriction on movement imposed by the Israeli Government.

E2. Humanitarian action²³ in 2003

The response made by Humanitarian organisations in the different crisis areas was not without its difficulties in 2003, particularly in relation to the contexts in which there were conditions of direct violence. The

main problems included difficulties in gaining access to people caught in the middle of armed confrontations (especially in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire), and the lack of protection for humanitarian workers, a circumstance that even forced some organisations temporarily to suspend their aid (as was the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan).

Iraq has captured
a significant proportion of
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to the detriment of other areas
of crisis.

Nevertheless, the humanitarian agenda in 2003 was marked by the emergency in Iraq and the impact that this has had on other areas of

crisis. As well as being the centre of media attention and perpetuating the complete lack of attention being paid to some other countries, Iraq has captured a significant proportion of the humanitarian aid offered by donor countries (especially the USA, the main donor on a world scale) to the detriment of other areas of crisis. The UN CAP for 2003 demonstrates this fact: of the 3.3 billion dollars collected by the organisation, more than 2 billion went to relieving the crisis in Iraq (64% of the total), while of the 2.2 billion requested to alleviate the 16 situations of crisis in Africa, only 990 million dollars was offered. Likewise, spending per capita in Iraq amounted to 180 dollars, while in Côte d'Ivoire or DR Congo it barely reached 25 dollars.

This is evidence of a dynamic that has gradually become consolidated over recent years, in which donor countries have drastically increased the amounts offered to contexts in which they have political and/or economic interests, rather than basing their aid strictly on criteria of need. The politicisation of humanitarian aid is completely at odds with respect for International Humanitarian Law, which theoretically recognises the right of any civilian population trapped by armed conflict to receive aid under the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Although for the time being there is no instrument that can be used to regulate this phenomenon, representatives from the 20 main donor countries, the UN, the ICRC and other humanitarian organisations met in June in Stockholm (Sweden) to launch the so-called

Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI). This initiative represents an unprecedented move and is an attempt by all the different agents involved to agree on certain objectives and common principles in relation to the financing, management and accountability of the humanitarian response to individual situations of crisis. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the meeting ended with a series of agreements

The politicisation of humanitarian aid is completely at odds with respect for International Humanitarian Law.

(see Table E.1) and an implementation plan, there is a certain scepticism among the humanitarian organisations regarding the real possibilities of operating this mechanism.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the UN Consolidated Appeals Process for 2004 would seem to be an


Chart E1. Main agreements relating to financing, management and accountability in humanitarian aid (GHDI, Stockholm)

- Strive to ensure that the funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises
- Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
- Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending.
- Explore the possibility of slowing the increasing bilaterilisation of aid (or the practice of providing resources to specific emergencies).

Source: United Nations, http://www.reliefweb.int/cap/ToTBinder/Hum_Financing_Studies/imgd.pdf

23. «Humanitarian action» is understood to mean the group of activities aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering in situations of humanitarian crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.

attempt to alleviate the impact that politicised aid has had on forgotten crises. The UN has requested some 3.1 billion dollars for the coming year, to provide aid for 52 million people suffering the consequences of armed conflicts and natural disasters in 22 areas of crisis throughout the world, 18 of which are to be found in Africa. Of the amounts called on for 2004, particularly notable are the 465 million dollars requested for Sudan, the 318 million for the food crisis in southern Africa and the 305 million for Palestine. The UN has called on donors to show more generosity and has underlined the fact that during 2003 the USA only contributed 0.01% of its GDP to the CAP, while the country donating most was Norway, which still only gave 0.03% of its GDP.



Source: United Nations

F. Militarisation and disarmament

The section dealing with militarisation and disarmament analyses issues relating to military security. The indicators in this section can be divided into two groups. On the one hand are those referring to the imposition of arms embargoes (see map F. 1, Appendix II), either by the UN Security Council (indicator no. 9), or by regional organisations such as the EU or the OSCE (indicator no. 10). The second group shows the level of militarisation for different countries, based on the following indicators: military spending (indicator no. 11), imports of major conventional weapons as a percentage of GDP (indicator no. 12), number of soldiers as a percentage of total population (indicator no. 13), and the BIC3D index (indicator no. 14). The BIC3D index results from the combination of four sets of figures: military spending, weapons reserves, armed forces personnel and personnel employed in military production, and it is therefore a suitable indicator to demonstrate a country's militarisation or demilitarisation as a whole, and the general trend shown.²⁴ Map F.2, Appendix II, shows the countries considered to have high levels of militarisation on the basis of their military budgets, as well as indicating the countries that show high levels of imports of heavy weapons and large numbers of soldiers.

This analysis is complemented with a study of the agendas of the principal **multilateral bodies** dealing with military issues (particularly the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EU), the most notable **military cooperation** programmes, the problem of the **proliferation of small arms** and aspects relating to **détente and disarmament**.

a) Arms embargoes

At the end of 2003, a total of 19 arms embargoes were in place (see Table F.1). In the case of the EU, the issue of arms embargoes is set out in criteria no. 1 of the Code of Conduct in the matter of arms exports, which was adopted by the EU in May 1998.

A comparison of these indicators with the remaining indicators used in this report shows that countries subject to embargoes are also those that show a larger number of warning signals in the final indicator table. As a general rule, embargoed countries are embroiled in political tension or armed conflict and are the scene of humanitarian crises, making them highly deteriorated contexts. It is therefore worth taking preventive measures to attempt to stop new weapons reaching these areas, thus reducing the risk of destabilisation. On occasion, embargoes are not imposed on governments but instead on armed opposition groups acting inside an individual country or neighbouring countries (shown with a white dot in the final table).

This report does not differentiate between compulsory and voluntary embargoes, because the mere adoption of an embargo is sufficient to denote a worrying situation in a particular country. It should be said that voluntary embargoes represent a particular difficulty, since there is no reason for them to be explicitly lifted or reviewed, which makes it difficult to ascertain the date on which the embargo in question ceases to be operative.

Table F.1. Countries and armed groups embargoed during 2003				
Al-Qaida	Burundi (1)	Myanmar	Sudan	
Taliban regime (Afghanistan)	China	Rwanda (1)	Tanzania (1)	
Armenia	Congo, RD (1)	RUF and other armed	Uganda (1)	
Azerbaijan	Iraq	opposition groups (Sierra Leone)	Yemen	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Liberia	Somalia	Zimbabwe	

⁽¹⁾ Arms embargoes imposed on non-governmental forces from Rwanda, and on Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and DR Congo, in the event that weapons could be used in Rwanda.

^{24.} Figures in this index vary between +100% and -100% and are interpreted on the basis of the percentage change between the average since the end of the Cold War and the BIC3D index for the year. Positive results indicate a process of demilitarisation while negative figures indicate increased militarisation.

The only new development in respect of last year is the lifting of sanctions on Libya. The embargo was lifted after an agreement was reached regarding compensation for the families of victims of the 1989 airline bombing, which had been the original cause of the sanctions. Mention should also be made of the pressu-

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cooperating with their
investigations.

re from some arms manufacturers and certain EU Governments for the lifting of the sanctions on China, based on their contention that such sanctions are out of date, though for the moment the EU's arms embargo on China remains in place.

Reference must be made to the case of Iraq, where all the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council have been lifted, except the one relating to arms transfers. In any case, according to Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May, which passed authority in the country to the USA, arms transfers will be authorised when the so-called Authority requests them, meaning that any new Government will be able to receive military materials and training under international supervision.

In addition, special attention should be paid to the reports issued by the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, which indicate the individuals, companies and countries that are infringing arms embargoes, or are not properly cooperating with their investigations. The publication of these reports is making a substantial contribution to improvements in control mechanisms and compliance with sanctions. Nevertheless, as Chart F.1 shows, arms embargoes continued to be violated in a systematic way.

Chart F1. How are arms embargoes being violated?

LIBERIA (S/2003/937, 28 October 2003):

According to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, the Liberian Government continued to receive arms in spite of the ceasefire of 6 August 2003

- Origin: their exact origin is unknown, but Serbian weapons have been discovered.
- Method of delivery: weapons are sent by aeroplane using false end user certificates. It is possible that false
 end user certificates may have been used for DR Congo. Imports of «technical equipment» and «detergent»
 for Guinea have also been discovered, when in fact they were weapons and ammunitions for Liberia.

SOMALIA (S/2003/1035, 3 November 2003):

According to the Group of Experts, the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in 1992 is still being violated.

- **Origin**: weapons mainly come from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
- Method of delivery: large deliveries sent by ship or aeroplane have decreased in number, but a stream of small arms and ammunitions continues to supply public arms markets and the arsenals kept by the leaders of Somali factions, arriving on small fishing boats or hidden among other air freight consignments.


It is important to mention the following three issues in this regard: a) not all arms suppliers respect international agreements; b) an increase has recently been noticed in the sources of supply, i.e. the appearance of new players and more illegal transactions, making monitoring difficult; and c) there are technical problems when it comes to implementing embargoes, due, for example, to the absence of a common model for products that are suitable for embargo. All of this makes it clear, once again, that the countries that produce and export arms should bear in mind the effects that the export of such products may have on the country

importing them, as well as the risk that the products exported may be redirected to an end user that is different from the one officially recognised as the purchaser.

b) Militarisation

As regards world military spending, according to the SIPRI yearbook this amounted in 2002 to 784 billion dollars, a 6% increase over the previous year, representing 2.5% of world GDP and a spending figure of 128 dollars per person. This demonstrates that the upward trend in world military spending that began in 1996 continues. This increase is due mainly to the increase in the USA's spending (10% in real terms) in response to the events of 11 September 2001. It should also be added that this figure does not include extraordinary entries, such as the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As regards world military spending, according to the SIPRI yearbook this amounted in 2002 to 784 billion dollars, a 6% increase over the previous year, representing 2.5% of world GDP and a spending figure of 128 dollars per person.



The USA continues to be the country with the highest military spending (43% of the total), followed by Japan, the United Kingdom, France and China (this group of five countries accounts for 62% of world spending). Both Russia and China have also increased their military budgets (in the latter case by 18%), due to their intention to modernise and reform their Armed Forces. EU members states have, however, continued to maintain their military budgets a constant levels, though certain countries, like Germany, Belgium, France and Italy, have asked the European Commission to exclude military spending from the rules controlling public deficits so that they can increase them. Balkan countries are drastically reducing their military budgets as they return to normality, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which aspire to NATO membership, are increasing their budgets in order to be able to meet this organisation's requirements.

On a regional scale, Table F3 shows the evolution of military spending since 1993. This table shows how, during this period, Africa, Asia and the Middle East are the regions of the world that have most increased their military spending. These regions are also the areas that are currently being experiencing most armed conflicts and situations of tension, as recorded in previous sections.

Table F2. Estimated military spending by region (1993-2002) (Figures shown in billions of dollars at constant 2000 prices) % 1993 1993 1994 1998 1999 Region 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2002 Africa 7.4 7.7 7.2 6.9 7.1 7.6 8.4 8.8 (8.9)(9.6)+30 2.5 2.9 3.3 North 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.6 +44Sub-Saharan 5.0 4.8 4.4 5.1 5.2 4.5 4.1 4.1 +4 America 385 365 347 328 328 321 322 333 338 368 -4 North 365 344 324 306 304 298 299 310 313 344 -6 2.8 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.3 Central 3.1 3.2 +18 South 17.6 17.4 20.0 18.3 20.9 20.1 19.6 19.5 21.5 21.1 +20 Asia and Oceania 120 121 123 128 128 127 129 134 140 147 +23 Central Asia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 East Asia 99.8 101 103 107 107 105 106 111 116 (122)+22 South Asia 12.0 12.0 12.6 12.8 13.4 13.5 14.6 15.2 16.2 17.3 +44 Oceania 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.7 7.5 7.3 7.4 7.4 -4 177 177 Europe 196 192 178 175 177 180 181 181 -8 East and Central 25.6 25.9 20.1 18.8 19.6 16.9 17.8 18.9 20.1 21.4 -16 West 171 166 158 158 157 158 159 161 161 160 -6 Middle East (53.5)54.1 50.9 51.7 56.5 60.7 60.0 67.3 73.8 --+38

-2.9 Source: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Appendix 10A, Table 10A.1 and Table 10A.3.

740

762

707

-4.4

691

-2.3

696

0.7

690

-0.9

696

0.9

723

3.9

741

2.5

784

5.8

+3

World Total

Change %

Turning to an analysis of military spending as a proportion of GDP for each country (indicator no. 11), it should be said that this analysis was prepared from data from the two most recognised research centres offering world statistics in this field: the SIPRI and the IISS. However, the figures from the two centres display certain differences, due principally to the fact that they use two different methodologies and also to the criteria employed by governments when indicating their levels of military spending, a factor that is further exacerbated by the secrecy and concealment that characterises many of the activities relating to the military arena. Following these statistics, we have opted in this report to indicate those countries which, according to one or the other of the sources mentioned above, show military spending in excess of 4% of their GDP. This is the case in 22 countries, to which 17 more cases should be added in which military spending exceeds 6% of GDP, as indicated in the following table:

Table F3. Countries with high levels of military spending				
Angola	Ethiopia	Maldives	Vietnam	
Armenia	Israel	Oman	Yemen	
Burundi	Jordan	Qatar		
Congo, DR	Korea, DPR	Saudi Arabia		
Eritrea	Kuwait	Syria		

From a regional perspective, the presence of large number of countries in the Middle East should be noted, particularly those located on the Arab Peninsular, a circumstance that has become the norm in recent years. Five of the cases shown in the table reflect situations of tension or armed conflict (Armenia, Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia and Israel). In four cases (Angola, DR Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia), the predominant situation is one of a recent post-war phase (although there are still focussed areas of local conflict, as is the case in DR Congo and Ethiopia), which leads to the expectation that military spending in these countries should fall drastically.

As regards the **production and transfer of arms**, SIPRI indicates that in 2002 there was an increase in production in the USA (26%) and Russia (28%), while there was a decline in the West European industry. The continuing process of concentration among western companies is also notable. Russia has unseated the USA as the number one exporter of major conventional weapons (36% of the total). Since 1998, Russian arms exports have constantly increased, while by contrast, exports by the USA have fallen (though this is balanced by increasing internal demand). These two countries, along with the United Kingdom, China and France account for 80% of total world exports of major conventional weapons.

China and India have taken the top places among arms buyers. The great majority of arms importers are countries involved in the so-called war on terror, though the majority of transfers currently being made in fact correspond to decisions taken before 11 September 2001. SIPRI also underlines its doubts regarding potential developments in heavy weapon transfers as a result of the importance assumed by anti-terrorist activities, given that such weapons are not effective in this type of operation.

Table F4. Dependence on the arms trade					
% arms exports of total amount exported 1999		% arms imports of total amount imported 1999			
				DPR Korea	22.4
Georgia	6.2	Saudi Arabia	27.5		
Belarus	5.2	Ethiopia	20.5		
Bulgaria	5.1	Myanmar	13.6		
USA	4.7	Sierra Leone	12.3		
Ukraine	4.7	Rwanda	11.9		
Russian Fed.	4.2	Pakistan	9.7		
Moldavia	2.1	Kuwait	9.5		

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, Appendix 5.8

According to the results shown by the indicator relating to **imports of major conventional weapons as a proportion of GDP** (indicator no. 12), there are eight countries in which arms purchases exceeded 0.5% of GDP. In four of these cases, the figure exceeded 1% (Eritrea, Jordan, Pakistan and Yemen). All these countries are indicated as having military budgets that are either high or very high. This indicator shows countries that do not have their own arms industry for certain products, meaning that they acquire military equipment on the international market. Though it is still not possible to ascertain the world figure for the acquisition of military material produced within an individual State, the indicator does offer warnings about potential arms races on a regional scale.

In this connection, mention should be made of the launch of a new international campaign led by Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam which is attempting to effect some form of control on the international trade in conventional weapons, mainly through the establishment of a legally binding International Arms Trade Treaty.

Chart F2. «Control Arms»: an international campaign for control of the arms trade



What are the campaign's objectives?

The main objective of this campaign is to **reduce the human cost of arms** and end the lack of control over the availability and supply of arms, in order to prevent the spread of conflicts, limit killings and restrict their humanitarian effects. There are four principal areas in which the campaign will operate:

Internationally: putting pressure on governments to adopt the **Arms Trade Treaty by 2006** and increase financing to aid programmes aimed at the communities affected by violence.

Regionally: strengthening **arms control agreements** already in place (like the EU's Code of Conduct), and developing regional coordination on policies and programmes for arms control.

Nationally: improving levels of control over the eventual use of arms transfers authorised by governments, as well as over the activities of intermediaries.

Locally: supporting security initiatives that reduce the presence of arms (such as collection and destruction programmes) and encourage their responsible use by members of the security forces.

Funther information: www.controlarms.org







As regards the number of soldiers as a percentage of total population in an individual country (indicator no. 13), there has been a clear reduction on a world level, in line with events of recent years, after the Armed Forces of many countries began to be professionally staffed. Nevertheless, in nine cases, the number of soldiers as a proportion of total population is between 1.5% and 2%, and in seven cases (United Arab Emirates, Eritrea, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and DPR Korea) this proportion exceeds 2%, though in the case of DPR Korea a plan to reduce the number of military troops has been announced.

Finally, the **BIC3D militarisation index**, prepared annually by the BICC (indicator no. 14), indicates that 66 countries are currently in a phase of militarisation, and levels of militarisation in 18 of these countries is considered very serious. In 8 of these cases, this circumstance coincides with very high levels of military spending (more than 4% of GDP): Armenia, Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Eritrea, Myanmar, Rwanda and Sudan. Several of these countries are or have recently been involved in armed conflict..

c) Multilateral bodies

At the **United Nations**, debate has centred around multilateralism (defended mainly by France) and unilateralism (the position taken by the USA), within the framework of discussions on Iraq. Secretary General, K. Annan has acknowledged that the organisation requires radical changes in order to be able to confront the current threats in the world. According to the *2002 UN Disarmament Yearbook*, the maximum priority on the organisation's agenda as far as disarmament is concerned is achieving total nuclear disarmament (analysed in the section on international behaviour). Other areas also considered a priority are the fight against the destabilising proliferation of small arms and the production of anti-personnel landmines. These three issues were precisely the ones that dominated the working agenda during the period of sessions at the United Nations Disarmament Conference during 2003. During the course of this Conference, China expressed its willingness to hold talks aimed at preventing an arms race in space, interpreted as an attempt to stop the

USA's development of its so-called anti-missile shield. Another important item on the agenda was the negotiation of a treaty that would restrict production of fission materials (FMCT) and prohibit the production of enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes.

As regards the war on terror, the Security Council insisted that member States apply measures to combat terrorism and control illegal activities, particularly those relating to al-Qaida and its associates. It has also backed approval of the draft convention on international terrorism and the draft convention on the repression of acts of nuclear terror. There has also been an important initiative from the Norwegian Government, which organised a conference in New York on the roots of terrorism, attended by the UN Secretary General and around 20 Heads of State and Government, along with representatives of the victims of terrorism.

Turning to **NATO**, two important events should be mentioned. Firstly, the enlargement process in which Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania will join the organisation, having signed the Access Treaty. This enlargement will become effective following the process of ratification by the other Member States (approximately May 2004). Secondly, the organisation is also undergoing a transformation in order to be able to adjust to new theatres of war. In Afghanistan, NATO has for the first time taken control of an operation outside Europe, directing 5,000 peace-keeping troops in Kabul. In the Balkans, it is working with the EU on different agreements for the improvement of security and stability; and in Iraq, it is also offering support to Poland in its Command of the Multinational Division. The Iraq war created a crisis within NATO when the necessary consensus for plans to protect Turkey was not reached. Mention should also be made of the election by consensus of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister, J. de Hoop Scheffer, as Secretary General of the organisation from 1 January 2004.

At the **EU** there have been three notable issues in matters of military security: the debate regarding the model for the construction of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the policy for common military equipment and the role of the EU in peace-keeping operations. As regards the debate about the creation of the ESDP, this has been led by those advocating an autonomous defence model (with the capacity to act on occasion outside NATO) and those favouring a closer transatlantic relationship. After months of negotiations, the European Council adopted a draft prepared by the EU's High Representative for CFSP, J. Solana, which advocated a balance between the EU and the USA. The importance of NATO's role in relations between the two powers was underlined, and it was stated that an effective European defence policy would prevent the duplication of both resources and equipment. With this aim in mind, and within the framework of the creation of the ESDP, 2004 will see the establishment of a European Armaments and Research Agency that is intended to cover the EU's main weaknesses in defence matters (see Appendix IX for a more detailed analysis). Special mention should also be made of the fact that in 2003 the EU took command of peace-keeping operations in Macedonia and DR Congo for the first time (see the section on armed conflicts).

Among the other important multilateral issues, two should be mentioned. Firstly, the USA's recommendation for the establishment of an Asian military organisation similar to NATO, in which India would play a predominant role, with the aim of facing up to potential enemies of the USA in Asia. This proposal would revive the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which was dissolved in 1977 and in which Pakistan played the role of regional leader. Secondly, the Declaration on Security in the Americas, in which the OAS adapted the concept of security to deal with new threats, including political, economic, social, health and environmental aspects.

d) Military cooperation

Another important issue to be considered are the different military cooperation programmes. The USA is the country that has led the most important agreements in this regard, based on two different axes: the fight against international terrorism and the search for support for intervention in Iraq, which has involved the reorganisation of US troops on a world scale. Special mention should be made of two initiatives led by

the USA: firstly, the freezing of military aid by the USA to 35 countries because they would not guarantee the immunity of US nationals in the ICC by signing bilateral agreements. The list (which was not made public in its entirety) includes six countries that are set to join NATO during the coming year, along with strategic allies in Latin America such as Colombia. Some of the USA's key allies that are affected by this step, such as Bulgaria and Colombia, have already announced that they will take measures to avoid this situation. In the case of the latter, President A. Uribe stated that the USA's freezing of military aid would not affect Plan Colombia.

Table F5. Main US foreign military financing programmes for 2004 (in millions of dollars)					
By region	Amount	By countries	Amount		
Middle East	3.751	Israel	2.160		
South Asia	241	Egypt	1.300		
Europe and Eurasia	192	Jordan	206		
America	143	Colombia	110		
Africa	23	Pakistan	75		
The Eastern Asiatic and Pacific regions	21	Turkey	50		
TOTAL	4.414	TOTAL	4.414		

Source: State Department International Affairs Budget Request, Congressional Budget Justification for FY04 Foreign Operations, February 2003.

Elsewhere, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched, in an attempt to establish a mechanism for the interception of shipping and aircraft suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction. This project involves 11 countries: Germany, Australia, USA, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The USA is trying to extend this coalition to other countries such as China, the Korean Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore and Thailand.

e) Proliferation of small arms

As regards the proliferation of **small arms**, the First Biennial Meeting on the implementation of the Programme of Action to combat the illicit trade in small arms was held in July at the United Nations.²⁵ This mee-

According to the yearbook

Small Arms Survey,
there are 639 million small arms
throughout the world
(60% are legal and in the hands
of the civilian population,
the remainder being in the hands
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victims every year.

ting was informed of the progress made at national, regional and international levels in respect of the discovery or the origins, aims and operating methods of the groups promoting the proliferation of small arms. The Secretary General called for greater international efforts to end this global threat, which results in one person dying every minute somewhere in the world. Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), a movement formed by different UN agencies (UNHCR, WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIDIR and UNIFEM), undertook to respond to the issue of small arms in a more consistent, coordinated and cooperative manner.

According to the yearbook *Small Arms Survey*, there are 639 million small arms throughout the world (60% are legal and in the hands of the civilian population, the remainder being in the hands of govern-

ment forces or illegal), and these claim half a million victims every year. Seven million small arms are manufactured annually (70% of these are produced by the USA and Russia), at a total value of 7.4 billion US\$.

The estimated total value of the trade in small arms is some 4 billion US\$, the countries of the EU being the main exporters on an international level. In spite of this data, it would appear that international arms trading is beginning to decline worldwide.

The International Action Network against Small Arms (IANSA) revealed in a report that two years after the adoption of the United Nations Programme of Action to combat the illegal trade in small arms, only a few countries have shown significant progress. The study, involving 156 countries only mentioned Canada, Croatia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda and Tanzania as positive cases, along with the USA at an international level (see Appendix V).

One of the areas in which more rapid progress has been made during recent years is that of the collection and destruction of weapons, along with the management of existing stocks. According to statements made at the Biennial Meeting, almost half of the more than four million weapons collected and destroyed throughout the world during the last ten years were collected over the past two years. Since July 2001, almost 50 countries have applied some type of measure relating to weapons collection, the elimination of existing stocks, confiscation, voluntary handover and forced recovery.

f) Détente and disarmament

The sub-section on détente and disarmament refers to events during the past year that have contributed positively to a reduction in military tension. Among the most significant are the advances made in the fight against **anti-personnel mines**. According to a report from Landmine Monitor 2003, the overall use of anti-personnel mines decreased significantly last year, while mine-clearing operations increased by 30%. To the present time, 69 countries have destroyed 52 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines (four million over the past year), the number of producer countries has fallen from 50 to 15, and no significant exports of these products have occurred since the mid-1990s. Special mention should also be made of the various announcements relating to mine clearance in especially sensitive areas, such as the border between the Korean Republic and the DPR Korea (see the section on peace processes), the so-called "green line" in Cyprus and the ratification of the Ottawa Agreement and the corresponding mine clearance by Greece and Turkey, all of which are contributing positively to processes of peace construction and good neighbourly relations.

It should also be added that a coalition of some 80 NGOs from all over the world (including Human Rights Watch and Handicap International) has launched a campaign for the total prohibition of **cluster bombs**. As well as intending to ban the manufacture, sale and use of these weapons, the campaign also wants countries that have used them in the past to be forced to clean up affected areas and provide aid for victims. On this same issue, the Pentagon is studying the possibility of suspending the use of cluster bombs, due to the difficulties being encountered in travelling round and patrolling certain areas of Iraq affected by this type of bomb.

In Central America, Heads of State and Government discussed the reduction and control of firearms in the region. The basis for discussion rested on restricting weapons on a regional scale, in order to achieve a reasonable balance of strength and encourage stability, mutual trust and transparency. It is also intended to establish a plan to combat the illegal arms trade. In addition, each country will create a National Commission for the Restriction and Control of Arms, in order to coordinate both civilian and military action, and a draft Regional Code of Ethics will be presented with rules to be respected equally and simultaneously in all member countries.

A country that has been particularly active in issues of détente and disarmament has been **Brazil**. A few days after coming to power, the new administration under President L. I. Lula da Silva suspended the purchase of 12 warplanes, allocating the amount that would have been paid (760 million dollars) to its hunger eradication programme. Brazil has also promoted a disarmament campaign that will facilitate the handover of weapons held by the civilian population, within the framework of a new Public Security Plan. This Plan is aimed at establishing an agreement between MERCOSUR countries with a view to harmonising legislation

on arms control, reducing demand and increasing taxes on trading. The Brazilian Congress has also approved the so-called «Disarmament Statute» to ban the carrying of weapons by civilians and open up the possibility of a total ban on the sale of weapons to civilians by means of a referendum to be held in October 2005.

The President of Brazil also made a call at the **G-8** meeting in Evian (France) for the establishment of a world tax on the arms trade that would finance an international fund for the eradication of hunger. This measure was received favourably by France, in spite of claims regarding technical problems in its implementation, though doubts were expressed among analysts, since it could result in greater secrecy within the international arms trade. An Action Plan was also approved at this G-8 meeting for controls on the export of portable aerial missile launchers (MANPADS), with the aim of preventing these products from being acquired by non-governmental groups.

Finally, mention should be made of the progress observed in **Russia** where, after 12 years of work, the process for the destruction of 6,000 tanks, 1,500 battle vehicles and 7,000 pieces of heavy artillery under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty has been completed. Finally, reforms were implemented in **Turkey** to restrict the influence of the Armed Forces in the country's political affairs, with the reduction of their role on the National Security Council, as recommended by the EU in order to facilitate Turkey's entry into the organisation.

By way of conclusion, the general balancing of issues of military security following the crisis in Iraq indicates a polarisation of the debate concerning unilateralism and multilateralism and the role of the United Nations. In the EU, this debate has also related to the transatlantic dimension of its security model, between those who favour a more autonomous model and those who want to see a closer relationship with the USA. On issues of directives and strategy, there are differences between the European model and the

Polarisation of the debate concerning unilateralism and multilateralism and the role of the United Nations.

In the EU, this debate has also related to the transatlantic dimension of its security model.

unilateralist attitude of the USA. While an attitude favouring prevention and the encouragement of good governance is the priority of future ESDP, the unilateralist option favours the use of preventive military strikes.

Militarisation and military spending continue to grow throughout the world, and the forecast is that this trend will continue during coming years, given that the main military powers (the USA, China and France) have already announced greater levels of expected military spending.

It is also important to point out the areas in which more notable improvements have been observed, such as the reduction in the use of anti-personnel mines and the increase in resources for mine-clearance operations, the adoption of a Protocol on the treatment of the explosive residues of war and the possibility of a ban on the use of cluster bombs, together with the efforts aimed at greater control over portable aerial missile launching systems.

G. Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

This section contains an analysis of the situation relating to Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The **first part** relates to the violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms reported by human rights organisations (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and international inter-governmental organisations (the EU and the United Nations, in the latter case, with special emphasis on the 59th period of sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights). The **second part** contains an analysis of issues relating to international law in situations of armed conflict and the use of child-soldiers. The question of respect for the international instruments offering protection for human rights is assessed in detail in part 1, which deals with conduct in relation to the international community (indicators 30 and 31).

G1. Human rights (indicators n° 15 to 19)

Human rights are the inherent rights and freedoms of any person to live in liberty and with dignity. These rights are universal, inalienable and indivisible, and are generally divided into the following three categories: a) civil and political rights; b) economic, social and cultural rights; and c) rights linked with solidarity and peace. The five indicators forming this section refer specifically to civil and political rights, while economic, social and cultural rights will be dealt with later, in section H on Development.²⁶ This section²⁷ reflects the complaints made about human rights abuses committed by government agencies (see table G1).

The right to life The right to personal integrity	 Genocide, covered by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Extra-judicial executions and summary disappearances, covered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Death Penalty, covered by the 2nd Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The right to personal integrity	- Death Penalty , covered by the 2nd Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political
The right to personal integrity	
	 Torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual violence, covered in the Convention against Torture
The right not to be arbitrarily detained or punished	 Arbitrary detentions and legal proceedings without guarantees, covered in both case by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The right not to be discriminated against and not to suffer a diminishment of one's rights and freedoms as the result of belonging to one of these groups	 Groups discriminated against: Defenders of human rights, covered in the Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individual Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Women, covered by the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women Children, covered by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols to this Convention Minority groups and indigenous peoples, covered by the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination Refugees, IDPs and asylum-seekers, covered by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the two Protocols to the Four Geneva Conventions

^{26.} See also Appendix VI.

^{27.} Based on Criteria nº 2 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

^{28.} The basic protection of these rights is set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Indicators 15 to 17 refer to the situation regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries or territories examined, while indicators 18 and 19 refer to the application of the death penalty and the grant of asylum status. Only human rights violations committed by the State or by government agencies have been taken into account.²⁹

Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms

The world situation in relation to human rights has continued to be marked by the international agenda imposed following the attacks of 11 September 2001. The different anti-terrorist laws, practices and policies of many countries are involving not only serious violations of civil and political rights but also violations of economic, social and cultural rights, according to experts on the UN Human Rights Commission. In addition, 2003 saw a perpetuation of tendencies already seen during 2002, such as the infringement of fundamental freedoms, an increase in the use of torture, a deterioration in living con-

The world situation in relation to human rights has continued to be marked by the international agenda imposed following the attacks of 11 September 2001.

ditions in detention centres, an absence of procedural guarantees and a hardening of policies for the grant of refugee and asylum status. Greater harassment and persecution of the media, ethnic and religious minorities and defenders of human rights has also been observed. In spite of the difference in the number of countries indicated, all these factors are clearly reflected in the following three indicators. The first is based on non-governmental sources, while the other two are based on information from the EU and the United Nations.

The first indicator (no. 15) relates to all the countries in which, according to the situation described **in** the 2003 reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which refer to events occurring in 2002,³⁰ serious human rights violations have been recorded, with the following results: a) systematic and widespread abuses relating to the right to life and personally security as a result of the actions or omissions of the State are recorded in 71 countries; b) torture and maltreatment are recorded in 117 countries (in spite of the fact that 134 countries have ratified the Convention against Torture, see indicator no. 30); and c) serious infringements of fundamental freedoms have been recorded in 89 countries, the most affected groups being defenders of human rights (in 53 cases) and people working in the communications media. In many of these cases, these abuses are committed against a background of impunity.

The second indicator (no. 16) refers to the countries which the **Council of Europe**³¹ has specifically mentioned as giving concern regarding their human rights situation. In this regard, the Swedish and Greek Presidencies have in turn indicated a total of 32 countries, mainly on the continent of Asia. The report records serious human rights abuses, with the following result: a) existence of systematic and widespread abuses relating to the right to life and personal security as a result of the actions or omissions of the State in 10 countries; b) torture and maltreatment are recorded in 12 countries; and c) serious infringements of fundamental freedoms have been recorded in 17 countries, the most affected groups being defenders of human rights (9 countries) and people working in the communications media. The report underlines improvements in the protection and promotion of human rights in another group of countries. As regards the death penalty, it welcomes the abolition of this practice in Cyprus, Turkey and Serbia and Montenegro. As regards

^{29.} This report appeals for State responsibility, meaning that the majority of the sources used for its indicators refer to violations committed by governments. The abuses perpetrated by other agents, such as armed opposition groups, are not considered, because international law regulates the behaviour of States.

^{30.} For information on reports of human rights violations by these bodies during 2003, see Barometer at http://www.pangea.org/unescopau.

^{31.} Council of Europe, European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2003, Brussels, 13 October 2003.

processes for the consolidation of post-war rehabilitation, it underlines the progress made in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in south-eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR of Macedonia and Croatia). It also welcomes the Presidential Declaration agreed by the Government of Colombia that lists the violations of human rights committed by armed opposition groups, and it recommends that the Libyan Presidency of the UN Human Rights Commission engage in greater cooperation with the international bodies that defend human rights.

In addition, this report indicates the five priority areas for action in respect of human rights for all the EU's bodies: a) a moratorium on the death penalty, b) the fight against impunity and the promotion of international justice, c) the fight against racism and xenophobia, along with discrimination against ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, d) the prevention of torture, and e) the rule of law and democracy.

Finally, the third indicator in this section (n° 17), relating to violations of human rights, is based on the reports presented to the **59th period of sessions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights** by Special Representatives and Rapporteurs or by Independent Experts working at country level, as well as on the Presidential Resolutions and Declarations issued.

Two elements should be pointed to as having marked the progress made by the Human Rights Commission. Firstly, six weeks before the beginning of this period of sessions, the Presidency was decided by a system of voting and not by the normal consensus, due to tensions between the different regional groups. The EU abstained, but it backed a Declaration from the eastern group that reminded the Libyan Presidency of the Commission's commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights . Secondly, due to internal divisions resulting from the attack on Iraq, it was agreed only to deal with the human rights situation prior to the armed conflict and to disregard the humanitarian situation and military intervention, a position that was also adopted by the EU, following the political option backed by the USA. Due to the political difficulties in approving condemnatory resolutions or resolutions expressing concern for the human rights situation in a particular country, it is hardly surprising that this final period of sessions covered many situations of serious abuse that were not eventually reflected. Many human rights organisations expressed regret that this UN body had not also condemned the human rights violations perpetrated in Zimbabwe (due to the AU's opposition to this resolution, at the request of South Africa), Chechnya (since it considered that, given the new process for autonomous institutionalisation that was underway, it was better to avoid any condemnation and support the process), Iraq and Sudan, while the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Iran and Equatorial Guinea were not included on the agenda.

From the reports prepared by Special Representatives and Rapporteurs or by independent Experts working at country level, the information shown below (see Table G2) is particularly worthy of note. In the case of Representatives and Rapporteurs working in different specific areas, consideration has been given to those human rights violations on which the different anti-terrorist policies and strategies have had the greatest effect, such as the increase in the use of torture or the absence of procedural guarantees (see Appendix VI). As regards Sudan, the UN Commission on Human Rights decided to end the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the country in spite of the fact that serious abuses against the civilian population had been recorded.

Table G2. Reports and resolutions adopted in the UNCHR's 59th period of sessions

sessions					
A. REPORTS BY SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO COUNTRIES					
Country reporter	Report (report n°)	Resolution (resolution n°)			
Afghanistan K. Hossain	Recorded abuse against ethnic groups and women and the existence of common graves in the north of the country. (E/CN.4/2003/39)	lUrged the country to sign the Convention on the Rights of the Child and reminds it of its obligations in respect of IHL. (2003/77)			
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia J. Cutileiro	Discrimination on ethnic, political and gender grounds continues in Bosnia and Herzegovina The human rights situation continues to improve in Serbia and Montenegro. (E/CN.4/2003/38)	There was no resolution in respect of either country as they were not included on the agenda.			
Burundi M.T.A. Keita	Recorded the recruitment of child-soldiers and the failure of the Arusha Agreement. (E/CN.4/2003/45)	Condemned the illegal sale and distribution of arms and attacks against humanitarian workers. (2003/16)			
Camboia P. Leuprecht	Denounced impunity, people-trafficking and prison overcrowding. (E/CN.4/2003/45)	Denounced the executive's interference with the judiciary, prison conditions and forced child labour. (2003/79)			
Cuba C. Chanet	Access to the country was denied and no report was presented during this period of sessions.	Urged the Cuban Government to receive an independent Expert. (2003/13)			
DR Congo I-A Motoc	Denounced summary executions, the disappearance of children, torture, death sentences, the terrible prison situation, the lack of freedom of expression, impunity, the repression of defenders of human rights, sexual violence against women and girls, child soldiers and the IDP situation. (E/CN.4/2003/43)	Expressed concern at reports of cases of mutilation and cannibalism. Condemns the massacres, abuses against the civilian population, cases of disappearance, torture and extra-judicial executions and regrets the recruitment of children. (2003/15)			
Haití L. Joinet	Denounced the increase in violence, attacks on the press, political activists and defenders of human rights, along with deficiencies in the penal system. (E/CN.4/2003/116)	There was no resolution relating to the report, but a Presidential Declaration was agreed.			
Iraq A. Mavrommatis	Denounced extrajudicial executions, torture, summary disappearances, enforced displacement and the application of the death penalty. (E/CN.4/2003/40)	Condemned the systematic abuses and the infringement of IHL being committed by the Government. Called on the authorities to attend to the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population. (2003/84)			
Myanmar S. Pinheiro	Denounced the harassment of opposition parties, the forced recruitment of children and the lack of press freedom. (E/CN.4/2003/41)	Condemned the situation relating to IDPs, people with HIV/AIDS and the forced employment and recruitment of children. (2003/12)			
Occupied Territories, including Palestine J. Dugard	Denounced the increase in civilian deaths, the use of torture in detention centres and the use of human shields. (E/CN.4/2003/30)	Regretted Israel's refusal to apply Security Council resolutions. Condemned the use of torture and the destruction of infrastructure. (2003/3)			
Somalia <i>G. Alnajjar</i>	Recorded the presence of common graves and suggested sanctions against the warlords. (E/CN.4/2003/115)	Condemned the breach of peace agreements. Denounced violations of human rights and IHL. (2003/78)			
Sudan <i>G. R. Baum</i>	Denounced impunity on the part of the security forces, torture, detention and the regime for the prolonged isolation of detainees, the exploitation of children, the IDP situation and the situation relating to women and children. (E/CN.4/2003/42)	Not considered on the agenda. Decision taken to end the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.			

The following should be mentioned among the resolutions condemning or expressing concern for countries without a Special Representative or Rapporteur (see Table):

B. RESOLUTIONS ON COUNTRIES WITHOUT PRIOR REPORT			
Country	Resolution (resolution n°)		
Belarus	Condemned cases in which the security forces are involved in disappearances and summary executions, the harassment of NGOs, religious groups and opposition parties. (2003/14)		
Chad	Asked the UNHCR and the Chad government to prepare a programme for technical assistance and advice services in human rights issues. (2003/81)		
DPR Korea	Condemned the use of torture, public executions, living conditions at detention centres and the violence and abuse suffered by women and children. (2003/10)		
Liberia	Decided to appoint an Independent Expert to facilitate cooperation between the Liberian government and the Office of the UNHCR. (2003/82)		
Sierra Leona	Expressed concern at the deficit in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Disarmament, the number of women and children detained by ex-combatants, reports on illegal arms trafficking, the use of child soldiers, IDPs and the humanitarian situation in the country. (2003/80)		
Turkmenistan	Condemned the restrictions imposed on minorities and the political opposition, censorship in the media and the lack of transparency in the elections held in March. Also deplores living conditions in prison and the lack of procedural guarantees. (2003/11)		

In three cases, the decision was taken to adopt a Presidential Resolution, as these were countries for which it would have been difficult to agree a condemnatory resolution (see following Table). In the case of Liberia, it was agreed to appoint an Independent Expert to supervise the situation in the country, with a one-year mandate.

C. DECLARATIONS BY THE UNHCR REGARDING INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES			
Country	Presidential Declaration (Presidential declaration no.)		
Colombia	Condemned the recruitment of children, the human rights violations committed by all the parties and the persecution of defenders of human rights. Indicates a deterioration in the armed conflict and calls for a negotiated solution. (OHCHR/STM/CHR/03/2)		
Haití	Expressed concern regarding the deterioration of the human rights situation in the country and urges the government to put an end to immunity from prosecution. (OHCHR/STM/CHR/03/1)		
Timor-Leste	Recalled the undertaking by the Indonesian government to bring those responsible for human rights and IHL violations to justice. (OHCHR/STM/CHR/03/3)		

Finally, among the most important issues dealt with at this session by means of the various resolutions passed, special mention should be made of the reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to Statehood, the support for a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara, the condemnation of the use of mercenaries and increasing intolerance and xenophobia against religious minorities, particularly Muslims after the attacks of 11 September, clear support for the initiative of the Committee against Torture for the preparation of a proposal redefining torture that would allow this practice to be properly combated, and the great consensus on the resolution to abolish the death penalty. This last issue is dealt with specifically below.

Other aspects deserving of special attention (indicators no 18 and 19)

EThis sub-section will deal specifically with the application of the death penalty and the issue relating to the grant of Asylum Status. It also includes the main initiatives aimed at encouraging corporate responsibility in the area of human rights.

The existence and application of the **death penalty** (indicator no. 18) represents the denial of the most fundamental right: the right to life. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that, in 2003, capital punishment

continued to form part of the legislation of almost half the countries of the world, in spite of the call for an international moratorium on executions and the existence of two instruments prohibiting the practice.³⁴

According to data from Amnesty International, by the end of 2002, 76 countries and territories had already abolished the death penalty for all offences. Another 15 countries had abolished the death penalty for all offences except those of an exceptional nature, such as offences committed in situations of armed conflict. A further 20 countries can be considered to have abolished it in practice, since no executions have taken place at least during the last ten years.³⁵ However, 84 countries continued to apply the death penalty.

It is recorded that at least 1,526 people were executed in 31 countries during 2002 and no less than 3,248 people were condemned to death in 67 countries.³⁶ As regards the countries in which the number of executions was particularly high, the following should be mentioned: China, USA and Iran (1,060, 113 and 71 respectively). These three countries together accounted for 81% of the executions carried out in the world during 2002. This figure represents a clear improvement and a decrease in the application of the death

It is recorded that at least 1,526 people were executed in 31 countries during 2002.

penalty, since it is half the number carried out in 2001 (that figure was 3,248 in 31 countries). The execution of minors was only recorded in the USA. Between 1994 and 2002, 22,588 people were executed in 70 countries, 19 of which were executions of children in five countries (12 of them in the USA).

Elsewhere, many countries and intergovernmental organisations began processes in 2003 for a moratorium on executions or a change in the law relating to their application. In relation to the Council of Europe, for example, special mention should be made of the entry into force in July 2003 of Protocol no. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in respect of the death penalty in all circumstances, a Protocol that was signed by all EU Member States and another 26 States that are members of the Council of Europe. Turkey has abolished the death penalty for all offences. Paraguay and Timor-Leste have unreservedly ratified the 2nd Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for the abolition of this practice.

Finally, in preparing this section, the question of the **grant of asylum** (indicator no. 19) has also been taken into account. Grant of this status, though on occasion subject to restrictions of a national or international nature, implies recognition by the Government of the host nation of the fact that the safety and freedom of the applicant is under threat in his or her country of origin. It therefore represents government recognition of some human rights violation in the country of origin and persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or the expression of certain political opinions, as set out in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. During 2002, the situation in 71 countries resulted in the grant of asylum for more than 100 people in each case, with an accumulated total of more than 130,000. The majority of people granted asylum have come from Africa and Asia, particularly from contexts in which the enforced migration of these applicants results from a combination of armed conflict and human rights violations.

Analysing the data for 2002, and some of the data available for 2003,³⁷ along with the relevant events occurring in matters of asylum policy during the course of the year, certain conclusions can be drawn and certain aspects worthy of particular mention can be observed in respect of world trends in requests for asylum and the legislative contexts by which they are governed.

^{34.} The Second Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Protocol no. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

^{35.} This list contemplates those countries which, while retaining the death penalty on their statute books, applied the rule of not carrying out executions or made an international undertaking not to do so.

^{36.} Nevertheless, it is highly possible that the real number of executions and condemnations is larger, since these figures only represent cases that are known.

^{37.} This data refers to the number of applications for asylum, but not the number accepted.

Firstly, UNHCR has indicated that the number of applicants in industrialised countries fell by 20% during the first nine months of 2003 as compared with the same period in 2002. The largest group of applicants has now become those from Russia, followed by Iraqis (in spite of the fact that the number of applicants has fallen by two thirds) and asylum seekers from Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, China and Afghanistan. The applications that have shown the greatest increase come from people originating from Pakistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia and Somalia. Human rights organisations have stressed that European countries have continued to harden their policies for the grant of Asylum Status, particularly the Netherlands and Austria

As regards the restrictive legislation implemented in respect of asylum in various host countries, UNHCR has complained that the reduction in both the number of applications for asylum and the number of people granted this status is due to the ever greater obstacles being placed in the way of people seeking international protection in the host countries. In this regard, the EU Directive on issues of asylum (which is under discussion as this report is being prepared) deserves particular mention. UNHCR has denounced this Directive repeatedly over the course of 2003, as it could be contradictory to international law on refugee status, to which all the EU Member States are signa-

UNHCR has complained that the reduction in both the number of applications for asylum and the number of people granted this status is due to the ever greater obstacles being placed in the way of people seeking international protection in the host countries.

tories. According to the UN agency, the Directive offers no guarantees of protection and responsibility in host countries for people who may have been the victims of serious human rights violations. As UNHCR indicates, this trend should be seen in conjunction with violation of the principle of *non-refoulement*, ³⁸the increasing difficulties encountered by victim of persecutions in gaining access to both asylum and other lasting solutions such as resettlement, and finally the failure to exclude enforced returns to the country of origin.

Based on the assessment of five indicators (numbers 15 to 19), a list has been prepared that indicates those countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This also takes into account the two indicators relating to International Humanitarian Law, as discussed below, and this report thus concludes that such violations occurred in 45 countries during 2003 (see Table G.3).

Table G3. Co	ountries with serio	us violations o	f human rights	
Afghanistan	Cuba	Iran	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Algeria	DPR Korea	Iraq	Nigeria	Sudan
Bangladesh	DR Congo	Israel	Pakistan	Thailand
Belarus	Equatorial Guinea	Jamaica	Palestine	Turkmenistan
Burundi	Ethiopia	Kenya	Peru	Turkey
Cambodia	Guatemala	Lebanon	Philippines	Uganda
China	Haiti	Liberia	Russia	Uzbekistan
Colombia	India	Mexico	Saudi Arabia	Vietnam
Côte d'Ivoire	Indonesia	Myanmar	Somalia	Zimbabwe

Finally, before moving on to the section dealing with IHL, we will here make special mention of certain initiatives that arose during 2003 in the area of **corporate responsibility** in relation to human rights. It was considered appropriate to refer to this issue in this particular section since the responsibility of companies for

^{38.} This principle establishes that no State that is a signatory to the 1951 Convention may, by expulsion or return, place a refugee in any way within the borders of territories where his or her life or liberty is in danger on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group of the expression of political opinions.

certain human rights violations does not exonerate Governments from protecting their citizens from such abuses (see Figure G1).

Figure G1. Main initiatives for encouraging corporate responsibility in the area of human rights (2003)

International instruments (United Nations and the European Union)

United Nations

- Sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights

The Sub-commission adopted the 'UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights' which established a series of responsibilities for companies in respect of human rights (August 2003).

- Global Compact

The Global Compact recommended that signatory companies report on their progress in relation to nine principles, through the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (March 2003).

European Union

European Commission

The European Commission proposed the directive 'Towards an EU regime on transparency obligations of issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market', aimed at strengthening the financial transparency of stock exchange listed companies (March 2003), COM (2003) 138(01).

European Parliament

The European Parliament presented its report on the European Commission Communication on corporate social responsibility (April 2003), A5-0133/2003.

Government initiatives

United Kingdom

The **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative** (EITI) invited Governments to remove confidentiality clauses in extractive industry agreements (June 2003). The World Bank supported this initiative in December and undertook to work with Governments and companies within its area of influence.

Campaigns

Publish What You Pay

Campaign calling on companies in the extractive industries (oil, gas and minerals) to publish a breakdown of their payments to Governments in the countries in which they have investments (see Appendix III).

Red card for child labour

Joint campaign by FIFA and the ILO to eradicate child labour in the manufacture of sporting products.

Other initiatives

International Financing Corporation (World Bank)

This body encourages financial institutions to sign up to the **Ecuador Principles** and undertake to assess and consider the labourrelated and environmental risks associated with the projects that they finance in developing countries

European Sugar Industry

This body adopted a code of conduct that is intended to come into force in January 2004 and cover questions relating to human rights.

Pacto Mundial España

Around 160 Spanish companies signed up to the principles of the UN Global Compact (October 2003).

Reports

United Nations

The UN Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Congo confirmed the direct or indirect participation of several companies in the conflict in its final report (S/2003/1027, October 2003).

G2. International Humanitarian Law³⁹ (indicators n° 20 and 21)

Finally, this report contains an analysis of two indicators relating to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL is understood to refer to a group of international regulations intended for application in areas engaged in both international and domestic armed conflicts. The aim is to protect people who may become the victims of acts of war (whether they are actual combatants or not) and to restrict the means and methods of war used. The regulations of IHL have both moral and political force (giving rise to international responsibility), and their incorporation in a country's internal legislation involves legal responsibilities that affect all governments as signatories to the different Conventions and Protocols.⁴⁰

IHL was born in 1864 with the 1st Geneva Convention. At that time it represented a series of rules aimed at regulating hostilities between states. ⁴¹ This first document continued to evolve until it resulted in the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the additional Protocol on the protection of victims in international armed conflicts (Protocol I) of 1979. All of these texts refer to conflicts in which at least two states are in conflict. ⁴² Of all the United Nations member states, only the Marshall Islands and Nauru are not parties to the Four Geneva Conventions, while the 1st Protocol has been signed by 161 countries (the Government of Mali ratified it in March 2003). In any

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case, the fact that armed conflicts are increasingly occurring within a single state and not between states (see the section dealing with armed conflicts) in which the civilian population is the group that suffers most (see the section dealing with humanitarian crises), and in which there are serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ⁴³ this has meant that IHL has had to continue to develop in order to adapt to new circumstances. This new type of armed conflict has also reawakened the debate on the recognition of non-state bodies and armed opposition groups involved in these conflicts, and the responsibilities that apply to them.

For this reason, the first indicator taken into account when preparing this section was constructed on the basis of the number of ratifications of the **Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts** (Protocol II, 1979)⁴⁴ (indicator no. 20). In 2003, this 2nd protocol had been ratified by a total of 154 states (the Protocol was not ratified by any State during 2003). All the countries that are party to this Protocol II have ratified Protocol I and the Four Geneva Conventions.

However, although IHL is essentially contained in the four Geneva Conventions, supplemented by the two additional Protocols I and II, there are other legal instruments whose fulfilment has clear consequences for the application of IHL itself. This is the case, for example, with the regulations prohibiting

^{39.} To follow the progress of the International Criminal Courts, see the quarterly publication *Barometer*.

^{40.} IHL only applies in the event of armed conflict. It does not cover situations involving tension and internal disturbance, such as isolated acts of violence. It is only applicable when a conflict has broken out and it applies equally to all parties.

^{41.} There are texts that date from as far back as 1108 regulating the treatment of prisoners of war and the sick, but these involve specific proposals that were generally bilateral and so did not represent a framework for international application.

^{42.} Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; Geneva Convention (II) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; Geneva Convention (III) relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, and Geneva Convention (IV) relating to the protection of civilians in times of war.

^{43.} In contrast to IHL, many of the provisions relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms may be suspended in a situation of internal armed conflict.

^{44.} Non-international armed conflicts are understood to be those in which the regular armed forces are in conflict with armed opposition groups, or armed groups are fighting each other, within the boundaries of an individual state. In these cases, a more restricted series of regulations applies, in particular the provisions of article 3, which are common to all four Geneva Conventions and the second additional protocol. Article 3 regulated armed conflicts within states until the publication of Protocol II.

the use of certain weapons or military tactics, such as the Ottawa Treaty on Anti-personnel Mines or the International Criminal Court (see indicator n° 30), and this even extends to laws protecting certain categories of people or goods. These last regulations have been particularly borne in mind in the preparation of this section, specifically the legal provisions relating to children and their participation in armed conflicts.

Indeed, the 4th Geneva Convention and the two additional Protocols I and II make specific provisions in favour of particular protection for children. This was supplemented by the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 (see indicator n° 30) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on participation in armed conflicts (2000). This Optional Protocol considers a child-soldier to be any «person under the age of 18 who voluntarily or forcibly joins the Armed Forces or armed opposition groups and participates directly in combat». Signatory States undertake to impose criminal sanctions on such practices. The Optional Protocol came into force on 12 February 2002 and has been ratified by 66 countries.

The second and final indicator examined in this sub-section indicates those countries in which the Armed Forces or armed groups recruit children as soldiers (indicator n° 21). The NGO Coalition to stop the use of child-soldiers has presented an annual report on this issue to the UN Security Council since November 2001, the date on which the first resolution on children and armed conflicts was adopted. This NGO stressed that the Secretary General's report this year indicated 15 cases in 2003 as compared with only 5 in 2002,⁴⁶ though it reiterated the fact that the report was limited and recommended the inclusion of nine cases in addition to those included by the Secretary General (see the following Table).

Table G4. Use of child-soldiers by the Armed Forces and/or armed opposition groups				
Body	Armed Forces	Armed Forces and armed opposition groups	Armed opposition groups	
UN Secretary General	_	Burundi DR Congo Côte d'Ivoire Liberia Myanmar Somalia Sudan Uganda	Afghanistan Colombia Nepal Filipinas Russia (Chechnya) Sri Lanka United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers	Eritrea Guinea-Bissau	Angola Indonesia Iraq Rwanda	India Pakistan Sierra Leone	

By way of conclusion, it should be emphasised that 2003 saw a consolidation of the legislative trend to restrict fundamental freedoms and increase the controls imposed on displaced people, refugees and applicants for asylum following the attacks of 11 September in respect of the fight against terrorism. However, it should be mentioned that, in spite of this deterioration in the promotion and protection of human rights at a domestic state level, the United Nations has continued to adopt new legal instruments to provide protection from such abuses at an international level.⁴⁷

^{45.} See Articles 2 and 4 of the Optional Protocol of 2000. Until the adoption of this Protocol, a child was considered to be a boy or girl of 15 or under (including in the International Criminal Court).

^{46.} See S/2003/1053 of 10 November 2003 and S/2002/1299 of 26 November 2002.

^{47.} Such as, for example, the adoption of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migratory Workers and their families (see the section dealing with conduct in relation to the international community).

H. Development

In this section, development is considered to mean the human right recognised in the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1986.⁴⁸ This Declaration claims as a human right the right to a particular development process in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully implemented, but not economic rights when they lead to increasing inequality and an ever-greater concentration of wealth. Article 2 of the Declaration defines it as «the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom».⁴⁹ This expression not only denotes it as a process, it also requires States to have specific policies, as it is they that whave the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies» to this end.

This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first contains an analysis of eight indicators, while the second deals with some of the more important issues on the development agenda that occurred during the course of the year. Indicators can be classified in two groups: those relating to poor government practices in respect of social development and governance (indicators n° 27 and 28), and those that provide evidence of conditions of vulnerability, economic dependence, inequality and impoverishment (indicators n° 22 to 26 and 29).

H1. Poor government practices in respect of social development and governance

As regards **public spending priorities** (indicator n° 27), there are 22 countries whose military spending is higher than the amounts spent on education and health, while another 24 countries devote more resources to military-related issues than to one of the other two items. Although a slight improvement can be observed in comparison with last year, the data confirms that many countries still place defence and militarisation above the basic needs of the population.

Table H1. Countries spending more on military items than on education and health				
Angola (3,1%)	Ecuador (2,1%)	Myanmar (2,3%)	Singapore (5,0%)	
Bahrain (4,1%)	Eritrea (27,5%)	Oman (12,2%)	Syria (6,2%)	
Brunei Darussalam (6,1%)	Ethiopia (6,2%)	Pakistan (4,5%)	Sri Lanka (3,9%)	
Burundi (8,1%)	Guinea-Bissau (3,1%)	Rwanda (3,9%)	Turkey (4,9%)	
Cambodia (3,0%)	Iran (4,8%)	Saudi Arabia (11,3%)		
China (2,3%)	Jordan (8,6%)	Sierra Leone (3,6%)		

Note: The figure in brackets shows the percentage of each country's GDP devoted to military spending.

In addition, the WB identifies 23 countries with poor **governance** and a further 10 with very poor governance (indicator n° 28). Governance, an area which is intrinsically linked to development and which is increasingly taken into account by aid agencies and international organisations when forming their development policies is assessed by the WB on the basis of six variables: control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, effectiveness of government, rule of law and regulatory quality.

^{48.} General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.

^{49.} The contents of the right to development are examined in five reports by the independent expert on the right to development, Arjun Sengupta: E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2, A/55/306, E/CN.4/2001/WG.18/2, E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2 and E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/6. 50. http://www.unhchr.ch

H2. Vulnerability and dependence

As regards the second group of indicators (numbers 22 to 26 and n° 29), it should be borne in mind that, although it is the individual States themselves that must implement development policies, conditions of vulnerability, economic dependence and impoverishment are not only explained on internal grounds. Indeed, the structures and rules of the global economy, together with the development policies of international organisations, also play a fundamental role in this regard.

As regards the **Millennium Development Goals**,⁵¹ the UNDP identified 30 maximum priority countries and 28 high priority countries (indicator no. 22). In any case, all of these countries will fail to meet the Goals on the planned date if current trends are not drastically reversed. This information must be seen as relative in view of the still incipient statistics and methodology available to the UNDP when assessing the progress made in respect of the Goals, as there are 32 countries for which there is no reliable information in this regard, while some countries that do not appear on the list still present enormous difficulties in reaching specific Goals and will therefore also require the attentions and assistance of the international community. It should be emphasised that 38 of the 59 high or maximum priority countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that some of these countries have the common characteristics of not having a coastline, having small economies which are essentially agricultural and a long way from the international markets, and suffering from armed conflicts and high rates of HIV/AIDS.

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Intrinsically associated with these difficulties in progressing towards the Goals are countries that are experiencing reverses in their **Human Development Index**⁵⁴ (HDI) or countries included in the Least Developed Countries (LDC) list (indicator no. 23). During the 1990s, human development stagnated and an unprecedented reverse set in, demonstrated by the fact that 21 countries currently have a Human Development Index which is lower than it was in 1990. This phenomenon is very serious if we consider that the HDI had shown steady growth since the 1970s, and also if we bear in mind the natural and empirical tendency of countries to show improvement in respect of the three HDI elements.

Ukraine Zambia Zimbabwe

The fall in HDI is concentred mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa (above all, due to the spread of HIV/AIDS), Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the CIS (due to the collapse of their economies). Similarly, although the percentage of the world population living below the poverty line fell during the 1990s, poverty levels increased in 54 countries and the number of people suffering from hunger increased in another 21 countries.

Table H2. Countries with a Human Development Index that is lo	ower than it was
in 1990	

Congo	Moldova
DR Congo	Russia
Côte d'Ivoire	South Africa
Kazakhstan	Swaziland
Kenya	Tanzania
Lesotho	Tajikistan
	DR Čongo Côte d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Kenya

- 51. For additional information, see the section entitled «The development agenda in 2003».
- 52. Countries with high levels of human poverty which are also at a standstill or even regressing in terms of compliance with the Goals.
- 53. Countries with medium levels of human poverty that have nevertheless shown no progress or a deterioration in their compliance with the Goals, or countries with extreme human poverty that have shown advances in respect of the Goals.
- 54. Compound index that measures progress on the basis of three fundamental elements in human development: a long a healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy rate and gross school numbers) and a decent standard of living (GDP per capita).

Elsewhere, special attention should be paid to the 49 countries that ECOSOC included in its list of LDCs (updated every three years) on the basis of three variables.⁵⁵ Some of the main characteristics of LDCs, which are mainly concentrated in Africa and Asia, are the poverty experienced throughout the whole of society and the fact that they depend greatly on the export of primary products (particularly minerals), income from which has fallen hugely over the last twenty years.

In spite of the fact that the Programme of Action for the LDCs includes the aim of increasing Official Development Aid (ODA)⁵⁶ to LDCs up to 0.15% of GDP and reducing by half the number of people living in extreme conditions of poverty (less than 1 dollar a day) by 2015, a report by UNCTAD⁵⁷ warns that this proportion has doubled during the last thirty years and that, since 1971, the number of LDCs has doubled from 25 to 49 countries at present.

The indicator showing **inequalities in internal income** (indicator n° 24), which is calculated on the basis of the Gini coefficient,⁵⁸ indicates that 50 countries have high levels of inequality (above 40), while another seven have very high levels (above 60). It is currently considered that the distribution of income is one of the most important elements in development, since it allows one to measure the extent to which the whole of society is benefiting from economic growth. In addition, high rates of inequality encourage instability and social exclusion and provoke various forms of violent demonstrations. Nevertheless, in spite of the importance of this information, it should be pointed out that inequality is greater between the inhabitants of the world as a whole than it is between the inhabitants of the most unequal country in the world, according to

the UNDP. Thus, «the richest 5% of the world's population receive 114 times the income of the poorest 5%, and the richest 1% receive as much as the poorest 57%». ⁵⁹ In spite of the different methodologies used to calculate inequality, there is consensus regarding the fact that this has grown on both a national and an international scale over recent decades, and wealth is thus becoming more and more concentrated. Inequality in Latin America continues at extremely high levels, while regions such as Southern and Eastern Europe and the countries of the CIS have seen it grow to very high levels.

Inequality is greater between the inhabitants of the world as a whole than it is between the inhabitants of the most unequal country in the world, according to the UNDP.

Turning to **gender inequalities** (indicator n° 25), the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) has been taken as a reference. This reflects the difference between men and women on the basis of three fundamental aspects of human development: life expectancy, income per capita and levels of literacy and schooling. Although the GDI does not cover multiple gender equality issues, the situation experienced by women is particularly serious in 35 countries, 28 of which are LDCs. Furthermore, the majority of countries with higher gender differences are also countries that show a very low HDI. One can conclude from these two related indices, among other things, that discrimination against women is an enormous obstacle to a country's capacity for development.

In its annual report on the status and progress of women in the world,⁶⁰ UNIFEM underlined the fact that the area in which most progress had been made during the past two years was political participation by women. Nevertheless, on a world scale, only 14% of parliamentary seats are occupied by women, which is

^{55.} Low income (GDP per capita), low human resources (standard of living index based on life expectancy, calories per capita, schooling and literacy) and low level of economic diversification (index based on several macro-economic indicators).

^{56.} Financial assistance given by governments to impoverished countries and channelled through bilateral or multilateral agreements, which should have the main objective of promoting economic growth and social welfare in developing countries, a minimum of 25% being in the form of donations.

^{57.} See http://www.unctad.org

^{58.} The Gini Coefficient measures the level of inequality between income or consumption in an individual country. The value 0 represents perfect equality and 100 total inequality.

^{59.} UNDP, Report on Human Development 2003, p. 39.

^{60.} http://www.unifem.org/index.php?f_page_pid=1

a long way from the 30% established at the Beijing Conference and other international conferences during the 1990s, a figure which is currently only met by 11 countries: Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Norway, Iceland, the Netherlands, South Africa, Costa Rica, Argentina and Mozambique. As one can see from this list, parliamentary representation is one of the few indicators of gender equality in which there are no significant differences between industrialised and impoverished countries. In addition, UNIFEM indicates many other areas in which progress is insufficient and slow (education, health, integration in the work force, human rights infringements, etc.) and it particularly underlines the feminisation of poverty and the especially negative effect that neo-liberal economic measures and structural adjustment plans are having on women. Likewise, the incidence of HIV/AIDS among women has increased from 41% to 50% during the last five years.

The percentage of Official Development Aid (ODA) received as a proportion of total public spending is one of the main indicators used to measure the degree of **economic dependence** in a country (indicator no. 26). Nine countries have been identified as receiving ODA equivalent to more than 50% of their public spending, while this proportion is above 25% in another nine countries. This indicator could reflect the fact that ODA is too high or that public spending is insufficient, though it is in any case clear that there are still too many countries that depend excessively on international aid. This aspect is at least worrying from two points of view. Firstly, because the State could become accustomed to delegating services which are intrinsically its own responsibility to international cooperative efforts, and secondly, because the growing politicisation of ODA could lead to excessive conditions being placed on the identification of development priorities and strategies.

Another indicator tackles the problem of **foreign debt** (indicator no. 29), i.e. the money that impoverished countries owe to the banks, lender countries and multilateral financial institutions (the IMF, the WB and regional banks) as a result of the loans received by their governments in the past, loans which they are now frequently unable to repay.

There are several formulas for measuring how foreign debt affects the capacity of an individual country. This report considers three aspects: total foreign debt in relation to GDP; the amount of debt repayments⁶¹ in relation to the amounts received in ODA; and inclusion on the list of 42 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). The HIPC initiative for the reduction of debt was proposed by the IMF and the World Bank in 1996, setting out special credit programmes for 42 countries. However, according to reports by these institutions themselves, the programme has seen little progress, and the world economic recession and the heavy fall in both prices and demand for raw materials have affected exports to impoverished countries and upset the forecasts regarding their ability to pay.

There are currently 12 countries whose foreign debt exceeds their GDP, a circumstance that demonstrates their inability to repay this debt and their difficulties in financing other priorities relating to the country's development. In addition, there are 61 countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA, which highlights the fact that on many occasions there is a net transfer of resources from impoverished countries to industrialised ones. It should also be borne in mind that the need to make debt repayments has provided an incentive for the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources, since their export is one of the few ways in which countries can earn sufficient amounts of foreign currency in order to meet payments. In other words, the population of the poorest countries continues to pay the opportunity costs that debt repayment represents in respect of development, and these debt repayments, as shown by this indicator, exceeds the financing received from developed counties in the form of ODA in a great many countries. There are also three countries (Angola, Congo and Côte d'Ivoire) which are not only HIPCs but also have foreign debt levels that exceed their GDP and pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA.

Table H3. Countries with foreign debt in excess of their GDP

 Angola (119%)
 DR Congo (222%)
 Mauritania (143%)
 Syria (111%)

 Congo (221%)
 Guinea-Bissau (231%)
 Serbia and Montenegro (108%)
 Sudan (130%)

 Côte d'Ivoire (109%)
 Liberia (436%)
 Sierra Leona (114%)
 Zambia (115%)

Note: The figure shown in brackets shows foreign debt as a percentage of GDP.

Based on an analysis of this data and the phenomenon of foreign debt in general, we can draw two conclusions. Firstly, both total foreign debt and the servicing of this debt have grown continually over the past 20 years, in spite of the repayments made during this time. This is due to two factors; an increase in the amount of interest that debtor countries are forced to pay, coupled with requests for new loans, largely in order to repay earlier ones. Secondly, foreign debt is fundamentally managed on a financial basis and not in terms of social development, i.e. without an active policy of either writing off debt or converting it into investment in social development in a way that can be coordinated with development cooperation work as a whole. In addition, conditional aid still represents a very high percentage of total ODA, and the undertaking to allocate 20% of bilateral ODA to basic social sectors is a long way from being fulfilled. It would therefore seem clear that poor practices in development cooperation policy are also partly responsible for the conditions of vulnerability, impoverishment, inequality and dependence mentioned at the beginning of this section.

H3. The development agenda in 2003

We will here deal briefly with some aspects (both inter-governmental and otherwise) of interest or importance that have arisen on the development agenda during the course of the year.

1) Given the continuing reports that several regions of the world will not be able to meet the **Millennium Development Goals** by 2015, the United Nations intensified its efforts in respect of internal coordination and assessment in order to relaunch the Millennium Agenda. As a result, in its 2003 Human Development report, the UNDP presented a new action plan (the Millennium Development Compact) which established specific

strategies for each of the parties involved in compliance with the Goals. The Millennium Development Compact, which works on the basis that each country should follow a development strategy that responds to its own needs and specific characteristics, calls on industrialised countries to increase ODA, offer the poorer countries more access to their markets and improve policies aimed at alleviating foreign debt. It also urges the poorer countries to improve their governance and make responsible use of ODA. In the words of the report itself, «the Compact provides a Goal-orientated development process in which all the main stakeholders have clear responsibilities as well as obligations to other actors». ⁶²

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The UN's strategy in relation to the Goals is complemented by two other processes. Firstly, the Millennium Project,⁶³ which comprises 10 working groups of international experts charged with designing the best strategy for implementing the Goals. Secondly, the teams set up to advise the Governments of the poorer countries, whose main objective is to prepare national reports on the progress made by individual countries in respect of each of the Millennium Development Goals.

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Table H4. Progres	ss towards the Millennium Development Goals by region
Region	Notable events
Arab States	General improvement in many aspects of human development, though the gender gap persists and economic growth has stagnated
East Asia and the Pacific	Very good results in respect of the reduction of poverty (15% during the 1990s) and hunger. Strong economic growth in spite of the crisis of 97-98
Eastern and Central Europe and the CIS	Poverty has increased and incomes have fallen. Particularly serious is the situation in the CIS, which shows some indicators at levels similar to those in countries showing the lowest levels of human development
Latin America and the Caribbean	Stagnation in the majority of indicators. During the 1990s, economic growth was very slow and poverty levels rose slightly
South Asia	Important advances and homogenous progress during the 1990s, though the region continues to show the highest absolute poverty figures in the world
Sub-Saharan Africa	Stagnation and reverses in the region (except for some countries which have made spectacular progress). The region is behind in compliance with the Goals in comparison with other areas of the world

Source: Prepared by the authors from information in the UNDP's 2003 Human Development Report.

2) The declaration of 2003 as the **International Year of Freshwater** gave rise to several events, the proliferation of a number of reports warning of the scarcity and degradation of water and the mobilisation of civilian organisations protesting against the privatisation of water filtering and distribution systems and calling for new models for the ownership and management of water supplies.

In this connection, a report prepared jointly by various UN agencies warned that by 2005 some 7 billion people (from a projected population of 9.3 billion) would be suffering from water shortages. The current situation is already serious, given that 40% of the world's population lack sufficient water for sanitation and hygiene and 2.2 million people die every year from diseases related to the lack of proper water supplies. Likewise, the declaration at the end of the Third World Forum on Freshwater held in Tokyo urged all States to double their financial and technical assistance for water and significantly increase their ODA for investment in this area. It also proposed the adoption of measures aimed at improving the administration of water resources, the prevention of pollution and the conservation of ecosystems, and the adoption of alliances between Governments and the private sector in order to ensure the supply of water. Nevertheless, Amnesty International and other organisations complained that this final declaration did not recognise water as a human right, which would involve imposing a direct responsibility on individual States to quarantee this right. In the same connection, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indicated that the right to water was a prerequisite for the observance of other human rights. As a result, a proposal was made at the International Forum on Fresh Water held in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) that the period between 2005 and 2015 be declared the international decade of fresh water. Other initiatives seen during the course of the year are the creation of a European Water Fund to provide aid to the poorer countries and the establishment of an Asian Forum for Water and Sanitation, which will meet annually to oversee advances in this area and advise the governments involved.

3) The interruption of the 5th Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun (Mexico), as a result of the failure of the 146 member states to reach any agreement, meant that negotiations had to be postponed, leaving both the organisation and the Doha round in a delicate position. Talks ended after the majority of countries objected to the EU proposal to tackle the so-called Singapore agenda (public tenders and state purchasing, investment in other countries and free competition), without having first reached any consensus on customs tariffs and subsidies for agricultural and food products. Several countries also accused the USA of adopting an intransigent attitude on cotton subsidies. For their part, delegates from the USA and the EU accused some of the poorer countries of negotiating without any desire for consensus.

The breakdown in these talks gave rise to an intense debate on the implications and consequences of the failure of the meeting. On the one hand, there are those who believe that the balance is basically positive, because this failure has allowed questions to be asked about the legitimacy of the WTO and the logic of the neoliberal economic model, pointing out that the blocking of agreement on essential drugs has been lifted. They also point to the fact that the role of the G22 (the group of developing countries) has been strengthened on the world stage and that the question of agricultural subsidies has been placed in a pre-eminent position on the international agenda. On the other hand, however, there are those who believe that the collapse of these negotiations may intensify the unilateralist behaviour of certain industrialised states, both in their management of international trade and in their commitment to the Millennium Development Goals. In this regard, while the USA and the EU have already announced their willingness to begin bilateral freetrade treaties with countries that they consider eligible, other countries have indicated that there will be no progress in trade liberalisation until the industrialised countries renounce their protectionist measures in relation to agriculture and food. For their part, several UN agencies have warned during the last three months about the reduction in resources for several of the Goals, and the Secretary General himself has emphasised the difficulty in relaunching the Millennium Agenda if consensus is not regained among the international community.

4) After eight months of intense negotiations, the 146 member states of the WTO reached consensus for the poorer countries to be able to import generic drugs under advantageous conditions, which should facilitate the treatment of people with diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Countries without any pharmaceutical capacity to produce **essential drugs** may only resort to their importation in the case of a health emergency, and drugs must be used solely for humanitarian purposes. This agreement, which is restricted to some twenty diseases and will apply exclusively to the poorer countries, sets out certain measures to prevent piracy and the diversion of drugs to other countries. While the WTO called this agreement historic, some African countries and organisations such as MSF and Oxfam believed that the new rules would be difficult to implement and that they represent a better solution for the western drugs industry than for the millions of victims of these diseases.

In its Declaration on the Agreements on Intellectual Property Rights in Trade and Public Health (adopted in 2001), the WTO recognised the primacy of public health over any other commercial interest, meaning that essential drugs should be treated differently from all other goods. However, negotiations have been at a standstill since December 2002, when the USA and its pharmaceutical industry blocked any advance on the basis that the agreement violated the patents system, which in many cases does not allow a drug to be copied until 20 years after its creation. The majority of WTO countries had previously warned that the approval of this agreement was a prior requirement if any progress was to be made at the WTO Conference in Cancun. Some progress was recorded in respect of this issue during the year, among which mention should be made of the new EU regulation that allows pharmaceutical companies to export cheap essential drugs to poorer countries in order to combat diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.

5) The 6th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat **Desertification and Drought**, held in La Havana, discussed the growing relationship between desertification (loss of cultivable land, reduction of vegetation cover, etc.) and poverty. Special reference was also made to the small island nations, which are increasingly affected by the phenomenon of desertification. Several countries also heavily criticised the harmful effects of the neoliberal economic system on the environment, and the lack of commitment shown by some industrialised countries to finding a solution to this issue. Of the three conventions that resulted from the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (climate change, biological diversity and desertification and drought), the first two have shown much more significant progress than the last one, in spite of reports warning of a worsening of the situation.

Chart H1. Some data on desertification

- It directly affects one third of the planet's land surface and 250 million people
- It makes subsistence difficult for more than 1.2 billion people who are dependent on agriculture.
- Some 60 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa (the part of the world most affected by desertification) may emigrate to Europe and North Africa during the next 20 years.
- Approximately one half of all armed conflicts are the result of environmental causes.
- 135 million people may face enforced displacement as the result of desertification.
- 70% of land used for agriculture is being eroded and threatened with desertification.
- It accelerates climate change, contributes to the impoverishment of biodiversity and causes the degradation and contamination of water reserves or salination and soil erosion.

Source: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought

6) The holding of the 3rd World Social Forum in the city of Porto Alegre (Brazil) represented the consolidation of this event (it was attended by 100,000 people from 150 different countries) and was notable for its creation of a strategy aimed at decentralising the Forum and ensuring the greater diffusion and effect of its proposals, as demonstrated by the increasing number of requests to participate from political parties and the groups that had called at the Economic Forum in Davos for closer links between the two Forums. As regards the strategy for decentralisation, special mention should be made of the decision to hold the World Social Forum in India in 2004, along with the holding during the course of the year of Social Forums for Asia (Hyderabad, India), Africa (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), the Amazon (Belem de Pará, Brazil), Europe (Paris, France) and a World Social Thematic Forum (Cartagena de Indias, Colombia). Also worthy of special attention are the demonstrations and proposals organised by civilian groups at the G8 meetings in Bercy and Evian, the World Economic Forum in Davos, the meeting of the European Council in Thessalonica and the WTO meeting in Cancun. In relation to this last event, special mention should be made of the final declaration made at the International Peasants' Forum, which demanded that food, agriculture, health and education should not be subject to commercial agreements within the framework of the WTO. It also opposed the production and importation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and the intellectual property agreements advocated by the WTO.

7) The United Nations launched the Decade of **Literacy** (2003-2012), which included the goals set by the World Forum on Education in Dakar (2000). This forms part of the international campaign «Education for All» and falls within the framework of the UN's strategy to make progress in respect of the Millennium Development Goals. The action plan, which will be coordinated by UNESCO, will cross-reference literacy with gender, poverty, health, peace and liberty every two years. There are currently 861 million adults in the world who can't read or write (20% of the world's population) and 113 million children who are unable to go to school. Illiteracy rates are particularly significant among women, though progress as regards improving access by women to education is currently better than that of men. In spite of the fact that the target is to reduce illiteracy by half by 2015, there will still be some 800 million illiterate people by that time if current trends continue. It should be emphasised that the thirty or so countries⁶⁴ that are displaying the slowest advances in respect of the Dakar goals will account for 92% of illiteracy by 2015 unless urgent and drastic action is taken. On a regional scale, Africa and Asia are showing the best progress, though there are marked disparities between individual countries.

^{64.} Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Iraq, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Senegal and United Arab Emirates.

Table H5. Evolution of illiteracy levels (people over 15 years) by region ⁶⁵						
	World	North Africa and the Arab States	East Asia and the Pacific	Latin America and the Caribbean	Southern and Eastern Asia	Sub-Saharan Africa
1990	25	50	20	15	52	51
2000	20	40	13	11	45	40
2015	15	28	7	7	24	26

Source: UNESCO.

8) December saw the first stage of the **World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva**. This was aimed at reducing the so-called «digital gap» and placing new communications and information technologies at the service of the Millennium Agenda and the development of impoverished countries. This Summit, which will next be held in Tunis in November 2005, was notable for the absence of the majority of Heads of State and Government of the most industrialised countries, the significant presence of many companies in the technology sector and the low political profile of the undertakings made in the Final Declaration and Action Plan. In addition, any decision regarding the two main demands from the poorer countries, relating to modification of current mechanisms for control of the Internet and the creation of a Digital Solidarity Fund, were postponed.

Firstly, as regards the «governance» of the Internet, a working group was created that will examine public policies and the technical aspects relating to this issue and present its final report in Tunis in 2005. At the present time, US multinationals for the most part control the allocation of Internet names and numbers, along with the majority of basic network servers.

Secondly, the refusal of industrialised countries to create a solidarity fund was to a certain extent offset by a review of current financing mechanisms and the announcement of various bilateral association agreements to finance some individual initiatives. Some companies, working with the United Nations, also promised funding, which was interpreted by certain sectors of civilian society as an attempt to expand their presence in new markets.

Finally, it should be mentioned that around 200 events were arranged around the Summit, principal among which were the World Forum on Communications Rights in the Information Society and the Communications Media Forum. The Civilian Declaration placed an emphasis on the human rights associated with the information society (freedom of expression, privacy, minority rights, etc.), supporting the role of the communications media and criticising the excessive protection of intellectual property rights and the concentration of media ownership.

I. Conduct in relation to international society

This final section contains an analysis of indicators 30 to 36, which refer to the Millennium Declaration, the protection of human rights, financial transparency and military security. In spite of the fact that some of these issues are analysed in more detail in other parts of the report, we want above all to point out here the level of commitment and compliance in respect of certain international treaties and regulations, in order to evaluate the conduct of individual States in relation to the international community. In this regard, in 2002 the UN Secretary General underlined the importance of multilateralism and urged member States to respect and contribute to the legal framework developed by the international community since the end of the Second World War. This section is divided into four sub-sections, each of which refers to one of the four areas mentioned above.

11. Behaviour in relation to the Millennium Declaration

The United Nations Millennium Declaration was adopted at the Millennium Summit (New York, September 2000) by 189 countries. This declaration defined a global agenda based on the values, themes and goals that should guide the actions of the United Nations and its member states throughout the coming years. The Declaration brings together some of the ideas that have themselves been the subject of world conferences (particularly those that took place during the 1990s)⁶⁷ and it includes 25 multilateral treaties that combine the organisation's main principals. These 25 treaties are in turn a selection from among the more than 500 legal instruments created since the United Nations was originally founded. The Millennium Declaration sets out principals and regulations that are not binding on individual countries, though all the treaties from which it is formed are legally binding.

This report has considered seven of the 25 treaties that make up the **Millennium Declaration** (indicator n° 30). The following table indicates the countries that had signed and ratified these seven treaties on 31 December 2003.

Legal instrument	F	R	R(2003)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)	139 ⁶⁸	92	Afganistán, Albania, Georgia, Guinea, Lituania
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction, or the Ottawa Treaty (1997)	133	141	Belarus, Burundi, Cyprus, Greece, Guyana, Lithuania, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Timor- Leste, Turkey
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change (1997)	84	119	Armenia, Belize, Botswana, Ghana, Guyana, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao, Lithuania, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Namibia, Moldova, Saint Lucia, Solomon Islands, Switzerland, Tunisia
Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)	168	187	—
Convention to Combat Desertification (1994)	115	190	Bhutan, Lithuania, Russia, Timor-Leste
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (1979)	9869	174	Afghanistan, Sao Tome and Principe, Syria, Timor-Leste
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	140	192	Timor-Leste

Notes: S: Signed; R: Ratified; R (2003): Ratified during 2003. As regards ratification, the United Nations provides other legal mechanisms with the same legal validity as ratification which do not require the prior signing of the legal instrument. These are acceptance, approval, accession and succession. For this reason, the number of signatures is sometimes greater than the number of ratifications. In these tables, ratification includes all the other mechanisms.

66. The EU's own Code of Conduct on arms exports indicates the need to comply with international obligations and undertakings (see criteria 1, 6 and 7 of the Code, Appendix X of this report).

^{67.} In particular the World Summit for Children (New York, 1990), the World Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), The World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) and the World Food Summit (Rome, 1996)

^{68.} The USA and Israel withdrew their signatures in 2002.

^{69.} San Marino signed the treaty in September.

Table I1.2. Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 7 main international legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration

Brunei Darussalam (2) Iraq (2) Tonga (3)

DPR Korea (3) United Arab Emirates (3)

Iran (3) Somalia (1) USA (1)

Note: The number in brackets indicates the number of instruments ratified

From a general point of view, it should be pointed out that the total number of ratifications in 2003 (43) represented a significant fall in comparison with the 117 that occurred in 2002. However, the number of countries that have ratified all the legal instruments covered by this section has now grown to 61. In spite of the fact that the first three instruments mentioned in Table I1.1 (the Rome Statute, the Ottawa Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol) are the ones that accounted for the highest number of ratifications during the year, they are also the ones that have seen the lowest number of ratifications since their approval. Thus, while the Rome Statute and the Ottawa Treaty have actually come into force, the Kyoto Protocol has not, and there were therefore repeated calls during the course of the year for countries such as the USA and Russia to ratify it.

Figure I1.1.	The Kyoto Protocol
Aim	 Reduce emissions of the greenhouse gases mainly responsible for global warming and climate change (particularly CO2).
Entry into force	 Requires ratification by 55 countries, which in turn are responsible for 55% of world CO2 emissions. It has currently been ratified by 119 countries, but they only total 44% of emissions. As a result, ratification is required by either the USA (36% of all emissions) or Russia (17%) in order to come into force.
Specific aspects of the Protocol	 Sets out that the 39 industrialised countries will reduce their emissions by 5.2% between 2008 and 2012 in respect of their 1990 levels. Does not contemplate financial sanctions, but any states that do not comply will see an increase of 30% in their undertaking for the following period (from 2013). Allows the negotiation and sale of pollution quotas. Its entry into force will mean large investments will be needed in order to modernise industry in many countries. Encourages the transfer of clean technologies to the poorer countries.

As regards specific countries, positive mention should be made of Lithuania and Timor-Leste (which gained independence in May 2002), since they both ratified four instruments during the course of the year. Elsewhere, the USA and Somalia are the only countries that have ratified only one of the treaties contained in the Millennium Declaration. In the case of Somalia, the absence of a single recognised authority for the whole territory may be conditioning its international behaviour. In the case of the USA, particular mention should be made of the fact that it withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, and that in 2001 it announced that it was withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, though it has not yet put this into effect.

12. Behaviour in relation to the protection of human rights

Following the Second World War, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1951, a series of legal instruments has been constructed for the protection of human rights on both an international and a regional scale.⁷⁰

^{70.} This internationalisation of the system for the protection of human rights during the 20th century places an emphasis on the responsibility of individual states when it comes to guaranteeing their protection and promotion under international monitoring. Subsequently, as a reflection of the current approach to human rights, more than 170 countries ratified the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights at the International Conference in Vienna in 1993.

In this connection, indicator no. 31 is created on the basis of the main human rights treaties that are legally binding on the States that have signed them. This indicator comprises the two Covenants that regulate human rights and fundamental freedoms generically (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 1966), along with four Conventions that refer to more specific subjects, such as genocide, refugee status, racial discrimination and torture and other cruel treatment. These conventions are complemented by the two conventions on human rights included in indicator no. 30 in relation to the rights of women and children.

The following table indicates the countries that had signed and ratified these six legal instruments by 31 December 2003.

Table I2.1. Countries that had signed and ratified the main legal instruments for the protection of human rights by the end of 2003

Instrumento jurídico	F	R	R(2003)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	66	151	Timor-Leste, Turkey
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	64	148	Timor-Leste, Turkey
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)	41	135	Sudan
Convention on the Status of Refugee (1951)	19	142	Timor-Leste
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms	84	169	Oman, Paraguay, of Racial
Discrimination (1966)			Thailand, Timor-Leste
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or	74	134	Congo, Timor-LesteDegrading
Treatment or Punishment (1984)			

Note: S: Signed; R: Ratified; R (2003): Ratified during 2003.

Table I2.2. Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 6 main UN legal instruments on human rights

Andorra (0) Bhutan (0) Brunei Darussalam (0) Cook Islands (NZ) (0)	Marshall Islands (0) Mauritania (2) Micronesia (0) Myanmar (1)	Samoa (1) Saint Lucia (1) Sao Tome and Principe (2) Singapore (1) Supplied (2)
Comoros (0) Granada (2) Guinea-Bissau (2) Indonesia (2) Kiribati (0)	Nauru (0) Niue (NZ) (0) Oman (1) Pakistan (2) Palau (0)	Swaziland (2) Tonga (2) Tuvalu (1) United Arab Emirates (1) Vanuatu (0)
Malaysia (1) Maldives (2)	Qatar (2) Saint Kitts and Nevis (1)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Note: The number in brackets indicates the number of instruments ratified.

Of the 31 countries that appear in this table, 19 are States that are either very small (Andorra, Singapore) or islands and archipelagos (11 in the Pacific, 3 in the Caribbean and 2 in the Indian Ocean). Indeed, some of these countries or territories justify their failure to make a commitment to international legislation on the grounds of their size, or the relatively marginal position that they occupy on the world stage. It is nevertheless worrying that 13 countries have not ratified a single instrument and a further 10 have ratified only one. It should, however, be mentioned that 88 States have ratified all six legal instruments and that there were 12 new ratifications during 2003,71 (five of them related to Timor-Leste,

^{71.} Although this figure is well below that of the number of new ratifications under indicator no. 30, it is worth pointing out that the legal instruments contained in indicator no. 32 are much older than those that make up the Millennium Declaration, and this has an unquestionable effect on the number of new ratifications.

a country that gained independence in 2002 and has consolidated its membership of the United Nations with these ratifications).

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the United Nations continued to adopt new legal instruments for the protection and promotion of human rights, such as the entry into force in 2003 of the International Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Their Families, following its ratification by 23 countries. In addition, a further two instruments are being drawn up by various of the UNHRC's Working Groups in connection with a draft optional protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, while a draft declaration is being prepared on the rights of indigenous peoples.

Finally, four countries are worthy of special attention as they appear under both indicator 30 and indicator 31. These are Brunei Darussalam, Oman, Tonga and the United Arab Emirates.

13. Behaviour in terms of financial transparency

This section contains an analysis of the behaviour of States and territories in respect of financial activities and transparency. Two indicators serve to illustrate this behaviour: the one relating to tax havens (indicator no. 32) and the one listing the countries that are not cooperating with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (indicator no. 33) in its pursuit of money laundering.

As regards the situation in 2003, 39 states or territories classified as **tax havens**, 72 of which five are non-cooperative because they have not adopted OECD directives on harmful fiscal practices (see Table I.3.1) The remaining 34 have undertaken to implement these directives, two of them during 2003 and the rest during previous years. Although the adoption of OECD directives does not mean that they cease to be considered as tax havens, it does indicate a greater willingness to cooperate with the international community. As a result, from a positive point of view, it should be mentioned that of the 35 non-cooperating states or territories listed in the 2000 report, 73 only five now remain. It should also be pointed out that only two States adopted the directives during 2003: Nauru and Vanuatu. In other words, the pace at which the criteria have been adopted has slowed considerably during the course of this year, thus showing a slowing of the trend seen in 2002, in which 21 countries undertook to cooperate. However, it should be pointed out that the restriction of the recommendations and directives during 2001 meant that many states and territories disappeared from the list of non-cooperating tax havens at that time.

Table 13.1. Tax havens that do not cooperate with the OECD									
Andorra Liechtenstein	Liberia Marshall Islands	Monaco							

For its part, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),⁷⁴ indicates nine states or territories that are not adequately following its recommendations for the prevention, detection and punishment of **money-laundering** (indicator no. 33). It should be pointed out that, following the same trend as for tax havens, only two States were removed from the list in 2003 as a result of their good conduct: Granada and Saint Vincent and

^{72.} The OECD considers that a state or territory is a tax haven when it meets the following four requirements: a) a tax on capital does not exist or is not applied; b) there is no effective exchange of information between different jurisdictions and between financial institutions; c) there is no transparency on the part of the judiciary, and d) there is no monitoring of financial operations.

^{73.} OECD, Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, Paris, 2000.

^{74.} The FATF was created by the G-7 in 1989 and includes 29 states and territories, together with the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Although it works closely with the OECD, it does not form part of this organisation, and its aim, based on a list of 40 recommendations, is the development and coordination of government efforts to combat money-laundering.

the Grenadines. In addition, during the meeting held in Stockholm in October 2003, the FATF decided to take counter-measures against Myanmar due to its failure to apply specific measures against money laundering in accordance with its legislation.

Two initiatives by the FATF were particularly important. Firstly, completion of a review of 40 recommendations to combat money laundering, which involved certain changes in its activities, such as improvements in the creation of a list of specific offences to strengthen the fight against money laundering, and the extension of anti-money laundering measures against non-financial businesses and professions, in addition to measures aimed at increasing international cooperation, improvements in transparency requirements and a ban on ghost banks. This second initiative is aimed at strengthening the fight against the financing of terrorist groups, an issue that the Group has named as one of its priorities and which is intended to involve both the donor community and international bodies.

Table 13.2. Countries that do not cooperate with the FATF in respect of money laundering

Cook Islands	Indonesia	Nigeria
Egypt	Myanmar	Philippines
Guatemala	Nauru	Ukraine

Adoption of the United Nations
Convention against
Corruption first legally binding
agreement on this issue.
It is aimed at combating
corrupt transactions
that account for one billion
dollars each year.

Finally, special mention should be made of a particularly important event during 2003, which was the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. 95 countries have so far signed this Convention (which needs 30 ratifications in order to come into force) during the Conference against Corruption held in Merida, Mexico during the month of December. This is the first legally binding agreement on this issue, and it is aimed at combating corrupt transactions that account for one billion dollars each year. The Convention was prepared on the basis that corruption goes beyond mere criminal conduct, mortgaging the future and impoverishing many countries, as well as depriving ordinary citizens of good government. The Conven-

tion includes measures for the prevention and pursuit of crimes, international cooperation and the recovery of wealth.

14. Behaviour in terms of military security

Three indicators have been taken into account in the preparation of this sub-section, and these refer to different international instruments on questions of military security: the ratification of the main agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (indicator n° 34) and participation in the UN's Register of Conventional Weapons and its Military Expenditure Report (indicators 35 and 36). The issue that has given rise to most expectations as regards international behaviour in terms of military security has been the question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and this section must therefore contain a brief review of the events that occurred during the course of the year.

As regards the **agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**, the position at the end of 2003 was that 50 countries had not ratified at least one of the three main treaties, i.e. the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, 16 countries had not ratified 2 of the 3 agreements. Particular mention should be made of the case of Israel, which is the only country that has not ratified any of the three agreements, and DPR Korea which withdrew from the NPT during 2003.

The other two indicators show the degree of transparency in the transfer of weapons and military spending and, to a certain extent, they indicate the level of political will to promote measures to encourage trust. In

the last report, 141 countries did not give information to the United Nations **Register of Conventional Weapons**, while 121 did not provide information for the Instrument for **Reporting Military Expenditures**. These figures show that, in spite of the fact that both registers are voluntary, very few countries are accustomed to providing information on military matters.

Weapons of mass destruction

The two areas that have given rise to most international attention in respect of this issue are DPR Korea and Iraq. **DPR Korea**, which as we have already mentioned has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, formally acknowledged for the first time during 2003 that it possessed weapons of mass destruction. This caused an increase in tensions with the USA, though by the end of 2003 there were plans to hold a second round of negotiations in January 2004 in which DPR Korea would abandon its nuclear programme in exchange for guarantees relating to security and economic aid and energy supplies, principally from the USA (see the section dealing with peace processes).

Turning to **Iraq**, after 550 inspections at some 350 locations and the destruction of 72 Al-Samoud 2 missiles since the end of 2002 by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, there were no indications of the existence of chemical or nuclear weapons, and the country's efforts to cooperate with inspections were acknowledged. In spite of this, a military attack was made by a coalition led by the USA, whose inspectors found serious evidence of the possession of weapons of mass destruction by the S. Hussein regime. Both UNMOVIC and the AEIA demanded the return of UN inspectors in view of the potential radioactive emergency and the looting of nuclear silos, and in order to guarantee the independence and credibility of the search for weapons of mass destruction.

It is also necessary to mention the cases of **Iran** and **Libya**. There was an increase in tension in Iran because of accusations by the USA that it was developing a nuclear arms programme. This tension had diminished by the end of the year as a result of Iran's cooperation in allowing international inspections, and because the country signed up to the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For its part, Libya also ended the year by opening up its programme for weapons of mass destruction to international supervision, with the aim of ending its international isolation. These advances led the Director General of the IAEA, M. El Baradei, to call on Israel to make some kind of gesture so that progress could be made in building a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

M. El Baradei also criticised the USA's attitude as a defender of non-proliferation while at the same time developing new types of nuclear weapons through its authorisation of the research and development of a new generation of nuclear weapons capable of penetrating underground bunkers. In addition, the **USA** and the **United Kingdom** have threatened to use nuclear weapons in the event that they are attacked with chemical or biological weapons, breaking international consensus on the control and reduction of weapons of mass destruction.

This inconsistent behaviour is also demonstrated by the votes cast in the UN General Assembly on issues relating to Disarmament and International Security, as these two countries (together with Israel) were the ones that voted against most resolutions, as can be seen from the following table.

USA and the United Kingdom
have threatened
to use nuclear weapons
in the event that they are
attacked with chemical
or biological weapons,
breaking international consensus
on the control and reduction
of weapons of mass destruction

Table I4.1. Countries that voted against resolutions at the 58th session of the UN General Assembly on issues of disarmament and international security *

Resolution	Total votes	Votes against	Albania	Bulgaria	France	India	Israel	Latvia	Marshall, I.	Micronesia	Monaco	Poland	Portugal	Spain	United Kingdom	USA
Implementation of the Declaration	155	3			•										•	•
on the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone																
Missiles	152	3					•			•						•
Control of conventional weapons at a regional and sub-regional level	174	1				•										
Promotion of multilateralism in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation	176	12	•	•			•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•
Observation of environmental regulations in the drafts and agreements on disarmament and weapons control	178	1														•
Monitoring by the Advisory Group on the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons	175	29	•	•	•		•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•
Southern hemisphere and adjoining areas free of nuclear weapons	174	3			•										•	•
Towards a world free of nuclear weapons: a new agenda	177	6			•	•	•								•	•
UN Conference for the identification of ways to eliminate nuclear risks in the context of nuclear disarmament	177	6			•		•				•	•			•	•
Relationship between development and disarmament	180	1														•
The route to total elimination of nuclear weapons	180	2				•										•
Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle Easto	176	4					•		•	•						•
TOTAL (12)			2	2	5	3	6	2	3	3	2	3	2	2	6	11

^{*} This table shows resolutions that were approved with more than two-thirds of countries voting in favour, along with the countries that voted against at least two of these resolutions.

Appendix I.

Table of countries and indicators and description of indicators

The following table has been prepared on the basis of a group of 36 indicators. The table shows data for the 191 member states of the United Nations plus a further 18 states and territories and is provided on the basis of these indicators, arranged into eight categories relating to armed conflicts and high risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, militarization and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and conduct as regards the international community. Thus, it is possible to make several different readings of the same table, observing how a country behaves on the basis of an individual indicator or looking at the global situation for each of the countries in terms of development, for example. To make it easier to read, the reader can consult the list of indicators shown at the beginning of the report.

As may be observed, various symbols are included in the table. The majority of indicators differentiate between what are considered «serious situations» (indicated with a white dot) and «very serious situations» (indicated with a black dot). In the case of indicators relating to human rights, other symbols have also been used (square, triangle and black diamond) to indicate situations also considered to be «very serious».⁷⁵ Numerical data is also provided with the symbol on some occasions, since it is considered that in these cases the figure provides information that is of interest. In addition, there are four cases in which the indicator has another meaning, a circumstance that has been indicated in a distinctive way. The first symbol refers to peace processes or official negotiations reached by the end of the year and are marked with the initials NP. Secondly, countries in conflict exploring negotiations at the end of the year are marked with the initials EX. Both instances are meant to give visibility to situations that require special attention on the part of the international community. Thirdly, Least Developed Countries are marked with the initials LDC in order to emphasise their internationally recognised position of vulnerablity and recall the commitment to prioritise strategies for the reduction of poverty in these countries. Finally, initials HIPC in English refer to countries classified as Highly Indebted Poor Countries. Lastly, and given the fact that the information sources used in the report do not always include data from every country, a dash (-) has been used to point out countries where information is lacking and, where used with indicators relating to conduct in respect of the international community, to point out countries or territories that do not have the capacity to ratify international treaties as they are not part of the United Nations.

Description of indicators

A. Armed conflicts

1. Countries engaged in armed conflict

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving groups of various kinds, such as regular or irregular military forces, guerrillas, armed opposition groups, paramilitary groups or ethnic or religious communities which, using arms and other destructive methods, claims more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths is just an indicator and should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country.

Armed conflict.

B. Situations of heightened tension and high-risk disputes

2. Situations of heightened tension and high-risk disputes

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

Situations of tension and high-risk dispute are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and States of emergency or exception), ⁷⁶ and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. In these areas there is a strong possibility that a situation of armed conflict will occur within a short time. These tensions may not occur within the geographical territory of the state in question, but we have borne in mind the extent to which the State's own interests or stability are directly affected, as well as the fact that they may involve specific attacks on the territory of another country.

▲ Situations of heightened tension and high-risk disputes.

C. Peace processes

3. Countries engaging in peace processes or formal negotiations or in exploratory phase

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

76. For the purposes of this report, a state of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with a restriction on certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in the different legislatures, such as, for example: State of Exception, interior disturbance, State of National Disaster, etc.

It is considered that a **peace process** exists when the parts that participate in a armed conflict have reached an agreement to follow a negotiation, that allows to find a pacific resolution to the conflict and to regulate or to solve the basic mutual incompatibility that they had. The process can be named in several forms, but in all the cases the dialogue has become serious, with or without aid of a third part. The existence of a negotiation process is independent if it is developed in a positive or negative way, aspect that is analyzed in the section of peace processes. It is considered that a process or a negotiation is in **exploratory phase** when the parts are in a stage of rough estimate and previous consultations, without they have reached a definitive agreement to initiate the negotiation. It also includes the cases of interrupted or failed peace processes in the past, that try to be relaunched again.

- PN Countries engaged in peace processes or formal negotiations at the end of the year.
- **EX** Countries with negotiations in an exploratory phase at the end of the year.

D. Post-war rehabilitation (international involvement)

4. Countries which receive international aid in terms of post-war rehabilitation

SOURCE: The authors' own monitoring of the international situation, based on information prepared by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

Post-war rehabilitation means the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling: 1) the maintenance of security, priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; 2) physical reconstruction and the reconstruction of basic institutions; 3) the resolution of basic incompatibilities (i.e. social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); 4) reconciliation, a respect for human rights, the fight against impunity; 5) the regional dimension, along with reintegration in international forums; and 6) the empowerment of local civilian society and the construction of good governance through international involvement. The starting point of the analysis in terms of international involvement answers to three given situations: the signing of a peace accord or a ceasefire between all the actors involve in the armed conflict, a clear victory by one of the parties in the conflict, or a clear victory by one of the parties in the conflict, or a clear victory by one of the parties in the conflict forced by an international intervention.

- O Countries or territories that can be considered to be in a phase of post-war rehabilitation and in which post-war rehabilitation (PWR) is progressing reasonably well. This includes only those cases in which the post-war phase is considered to have begun after 1994 (Rwanda genocide).
- Countries or territories in which the end of hostilities came about as the result of a clear victory by one of the parties or in which, in spite of the existence of a peace agreement, this agreement is not fulfilled, thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work.
- Countries or territories analysed which, while still in a phase of post-war rehabilitation, are receiving a considerable level of international aid that can be classified as post-war, this aid being frequently used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit of an agreement that will lead to an end to hostilities.

E. Humanitarian crises

5. Countries facing food emergencies

SOURCE: FAO, Food crops and shortages http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/J0577e/J0577e00.htm

The alerts put out by the FAO indicate countries facing food emergencies, whether due to drought, flooding, civil disturbance, the displacement of the population, economic problems or sanctions. Countries are considered to have food emergencies when the prospects for the coming harvest are unfavourable

and/or there is an uncovered food supply shortage which requires exceptional foreign aid. Countries are considered to have serious food emergencies when they suffer chronic bad harvests and food shortage.

- Serious food emergency.
- O Food emergencies.

6. Countries included in the UN's Interagency Consolidated Appeal 2004

SOURCE: CAP http://www.un.org/depts/ocha/cap/index.html

The Humanitarian Appeal 2004 is a product of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), a United Nations-led mechanism. The Consolidated Appeals were created a decade ago by the United Nations General Assembly to ensure strategic and coordinated humanitarian responses to humanitarian crises. In all targeted countries, aid channelled through the Consolidated Appeal helps fight inequality and injustice. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) manages the CAP. The fact that a country or a region is included in the appeal represents international recognition of a crisis situation.

• Countries included in the Humanitarian Appeal 2004.

7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is a refugee.

SOURCES: UNHCR, 2002 Statistics on Asylum-seekers, Refugees and Other of Concernto UNHCR, July-August 2003, http://www.unhcr.ch and the United Nations Population Division for the total number of inhabitants in 2003.

This indicator shows the number of refugees as a percentage of the total population of the country of origin. The figures correspond to the absolute number of people who were refugees during 2002 (provisional data).

- Situation considered very serious: at least 1 person in every 100 is a refugee.
- O Situation considered serious: at least 1 person in every 1,000 is a refugee or, if this percentage is not reached, at least 5,000 are refugees.

8. Countries in which at least 1 person in every 1,000 is internal displaced people

SOURCES: Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), *World IDP map by the global IDP project en Internal Displacement Unit* http://www.idpproject.org/images/website_maps/IDP_worldmap.gif (December 2003) and United Nations Populations Division for the total number of inhabitants in 2003.

This indicator shows the number of internal displaced people as a percentage of the total population of the country, and the figures correspond to the absolute number of people who were displaced, as updated in September 2003. In the cases where the sources offer two figures it has been made the average.

- Situation considered very serious: at least 1 person in every 100 is internally displaced.
- O Situation considered serious: at least 1 person in every 1,000 is internally displaced or, without getting this percentage, at least 5.000 persons are internally displaced

F. Militarisation and disarmament

9. Countries with arms embargoes from the United Nations Security Council

SOURCE: Resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/documents/.

The fact that the United Nations Security Council has imposed or recommended an arms embargo is recognised to be an acknowledgement of an exceptional situation in the country affected. As a result, and under the terms of this study, no differentiation is made between binding and voluntary embargoes.

The voluntary embargoes of the United Nations take the form of non-binding «calls» or «emergencies» in relation to the supply of arms. The date on which a voluntary embargo from the United Nations ends is difficult to establish, because there is generally no formal expiry date and its lifting is not announced.

- Embargoed countries. Armenia (S/RES/853 of 29/07/93); Azerbaijan (S/RES/853 of 29/07/93);
 Iraq (S/RES/661 of 06/08/90); Liberia (S/RES/1343 of 07/03/01); Somalia (S/RES/733 of 23/01/92);
 Yemen (S/RES/924 de 01/06/94).
- O Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups. In the case of *Afghanistan*, this is a sanction imposed on the Taliban, which remains in force in spite of the change in the country's situation (S/RES/1333 of 19/12/00); *Sierra Leone* (S/RES/1299 of 19/05/00, except for UNAMSIL forces and the government of Sierra Leone, provided that arms are used within its borders); *Rwanda* (S/RES/1011 de 16/08/95), where restrictions are placed on the transfer of arms, though the embargo is lifted at certain points of entry, and the embargo is maintained for *non-governmental forces* operating in the country, as it is for Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the event that arms may be used in Rwanda.

10. Countries with arms embargoes from regional bodies (EU and OSCE)

SOURCES: European Union, http://www.ue.eu.int, and *Committee of Senior Officials*, Journal No. 2, Annex 1, Seventh Committee on Senior Officials meeting, Prague, 27-28 February 1992

- By the EU (from the most binding to the least binding: Regulations (R), Common Positions (CP) and Declarations (D): Bosnia Herzegovina (CP 96/184/PESC of 13/03/96, confirmed in CP 98/240/PESC of 19/03/98; except for the transfer of light arms to the police from 19/07/99); China (Declaration of 27/06/89); Democratic Republic of Congo (Declaration 33/93 of 07/04/93); Iraq (Declaration 56/90 of 04/08/90); Myanmar (Declaration of 29/07/91 confirmed by CP 96/635/PESC of 28/10/96); Sudan (CP 94/165/PESC of 16/03/94); Zimbabwe (R no. 310/2002 of 18/02/02). By the OSCE: Armenia (28/02/92), Azerbaijan (28/02/92).
- O Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups. In the case of *Afghanistan*, this refers to deliveries to territories run by the Taliban (CP 2001/771/PESC of 05/11/01); in the case of *Sierra Leone* this relates to sanctions imposed on the armed opposition forces operating in the country (CP 98/409/PESC of 29/06/98).

11. Countries with military spending in excess of 4% of GDP.

SOURCES: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2003; IISS, The Military Balance 2003-2004, and the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003.

Military spending is considered to include the Defence Ministry budget plus all items of a military nature spread throughout other ministries. Given that, on many occasions, a complete calculation is not made, information from various sources has been used in order to obtain a more reliable result. The economic situation in some places, particularly if they are subject to fluctuations in the exchange rate, represents an added difficulty when converting the calculated amount into US\$.

- Very serious situation: military spending in excess of 6% of GDP.
- O Serious situation: military spending between 4% and 6% of GDP.

12. Countries with imports of heavy conventional weapons exceeding 0.5% of GDP.

SOURCES: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2003, and the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003.

The calculation of this indicator was based on imports relating to the six categories of conventional heavy weapons usually used by SIPRI: warplanes, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar and surveillance systems, missiles and warships. Other types of weapons, i.e., conventional light weapons and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) have not been included because there are no statistical sources available. The figures indicate the percentage of conventional heavy weapons imports against GDP and it is considered that imports bigger than 0,5% mean a high level of militarisation.

- Very serious situation: major conventional weapons imports in excess of 1% of GDP
- O Serious situation: major conventional weapons imports between 0.5% and 1% of GDP.

13. Countries where the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population

SOURCES: IISS, The Military Balance 2003-2004 and UNDP, Human Development Report 2003.

This definition only includes members of the official armed forces. Armed opposition groups and paramilitary forces have been excluded due to the difficulties involved in estimating their number in a large number of cases. The figures indicate the number of soldiers as a percentage of the whole population.

- Very serious situation: number of soldiers in excess of 2% of population.
- O Serious situation: number of soldiers between 1.5% and 2% of population.

14. Militarised countries according to the BIC3D Index

SOURCE: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, *Conversion Survey 2003*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2003.

The BIC3D index is calculated by combining four sets of data: military spending, arms reserves, armed forces personnel and people employed in arms production. Values in the BIC3D index vary between +100% and -100%, and they are interpreted on the basis of the difference between the current BIC3D figure and the average since the end of the Cold War. A positive value indicates a process of demilitarisation while a negative one indicates militarisation.

- In a highly significant process of militarisation: BIC3D index equal to or exceeding -30.
- O In a process of militarisation: BIC3D index between -1 and -29.

G. Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

15. Countries with serious and systematic violations of human rights according to non-governmental sources SOURCES: Amnesty International, Report 2003, http://www.amnesty.org; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003, http://www.hrw.org, and the authors' own monitoring of the current international situation (the classification of each country is the responsibility of the authors of this study, not Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, who do not make classifications in this regard).

Very serious violations of human rights are considered to be those systematic abuses that relate to the right to life and personal safety and are originated by the actions or omissions of the state, particularly cases of extra-judicial execution, forced disappearance, death in custody, torture, arbitrary detention and general immunity. Serious violations of human rights are considered to be the frequent occurrence of the abuses mentioned above, along with abuses that threaten personal, political and civil rights, particularly courts without the minimum procedural guarantees or the existence of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, based on the methodology used by the PIOOM (in Schmid, Alex P.; Jongman, Albert J. (eds.), *Monitoring Human Rights Violations*, Centre for the Study of Social Conflicts, Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, Leiden, 1992).

- Situation considered very serious in terms of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- O Situation considered serious in terms of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

16. Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to the EU

SOURCE: Council of the European Union, *European Union annual report on human rights 2003*, Brussels, 13 October 2003 http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/documents_en.htm>.

This indicator refers to countries which, given their human rights situation, gave rise to concern for the Council of Europe during the period between 1 July 2002 and 30 June 2003. The EU made declarations relating to the human rights situation in different parts of the world at the 58th session of the Human Rights Commission and at the Third Commission in the 57th session of the General Assembly and at the 59th session of the Human Rights Commission.

- Situation considered very serious in terms of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
- O Situation considered serious in terms of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

17. Countries with serious violations of human rights according to the reports and resolutions of the UNCHR

SOURCE: UNHCHR. http://www.unhchr.ch>.

This indicator refers, within the «Special Procedures» of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, to the «country mandates» performed by Special Rapporteurs, Special Representatives or Independent Experts of the Commission on Human Rights, as well as country mandates entrusted to the Secretary General. The aim of this system is to promote compliance by the authorities with the agreed regulations on human rights, by means of a series of surveillance duties and the presentation of reports. In addition, this indicator shows the countries that were subject to condemnatory, negative or critical resolutions from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in its 59th session period, based on prior reports from rapporteurs or special representatives, or at the request of other individuals (the Secretary General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, etc.). Finally, Presidential Statements have been included with regard to the human rights situation in a given country. This is due to the fact that this is a political agreement which is not put to the vote and is therefore the only means to reach an agreement to condemn some human rights related issues in particular countries.

The report of the Human Rights Commission's Special Representative with the mandate to examine the human rights situation in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** and in **former Yugoslavia** («Situation of human rights in parts of South-Eastern Europe» - see E/CN.4/2003/38) and the resolution concerning **Western Sahara** («The Western Sahara question» - see E/CN.4/RES/2002/4) have not been included in the table by countries nor in the indicators since positive moves and advances are acknowledged in both documents.

- Special Representative or Special Rapporteur's reports condemning or expressing concern, and UN Commission on Human Rights' resolution condemning or expressing concern. Burundi (E/CN.4/2003/45, «Situation of human rights in Burundi» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/16); Cambodia (E/CN.4/2003/114, «Situation of human rights in Cambodia» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/79); DR Congo (E/CN.4/2003/43; «Situation of Human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/15); Myanmar (E/CN.4/2003/41, «Situation of human rights in Myanmar» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/12); Palestinian occupied Territories by Israel since 1967 (E/CN.4/2003/30, «Situation of human rights in occupied Palestine» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/3; «Question of the violations of human rights in the occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/6; «Israeli Settlements in the occupied Arab Territories» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/7; «Human rights in the occupied Sirian Golan» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/5; «Human rights situation of the Lebanese detainees in Israel» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/8); Somalia (E/CN.4/2003/115, «Situation of human rights in Somalia» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/78).
- Special Representative or Rapporteur's reports condemning of expressing concern without a resolution from the Commision on Human Rights. Haití (E/CN.4/2003/116, «Situation of human rights in Haití». A Presidential Statement was finally approved; Iraq (E/CN.4/2003/40, «Situation of human rights in Irak» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/84. This report has been included in view of the fact that the adopted resolution does not reflect the human rights situation in the country but refers to the situation previous to the USA attack. This is due to the dificulties encountered to adopt a text by consensus); Sudan (E/CN.4/2003/42, «Situation of human rights in Sudan»).

This chapter includes the case of **Afghanistan**, where the Special Rapporteur has condemned the human rights situation (E/CN.4/2003/39) and a resolution been issued to welcome some particular aspects («Situation of human rights in Afghanistan» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/77).

- A Resolution condemning or expressing concern about countries without a previous report by a Rapporteur or Special representative. Belarus («Situation of human rights in Belarus» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/14); DPR Korea («Situation of human rights in DPR Korea» see E/CN.4/RES/2002/18); Cuba («Situation of human rights in Cuba» see E/CN.4/RES/2002/18); Sierra Leone («Situation of human rights in Sierra Leone» see E/CN.4/RES/2002/20); Turkmenistan («Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan» see E/CN.4/RES/2003/11). The paragraph includes cases on Chad («Technical cooperation and advisory services in Chad» see E/CN.4/RES/2002/81 as it has been agreed to further examine the country's situation in the next session) and Liberia («Technical cooperation and advisory services in Liberia» see E/CN.4/RES/2002/83, as an Independent Expert is being appointed for this country)
- ◆ Presidential Statements on a particular country by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Colombia («Situation of human rights in Colombia» see OHCHR/STM/CHR/03/2); Haiti («Technical cooperation and situation of human rights in Haiti» see OHCHR/STM/CHR/03/1); Timor-Leste («Situation of human rights in Timor-Leste» see OHCHR/STM/CHR/03/3).

18. Countries that apply or maintain the death penalty.

SOURCE: Amnesty International, Report 2003; http://www.a-i.es/temas/pmuerte/pm_hechos.htm

This indicator refers to countries in which executions have taken place and/or death sentences have been approved, along with those that retain the death penalty on their statute books, it being specified whether they are retentionist (countries in which the death penalty is retained for common offences), abolitionist in practice (countries that retain the death penalty for common offences but in which there has been no execution in the last 10 years, and countries that have undertaken not to apply the death penalty) and abolitionist for common offences (countries that retain the death penalty for exceptional offences, i.e. under military law or in the context of armed conflict). The figures relate to the number of executions confirmed by Amnesty International during 2002.

- Retentionist countries in which executions have taken place and death sentences have been approved. (31 countries. These include Belarus and Equatorial Guinea, countries in which executions were carried out but no death sentences were approved in 2002).
- Countries that are retentionist and abolitionist in practice, though **death sentences** have been approved. (32 retentionist countries, 3 abolitionist for ordinary crimes: Armenia, Fiji y Turkey; and 5 de facto abolitionist countries: Grenada, Central African Republic, Samoa, Sri Lanka and Togo).
- O Countries that retain the **death penalty on their statute books** but did not carry out any executions in 2002. Retentionist, 22 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Chad, Comoros, Dominica, Eritrea, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, Mongolia, Oman, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Tunisia; countries that are abolitionist in practice, 15 countries: Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Congo, Gambia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Nauru, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Surinam and Tonga. Abolitionist for common offences: 13 countries: Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Cook Islands, El Salvador, Greece, Israel, Latvia, Mexico and Peru.

19. Countries of origin of people who have obtained asylum.

SOURCE: UNHCR, 2002 UNHCR population statistics (provisional). Asylum and refugee status determination, http://www.unhchr.ch (on august of 2003).

The indicator gathers provisional data on asylum granting. Asylum, which is sometimes restricted for national or international reasons, implies the acknowledment of the recipient country that the applicant's security and freedom are threatened in his/her country of origin. Thus, it represents governmentary.

tal recognition of human rights violations in the actual country of origin. The figures indicate grants of asylum status during 2002 that number more than one hundred.

- Have given rise to more than one thousand grants of asylum status.
- O Have given rise to between one hundred and one thousand grants of asylum status.

20. Countries that have not ratified the 2nd Protocol of 1977 on armed conflicts between states in relation to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949

SOURCES: ICRC http://www.icrc.org (on 31 December of 2003) and UNHCR http://www.unhchr.ch.

The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the first Convention deals with the treatment of the wounded in war, the Second with shipwreck, the Third with prisoners of war and the Fourth with the protection of civilians in times of occupation) and the 1st Protocol of 1977 legislate for and regulate armed conflicts between states. This indicator relates to failure to ratify the 2nd Protocol, given that the majority of armed conflicts are currently taking place within a single state.

Countries that have not ratified the 2nd Protocol.

21. Countries that recruit both boys and girls for their armies and have not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts

SOURCES: Child Soldiers: 1379 Report by Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, <http://www.child-soldiers.org> (on 07 December of 2003), UN Secretary General's report on children and armed conflicts (S/2003/1053) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts <http://www.unhchr.ch> (on 31 December of 2003).

Child-soldier has been defined in its most restrictive sense, i.e. any person younger than 18 who either voluntarily or forcibly forms part of the official armed forces and participates directly in combat.

- Countries that have ratified the protocol in which the official armed forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers.
- Countries that have not ratified the protocol in which the official armed forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers (includes Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau, though there is only evidence that the official armed forces use child-soldiers).
- O Countries in which armed opposition groups include child-soldier.

H. Development

22. Maximum and high priority countries in the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals, according to the UNDP

SOURCE: UNDP, Human Development Report 2003.

Maximum priority Countries are those with high levels of human poverty which are also at a standstill or even regressing in terms of compliance with the Goals. High priority Countries are those: a) with medium levels of human poverty that have nevertheless shown no progress or a deterioration in their compliance with the Goals, or b) with extreme human poverty that have shown advances in respect of the Goals. In any case, all of these countries will fail to meet the Goals on the planned date if current trends are not drastically reversed.

- Maximum priority countries
- O High priority countries.

23. Countries with a Human Development Index lower than it was in 1990 and Countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (LDC)

SOURCE: UNDP, Human Development Report 2003 and United Nations, http://www.unctad.org/ldcs

UNDP annually produces a compound index that measures progress on the basis of three fundamental elements in human development: a long a healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy rate and gross school numbers) and a decent standard of living (GDP per capita). Taking into account the natural and empirical tendency of countries to show improvement in respect of the three HDI elements, the fall of HDI to lower levels than in 1990 demonstrates the difficulties of some governments to guarantee the main dimensions of human development. On the other hand, every three years, ECOSOC updates the list of countries classified as Least Developed Countries (LDC) on the basis of three variables: low income (GNP per capita), low level of human resources (low standard of living based on life expectancy, calories per capita, schooling and literacy) and a low level of economic diversification (an index based on several macroeconomic indicators). 49 countries currently belong to the LDC group.

- O Countries with a Human Development Index lower than it was in 1990.
- LDC Countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries.

24. Countries with high levels of inequality in internal income on the basis of the Gini coefficient

SOURCE: WB, World Development Indicators, 2003 (data refers to the most recent year available)

The Gini Coefficient measures the level of inequality between income or consumption in an individual country. The value 0 represents perfect equality and 100 total inequality.

- Countries with a Gini coefficient above 60.
- O Countries with a Gini coefficient above 40.

25. Countries with great gender inequalities, on the basis of the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) SOURCE: UNDP, Human Development Report 2003

GDI reflects the difference between men and women on the basis of three fundamental aspects of human development: life expectancy, income per capita and levels of literacy and schooling. The countries marked are those with a total value below 0.500, which is considered as 'low' by the UNDP in terms of Human development.

• Countries with a GDI below 0,500.

26. Countries whose amounts received in official development aid (ODA) exceed the 25% of the public spending

SOURCE: WB, http://econ.worldbank.org/files/30042_select.pdf

The percentage of ODA received as a proportion of total public spending is one of the main indicators used to measure the degree of economic dependence in a country. Firstly, because the State could become accustomed to delegating services which are intrinsically its own responsibility to international cooperative efforts, and secondly, because the growing politicisation of ODA could lead to excessive conditions being placed on the identification of development priorities and strategies.

- ODA received exceeds 50% of the public spending.
- O ODA received exceeds 25% of the public spending.

27. Countries that spend less on public health and/or education than on military spending

SOURCES: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2003 (the data on military spending against GDP refer to 2001, or where this is found, the most recent year available); PNUD, Human Development Report 2003 (the data on public health spending are against GDP and refers to 2000; the data for public education spending are against GNP refers to the most recently available figure between 1998 and 2000)

The fact that public spending on health and/or education is less than military spending indicates a country's budgetary priorities, considering militarisation to be more important than satisfying the basic needs of the population through the financing of public services.

- Public spending on health and education is less than military spending.
- O Public spending on either health or education is less than military spending.

28. Countries with poor governance according to the World Bank

SOURCE: World Bank, GRICS II: Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot at http://info.world-bank.org/beeps/kkz/worldmap.asp#map (data of 2002)

This aggregated governance indicator from the WB calculates the median value of six components relating to governance. These are the presentation of accounts, political stability and the absence of violence, governmental effectiveness, procedural guarantees, the rule of law and the control of corruption.

- Very poor governance.
- O Poor governance.

29. Countries with a total amount of foreign debt in excess of their GNP, countries whose foreign debt repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

SOURCE: World Bank, *Global Development Finance 2002* in http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2002/, *World Development Indicators 2003* and http://www.worldbank.org/hipc (data of 2000). Development Assistance Comitee of OCDE in http://www.oecd.org

This indicator aims to show some issues on the grade of foreign indebtedness of any country. Firstly, the fact that debt exceeds GNP in a country demonstrates the inability of the country to repay this debt and their difficulties in financing other priorities relating to the country's development. Secondly, there are many countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA, which highlights the fact that on many occasions there is a net transfer of resources from impoverished countries to industrialised ones. Finally, this indicators shows those countries belonging to HIPC, approved by the WB and the IMF in 1996. The initiative's aim is to reduce debt (multilateral, bilateral and private) in 41 countries within a period of six years, until it has reached a level that allows repayment. Then, it is the first debt reduction plan that allows the debtor to cancel its loans without endangering its economic growth and without once again accumulating backlogs in the payment of debt in the future.

- Countries with a total amount of foreign debt in excess of their GNP.
- Countries whose foreign debt repayments exceed the amounts received in ODA.
- ▲ Countries with an external debt higher than their GNP and whose repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid.

HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.

I. Conduct in respect of the international community

I.1. Conduct in relation to the Millennium Declaration

30. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration

SOURCE: United Nations, http://untreaty.un.org/English/millennium/law/index.html (on 31/12/02); Social Watch, *Report 2003. Los pobres y el mercado* http://www.socialwatch.org

This indicator shows how states have behaved in respect of the 25 legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration. These seven treaties are considered to be of vital importance in international legislation, and the institution Social Watch therefore monitors all the signings and ratifications made in relation to them. The indicator was prepared on the basis of the total number of ratifications of these international legal instruments, which are as follows:

- The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998).
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction, or the Ottawa Treaty (1997).
- The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change (1997).
- The Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (1992).
- The Convention to Combat Desertification (1994).
- The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979).
- The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).
 - Has ratified fewer than half of these instruments: between 0 and 3.
 - O Has ratified half or more of these instruments, but not all of them: between 4 and 6.

I.2. Conduct in relation to the protection of Human Rights

31. Countries which have not ratified the main United Nations legal instruments on human rights SOURCE: UNHCR, http://www.unhchr.ch (on 31/12/03)

This indicator has been calculated on the basis of the sum total of ratifications of the 6 main legal instruments put forward by the United Nations. These instruments are:

- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
- Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
- Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatments and Punishments (1984).
- International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966).
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).
- Convention on the Status of Refugee (1951).
 - Has ratified less than three instruments: between 0 and 2.
 - O Has ratified three instruments: 3.

I.3. Conduct in terms of financial transparency

32. Countries acting as tax havens

SOURCE: OECD, Tax Heaven update, (on december 2003) http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,2340,en_2649_33745_1903251_119666_1_1_37427,00.html

In 1998, the OECD created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which established Guidelines for Dealing with Harmful Preferential Regimes in OECD Member Countries. There are four determining factors

for qualification as a tax haven: a) a tax on capital does not exist or is not applied; b) there is no effective exchange of information between different jurisdictions and between financial institutions; c) there is no transparency on the part of the judiciary; and d) there is no monitoring of financial operations.

- Tax havens that have not adopted the directives.
- O Tax havens that have undertaken to adopt the directives.

33. Countries which do not cooperate with the Financial Action Tash Force (FATF) on money-laundering SOURCE: FATF, http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/NCCT_en.htm (on december 2003).

FATF, established by the G-7 in 1989, has unified criteria at an international level for the prevention, detection and punishment of money-laundering, based on 40 recommendations and publishes an annual report on countries and territories unwilling to cooperate with these recommendations (Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, NCCT)...

Non-cooperative country or territory.

I.4. Conduct in terms of military security

34. Countries which have not signed the non-proliferation agreements

SOURCE: United Nations

Criterion 1 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports makes special mention of international conduct in relation to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

- Countries that have not ratified 2 or more of these agreements.
- O Countries that have not ratified any of these agreements.

35. Countries which have not given information to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons

SOURCE: UN Register of Conventional Weapons (A/58/203, 21 August 2003) http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/register.htm

Pursuant to the terms of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, the UN Secretary General established the Register of Conventional Weapons in 1992, under which all member states are invited to give information each year regarding their imports and exports of conventional weapons in the seven categories set out in the Register (combat tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aeroplanes, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and missile launchers). Although offering such information is a voluntary act, it indicates the willingness of each of the member states in terms of their level of transparency.

• Has not provided information to the Register of Conventional Weapons in 2002.

36. Countries which have not given information to the UN Instrument to Report Military Expenditures SOURCE: UN Instrument to Report Military Expenditures (A/58/202, 1 August 2003) http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/military.htm

In resolution 56/14 of 29/11/01, the General Assembly called on member states to inform the Secretary general each year of their military spending, in accordance with the model recommended in resolution 35/142 B of 12/12/80. Although offering such information is a voluntary act, it indicates the willingness of each of the member states in terms of their level of transparency.

Has not provided information to the UN Instrument to Report Military Expenditures in 2002.

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Kiribati															-	-	-			•			LDC	-	-		-		-	0	•			0	0	0
Korea, Rep. of													O 1 46	O -18	0	-	-	-								-	0		•	0						0
Korea, DPR			PN		•	•					•		-		•	•	A	•		•		0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	•	0			•	0	0
Lao, PDR							O 10.989								0	-	-	-					LDC			-	0		HIPC	0	0				0	
Malaysia														● -3	0	0	-	•		•				0		-			•	0	•					
Maldives		•									•				0	-	-	0					LDC	-			-		-	0	•				0	0
Marshall I.															-	-	-		-											0	•	•		•	0	
Micronesia (Fed. States of)															-	-	-		-											0	•			0	0	0
Mongolia					•										-	-	-	0				0		0		•				0					0	0
Myanmar		•	PN				O 148.522	800.000	•	•	0			● -42	•	-	•	-	1.248	•	•		LDC	-	-	-	•	•	HIPC	0	•		•	•	0	0
N. Zealand															-	-	-																			
Nauru															-		-	0												0	•	0	•	0	0	
Nepal	•							O 150.000						● -37	•	•	-		O 158	•	0		LDC		•	0	0			0				0	0	
Niue (NZ)											-				-	-	-		-											0	•	0		-		0
Pakistan		A	PN				O 15.133	O 45.000			0	2 18		0 9	•	•	-	•	2.102	•	0				•		•		•	0	•			0		0
Palau															-	-	-													0	•			0	0	0

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Papua New Guinea				0										0		0	-	0		•		0		0		-			•	0	0				0	0
Philippines	•	•	PN				O 45.473	O 130.000							•	-	-				0			0					•	0			•		0	
Samoa															-	-	-	•					LDC	-	-		-		-	Г	•	0		0	0	0
Singapore											0		O 1 48	O -13		-	-	•		•				0			•		-	0	•					0
Solomon Is.		•						O 3.500								0	-						- LDC	-	-		-		-	0	0			0	0	0
Sri Lanka		•	PN	-			O 126.466	● 613.000						- 60	•	-0	-	-	3.975	•	0						•		•	0					0	0
Taiwan																-	-	•	_	-			-	-	-		-		-	-	-				-	-
Thailand					0									O -10	•	-	-	•		•			-	0	-		-		•	0	0					
Timor-Leste				0	0		● 28.097										•			•										0				0	0	
Tonga															-	-	-	0		•			-		-		-		-	•	•				0	0
Tuvalu															-	-	-			•			LDC							0	•			•	0	0
Vanuatu															-	-	-						- LDC		-		-			0	•	0		0	0	0
Viet Nam							O 348.301				•				0	0	-	•	1.131	•							-	0	HIPC	0					0	0
													E	URC	DPE	anc	d CE	NTR	AL AS	IA																
Albania							O 8.757								0		-	0	1.280					-		-	-			0					0	0
Andorra															-	-	-			•										0	•	•		0	0	
Armenia			PN		•		O 9.086	50.000	•	•	•			● -41	0	-	-	-	1.244				•				0			0						
Austria																-	-							-					-						0	0
Azerbaijan		•	PN				• 254.732	570.000	•	•					0	-	-		O 603	•					-	-	0	0		0				0		0
Belarus		A													•	•	A	•	O 249				•					0		0						
Belgium																-	-												-							
Bosnia and Herzegovina				0			● 371.570	● 335.850		•					0			0	O 624					-	-	-	0			0					0	0
Bulgaria															0	-			O 226										-							
Croatia							• 269.733	O 13.995								-			O 106										•	0					0	
Cyprus			PN					210.000						O -18	-		-							-					-			0			0	

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Czech Republic																-	-												•	0						
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Georgia		•	PN		•		O 14.659	260.000							0	-	-		O 414						-	•	-	0		0						
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Greece				•							0			O -7		-	-	0									0		-							0
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Holy See															-	-	-							-					-	•	0				0	0
Hungary																-	-		O 251							-			-						0	0
Iceland															-	-	-							-			-		-						0	
Ireland														O -10		-	-																		0	0
Italy																-	-												-							
Jersey (UK)											-				-	-	-	-	-											-		0		-	-	-
Kazakhstan															0	0	-	•	O 141			0	•				-		•	0				0	0	
Kyrgyzstan		•													0	-	-	-					-		-	•		0		0				0	0	0
Latvia														● -34	-	-	-	0											•	0					0	
Liechtenstein															-	-		-												0		•			0	
Lithuania														● -48	-	-	-												•	L					Ш	
Luxembourg														● -32	-	-	-																		0	
Macedonia, FRY				•			O 4.909	O 3.154						-9-	0			-							-	-	0			0					0	0
Malta														O -12	-	-		-														0			0	
Man Island (UK)											-				-	-		-	-											-		0		-	-	-
Moldova, Rep.		•					0 4.732								0	-		-	O 142			0	•			0			•	0				0		

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Monaco															-	-	-													0		•			0	
Netherlands															-	-	-																			
Norway															-	-	-																			
Poland															-	-	-		O 115					-					-	0						
Portugal																-	-									-			-						0	
Romania															0	-	-		O 382								0		-						0	0
Russian Fed.	•				0	•	O 49.136	O 366.000			0				•	•	-	0	2.609		0		•	0					-	0					0	0
San Marino															-	-	-													0	0	0			0	
Serbia and Montenegro		•		•	0		● 161.277	275.400			0				0	0			● 2.223				-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0					0	
Slovakia																-	-						-						-							
Slovenia														O 5		-	-										-		-							
Spain																-	-																			
Sweden																-	-																			1
Switzerland																-	-																			
Tajikistan				0	•	•	● 63.032								0	-	-	•	O 145			•	•			•	0	0		0				0	0	0
Turkey							O 96.694	1,000.000			0			O -24	•		-	-	4.280	•				0			•		-	0						0
Turkmenistan		A						-							•	0	A					0		0	-	-	-	•	-	0					0	0
Ukraine		A					O 32.126								0	-			O 516				•						•	0			•			0
UK	•															-					0	L														
Uzbekistan		•												O -15	•	-•		•	O 258			0				-	-	0	•	0					0	
															N	1IDI	DLE	EAST																		
Bahrain											0		O 1 53	● -44	0	-	-	0						-			•		-	0	0	0			0	0
Iran (Islamic Republic of)		A					O 99.530				0			O -17	•	•	-	• 71	● 5.397					0		-	•		-	•					0	0
Iraq	•			•	•		● 400.638	950.000	•	•	-				•	•	•	•	8.081	•	•	Ŀ	-	-	-	-	-	•	-	<u> •</u>				0	0	0
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Jordan											•	• 1 69	O 1 93	0 4	0	-	-	•									•		•							
Kuwait											•				0	-	-	•					-	-		-	0		-	0					0	0
Lebanon		•					O 7552	300.000			0		2 05	O -8	•	-	-	•	O 225					-		-	0		•	0				0	0	
Oman											•			O -29	-	-	-	0				0		-			•			•	•				0	0
Palestinian N A	•		ΝP	•		•	O 428.710	O 12.700			-				•	•		•	O 294	-				-	-		-		ı	-	1			-	1	1
Qatar											•		2,07			1	-	•		•			-	-	-		-			0	•				0	0
Saudi Arabia											•			○ -16	•	•	-	•						-		-	•		1	0	0				0	0
Syrian Arab Rep.		•					O 7.978	• 350.000			•	O 0,83			0	9	1	•	O 475	•				-		-	•		•	0				•	0	0
UAE											0			O -17	0	-	-	•					-	-		-	0		ı	•	•			0	0	0
Yemen											•	● 5,35			0	-	-	•				0	LDC	-	•	-	-	0	HIPC	0					0	0
TOTAL																																				
•	23			12	17	28	18	30	7	10	17	4	4	18	47	18	6	31	29	37	11	30	21	7	35	9	22	10		10	31	5	9	16		
0				7	21		42	18	6	1	22	3	5	48	57	14		60	42		10	28		50		9	24	23	12	123	17	34		49	141	119
•				5													4	40			3								61							
A		51															7												4	L						
•																	3																			
HIPC / PN			20																										42							
LDC / EX			3																				49													

Appendix II. Maps

The following maps have been drawn from the country tables indicated in each theme subject, that is, conflict and tension situations, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, militarisation and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IDH), development and behaviour towards world society.

Description

Maps A, B, C and D: **Conflict situations**. States and territories with armed conflicts by the end of 2003 (see section A, table A1) are coloured in dark grey, whereas symbol \triangle represents high level tension situations (see section B). Countries with peace negotiation processes underway (see section C, table C1) are represented by \triangleright *. Countries that receive aid for post-war rehabilitation purposes (see section D, table D1) are depicted with symbol \triangleright *.

Map E. Map E: **Humanitarian crises**. Shows countries that go through a humanitarian crisis and which are coloured in dark grey. Furthermore, specific food emergency situations are indicated by produce a large number of both refugees and IDP are represented by and countries in the UN 2004 CAP are depicted with simbol .

Map F1. **Arms embargoes** Indicates embargoed countries and embargoed armed groups (see table F1) Countries have been coloured in dark grey and armed groups are represented by (simbol)


Map F2. **Militarisation**. Shows countries with high military expenditure (see table F5) which are coloured in dark grey. In addition, a soldier (†) sketch identifies States with a high percentage of soldiers over the whole population, and a ($\stackrel{\frown}{}$) sketch has been used to identify countries with important arms imports.

Map G. **Human rights situation**. Shows countries with alledged grave human rights violations and lack of fundamental freedoms (see section G, table G3). The map is coloured in dark grey. Furthermore, countries which a Rapporteur or Special Representative has been appointed for are indicated with symbol $\mathring{\mathbb{Q}}$ and countries where the Rapporteur or Special representative has been withdrawn are indicated by $\mathring{\mathbb{X}}$.

Map H. **Development**. Shows countries with a Human Development Index lower than in 1990 (see section H, table H2) and are coloured in dark grey. In addition, countries whose foreign debt payment is higher than their ODA income are represented by **a**.


Map I. **Behaviour towards world society** Shows those States which have ratified less than half of the basic UN legal instruments (see section 1, tables I1.2 and 12.2: the Millennium Declaration (light grey), human rights (dark grey) and **5** for countries which have ratified less than half of the instruments in both instances. With regard to financial transparency (simbol) represents countries which do not cooperate with the OECD and **6** countries which do not cooperate with FATF in terms of capital laundering.

A, B, C and D. Conflict situations




- Countries engaged in armed conflict (indicator no. 1)
- Situations of tension and high-risk disputes (indicator no. 2)
- Countries engaging in peace processes or formal negotiations (indicator no. 3)
- Countries engaged in Post-war rehabilitation (international involvement) (indicator no. 4)

E. Humanitarian crises




- Countries in a situation of humanitarian crisis
- Countries facing food emergencies (indicator no. 5)
- Countries facing enforced displacements (indicators no. 7 and no. 8)
- © Countries in the UN's Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) (indicator no. 6)

Mapa F1. Arms embargoes



Mapa F2. Militarisation and disarmament




Countries with high military spendings

Countries where the number of soldiers exceeds 2% of the population

Countries with imports of heavy conventional weapons exceeding 1% of GDP

Mapa G. Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law



Countries with very serious violations of human rights




United Nations Rapporteur or Special Representative




Withdrawn Rapporteur or Special Representative

Mapa H. Development



- Countries with a
 Human Development
 Index lower than it
 was in 1990
 (table H2)
- Countries whose foreign debt repayments exceed the amounts received in official development aid (indicator n° 29)

Mapa I. Conduct in relation to international society



- Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 7 main international legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration (Table 11.2)
- Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 6 main UN legal instruments on human rights (Table 12.2)
- Countries that have ratified fewer than half of the 7 main international legal instruments included in the Millennium Declaration and fewer than half of the 6 main UN legal instruments on human rights
- Tax havens that do not cooperate with the OECD (Table I3.1)
- Countries that do not cooperate with the GAFI in respect of money-laundering (Table 13.2)

Appendix III. Alert in oil production countries due to conflict/tension, human rights, human development and /or governance

	World reserves (%) and estimated	Overall production and (thousand of barrels	Armed conflict	Human Rights	HDI (medium	Millennium goals	Poor
	remaining explotation	per day)) production	tensión	Humanos	or low)	2003	Governance
Countries	period (years)	ranking for 2002	2003 (1)	2003 (2)	2001	(3)	2002 (4)
Saudi Arabia	25,0% (86,0)	8680 (1)		•	73		
Iraq	10,7% (+100)	2030 (11)	•	•	Nd	•	•
A. U. Emiratos	9,3% (+100)	2270 (10)					
Kuwait	9,2% (+100)	1871 (13)					
Iran	8,6% (73,8)	3366 (5)	A	•	106		
Venezuela	7,4% (74,0)	2942 (7)	A		69	0	0
Rusian Fed.	5,7% (21,7)	7698 (2)	•	•	63		
USA	2,9% (10,8)	7698 (2)	•				
Libya	2,8% (59,4)	1376 (16)			61		0
Nigeria	2,3% (32,8)	2013 (12)	•	•	152	•	0
China	1,7% (14,8)	3387 (4)		•	104		
Qatar	1,5% (57,6)	755 (24)					
Mexico	1,2% (10,1)	3585 (3)	A	•			
Norway	1,0% (8,7)	3330 (6)					
Kazakhastan	0,9% (26,1)	989 (18)			76	0	
Argelia	0,9% (16,5)	1659 (14)	•	•	107		
Brasil	0,8% (15,4)	1500 (15)	A		65		
Canada	0,7% (9,0)	2880 (8)					
Azerbaijan	0,7% (62,5)	308 (33)	A	•	89		0
United Kindom	0,5% (5,4)	2463 (9)					
Oman	0,5% (16,8)	902 (20)			79	0	
Angola	0,5% (16,4)	905 (19)	A	•	164		•
India	0,5% (19,4)	793 (23)	•	•	127	0	
Indonesia	0,5% (11,1)	1278 (17)	•	•	112		0
Ecuador	0,4% (31,2)	410 (30)	A		97		
Yemen	0,4% (23,4)	473 (29)			148	0	0
Egypt	0,4% (14,1)	751 (25)			120		
Argentina	0,3% (10,1)	800 (22)					
Australia	0,3% (14,1)	730 (26)					
Malasia	0,3% (10,6)	833 (21)			58		
Colombia	0,2% (8,5)	601 (27)	•	•	64		
Syria	0,2% (11,9)	576 (28)					
Gabon	0,2% (23,2)	295 (34)			118	0	
Trinid. and Tob.	0,1% (13,6)	155 (42)					
Denmark	0,1% (10,0)	371 (31)					
Italia	0,1% (16,6)	103 (44)					
Rumania	0,1% (20,9)	127 (43)			72		
Turkmenistan	0,1% (8,3)	182 (40)	A	•	87	0	•
Uzbekistan	0,1% (11,3)	171 (41)	A	•	101	0	0
Congo	0,1% (16,0)	258 (35)	A		140	0	0
Sudan	0,1% (6,6)	233 (37)	•	•	138	0	•
Brunei	0,1% (18,0)	210 (38)					
Thailand	0,1% (9,6)	197 (39)		•	74		
Vietnam	0,1% (4,7)	354 (32)		•	109		
Peru	Nd	98 (45)	A		82		
Cameroon	Nd	72 (47)			142	•	0
Tunisia	Nd	76 (46)			91		
Papua N. G.	Nd	46 (48)			132	0	
Chad	Nd	225*			165	0	0
Ecuat. Guinea	Nd	237 (36)		•	116	0	
S. Tomé and P.	3000-8000**	Nd	A				

^{• (1)} Countries with armed conflict (2) Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (3) Maximum priority countries (4) Countries with very poor governance.

Own calculation as per BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2003.

^{▲ (1))} Situations of tension and high-risk dispute.

O (3) High priority countries (4) Countries with poor governance.

Nd = No data available

^{*} Estimation for 2003.

^{**} Estimated reserve in thousands of barrels.

Appendix IV. Requirements and Contributions to 2003 Interagency Consolidated Appeals

Affected Country/Region	Requirements (millions USD)	Total funds available as of October 2003 (millions USD)	% of needs covered	Targeted beneficiaries (millions of people)
Africa				
Angola	313, 8	149,1	47,5 %	3,7
Burundi	71,5	21,3	28,4 %	0,4
Central African Republic	9,1	1,05	11,5%	2,2
Côte d'Ivoire	22	11,8	53,5 %	-
Côte d'Ivoire + 5 (a)	90,9	35,8	39,4 %	2,5
DR Congo	229,4	83,3	36,3 %	2,6
Eritrea	160	99,2	62,0 %	2,3
Great Lakes region and Central Africa	115,3	110	95,4 %	0,7
Guinea	48	24,2	50,4 %	0,4
Liberia	46,6	11,2	24,1 %	0,5
Sierra Leone	125,8	101,4	80,6 %	1,3
Somalia	71,5	35,3	49,5 %	0,75
Southern Africa region	419,1	101,2	24,2 %	2,5
Sudan	263	111,3	42,3 %	2,8
Uganda	126,6	92,9	73,4 %	0,75
Zimbabwe	113,8	4,4	3,8 %	4
TOTAL	2.226	993,357	44,6 %	27,5
Asia, Europe and Commonwealth of Indep	endent Sta			
Chechnya and Neighbouring Republics (RF)	30,3	26,3	87,0 %	1,2
DPR of Korea	229,4	129,4	56,4 %	6,4
Indonesia	55,5	29,9	54,1 %	3,0
Iraq	2.223	2.015,1	90,6 %	27,1
Occupied Palestinian territory	293,8	112,3	38,2 %	1,5
Tajikistan	62	47,4	76,5 %	1,0
TOTAL	2.893,9	2.360,6	81,6 %	40,2
TOTAL AMOUNT	5.120,4	3.353,9	65,6 %	67,7

Non-CAP Humanitarian Programmes				
Afghanistan	714,7	360,4	50,4 %	-
Colombia	79,5	30,2	38,0 %	-
Haiti	14,4	0,69	0,5 %	_
R. Congo	28,3	9,9	35,0 %	-
TOTAL	836,9	400,5	47,9 %	

⁽a) Côte d'Ivoire and five neighbouring countries: Liberia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali and Ghana.

Appendix V. Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 77 agreed in July 2001, now stands as the central global agreement on preventing and reducing trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This agreement will have to be revised in 2006, but the first Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action took place in July 2003 to consider progress towards its implementation. The second Biennial Meeting of States will be held in 2005.

In the following table the different progresses are shown, in base of the recompilation by the International Action network on Small Arms (IANSA), a network of more than 700 NGO working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in 100 countries. The report considers the situation of 156 countries and has been co-ordinated by the British NGO coalition «Biting the Bullet» (University of Bradford, International Alert and Saferworld).

The report does not aim to have a condemnatory purpose, so it establish different rankings according the countries who had made a reliable progress because they could have really different starting. A two years period it is also insufficient to evaluate the necessary changes to achieve a control on small arms proliferation, so the report and the table only emphasise in the essential aspects of the Programme of Action, which are:

- Creation of a national contact (by a National Coordination Agency or a National Point of Contact)
- Laws and procedures on the arms race cycle:
 - Production (Pr)
 - Export (E)
 - Import (I)
 - Transit (Tr)
- National system of export and import licensing or authorisation, following the next issues:
 - Diversion risk assesment (D)
 - End User Certificates (EUC)
 - Retransfer notification (R)
- Brokering controls
- Domestic legislation about the control on small arms proliferation:
 - Manufacture (M)
 - Possession (P)
 - Stockpiling (S)
 - Trade (T)
- Stockpile management.
- Weapons destruction (unserviceable surplus arms or Police confiscation)
- Disarmament and weapons collection programmes in the civil society and/or DDR programs (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of former combatants)

	National contact	on Prod	proce ductio	edimi	cedur entos aport ansit	5	of e imp	xpor ort li	Syste t and cension	ng	Brokering control	Domestic legislation			on	Stockpile management	Weapons destruction	Disarmament and	collection	
	Na		Pr	E	1	Tr		D	EUC	R	Bro		M	Р	S	T	Stc	We		DDR
Afghanistan																	•			
Albania		Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Algeria	Yes																			
Andorra	Yes																			
Angola	Yes	Yes										Yes							Yes	•
Anguilla (UK)																				
Antigua and Barbuda	Yes																			
Argentina	Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes					Yes		•	•	•		Yes	Yes	
Armenia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		Yes	
Aruba																				
Australia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		•	•		Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Austria	Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes							Yes		
Azerbaijan		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•			Yes			
Bahamas																	100			
Bahrain																				
Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	•	•	•															
Barbados	Yes	103										Yes	•	•		•				
Belarus	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes				Yes	Yes	•	•			Yes	Yes	Yes	
Belgium	Yes	Yes		•			Yes		-		Yes	163					163	163	103	
Belize	163	Yes					163				163	Yes								
Benin		162		•	•	•						ies	•							
Bermuda (UK)																				
Bhutan												.,								
Bolivia	.,	Yes		•	•	•						Yes	•			•	.,		.,	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Botswana	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes								
Brazil	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•	•	•		Yes		
Brunei Darussalam		Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•	•	•				
Bulgaria	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes		
Burkina Faso	Yes																			
Burundi	Yes																			
Cambodia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	•
Cameroon	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes			
Canada	Yes	Yes		•	•	•						Yes	•							
Cape Verde																				
Cayman, I. (UK)																				
Central African Rep.																			Yes	
Chad																			Yes	
Chile	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•	•					
China	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		•			Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes			
Colombia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Comoros																				
Congo	Yes																	Yes	Yes	•
Congo, DR	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•					Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes Í	•
Cook, I. (NZ)	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes		•		•				
Korea, DPR																				

	National contact	Laws and procedures on procedimientos on production, Export, in Import and Transit or Pr E I Tr			of e	xport ort lie utho	Syste t and censin	ng on	Brokering control	Domestic legislation				Stockpile management	Weapons destruction	Disarmament and				
	ž		Pr	E	1	Tr		D	EUC	R	찙		M	Р	S	T	St	Š		DDR
Korea, Rep.	Yes	Yes	•	•	•		Yes		•			Yes	•			•				
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes		
Côte d'Ivoire	Yes																			
Croatia																		Yes	Yes	
Cuba																				
Cyprus																		Yes		
Czech Rep.	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes			•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		Yes	
Denmark	Yes	Yes		•		•	Yes	•	•											
Djibouti																				
Dominica																				
Dominican Republic																				
Ecuador	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•				
Egypt	Yes																			
El Salvador	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes	•			•	Yes	Yes		
Equatorial Guinea																				
Eritrea																				
Estonia	Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes		•	•	Yes									
Ethiopia	Yes																			
Fiji	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•				
Finland	Yes	Yes		•			Yes	•	•		Yes									
France	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes				Yes	Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes		
French Polynesia		Yes			•							Yes		•						
Gabon																				
Gambia	Yes																			
Georgia		Yes		•	•	•	Yes		•			Yes		•	•	•		Yes	Yes	
Germany	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes		
Ghana	Yes	Yes			•						Yes	Yes					Yes	Yes	Yes	
Gibraltar (UK)																				
Greece	Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes	•	•											
Grenada																				
Guatemala		Yes		•	•							Yes	•							
Guernesey (UK)																				
Guinea	Yes																			
Guinea-Bissau																				
Guyana												Yes	•							
Haiti																				
Holy See	Yes																			
Honduras		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•		Yes	Yes	
Hungary	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes			
Iceland	Yes																			
India	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		Yes	•
Indonesia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•	•	•				
Iran,. Isl. Rep	Yes	Yes	•	•	•							Yes		•		•				
Iraq																				
Ireland	Yes	Yes		•	•		Yes													

	National contact	on Prod	Aws and procedures of export and import licensing or authorisation Pr E I Tr D EUC R M P S T				of export and import licensing					Stockpile management	Weapons destruction	Disarmament and						
	N		Pr	E		Tr		D	EUC	R	P. B.		M	Р	S	T	Stc	×		DDR
	.,	.,		Yes		•					.,	.,								
Israel	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•					Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	.,			
Italy	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		•			Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes		
Jamaica .	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•		•	.,	Yes		
Japan	Yes	Yes	•	•	•						Yes	Yes	•	•		•	Yes			
Jersey (UK)																				
Jordan	Yes											Yes	•			•			Yes	
Kazakhstan	Yes	Yes		•			Yes		•											
Kenya	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Kiribati		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•				
Kosovo	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	ψΝΜΙ	(Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	•			
Kuwait																				
Kyrgyzstan												Yes		•			Yes			
Lao, PDR		Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•	•	•				
Latvia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•		Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes		
Lebanon	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes			
Lesotho												Yes	•	•		•		Yes		
Liberia																				
Liechtenstein	Yes																			
Lithuania	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Luxembourg																				
Libya, Arab Jamahiriya																				
Macedonia, ERY		Yes		•	•							Yes		•						•
Madagascar																				
Malawi		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•	Yes			
Malaysia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•					Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		Yes	
Maldives	Yes																			
Mali	Yes	Yes					Yes	•	•			Yes					Yes	Yes	Yes	•
Malta	Yes																			
Man, I. Of (UK)																				
Marshall, I.		Yes			•							Yes	•	•		•				
Mauritania																				
Mauritius	Yes	Yes			•							Yes	•	•		•				
Mexico	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•			Yes	Yes	Yes	
Micronesia, Fed. Est.		Yes			•							Yes	•	•		•				
Moldova, Rep. of	Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes		•	•		Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Monaco	Yes																			
Mongolia	Yes																			
Montserrat (UK)																				
Morocco	Yes																			
Mozambique	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes		
Myanmar	103	Yes	•	•		•						103					103	103		
N. Caledonia		Yes			•							Yes	•	•						
IV. Calcuttila		162										162				•				

	National contact	on Prod	proce duction ort a	edimi on, Ex	cedur entos aport,		of e	xport ort li	censir risatio	ng on	Brokering control	Domestic legislation				Stockpile management	Weapons destruction	Disarmament and		
			Pr	E	1	Tr		D	EUC	R	늅		M	Р	S	T				DDR
N. Zealand	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•		Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Namibia		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•				
Nepal		Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•		•				
Netherlands	Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes		•		Yes	Yes		•		•	Yes	Yes		
Netherlands Antilles																				
Nicaragua		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•				
Niger																		Yes	Yes	
Nigeria	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		•		Yes	Yes					Yes	Yes	Yes	
Niue (NZ)		Yes		•	•							Yes		•						
Norway	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes				Yes	Yes					Yes			
Oman	Yes																			
	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•					Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Palau		Yes			•							Yes	•	•						
Palestine, O.T.																				
Panama		Yes			•														Yes	
Papua New Guinea		Yes			•							Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes	Yes	•
Paraguay	Yes	Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	103	103	
Peru	Yes	Yes			•							Yes	•	•		•	103	Yes		
Philippines	Yes	Yes	•		•	•						Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	103	Yes	
Poland	Yes	Yes	•		•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes	_			_	Yes	Yes	Yes	
	Yes	162	•	•	•	•	Yes		-		162	162	•	•	•	•	162	162	162	
Portugal							162	•	•											
Qatar	Yes	\/					\/				\/	\/					\/	\/		
Romania	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes	•	•	•		Yes	Yes		
Russian Fed.	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	•
Rwanda	Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes		•	•	•	Yes			
S. Vincent and the Grenadines																				
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Yes																			
Samoa		Yes		•	•							Yes		•		•				
San Marino	Yes																			
Santa Lucia																				
Sao Tome and Princip	е																			
Saudi Arabia																				
Senegal	Yes																			
Serbia and Montene.	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		•		Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	•
Seychelles		Yes		•	•	•						Yes	•	•		•				
Sierra Leone	Yes																	Yes	Yes	•
Singapore	Yes	Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•		•				
Slovakia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes									
Slovenia	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Solomon Islands		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•	•				Yes	•
Somalia																			. 50	
South Africa	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•		•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes		
Spain	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		•		103	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	103		
Sri Lanka	Yes	Yes	•	•			162					Yes	•				162	Yes	Yes	
					•	•	Voc	_			Voc			•			Voc	Yes		
Sudan	Yes	Yes					Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes					Yes	res	Yes	

	National contact	on Prod	s and proce duction ort and	edimi on, Ex	entos xport,		of e	xport ort li	Syste t and censir risatic	ıg	Brokering control	Dor	mesti M	c legi	islatio	on T	Stockpile management	Weapons destruction	Disarmament and	add collection
Suriname																				
Sweden	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Switzerland	Yes										Yes									
Syrian Arab Rep.	Yes																			
Taiwan (China)																				
Tajikistan																				
Tanzania, United Rep.	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•		Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes		Yes	
Thailand	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•						Yes	•	•	•	•				
Timor Leste																				
Togo																				
Tonga		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•	•					
Trinidad and Tobago		Yes		•	•	•						Yes	•	•		•	Yes			
Tunisia																				
Turkey	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•	•	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•		Yes		
Turkmenistan																				
Turks and Caicos (UK)																				
Tuvalu	Yes	Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•						
Uganda	Yes										Yes	Yes					Yes		Yes	
Ukraine	Yes	Yes		•																
United Arab Emirates																				
United Kingdom	Yes	Yes	•	•	•		Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes		•		•	Yes	Yes	Yes	•
Uruguay		Yes		•	•	•													Yes	
USA	Yes	Yes	•	•	•	•	Yes	•	•		Yes	Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Uzbekistan																				
Vanuatu		Yes			•							Yes	•	•	•					
Venezuela	Yes	Yes			•							Yes	•	•	•	•				
Viet Nam		Yes	•	•	•							Yes	•	•		•				
Virgins, I. (UK)																				
Virgins, I. (USA)																				
Yemen												Yes	•	•	•	•				
Zambia	Yes	Yes	•	•		•						Yes	•	•		•	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Zimbabwe		Yes		•	•							Yes	•	•		•			Yes	

Key: Pr: Production E: Export I: Import Tr: Transit

D: Diversion risk assessment EUC: End User Certificates R: Retransfer notification

M: Manufacture P: Possession S: Stockpiling

T: Trade

DDR: Disarmament, desmovilisation and Reintegration Programme

Appendix VI. The Millennium Declaration and the millennium development goals

At the Millennium Summit held in New York in September 2000, 189 states adopted the Millennium Declaration, which summarised the great global challenges and lines for its agenda in a series of legal instruments. Of these, the seven main instruments have been considered, along with the eight Millennium Development Goals, whose target year is 2015.

GOAL 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 1: halve the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day

Target 2: halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education

Target 3: ensure that children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 4: eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education

GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality

Target 5: reduce by two-thirds the under-5 mortality rate

GOAL 5: Improve maternal health

Target 6: reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio

GOAL 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Target 7: halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

Target 8: halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

Target 9: integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the losses of environmental resources

Target 10: halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to drinking water

Target 11: achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

GOAL 8: Develop a global partneship for development

Target 12: develop a rule-based, non-discriminatory trading and financial system

Target 13: address the special needs of the LDC

Target 14: address the special needs of land-locked countries and small island developing states

Target 15: deal comprehensively with debt problems through national and international measures

Target 16: provide youth with decent and productive work

Target 17: provide access to essential drugs in developing countries

Target 18: make available the benefits of new information and communications technologies

Sources: United Nations, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals; World Bank http://www.developmentgoals.org/

Appendix VII. Armed conflicts, missions and Representatives / Envoys / Special Advisers of the Secretary-General during 2003

Country	Beginning- end of conflict	Presence, type of mission ⁸⁰ and duration (resolution of the last extension)	Military/police and civilian personnel (at 30/11/03)	Special Representative /Chief of Mission (SR), Special Envoy (SE) and Special Adviser (SA)
		AFRICA		
African continent				SA on Africa, Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) SA for Special Assignments in Africa, Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)
West African Region	Several conflicts	SR Office (PO) from 03/02 to 31/12/03	0 and 16	SR Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)
Great Lakes Region	Several conflicts	SR Office (PO) from 19/12/97 to 31/12/03	0 and 16	SR Ibrahima Fall (Senegal)
Algeria	1992-	no		
Angola	1975-2002	UNMA ⁸⁰ (PO) from 15/08/02 to 02/03 (closed)		SR Eric de Mul (Netherlands)
Burundi	1993-	UNOB (PO) from 25/10/93 to 31/12/03	1 and 57	SR Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia)
CAR Central African Republic	(1996-2000) 2002-2003	BONUCA ⁸¹ (PBO) from 15/02/00 to 31/12/04	11 and 62	SR Lamine Sissé (Senegal)
Congo	1998-2003	no		
Congo, DR	1998-	MONUC ⁸² (PKO) from 30/11/99 to 30/07/04, S/RES/1493 (2003)	10.611 (of 10.800) and 1.419	SR William Lacy Swing (USA)
Côte d'Ivoire	2002-	MINUCI ⁸³ (PO) from 05/03 to 04/02/04, S/RES/1514 (2003)	63 and 99	SR Albert Tévoédjré (Benin)
Ethiopia-Eritrea	1998-2000	UNMEE (PKO) from 31/07/00 to 15/03/04S/RES/1507 (2003)	4.085 (of 4.200) and 494	SR Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana)
Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	UNOGBIS (PBO) from 03/03/99 to 31/12/03	2 and 21	SR David Stephen (United Kingdom)
Liberia	1989-	UNMIL ⁸⁴ (PKO) from 19/09/03 to 19/09/04, S/RES/1509 (2003)	(5.528 + 41) of (15.000 + 1.115) and 18	SR Jacques Paul Klein (USA) 8
Morrocco-Occidental Sahara*	1975-	MINURSO (PKO) from 04/91 to 31/01/04, S/RES/1513 (2003)	239 and 257	SR Álvaro de Soto (Peru) and SE James A. Baker III (USA)
Senegal (Casamance)	1982-2003	no		
Sierra Leone	1991-2001	UNAMSIL ⁸⁵ (PKO) from 22/10/99) to 31/03/04, S/RES/1508 (2003	(11.278 + 130) of (17.500 + 170) and 896	SR Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago (Tanzania)
Somalia	1988-	UNPOS ⁸⁶ (PO) from 15/04/95 to 31/12/03		SR Winston A. Tubman (Liberia)
Sudan	1983-	no		SE Tom Eric Vraalsen (Norway)
Sudan (Darfur)	2003-	no		
Uganda	1989-	no		

^{79.} Peace-Keeping Operation (PKO), Political Operation (PO) and Peace-Building Operation (PBO).

^{80.} UNAVEM I (1988-1991), UNAVEM II (1991-1995), UNAVEM III (1995-1997), MONUA (1997-1999) (PKO) and UNOA (1999- 2002) (PO). UNOA has become UNMA, with and extended mandate.

^{81.} MINURCA (1998-2000) (PKO).

^{82.} ONUC (1960-1964) (PKO).

^{83.} Although it is a political mission, it is directed and supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

^{84.} UNOL (PBO) from 01/11/97 to 31/12/03.

^{85.} UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (PKO).

^{86.} UNOSOM I (1992-1993) UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with a UN Security Council mandate) UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKO).

	AMERICA		
			SA Diego Cordovez (Ecuador)
1964-	no		SA James LeMoyne (USA)
1962-1996	MINUGUA (PBO) from 19/09/94 to 31/12/03	3 and 188	SR Tom Koenings (Germany)
			SR on the Border Controversy between both countries, Oliver Jackman (Barbados)
1994-	no		
	ASIA		
2002-	UNAMA ⁸⁸ (PO) from 28/03/02 to 28/03/04	11 and 903	SR Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)
1975-1997	UNPOB (PO) from 15/06/98 to 31/12/03	1 and 7	SR Noel Sinclair (Guyana)
1950-	no		
1950,1953-	no		
1989-	no		
1989-	no		
1946-	UNMOGIP89 (PKO) from 01/49	46 and 71	Chief of the Mission Perti Juhani Puonti (Finland)
1976-	no		
1998-2003	no		
1963-	no		
	no		SE Razzali Ismail (Malaysia)
1996-	no		
1969-	no		
1983-2002	no		
1992-1997	UNTOP (PO) from 01/06/00 to 31/05/04	1 and 26	SR Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria)
1975-1999	UNMISET ⁹⁰ (PKO) from 20/05/02 to 20/05/04S/RES/1480 (2003)	(2.604 + 390) of (5.000 + 1.250) and 1.2	SR Kamalesh Sharma (India) 296
	EUROPE		
			SA Jean-Bernard Merimee (France)
1991-(1994)	no		(
		1.414 (of 2.057)	SR and UNMIBH Coordinator,
	to 12/02 (closed)	and 1.569	Jacques Paul Klein (USA)
1991-1995	UNMOP (PKO) from 02/96 to 12/02 (closed)	28 and 9	Military Chief of the Misson, Rodolfo Sergio Mujica (Argentina)
1974-	UNFICYP (PKO) from 03/64 to 15/06/04, S/RES/1518 (2003)	1.266 and 141	Acting SR Zbigniew Wlosowicz (Poland) (SA to be appointed)
ece	no		Personal Envoy for the talks between both countries, Matthew Nimetz (USA)
1992-1993	UNOMIG (PKO) from 08/93	124 and 279	SR Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)
1998-1999	UNMIK (PKO) from 06/99		SR Harry Holkeri (Finland)
	1962-1996 1994- 2002- 1975-1997 1950- 1950,1953- 1989- 1946- 1976- 1998-2003 1963- 1996- 1969- 1983-2002 1992-1997 1975-1999 1991-(1994) 1992-1995 1974- ecce	1964- no 1962-1996 MINUGUA (PBO) from 19/09/94 to 31/12/03 1994- no ASIA 2002- UNAMA® (PO) from 28/03/02 to 28/03/04 1975-1997 UNPOB (PO) from 15/06/98 to 31/12/03 1950- no 1950- no 1950,1953- no 1989- no 1989- no 1946- UNMOGIP® (PKO) from 01/49 1976- no 1998-2003 no 1963- no 1963- no 1996- no 1996- no 1996- no 1997-1997 UNTOP (PO) from 01/06/00 to 31/05/04 1975-1999 UNMISET® (PKO) from 20/05/02 to 20/05/04\$/RE\$/1480 (2003) EUROPE 1991-(1994) no 1992-1995 UNMIBH® (PKO) from 12/95 to 12/02 (closed) 1991-1995 UNMOP (PKO) from 02/96 to 12/02 (closed) 1974- UNFICYP (PKO) from 03/64 to 15/06/04, \$/RE\$/1518 (2003) ecce no	1964- no 1962-1996 MINUGUA (PBO) from 19/09/94 3 and 188 to 31/12/03 1994- no ASIA 2002- UNAMA® (PO) from 28/03/02 11 and 903 to 28/03/04 1975-1997 UNPOB (PO) from 15/06/98 1 and 7 to 31/12/03 1950- no 1950- no 1989- no 1989- no 1989- no 1946- UNMOGIP® (PKO) from 01/49 46 and 71 1976- no 1998-2003 no 1998- no 1998-100 1969- no 1998-100 1976- no 1998-100 1976- no 1998-100 1976- no 1999- no 1999- no 1999- no 1999- no 1983-2002 no 1992-1997 UNTOP (PO) from 01/06/00 1 and 26 to 31/05/04 1975-1999 UNMISET® (PKO) from 20/05/02 (2.604 + 390) of to 20/05/04\$/RE\$/1480 (2003) EUROPE EUROPE EUROPE 1991-(1994) no 1992-1995 UNMIBH® (PKO) from 12/95 1.414 (of 2.057) and 1.569 1991-1995 UNMOP (PKO) from 02/96 28 and 9 to 12/02 (closed) 1974- UNFICYP (PKO) from 03/64 to 15/06/04, \$7/RE\$/1518 (2003) 1992-1993 UNOMIG (PKO) from 03/64 1.266 and 141 to 15/06/04, \$7/RE\$/1518 (2003) 1992-1993 UNOMIG (PKO) from 08/93 124 and 279

^{87.} The armed conflict that undergoes the country in its present phase began with the attack of the USA and United Kingdom in October of 2001, although the country is in armed conflict from 1979.

^{88.} Although it is a political mission, it is directed and supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

^{89.} UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKO).

^{90.} UNTAET (1999-2002) (PKO).

^{91.} For former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR (1992-1995) (PKO). In December of 2002 the UNMIBH is transformed into a police mission under mandate of the EU.

		MIDDLE EA	ST	
Iraq-USA/United Kingdom	2003	no		Acting SR, Ross Mountain (New Zealand)SA Rafeeuddin Ahmed (Pakistan)
Iraq-Kuwait	1990-1991	UNIKOM (PKO) from 04/91 to 10/03 (closed)	4 and 131	
Israel- Palestine ⁹²	1948-	UNSCO ⁹³ (PO) from 05/48 to 19/09/04	0 and 45	SA for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative to the PLO and the PNA, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)
Israel-Siria (Golan Heights)	1967, 1973	UNDOF (PKO) from 06/74 to 06/04, S/RES/1520 (2003)	1.036 (+80 of UNTSO) and 130	Chief of the Mission Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)
Israel-Lebanon	1967, 1982-2000	UNIFIL (PKO) from 03/78 to 01/04, S/RES/1486 (2003)	2.008 (+50 of UNTSO) and 415	SR Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)
Middle East	1948-	UNTSO (PKO) from 05/48	156 and 213	Military Chief of the Misión, Carl A. Dodd (Ireland)

^{*}Situations that remain unresolved during 2003 (see section of peace processes). India-Pakistan are analyzed from the perspective of the peace process.

^{92.} Despite the armed conflict having broken out in 1948, the report only analyses the last stage of the conflict which corresponds to the II Intifada started in September 2000.

Appendix VIII. UN Security Council Resolutions and Reports by the UN Secretary General during 2003

UN Securi	ity Cou	ncil Resolu	utions during 2003			
Country	N°	Date	Content			
_	1455	17-01	On the threats to international peace and security created by acts of terrorism, a improving the work of the Security Council Committee aimed at verifying the application of earlier resolutions.			
_	1456	20-01	Declaration on combating terrorism, in which the Council stated that it was willing to counter-attack by contributing to the peaceful solution of disputes, and that States should ensure that the methods they adopt to combat terrorism comply with the obligations by which they are bound under international law.			
DR Congo	1457	24-01	Condemned the illegal exploitation and looting of natural resources, and stressed the possibility of calling an international peace conference for the Great Lakes region.			
Liberia	1458	28-01	Decided to re-establish the Group of Experts to investigate the trafficking of diamonds.			
_	1459	28-01	Indicated the link between the illegal trade in diamonds and the intensification of armed conflicts, supporting the system for the certification of untreated diamonds under the Kimberley Process.			
_	1460	30-01	On the rights and protection of children affected by armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.			
Lebanon	1461	30-01	Extended the mandate of UNIFIL for six months and reiterated the territorial integrity and political independence of the Lebanon.			
Georgia	1462	30-01	Regretted that no progress had been made in initiating negotiations, along with the repeated refusal by the Abkhazis to discuss the document entitled «Basic principles for power-sharing between Tbilisi and Sujumi», and extended the mandate of UNOMIG for six months.			
W. Sahara	1463	30-01	Extended the mandate of MINURSO for two months.			
Côte d'Ivoire	1464	04-02	Fully accepted the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, calling on all political forces to apply it, and authorised the States contributing to the ECOWAS force, along with the French troops supporting it, to take the measures necessary in order to guarantee the security of their personnel and protect civilians at risk for a period of six months.			
(Colombia)	1465	13-02	Condemned the bomb attack in Bogota and called on States to find the perpetrators and bring them to justice.			
Eritrea/Ethiopi	a 1466	14-03	Extended the UNMEE mandate for six months.			
_	1467	18-03	Declaration on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and mercenary activities, along with threats to peace and security in West Africa.			
DR Congo	1468	20-03	Favourably accepted the agreement on transitional arrangements reached by the Congolese parties in Pretoria; condemned the killings carried out in some regions; encouraged the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission; requested an increase in the human rights components in MONUC; called on the Ugandan Government to withdraw its troops and put an end to the recruitment of children.			
W. Sahara	1469	25-03	Extended the mandate of MINURSO for two months.			
Timor-Leste	1473	04-04	Decided on the composition and powers on the UNMISET police force and asked for a timetable for the reduction of its military contingent.			
Somalia	1474	08-04	Decided once again to establish a Group of Experts to investigate infringements of the arms embargo.			
Cyprus	1475	14-04	Deplored the negative attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leader and made a call for negotiations within the framework of the good offices of the Secretary General.			
Iraq	1476	24-04	Extended the provisions of Resolution 1472 on humanitarian supplies until 3 June.			
Rwanda	1477	29-04	Submitted the names of candidates for the International Court for Rwanda to the General Assembly.			

Liberia	1478	06-05	Called on the government and LURD to set up bilateral ceasefire negotiations without delay, under the auspices of ECOWAS and with the mediation of the former President of Nigeria; extended the arms embargo for a year; asked the government to establish an effective regime to provide certificates of origin for untreated diamonds; and asked all states to take measures to prevent the import of timber and wooden products from Liberia for a period of 10 months.
Côte d'Ivoire	1479	13-05	Established a UN Mission (MINUCI) for a period of six months, with the mandate to facilitate application of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.
Timor-Leste	1480	19-05	Extended the mandate of UNMISET for a year.
Former Yugoslavia	1481	19-05	Decided to modify one article of the Statute of the International Court of crime for the former Yugoslavia, relating to the status of magistrates.
Rwanda	1482	19-05	Decided that several magistrates coming to the end of their mandates could complete certain pending cases.
Iraq	1483	22-05	Made a call to the people of Iraq to work to reform their institutions and reconstruct their country; asked the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq; supported the establishment of a provisional administration that would act as a transitional authority; reaffirmed its intention to re-examine the mandates of the arms inspectors; and asked that the «oil for food» programme be brought to an end in six months.
DR Congo	1484	30-05	Authorised the deployment, until 1 September, of a Provisional Multinational Emergency Force in Bunia, working in close cooperation with MONUC, to assist in the stabilisation of security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia. Also called on all parties to put an immediate end to hostilities.
W. Sahara	1485	30-05	Extended the mandate of MINURSO for two months.
Cyprus	1486	11-06	Extended the mandate of UNFICYP for six months.
_	1487	12-06	Asked the International Criminal Court not to begin investigations or proceedings, for a period of one year, in relation to actions or omissions connected with operations involving the participation of people from any state that is not a party to the Rome Statute and that provide contingencies.
Israel/Syria	1488	26-06	Extended the mandate of UNDOF for six months.
DR Congo	1489	26-6	Extended the mandate of MONUC for one month.
Iraq/Kuwait	1490	03-07	Extended the UNIKOM mandate for three months, the mission to be subsequently closed.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1491	11-07	Urged the parties to comply with the obligations undertaken under the Dayton Agreement; authorised SFOR to remain in place for a further year and acknowledged SFOR's right to take any measures necessary to defend itself
Sierra Leona	1492	18-07	Approved the Secretary General's proposal to conclude the UNAMSIL mission in December 2004.
DR Congo	1493	28-07	Extended MONUC for a year and authorised an increase in troop numbers; asked the Secretary General to deploy MONUC observers in North and South Kivu and Ituri, authorising it to use any means within its power to comply with its mandate.
Georgia	1494	30-07	Extended the UNOMIG mandate for six months.
W. Sahara	1495	31-07	Asked the parties to collaborate with the United Nations and each other with a view to accepting and applying the Peace Plan; extended the MINURSO mandate for three months.
Middle East	1486	31-07	Extended the FPNUL mandate for six months.
Liberia	1497	01-08	Authorised the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement of June 2003, and to prepare for the introduction of a UN stabilisation force, to replace the multinational force in the long term; authorised UNAMSIL to provide logistical support for one month to the advance elements of the multinational ECOWAS force
Côte d'Ivoire	1498	04-08	Renewed the authorisation granted to member states participating in the ECOWAS force, and the French forces supporting it, for six months.
DR Congo	1499	13-08	Asked the Secretary General to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts studying the illegal exploitation of natural resources in DR Congo until the end of October.
Iraq	1500	14-08	Welcomed the establishment of the Iraq Governing Council and decided to establish a UN Aid Mission to Iraq, initially for a period of one year.

DR Congo	1501	26-08	Authorised the member states forming the Provisional Multinational Emergency Force to provide assistance to the MONUC contingent deployed in the city of Bunia.
_	1502	26-08	Condemned aggression against humanitarian workers and reaffirmed the obligation of all parties in a conflict fully to respect the rules and principles of international law.
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda	1503	28-08	Urged the international community to assist in increasing the powers of the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Court for Rwanda.
Former Yugoslavia	1504	04-09	Named Carla Del Ponte as Prosecutor in the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia, for a period of four years
Rwanda	1505	04-09	Named Hassan Bubacar as Prosecutor in the International Court for Rwanda, for a period of four years
Libya	1506	12-09	Decided to lift the sanctions announced in 1993
Eritrea/Ethiopia	a 1507	12-09	Prolonged the UNMEE mandate for six months
Sierra Leone	1508	19-09	Prolonged the UNAMSIL mandate for six months
Liberia	1509	19-09	Decided to establish the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for one year, comprising 15,000 troops, who will assume the duties of ECOMIL, led up to this point by ECOWAS. UNMIL has a very broad mandate, including powers such as disarmament, the implementation of the ceasefire, support for the peace process and support for humanitarian assistance and human rights
Afghanistan	1510	13-10	Authorised the extension of the ISAF's mandate, extending it for one year and authorising the member States contributing to this force to adopt the measures required in order to allow it to fulfil its mandate.
Iraq	1511	16-10	Emphasised that the Coalition Provisional Authority was temporarily taking charge of the powers of government, urging the Authority to devolve its governing powers and structures to the Iraqi people as soon as this was feasible; decided that the United Nations should strengthen its essential role in Iraq; noted the Governing Council's intention to hold a constituent conference, and authorised a multinational force under a unified command to take the measures required in order to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.
Rwanda	1512	27-10	Amended some of the articles in the Statutes for the International Criminal Court for Rwanda.
W. Sahara	1513	28-10	Extended MINURSO's mandate for three months.
Côte d'Ivoire	1514	13-11	Extended MINUCI's mandate until 4 February 2004.
Palestine	1515	19-11	Accepted the Road Map and urged the parties to comply with the obligations that it contained.
_	1516	20-11	Condemned terrorist attacks.
Cyprus	1517	24-11	Extended UNFICYP's mandate until 15 June 2004.
Iraq	1518	24-11	Established a Security Council committee to continue identifying the parties referred to in Resolution 661 from 1990.
Somalia	1519	16-12	Called for the establishment of a supervisory group to investigate infringements of arms embargoes.
Israel/Syria	1520	22-12	Extended UNDOF's mandate for six months.
Liberia	1521	22-12	Decided to end certain prohibitions; decided that all States should adopt measures to prevent arms sales; called for measures to be taken to prevent the entry of anyone threatening the peace process; and called for the adoption of measures on the trading of diamonds and timber.

NIO	D-1	Cambamb	NIO	D-4-	Comtont
Nº	Date	Content	Nº	Date	Content
S/2003/5	03-01	On the situation in Central African Republic and the activities of BONUCA	S/2003/675	26-06	On the UN Provisional Administration in Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro)
S/2003/38	14-01	On UNIFIL	S/2003/715	17-07	On the situation in Iraq
S/2003/39	13-01	On the situation in Abkhazia	S/2003/728	23-07	On UNIFIL (Lebanon)
S/2003/59	16-01	(Georgia) On the situation in Western	S/2003/751	21-07	On the situation in Abkhazia (Georgia)
3/2003/39	10-01	Sahara	S/2003/754	21-07	On the situation in Afghanistan
S/2003/113	29-01	On UNMIK in Kosovo (Serbia	S/2003/793	05-08	On the situation in Liberia
		and Montenegro)	S/2003/801	08-08	On MINUCI (Côte d'Ivoire)
S/2003/158	07-02	On UNMA (Angola)	S/2003/813	13-08	On the situation between Iraq
S/2003/191	18-02	On the fight against terrorism			and Kuwait
S/2003/211	21-02	On MONUC (DR Congo)	S/2003/858	04-09	On the situation in Ethiopia and
S/2003/227	26-02	On the situation in Liberia			Eritrea
S/2003/231	26-02	On the situation in Somalia	S/2003/863	05-09	On UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)
S/2003/243	03-03	On UNMISET (Timor-Leste)	S/2003/875	11-09	On the situation in Liberia
S/2003/257	06-03	On Ethiopia and Eritrea	S/2003/888	12-09	On the prevention of armed
S/2003/321	17-03	On UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)			conflicts
S/2003/333	18-03	On the situation in Afghanistan and its consequences for	S/2003/933	02-10	On the activities of UNIKOM (Irac and Kuwait)
		international peace and security	S/2003/944	06-10	On UNMISET (Timor-Leste)
S/2003/345	20-03	On UNPOB (Bougainville, Papua New Guinea)	S/2003/947	10-10	On the peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question
S/2003/374	26-03	On the situation in Côte d'Ivoire	S/2003/987	13-10	On the situation in Somalia
S/2003/393	31-03	On UNIKOM for Iraq and Kuwait	S/2003/996	15-10	On UNMIK in Kosovo (Serbia
S/2003/398	01-04	On its good offices mission in Cyprus	S/2003/1016	16-10	and Montenegro) On the situation in Western
S/2003/412	12-04	On the situation in Abkhazia (Georgia)	S/2003/1019	10-10	Sahara On the situation in Abkhazia
S/2003/419	11-04	11th report presented in			(Georgia)
		accordance with paragraph 14 of	S/2003/1053	30-10	On children and armed conflicts
0/0000/101		resolution 1284 (1999)	S/2003/1069	04-11	On MINUCI (Côte d'Ivoire)
S/2003/421	14-04	On UNMIK in Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro)	S/2003/1078	12-11	On UNFICYP (Cyprus)
S/2003/449	21-04		S/2003/1098	17-11	On MONUC (DR Congo)
S/2003/449 S/2003/466	22-04	On the UN Support Mission in Timor-Leste Compliance with the contents of	S/2003/1099	17-11	On preparations for an international conference on the Great Lakes region
		resolution 1408 (2002) relating to	S/2003/1146	04-12	On the situation in Burundi
		Liberia	S/2003/1147	04-12	On the application of the
S/2003/565	23-05	On the situation in Western Sahara			recommendations of the Security Council mission in West Africa
S/2003/566	27-05	Second special report on MONUC	S/2003/1148	09-12	On UNDOF (Israel and Syria)
C/0000/E70	07.05	in DR Congo	S/2003/1149	05-12	On Iraq
S/2003/572	27-05	On Cyprus	S/2003/1157	05-12	On the evolution of the situation
S/2003/576	28-05	On humanitarian aid in Iraq			in Guinea-Bissau
S/2003/582	02-06	On the situation in Liberia	S/2003/1161	09-12	On compliance with resolution
S/2003/614	05-06	12th report presented in accordance with paragraph 14 of	S/2003/1175	15-12	1284 (1999) On UNMIL (Liberia)
\$/2002/421	00.04	resolution 1284 (1999)	S/2003/1186	19-12	On Ethiopia and Eritrea
\$/2003/621	09-06	On the situation in Guinea-Bissau	S/2003/1201	23-12	On UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)
\$/2003/636	10-06	On the situation in Somalia	S/2003/1209	29-12	On the situation in Central
\$/2003/640	11-06	on the reconstruction of Iraq			African Republic
S/2003/655 S/2003/654	18-06	On UNDOF (Israel and Syria)	S/2003/1212	30-12	On the situation in Afghanistan
S/2003/656	17-06	On the activities of UNIKOM (Iraq and Kuwait)	S/2003/1217	31-12	On small arms
S/2003/663	23-06	On UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)			
S/2003/665	24-06	On the situation in Ethiopia and			

Appendix IX. The EU, security and peace-building

Europe is gradually moving away from its status as a mere common trade area and becoming an international player whose influence on peace-building around the world is increasingly significant and necessary. The debates that have taken place during 2003 in relation to the European Constitution, enlargement and European Security Strategy, among other issues, represent good examples of this process. This Appendix contains an analysis of some of the specific issues dealt with in these debates, such as the establishment of a European Security Strategy, the promotion of good governance, human rights and the rule of law, the EU's role in crises requiring an international presence, the fight to combat arms proliferation and the promotion of disarmament, and the efforts made in respect of humanitarian aid and development cooperation.

Strategic issues relating to European Security

The head of Common Foreign and Security Policy, J. Solana, called throughout 2003 for the discussion and definition of a European Security Strategy. This strategy was finally approved by the Council of Europe on 12 December.

The definition of this European Security Strategy was influenced by three large debates with an international dimension: the new threats currently being faced and how this was to be achieved (especially following the attacks of 11 September 2001 against the USA); the difficulties being experienced by the United Nations as a multilateral and global forum in respect of the prevention and management of disputes; and the undertakings that should be assumed by the EU so that it could become a more active, capable and coherent player on the world stage.

Although there was no direct organic link between the preparation of a Security Strategy and the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) held at the end of the year (this conference specifically tackled the issue of the preparation of a European Constitution), these two processes represent two sides (one political, the other institutional) of the same coin. They in turn have a strong influence on relations with NATO and, in particular, the USA, relations which cooled to a certain degree during 2003 as a result of various disagreements relating to the increasingly unilateralist approach of the US Government, an issue already mentioned in other chapters.

Guidelines for a European Security Strategy proposed by J. Solana and approved by the Council of Europe on 12 December 2003

The **first section** of the document lists the **global challenges** (both new and old) which the EU must tackle (conflicts, poverty, epidemics, economic crises) and the principal **threats** to its security. The following threats are mentioned:

- (1) Terrorism, for which the EU is at the same time both a target and a base for operations;
- (2) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which represent «the most significant potential threat»
- (3) Regional conflicts that constantly reappear, particularly those affecting the Middle East and other more distant conflicts such as those in the Great Lakes, Africa and Kashmir, between India and Pakistan.
- (4) The decomposition of individual States (Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan)
- (5) Organised crime (arms-trafficking, drug-trafficking and illegal immigration)

The **second section**, establishes three objectives:

- (1) Tackle threats on three fronts: as was done following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (adoption of the European detention order, measures to combat the financing of terrorism and agreement on judicial cooperation with the USA), combating weapons proliferation (both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, particularly small arms), and promoting the resolution of regional conflicts, as well as contributing to the rehabilitation of States in a process of decomposition. In addition, the EU should tackle threats that appear to be more distant, and prevent the outbreak of new conflicts and threats, using all the means at its disposal: military, police, judicial, economic, humanitarian, diplomatic and civilian.
- (2) Create security in neighbouring countries, particularly the countries of the East and those bordering the Mediterranean. Priority areas are the Balkan countries and the southern Caucasus, along with the Middle East. The document also calls for greater commitment in relation to the Arab world as a whole.
- (3) Construct a stronger international society based on effective multilateralism and the strengthening of the United Nations. This requires more respect for international law, increasing membership of international institutions (such as the WTO), taking care of transatlantic relations (NATO), promoting good governance, supporting economic and social reforms, combating corruption, adopting trade and development policies and assisting countries that find themselves excluded to join the international community once again.

The **third section** of the document lists the political implications for the EU in pursuing these objectives:

- (1) The **EU must be more active**, meaning that it must be prepared to make rapid and robust interventions and to do this in several places at the same time, always in collaboration with the UN. It is also necessary for the EU to increase its preventive involvement with the aim of detecting serious situations before they deteriorate.
- (2) The **EU must develop its capacity** (provide itself with more resources, make better use of existing resources, use joint missions and shared powers, strengthen civilian and diplomatic powers, encourage the joint assessment of threats and increase the scope of its missions, supporting joint disarmament initiatives, assisting other countries in combating terrorism and contributing to the reform of the security sector), turning where necessary to permanent EU-NATO resources (Berlin plus).
- (3) The **EU must be more coherent** when bringing together the means and instruments at its disposal, as well as in the definition of the foreign activities of each of its different member States.
- (4) The **EU must cooperate with its partners**, and particularly with its strategic ally, the USA. The EU must also establish closer relations with Russia and promote strategic alliances with Japan, China, Canada and India.

The EU and the promotion of good governance, human rights and the rule of law

European institutions made significant progress in this regard. By way of example, some of the initiatives adopted are mentioned below.⁹⁴

Firstly, the European Commission promised 31 Million euros in 2003 to support 51 projects under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), chosen from among a total of 580 proposed projects. The recipient countries in Africa were Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Algeria and Tunisia; in the Middle East they were Israel

and Palestine; in Asia and the Pacific they were Cambodia, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Fiji; in America they were Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Haiti; and in Europe they were Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkev.⁹⁵

For its part, in June the Council adopted a Common Position on the International Criminal Court (ICC), in which it reinforced the organisation's commitment to support and respect international law.

Finally, in October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging an initiative for achieving a universal moratorium on the death penalty at the United Nations, asking the Italian Presidency to present this document to the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, several human rights organisations insisted that the EU should make use of its international recognition and exert pressure for a greater respect of human rights in the countries with which it has regular relations, such as Morocco and China.

The EU and crises

There were various meetings between the EU, the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe during the course of the year. These served to define a common strategy to be pursued in respect of international crises, particularly in terms of the training of experts.

The EU also carried out some of its own peace-keeping operations, with two military missions and two police missions. The two military missions were Concordia, in the FYR of Macedonia (between March and December) and Artemis, in DR Congo (between June and September), both led by the French. The two police missions were the mission in Bosnia (EUPM) and Proxima, in the FYR of Macedonia (from December). In general, the assessment of all these missions was positive, in the sense that they contributed to a stabilisation of the different contexts in which they were operational.

Turning to another of the crises in which some EU States were heavily implicated, it is interesting to recall the Eurobarometer of October, which referred to the EU's role in post-war Iraq. 58% of Europeans believed that management of the country's reconstruction should be left to the United Nations, 44% believed that this task should be supported and supervised by the provisional Iraqi Government and 25% believed this job should fall to the EU and its member States, while only 18% believed it should be left to the USA. As regards financing, 54% agreed that their countries should participate in the financing of reconstruction, while 45% did not.

Control of weapons proliferation and support for disarmament initiatives

In June, the EU adopted further measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, giving priority to the development of preventive measures in the political and diplomatic arena, such as the promotion of international agreements and the improvement of systems for the monitoring of exports. However, it left open the possibility of adopting sanctions, intercepting consignments and, where considered appropriate, using force, though always with the backing of the UN. By way of example, it is worth mentioning the common position adopted by the Council in November, the aim of which was to encourage the universal signing and ratification of the different international agreements relating to the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. This common position also called for the Treaty on the prohibition of all kinds of nuclear tests to come into force as soon as possible.

Elsewhere, the EU agreed at the end of the year to create a European weapons agency that would coordinate and optimize the efforts of member states in respect of military resources. The agency would be headed by the High Representative for Common Security and Defence Policy, and would have a managing council formed from the Defence Ministers from all countries wishing to participate. The agency's duties from 2004 would be to coordinate the weapons production, research, purchasing and export policies of the different member countries. The aim is to make member states' spending on defence more efficient (avoiding fragmentation and overlapping), and to provide the European industry with more competitiveness in this sector. The agency's launch, approved by the EU's Defence and Foreign Ministers in Brussels in November, was seen as the first step towards the creation of a real common security policy. Nevertheless, in spite of the agency's creation, the 15 member States continued to retain all their individual state powers, to which they would add the benefits represented by the shared dimensions offered within the framework of the agency. This meant that instead of rationalising costs and military production by introducing these community-based policies, such costs would rise with the addition of the communal dimension to their individual state commitments, resulting, in the end, in the existence of 15+1 defence policies.

As regards transparency and the control of arms exports, the Council presented its fifth annual report under operational provision 8 of the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Following the format of previous years, the Consolidated Report contains a review of the Code's implementation throughout the year. The most significant event during the year was the agreement by member states in June on a Common Position on the Control of Intermediaries, along with the establishment of a centralised database that would provide information on the refusal of export licences by individual governments.

As regards support for disarmament initiatives, the EU made significant commitments and took specific initiatives in respect of mine clearance and the control of small arms. Specifically, the Commission (which has allocated more than 200 million euros to mine clearance over the past ten years and at least 33 million euros to assist in the implementation of new mine clearance techniques) allocated 18 million euros in 2003 to mine clearance operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lao, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Sudan. As regards the control of small arms, community institutions and some member states continued to make progress in their compliance with the UN Action Programme of 2001 and the EU's Common Action of 2002, with specific acts such as the extension of their contribution to the programmes to combat the proliferation of small arms and small-calibre weapons in countries such as Cambodia.

The EU and humanitarian aid and development cooperation

The European Commission, acting through ECHO, allocated almost 900 million euros in 2003 to various humanitarian aid projects and programmes. Although Iraq was one of the main recipients of European aid, it was various African countries that received most resources in this regard, particularly places like DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and Somalia, or Tanzania, or larger regions such as South and West Africa, along with certain countries in Central Asia and the Pacific. A report on ECHO's work during 2002 was also presented. According to this report, ECHO spent 538 million euros in 2002 in more than 60 countries, benefiting some 40 million people. The Office intervened in areas of great humanitarian need, as well as in the so-called «forgotten crises» (Angola, Sudan, Northern Uganda and Sri Lanka), and carried out important work in support of the coordination of emergency aid, rehabilitation and development. The intervention areas defined in earlier years changed in 2002, as ECHO had a greater presence in Asia and Africa, to the detriment of the Balkans. The report also complained that the principles of humanity, impartiality and independence of action recognised under International Humanitarian Law were not being respected, a circumstance that was impeding the work of humanitarian aid agencies.

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Elsewhere, the European Commission supported a new regulation to promote gender equality in development cooperation policy. This included specific measures favouring women in the poorer countries. The measure will have a budget of 9 million euros for the period from 2004 to 2006. For its part, Sweden increased the average level of its public development aid from 0.81 to 0.87% in 2004, a gesture that will considerably help the EU to meet the undertakings it assumed at the Monterrey Summit in respect of financial aid for developing countries. By 2006, it will be allocating 0.39% of its GDP to this area, as opposed to the current level of 0.32. Finally, in October, the European Development Fund (EDF), which finances most of the EU's aid to the 77 countries associated with the Cotonou Agreement, approved the allocation of 250 million euros to support the peace-keeping operations being run by African countries. The EDF will also allocate 170 million euros to the World Fund to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. These two decisions were taken following a debate initiated by the French President, J. Chirac, surrounding the delay in managing the EDF's funds. This had caused France, the EU's largest contributor, to warn that it might withdraw from the EDF and manage its contributions itself.

Appendix X. European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

Approved by the Council of the European Union on 25 May 1998. The Council of the European Union,

BUILDING on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992,

RECOGNISING the special responsibility of arms exporting states,

DETERMINED to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency,

DETERMINED to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability,

WISHING within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports,

NOTING complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,

ACKNOWLEDGING the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort,

RECOGNISING that states have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter, have adopted the following Code of Conduct and operative provisions:

Criterion 1

Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations

An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

- a) the international obligations of member states and their commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes
- b) the international obligations of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- c) their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- d) their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel land mine.

Criterion 2

The respect of human rights in the country of final destination

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States will:

- a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.
- b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU;

For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes.

Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Criterion 3

The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts

Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

Criterion 4

Preservation of regional peace, security and stability

Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account inter alia:

- a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
- b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
- c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;
- d) the need not to affect regional stability adversely in any significant way.

Criterion 5

The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries

Member States will take into account:

- a) the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those of friends, allies and other member states, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
- b) the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or other member states:
- c) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

Criterion 6

The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law

Member States will take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

- a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
- c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

Criterion 7

The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or reexported under undesirable conditions

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:

- a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity;
- b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
- c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;
- d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).

Criterion 8

The compatibility of arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments

Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

Operative provisions

- 1. Each EU Member State will **assess** export licence applications for military equipment made to it on a **case-by-case** basis against the provisions of the Code of Conduct.
- 2. This Code will not infringe on the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies.
- 3. EU Member States will circulate through diplomatic channels details of licences refused in accordance with the Code of Conduct for military equipment together with an explanation of why the licence has been refused. The details to be notified are set out in the form of a draft pro-forma at Annex A. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it will first consult the Member State or States which issued the

denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it will notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any item of military equipment will remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the member state has refused to authorise the actual sale or physical export of the item of military equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

- 4. EU Member States will keep such **denials and consultations confidential** and not to use them for commercial advantage.
- 5. EU Member States will work for the **early adoption of a common list** of military equipment covered by the Code, based on similar national and international lists. Until then, the Code will operate on the basis of national control lists incorporating where appropriate elements from relevant international lists.
- 6. The **criteria in this Code** and the consultation procedure provided for by paragraph 3 of the operative provisions will also apply to **dual-use goods** as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP as amended, where there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.
- 7. In order to maximise the efficiency of this Code, EU Member States will work within the framework of the CFSP to **reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence** in the field of conventional arms exports.
- 8. Each EU Member State will circulate to other EU Partners in confidence an **annual report** on its defence exports and on its implementation of the Code. These reports will be discussed at an annual meeting held within the framework of the CFSP. The meeting will also review the operation of the Code, identify any improvements which need to be made and submit to the Council a consolidated report, based on contributions from Member States.
- 9. EU Member States will, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the situation of potential or actual recipients of arms exports from EU Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of the Code of Conduct.
- 10. It is recognised that Member States, where appropriate, may also **take into account the effect of proposed exports** on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the above criteria.
- 11. EU Member States will use their best endeavours to encourage other arms exporting States to subscribe to the principles of this Code of Conduct.
- 12. This Code of Conduct and the operative provisions will replace any previous elaboration of the 1991 and 1992 Common Criteria.

Appendix XI. The School of Peace Culture at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

The School of Peace Culture (*Escola de Cultura de Pau*) was formed in 1999, with the aim of organising different academic and research activities related to peace culture, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School is essentially financed by the Government of Catalonia, through its Department for Universities, Research and Information Society, and through its Foreign Relations Secretariat. It also receives support from other departments of the Catalan Government, as well as from local councils, foundations and other institutions. The School is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

The main activities of the School of Peace Culture are as follows:

- Diploma course in Peace Culture (230-hour post-graduate course with 70 places).
- Optional subjects «Peace culture and conflict management» and «Educating for peace and in conflicts».
- Initiatives for awareness and intervention in conflicts, to facilitate dialogue between the parties involved.
- Programme Colombia, dedicated to raising awareness of the peace initiatives in this country.
- Peace Education Programme. The team aims to promote and develop the values and capacity of Peace Education.
- The Disarmament Programme offers technical assistance for campaigns on small arms undertaken by NGOs as well as advice to international bodies.
- Alert Unit Programme on Conflicts, Peace and Human Rights. This programme carries out a daily monitoring of the international situation, particularly as regards conflicts and the human rights situation in all countries, the movement of displaced people and refugees, the peace processes currently underway, the stages of post-war rehabilitation and the dynamics of development, for the purposes of preparing this report, as well as quarterly bulletins and weekly reports.
- Peace Processes Programme works on the follow-up and analysis of countries under a peace process, countries engaged in formal negotiations and countries where axploring negotiations are in progress.
- Post-War Rehabilitation Programme works on the follow-up and analysis of humanitarian aid in terms of peace building in both a war and a post-war context.
- Human Rights Programme aims to promote a human rights culture by means of the analysis, promotion and defence of human rights at local and international level.

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