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Abstract:
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[ENG] The points raised by J. A. Fodor about carrying out scientific confirmation have special interest with respect to reasoning in scientific methodology. His investigation proposed that the conection between confirmation and basic interpretation is theoretical, it is about how the structure of scientific thought is exposed by means of our language. It is clear then, that such confirmation has to be establish after a careful examination of the data relevant to our thoughts. On the basis of determinated data he developes an interpretation that comes from the Quinean thesis with which the isotropic Quinean platform is specified. Following Fodor, the fixation of scientific thought by undemonstrative means present the afermentioned properties. It is well worth underlining the point such that it emphaisizes the modularity hypothesis made on the grounds of semantic proposals. But what is isotropism and Quineanism? One of the characteristic meanings of isotropism is that the data that one uses in the confirmation of scientific hypothesis can be encountered anywhere in the universe of empirical truths. This isn't a problem of interest for us. However, one cannot characterize Quineainism positively, without it being concerned with the criticism made by Quine of the role played by a priori (dis)conformation. Following Fodor, to reject a priori experimental observations, is a cut easily made which appears linked to the conventionalist arguments. The afermentioned cut is strongly critized on the basis of the difficulties of the analytic/ synthetic distinction that affect irrepariably the distinction between a priori and a posteriori truths. The problems mentioned have already been broached in the framework of individual thought fixation, it is well analysing it under this light. If the existence of a priori truths don't have the slightest scientific value, then, they are not methodologically justifiable, science cannot preceed the raising of hipothesis a priori. Despite this, hipothesis are corrected by our experiences and our empirical data. An example that reinforces this nouance is concerned with singular prediction as well as with inductive generalization. The first question -a key for our data- is concerned with the establishment of degrees of confirmation based on available empirical data and of the singular hipothesis that an individual fact even through not observed has a certain property. This is precisely to develope an inductive method suitable, that is to say a function of appropiate confirmation that one cannot provide with mere empirical data. |
Confirmación isotrópica-quineana reconsiderada